ORDER : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Affidavit-in-reply on behalf of respondent No.5 filed today in the Court is taken on record. 3. The present petition is a glaring example of unscrupulous litigant misusing the process of the Court. The petitioners herein (three in number), as per the statement in the writ petition are tenants of the property in question bearing old Survey No.125/P, 128/P, 131/P, 133,134, 135 of Mouje Saherkotada, Taluka: Dascroi, Sub-District Ahmedabad being T.P. Scheme No.16, Final Plot No.101. 4. In paragraph No. ‘3.2’ of the writ petition, it is contended that the portion of the land-in-question was given to one Nankram Sobhraj Mill, which was running the mill therein. The petitioners No.2 and 3 are stated to be in occupation of the land in question, namely in a way that the petitioner No.2 is running a tea stall and petitioner No.3 is doing a small canteen business. It is stated in the said paragraph that the petitioner No.1 had taken a portion of the aforesaid plots in the year 1949 and running the business in the name and style of Jaswant Iron and Textile Works. The original landlord, as per the contention in paragraph No.’3.3’ of the writ petition, was a trust, namely Chinubhai Ranchhodlal Baronetcy Trust Corporation. It is further stated that heirs of Chinubhai had started collecting rent from the respective tenants. In the year 2004, a proposal for acquisition of the land in question was made for establishment of headquarters of Gujarat Police force. The assertion in the writ petition is that the said proposal was made at the instance of the landlord. The copies of the communication dated 05.7.2004 and 14.02.2004 are appended with the writ petition to substantiate the said assertion. Various other communications have been appended in the writ petition to impress upon the Court that at some point of time, there was a proposal to drop the land acquisition proceedings. 5. Be that as it may, the land in question has been acquired vide Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published in the official gazette on 04.10.2010. As per the statement in the writ petition, publications in two daily newspapers of Section 4 Notification was made on 23.09.2010. 5. Be that as it may, the land in question has been acquired vide Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published in the official gazette on 04.10.2010. As per the statement in the writ petition, publications in two daily newspapers of Section 4 Notification was made on 23.09.2010. The copies of the communications of the years 2010-11 on the record have been placed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire proceedings of acquisition was made at the behest of the landlord and the competent authority had no intention to acquire the land in question. The Section 4 Notification, however, was published in the official gazette on 06.09.2011 and in the daily newspapers dated 09.09.2011. A public notice under Section 9 had been issued on 21.10.2011, as is reflected from the assertions made in the writ petition. The award dated 30.10.2013 had been passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The assertion in the writ petition that the award is time barred and the proceedings of land acquisition stood lapsed being hit by Section 11(A) of the Land Acquisition Act is, thus, repelled from the own assertions of the petitioner in the writ petition, for the proven fact of Section 6 Notification having been published within a period of one year from the date of the publication of Section 4 Notification. 6. The fact remains that without challenging the acquisition proceedings at any stage, the instant writ petition has been filed in the year 2014, seeking to challenge the award dated 30.10.2013 on the ground that the same is hit by Section 11(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.The relief has been sought in the writ petition in the following manner. “(A) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to admit and allow this petition and issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the award passed under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by respondent No.2 dated 30.10.2023 (ANNEXURE ‘Q’) as the same is hit by section 11A of the said Act. (B) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, holding that the entire proceeding is carried out in a irregular manner and in violation fot he circular dated 7.09.96(ANNEXURE-R), hence requires to be quashed and set-aside. (C) Pending admission hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to restrain the respondents herein from taking any further action in connection with the award dated 30.10.2023 (ANNEXURE’Q’) and further be pleased to restrain the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the land in question, as till date the possession has not been taken.” 7. On a pointed query made by the Court as to how and in what circumstances the writ petition can be entertained at the instance of a person, who himself admits that he is a tenant of the land in question. Moreover, it may be pertinent to note, at this juncture, that the claim of tenancy has been made only with respect to petitioner No.1. There is no assertion of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 being tenants of the land in question, having been duly inducted by the landlord. 8. In order to substantiate the submission that the tenant of a property in question would fall within the meaning of “persons interested”. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Sanyojan Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Ahmedabad vs. Surajben Wd/o. Of Govindbhai Prabhudas, 1985 (2) GLR 1340 as well as the decision of the Division Bench of the Andra Pradesh High Court in the case of Katari Satyanarayana Vs. District Collector, Kirshna at Machilipatnam, 1990 (2) ALT 447 . The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners being in occupation of the property in question, being lawful tenant, would fall within the meaning of “persons interested” and are entitled to seek for quashing of the award, which has become final with respect to the land in question. 9. We may further note that the original owner of the property in question, namely the landlord had not been impleaded in the writ petition, initially. 9. We may further note that the original owner of the property in question, namely the landlord had not been impleaded in the writ petition, initially. The impleadment of respondent No.5, the landlord of the premises in question, had been made only under the orders passed by this Court dated 31.08.2015 in Civil Application No.7792 of 2015. It is also relevant to note that at no point of time, the petitioners who claim to be “persons interested”, had submitted their objections to the acquisition at any stage of the proceedings. At no stage prior to the declaration of the award dated 30.10.2013, the petitioners had challenged the acquisition notification on any ground available to them. The assertions of learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no public purpose in the acquisition of the land in question, inasmuch as, the acquisition was made at the instance of the landlord who wanted to get rid of the tenants occupying the property in question, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. The submissions that the petitioners being the tenants of the property in question would fall within the meaning of “persons interested” and are entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings as a whole, therefore, is repelled at the threshold. 11. The fact remains that the challenge in the writ petition is to the award dated 30.11.2013 on the ground that the same has been lapsed for being in violation of Section 11(A) of the Act’1894, which arguments itself is repelled from the assertions made in the writ petition, which demonstrates that Section 6 of the Notification was published within the period of one year of publication of Section 4 of the Notification. 12. In any case, from the facts brought before us, it is more than evident that the petitioners have no right, title or interest in the land in question so as to maintain the instant writ petition to challenge the award on the ground that it has lapsed, more so, when the award was accepted by the original owner. The contention that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated at the instance of the landlord/land owner without any public purpose is devoid of any substance. 13. The contention that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated at the instance of the landlord/land owner without any public purpose is devoid of any substance. 13. We may further record that in a suit for eviction of the petitioners filed by the respondent No.5 landlord before the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad, namely HRP Suit No.1708 of 1998, eviction decree dated 31.03.2011 has been passed by the competent Court. It is brought before us by means of an affidavit filed in the Court today on behalf of respondent No.5 landlord that the challenge to the eviction decree made at the instance of the petitioners in Regular Civil Appeal No.57 of 2011 has been turned down vide judgment and order dated 23.11.2023. The petitioners herein, who were defendants in the said eviction suit had been directed to hand over the possession of the suit premises as per Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act. The decree for eviction in the suit instituted by the landlord in the year 1998 has, thus, been affirmed. In this view of the aforesaid as well, the petitioners have left no right, title or interest in the land in question and cannot be considered to fall within the meaning of “persons interested” so as to enable them to seek a writ for setting aside the award passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. All other arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on an earlier decree passed in the year 1973, appended with the rejoinder, therefore, are of no relevance. 14. The fact remains that by institution of the present writ petition in the year 2014, the petitioners have succeeded in stalling the process of disbursement of compensation under the award dated 13.10.2013 to which the original landlords were entitled to. 15. We further find that the petitioners No.2 and 3 have no right, title or interest in the land in question, they were never even inducted in the property in question as tenants. For the above discussion we have no hesitation in holding that the present petition is nothing but a misuse of the process of the Court. We, therefore, propose to dismiss the writ petition with an exemplary cost in order to deter such unscrupulous litigants to approach this Court. For the above discussion we have no hesitation in holding that the present petition is nothing but a misuse of the process of the Court. We, therefore, propose to dismiss the writ petition with an exemplary cost in order to deter such unscrupulous litigants to approach this Court. For the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed with cost of Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees One lakh only) which is to be deposited by the petitioners within a period of four weeks from today before the Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat. The cost deposited shall be handed over to the original owners, namely respondent No.5 herein on an application filed by the learned counsel for respondent No.5 before the Registrar General. Consequently, all connected Civil Applications stand disposed of, accordingly.