ORDER : 1. The present appeal from order is filed challenging the impugned order dated 05.02.2024 passed below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.186 of 2022, whereby, the trial Court has granted application below Exh.5 in part by directing the defendants not to create any further charge or transfer the property or by way of executing any sale deed or gift and during the pendency of the suit, the status quo should be maintained. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 For sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in their original status as plaintiff and defendants. The defendant no.5 Rama Filament Pvt. Ltd. sought Rs.150/- lakh term from the plaintiff and the same came to be approved on 9.9.1999. The respondent no. 4-Murli Manohar Goyal, Director, for exchange of collateral security, a letter dated 16.9.1999 was written and in it, Adajan Sub-District, Mouje Pal Village having Revenue Survey No.176, Block No.161 property is requested to be placed in security. The land which was to be given as security is the property of the father of the defendant no. 3 and therefore, it was necessary to obtain the permission of the Deputy Collector and therefore, Gangarambhai applied before the Deputy Collector as per Section 5 and 43 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 to mortgage this land and on the basis of such application of Gangarambhai, permission was granted by the Deputy Collector on 23.9.1999. Therefore, the sanctioned letter of the plaintiff was amended and accepted on 24.9.1999. By Gangarambhai on 17.9.1999, an affidavit was also given regarding the ownership of this land. On 17.09.1999, title clearance of the property also came into picture. Thereafter, by Gangarambhai, the defendant No.6 was given power of attorney and thereby, defendant No.6 on 23.09.1999 executed registered mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff and it was lastly numbered as 9244/2017. 2.2 After taking the loan, some amount was paid by the defendant no.5 and since the balance amount of the loan was not paid, the plaintiff proceeded under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act and the possession of the secured property was obtained on 10.12.2007 by way of Panchnama. 2.2 After taking the loan, some amount was paid by the defendant no.5 and since the balance amount of the loan was not paid, the plaintiff proceeded under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act and the possession of the secured property was obtained on 10.12.2007 by way of Panchnama. In the meantime, the father of defendant no.3 had passed away and respondent no.3 filed an RTI dated 29.04.2008 and in the application it was stated that the plaintiff- corporation has put up a board on its land, so to inform as to why the board is there. Even thereafter, the heirs of Gangarambhai have been in correspondence from time to time and the premises have been taken over by the plaintiff-corporation. It is alleged that the defendant no.1 to 3 in connivance with the other defendants, despite their knowledge, have falsely raised sale documents and acted to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff-corporation to recover public money. That the power of attorney in favour of the defendant- Vinod Goyal has been stated to be wrong but the document produced in that regard is only an opinion and that opinion is also formed after the death of Gangarambhai and in such circumstances, it is the case of the concerned party that at the present stage, it cannot be held that the power of attorney is wrong and Gangarambhai has himself sought permission to mortgage the land from the Collector during his lifetime. 2.3 The mortgage deed relied upon by the plaintiff is the mortgage deed executed by the defendant no.6 and Gangarambhai had not given any power of attorney and they have filed a criminal complaint regarding no signature of Gangarambhai in the power of attorney as per the mortgage deed and have been charged with the criminal proceedings and FSL report shows that signature is not of Gangarambhai and hence this document is void. The loan was sanctioned before the change of security by the plaintiff and the loan was sanctioned without any verification. Even in the mortgage deed, the signature of defendant no.6 is not done as a power of attorney of Gangarambhai. The loan was sanctioned before the change of security by the plaintiff and the loan was sanctioned without any verification. Even in the mortgage deed, the signature of defendant no.6 is not done as a power of attorney of Gangarambhai. Further, no care has been taken by the plaintiff till the year 2017 to get the mortgage deed executed properly and the plaintiff has not taken any steps to recover the loan amount and in a situation where the conduct of the plaintiff is under suspicion and the grantor of the mortgage deed in their favour has no authority to do so, it is averred that there is no case in favour of the plaintiff. It is the case of the defendant No.1 that he is a bona fide purchaser and he has sold this property to defendant no. 3. The sale documents have been marked as purchased and the allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint are not true. It is further the case that when the grantor of the mortgage deed in favor of the plaintiff has no power to mortgage the property, the plaintiff does not get any rights based on such document. 2.4 Thereafter, the present appeal from order is preferred by being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 05.02.2024 passed below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.186 of 2022, whereby, the Court has granted application below Exh.5 in part. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah for the appellant. He has drawn my attention towards the findings of the trial Court and also the pleadings of the parties, more particularly, plaint filed by the respondent-Gujarat State Financial Corporation. He has submitted that the reasoning given by the trial Court while deciding the application below Exh.5 is not in consonance with the provisions of law and are erroneous and the same is required to be interfered with. He has further submitted that the mortgage which is created by the power of attorney in favour of the respondent- corporation, prima facie, does not inspire any confidence as there is prevailing criminal proceedings, the charge-sheet is filed against the original-defendant Nos.4 to 6 and criminal proceedings are pending and as per the FSL report also, the power of attorney is opined to be false. He has further submitted that the appellant is holding the property by way of registered sale deed and his rights should not be jeopardized as the officers of the respondent-corporation have colluded with the other defendants. He has further submitted that findings of the trial Court that public money is required and therefore, the consideration of the case is made in favour of the plaintiff, is not proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, he has submitted that the Court below has failed to appreciate the material available on record, in accordance with law and therefore, the findings given by the trial Court while granting injunction are also erroneous and the same is required to be interfered with by exercising powers under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.). 4. I have considered the submissions made at the bar. I have also considered the fact that it is the case of the plaintiff before the trial Court that the loan amount is given to the defendant No.4, who in turn has created security and thereafter, the security is also changed by way of the property given in the security and permitted by the respondent-Corporation and accordingly, the property in question is mortgaged with the bank by way of registered mortgage deed. It also transpires that the mortgage deed is executed in the year 2008, possession of the land in question is also taken over by the original plaintiff-Corporation in the year 2008 but no action is taken by the concerned defendant No.3, though he was aware about the same. The Court below has also considered the aspect that there is registered mortgage deed as well as registered sale deed and also considered the aspect that the plaintiff is a Government undertaking and public money is involved and looking to the contentions raised by the parties and when two registered documents are available on the record, which are very difficult to decide on the count of validity and correctness of such documents at the stage of application below Exh.5, which can be considered after a full-fledged trial and the Court below has accordingly found that the contentions regarding the mortgage deed raised by the defendant is tested at the time of trial as issue regarding the same is triable issue. The Court below has also considered the aspects of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of the plaintiff and the Court has given cogent and convincing reasons in doing so. It is fruitful to consider the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 as well as Order 43 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., which read as under: “ORDER 39 RULES 1 AND 2: 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.— Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding] his creditors, [(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,] the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property 1 [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. —(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. ORDER 43 RULE 1: 1. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. ORDER 43 RULE 1: 1. Appeal from orders.- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely- (a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court [except where the procedure specified in rule 10A of Order VII has been followed]; (c) an order under rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (d) an order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex-parte. *** (f) an order under rule 21 of Order XI; *** (i) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; (ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of that Order is appealable. (k) an order under rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit; (l) an order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave; *** (n) an order under rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (na) an order under rule 5 or rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent persons: (p) orders in interpleader-suits under rule, rule 4 or rule 6 or Order XXXV; (q) an order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of Order XXXVIII; (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX; (s) an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order XL; (t) an order of refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to re- admit, or under rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal; (u) an order rule 23 [or rule 23A] of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court; (w) an order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review.” 5. Considering the impugned order in totality and considering the facts of the present case as well as the provisions of law, this Court is of the view that the view taken by the trial Court is prima facie found in consonance with law and also, it is possible view and therefore, at this stage, it is apt to consider the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp SCC 727, more particularly, para 14, which reads as under: “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. In Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [ (1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156 ] : (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 6. This Court is of the view that the discretion used by the trial Court is in judicious manner and therefore, no reason emerges to interfere with the findings given by the trial Court, which is otherwise, found in accordance with law and no serious error is committed by the trial Court while passing the order dated 05.02.2024 below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.186 of 2022 and therefore, the present appeal from order is required to be dismissed. 7. Accordingly, the present Appeal From Order is dismissed. 8. It is always open for the parties to make request before the concerned trial Court to expedite the suit proceedings, more particularly, keeping in mind the observations made in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh rendered in Criminal Appeal No.3589 of 2023. 8. It is always open for the parties to make request before the concerned trial Court to expedite the suit proceedings, more particularly, keeping in mind the observations made in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh rendered in Criminal Appeal No.3589 of 2023. If such application is preferred by either of the parties before the trial Court, the concerned trial Court may decide such application in accordance with law by keeping in mind the aspect about the other pendency before the concerned Court. 9. In view of dismissal of the main matter, connected civil application does not survive and the same stands disposed of accordingly.