JUDGMENT : B.S. BHANUMATHI, J. 1. This petition is filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 of C.P.C. against the order dated 01.05.2024 dismissing I.A. No. 252 of 2005 in O.S. No. 57 of 1998 on the file of the Court of Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Machilipatnam filed under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. by the revision petitioner/defendant to set aside the ex-parte decree dated 17.08.2004. 2. The suit is filed for partition by the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 against the sole defendant. After an ex-parte decree was passed on 17.08.2004, the defendant filed the petition in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 on 10.09.2004 stating that he could not appear before the Court on the days fixed due to his ill-health i.e. fever and high BP and engaged in the arrangements for the marriage of his son held on 18.08.2004. The petition was opposed by the respondents/plaintiffs by filing counter stating that the petitioner had full knowledge of the appointment of the Commissioner for recording evidence of PW-1 in cross-examination and that PW-1 is an old lady of more than eighty (80) years age and later PW-2 was examined in the Court and further that the petitioner had been given ample opportunity, but the petitioner had not availed the same and thus the trial Court had passed the ex-parte preliminary decree. Further, the respondents did not admit that the petitioner had suffered from ill-health and also busy in the arrangements for the marriage of his son. 3. After hearing the both parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition by observing that the learned counsel for the petitioner had received notice of execution of warrant for recording the evidence of the PW-1 twice on 27.07.2004 and 06.08.2004 and therefore the Commissioner had fixed another date i.e. on 09.08.2004 for recording the evidence of PW-1 and given another notice on 06.08.2004 in that regard, but having knowledge of the execution of the warrant, the petitioner had not appeared before the Commissioner on 09.08.2004 and in addition to that the learned counsel for the petitioner had filed a memo dated 12.08.2004 reporting he had no instructions from the petitioner. Therefore, the trail Court observed that these are the instances which show that the petitioner was not interested in the proceedings and wanted to drag on the proceedings by filing the present petition. 4. Therefore, the trail Court observed that these are the instances which show that the petitioner was not interested in the proceedings and wanted to drag on the proceedings by filing the present petition. 4. That apart, the trial Court observed that the reasons stated by the petitioner for non-prosecution of the matter are contradictory because, on one hand the petitioner stated that he was suffering from ill-health and on the other hand, he stated that he was busy in the arrangements for the marriage of his son. Since no medical record showing his ill-health was filed, the trial Court made a note of it, however regarding the marriage of the son of the petitioner held on 18.08.2004 which was evidenced by the wedding invitation filed before the Court, no adverse observation was made by the trial Court about the performance of the marriage, but observed that the previous dates fixed by the Commissioner for recording the cross-examination of PW-1 had not come in conflict with the date of the marriage of the son of the petitioner. The trial Court further noted that the petitioner was aware that his mother who died during the proceedings, being an old lady, was unable to appear before the Court and therefore the petitioner ought to have been vigilant and did not bother to give instructions to his counsel and as such he cannot seek to set aside the ex-parte decree. Finally, the trail Court found that the reasons stated by the petitioner are not sufficient to set aside the ex-parte decree. 5. Aggrieved by the order, this miscellaneous second appeal was filed. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner/defendant submitted that the day on which the ex-parte decree was passed is one day prior to the marriage of the son of the petitioner and therefore he could not appear on that day for a valid reason, but the trial Court failed to appreciate the same by considering the absence of the petitioner on the days prior to 17.08.2004. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in G.P. Srivastava vs. Shri R.K. Raizada and Others, AIR 2000 SC 1221 wherein the scope of the expression of ‘sufficient cause’ used under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was explained and suggested to be liberally construed to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to erring party and further that if sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex-parte proceeding was initiated against him, the party cannot be penalized for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs submitted that it is not only on the day when the decree was passed, on the previous dates, there was deliberate negligence of the petitioner for not instructing the counsel to complete the cross-examination of the witnesses without any sufficient reason, irrespective of whether there is any sufficient cause on 17.08.2004. She further submitted that the trial Court has rightly given valid reasons for dismissing the petition and no valid ground is made to interfere in the appeal. She further stated that the petitioner did not even get ready for disposal of the petition in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 which lead to further delay in passing the final decree and these subsequent developments throw light on the conduct of the petitioner which is justly appreciated by the trial Court for dismissing the petition. 8. When this Court enquired about the inordinate delay in disposal of this petition, it was represented that the petition in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 which was once dismissed for default due to boycott by the advocates and later restored vide I.A. No. 258 of 2012 and disposed of as per the directions of this High Court for early disposal. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the petitioner filed C.R.P. No. 1526 of 2019 for early disposal of I.A. No. 258 of 2012 in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 and thereafter the petition in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 was restored to file, heard and disposed of. Therefore, she submitted that there was no lapse on the part of the petitioner for the delay in disposal of I.A. No. 252 of 2005. 10. Therefore, she submitted that there was no lapse on the part of the petitioner for the delay in disposal of I.A. No. 252 of 2005. 10. In the case of G.P. Srivastava (supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows: “.........Under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. an ex-parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that earlier the summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause” is shown for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the date of hearing, the Court has no power to set aside an ex-parte decree. The words “was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing” must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13 has to be construed as elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have wide discretion in deciding the cause for non appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex-parte and cannot be stretched to reply upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for non appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex-parte proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where defendant approached the Court four, provided the absence was not malafied or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits.....” 11. In view of the above noted observations of the Supreme Court, it is rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that previous conduct in not instructing the counsel for cross-examination cannot be adversely viewed while examining the sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date when the ex-parte decree was passed. The fact that the marriage of the son of the petitioner was performed on 18.08.2004 is not disputed though a general denial was made and the trial Court also did not find it as a false statement. The fact that the marriage of the son of the petitioner was performed on 18.08.2004 is not disputed though a general denial was made and the trial Court also did not find it as a false statement. Therefore, a very valid reason is shown by the petitioner for nonappearance on 17.08.2004. Even on the previous dates also it is not just ill-health but the same reason was given in addition to the ill-health. It is not un-common that arrangements for the purpose of marriage of the children would need involvement of the parents. Even on the dates fixed by the Commissioner, the marriage of the petitioner’s son was not far off. That apart, the petitioner filed the petition within a month after passing the ex-parte decree. By the time of filing of the petition, though the 1st plaintiff was advanced in aged, she was alive. The date of death of the 1st petitioner is not known from the record. If she died subsequent to filing of the petition, the same cannot be taken into consideration while deciding the sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. Normally, when the petition under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. is filed without much delay, liberal approach would be adopted. Had the petition been disposed of within a short period, there could not be much hardship to the respondents/plaintiffs. It is not even mentioned in the order or shown to this Court that it is the petitioner who is responsible for the entire delay in disposing of the petition in the year 2024, deliberately to delay further proceedings in the suit for passing final decree. Under these circumstances, the subsequent delay for disposing of this petition cannot have bearing for the reasons shown by the petitioner to set aside the ex-parte decree passed against him. The trial Court was under the influence of the delay in disposing the present petition and also the fact that PW-1 died. Thus, the trial Court failed to appreciate the reasons shown for sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date when the ex-parte decree was passed. If at all, there is any inconvenience to the respondents, the trial Court ought to have imposed some terms as to costs, instead of dismissing the petition. Therefore, the order impugned in the appeal needs to be set aside. 12. In the result, appeal is allowed. If at all, there is any inconvenience to the respondents, the trial Court ought to have imposed some terms as to costs, instead of dismissing the petition. Therefore, the order impugned in the appeal needs to be set aside. 12. In the result, appeal is allowed. The order dated 01.05.2024 in I.A. No. 252 of 2005 in O.S. No. 57 of 1998 on the file of the Court of Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Machilipatnam is set aside and the said petition is allowed on the condition that the petitioner shall pay the contesting respondent i.e. respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) within ten (10) days from the date of receipt of copy of this order failing which the petition shall stand dismissed without any further order. In view of long pendency of the suit, the trial Court shall dispose of the suit within a period of three (03) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The petitioner shall also lead evidence quickly without any further delay and assist the Court in early disposal of the suit as directed by this Court. 13. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.