JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. This appeal has been preferred challenging the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed by the Special Judge for the Trial of Offences against Women and Children, Thalassery, in S.C.No. 591 of 2009. In the above case, the appellant herein was indicted for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 of the IPC. 2. Short facts: a) The appellant herein and his wife, Sindhu, were residing in House No. VIII/46 of Cherupuzha Panchayat for about 2 years prior to 28.7.2008, on which day, the incident which led to the death of Sindhu had taken place. Sindhu, in fact, was married to another man and she had two children in the said marriage. However, she got acquainted with the appellant and started residing with him after getting their marriage solemnised in a temple. The appellant was a mason by profession and Sindhu used to function as the Secretary of the Kudumbasree of the local unit. b) PWs 1 to 3 are nearby residents. PW1, a person by name Somanathan, was originally a resident of Ponkunnam, Kottayam, the same place where the appellant also hails from. Their acquaintance date back to the period when they used to reside at Ponkunnam. PW2-Varghese @ Varkey is a marriage broker. He is residing about 20 meters away from the house of the appellant. As he did not have an electric supply in his house, he used to go to the house of the appellant to charge his mobile phone. The wife of PW2 was having acquaintance with Sindhu. PW3-Rajan, on the other hand, is a Panchayat member and the Branch Secretary of the CPI(M). He was also having acquaintance with the appellant. c) The prosecution case is that on 29.7.2008 since Sindhu was not to be seen on that day, at about 5.30 p.m., the wife of Varghese asked him to enquire about the whereabouts of Sindhu to the appellant. Heeding her request, Varghese went to the house of the appellant and he was found standing outside. When he asked about Sindhu, the appellant gave vague answers. When Varghese insisted, the appellant responded by saying that if the presence of Somanathan is secured, he shall disclose everything. The appellant himself is alleged to have called PW1 using his mobile phone. Heeding her request, Varghese went to the house of the appellant and he was found standing outside. When he asked about Sindhu, the appellant gave vague answers. When Varghese insisted, the appellant responded by saying that if the presence of Somanathan is secured, he shall disclose everything. The appellant himself is alleged to have called PW1 using his mobile phone. When Somanathan came, the appellant told him that Sindhu had hanged herself to death and he pointed to the inside of his house. On hearing what the appellant said, Somanathan and Varghese decided to secure the presence of Rajan, who is a social worker. Some of them entered the house and found three cloth bags in the inside room and blood was found dripping from the same. They came out and enquired with the accused and then he is alleged to have made an extra-judicial confession to the effect that he had strangulated Sindhu using a cable wire and thereafter, cut her into pieces. On hearing the same, PW3 immediately called the Police Station, Peringom, and based on the information furnished by PW1, Crime No. 247 of 2008 was registered. 3. Investigation: PW19, the Circle Inspector of Payyannur, took over the investigation at 8:30 a.m. on 30.7.2008. He conducted the inquest. The accused who was being kept under surveillance at the Peringom Police Station was arrested at 2:00 p.m. on 30.7.2008. Based on the disclosure statement furnished by him, the cable, hacksaw blade, and a small sword were seized on the same day itself. He also identified the shop from where the accused purchased the hacksaw blade. After completing the investigation, the final report was laid before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Payyannur. 4. Initial Proceedings: After complying with the procedure, the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Payyannur committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thalassery, which court made over the case to the Special Judge for the Trial of Offences Against Women and Children, Thalassery. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. Evidence Tendered: The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 19 to prove its case. Exts.P1 to P23 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 26 were produced and identified. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. 5. Evidence Tendered: The prosecution examined PWs 1 to 19 to prove its case. Exts.P1 to P23 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 26 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought against him and maintained his innocence. He stated that he did not furnish Ext.P3(a) disclosure statement to the police nor did the police recover the weapons at his instance. He also denied that he had confessed to the commission of the crime to PWs 1 to 3. On finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., he was called upon to enter upon his defence. However, he did not choose to adduce any evidence. 6. Findings of the learned Sessions Judge: a) The learned Sessions Judge, after careful evaluation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had established that the accused had given the extrajudicial confession to PWs 1 to 3 that he had murdered Sindhu and had mutilated her. b) The evidence adduced by the prosecution to bring home the point that the accused reached home on the night of 28.7.2008 and that the accused and his wife were the only occupants of the house were found to be convincing. His failure to offer any explanation for the brutal murder of his wife committed in the confines of his home was held to be a strong circumstance against him. c) The recovery of MO20 cable wire which was used to strangulate the deceased, MO21 hacksaw blade used for sawing the body, and MO22 small sword for cutting up the body into pieces on the basis of the disclosure statement given by the accused was another clinching evidence linking the accused with the crime. 7. The sentence imposed: The appellant was convicted u/s. Section 201 IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- in default to undergo S.I. for six months. 7. The sentence imposed: The appellant was convicted u/s. Section 201 IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- in default to undergo S.I. for six months. He was also convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default to undergo S.I. for one year. 8. Contentions of the appellant: a) Sri. Dheerendra Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that there is no positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together by any of the witnesses. If that be the case, the theory of ‘last seen’, in the absence of any other positive evidence cannot be considered as an incriminating circumstance against the accused. To substantiate the legal principles, reliance is placed on the law laid down in Krishan Kumar v. State of Haryana, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1180]. b) In the case on hand, the prosecution had come up with a motive that the appellant and his wife used to quarrel with each other as the wife suspected the husband of infidelity. However, no positive evidence was adduced. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, when the prosecution comes out with a motive and the motive is either not proved or held to be insufficient, evidence of witnesses of the said fact has to be scrutinized with great care and caution. c) Extrajudicial confession made by the appellant to PWs 1 to 3 was considered as the very pillar of the prosecution case and the conviction was primarily founded on the same. Extrajudicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and only if the confession is proved to be voluntary and truthful can conviction be founded on the same. In the instant case, during the cross-examination of PW2, Ext.D2 contradiction was brought out wherein the assurance given by the said witness that he shall endeavor to save the appellant was brought out. According to the learned counsel, this aspect of the matter would bring out that it was based on an inducement made by PW2 that he shall save the accused that he was made to confess to the crime. To substantiate his contentions, the learned counsel has relied on Moorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [ AIR 2023 SC 3960 ]. According to the learned counsel, this aspect of the matter would bring out that it was based on an inducement made by PW2 that he shall save the accused that he was made to confess to the crime. To substantiate his contentions, the learned counsel has relied on Moorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [ AIR 2023 SC 3960 ]. d) In a case based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary for the courts to bear in mind that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. In the case on hand, it cannot be said that the facts established by the prosecution are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. e) It is pointed out by the learned counsel that though PWs 1 to 3, while being examined in the court, said that they know the accused, none of them have specifically identified the person standing in the dock as the person, who had given the extrajudicial confession to them. This is a serious mistake committed by the prosecution as well as the trial court. Though this Court in Mohammed v. State of Kerala, [ 2003 (1) KLJ 46 ] had issued guidelines, the same error is being repeated. 9. Submissions of the learned Senior Public Prosecutor: a) PWs 1 to 3 are immediate neighbours of the accused and he has no case that any of them are inimical towards him. They are persons with whom the accused was having acquaintance for years. Relying on Pawan Kumar Chourasia v. State of Bihar [2023 SCC OnLine SC 259], it is submitted that a conviction can be sustained on the basis of extrajudicial confession, provided that the confession is proved to be voluntary, truthful and free of inducement. There is no reason for PWs 1 to 3 to falsely implicate the appellant and in that view of the matter, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly relied on their evidence. It is further submitted that PW2 is a man aged 70 years working as a marriage broker and residing near to the house of the accused. He could not have given a reprieve to the accused even if he wished so. In that view of the matter, the contention of the appellant that the confession was not voluntarily made cannot be sustained. He could not have given a reprieve to the accused even if he wished so. In that view of the matter, the contention of the appellant that the confession was not voluntarily made cannot be sustained. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly relied on the extrajudicial confession made by the appellant to PWs 1 to 3. It is further submitted that immediately after the arrest of the appellant and based on his disclosure statement, the weapons which were allegedly used by the accused were seized from the store room attached to the kitchen and the said weapons revealed the presence of blood when subjected to forensic analysis. This is an additional aggravating circumstance against the accused. It is further submitted that the accused does not dispute that the deceased was not his wife. The body of his wife minced into pieces was found inside the house and the appellant has not provided any satisfactory explanation when he was examined before the court or while cross-examining the witnesses. The failure of the accused to provide a plausible explanation would be an additional circumstance to establish the gruesome act of murder was committed by him and him alone. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides. 11. Cause of death: It was on 29.07.2008 that the mutilated body of Sindhu was found packed in three bags inside the house of the appellant. The fact that the body was found in the house of the accused and that the appellant and Sindhu had been living in the said house has not been disputed. In order to prove the death of Sindhu and the manner in which she was killed, the prosecution relies on the evidence of PW9, the Professor of Forensic Medicine and Police Surgeon, Pariyaram Medical College. Ext.P7 is the postmortem certificate issued by him. He has noted four antemortem injuries and four postmortem injuries on the deceased. He has stated in his evidence that the death of the deceased had occurred due to ligature strangulation. Insofar as the postmortem injuries are concerned, the doctor has noted that the right upper limb and the left upper limb were amputated 7 cm below the tip of the shoulder. The humerus was found separated into two by neatly cutting 2/3rd of its thickness and then fracturing it. Insofar as the postmortem injuries are concerned, the doctor has noted that the right upper limb and the left upper limb were amputated 7 cm below the tip of the shoulder. The humerus was found separated into two by neatly cutting 2/3rd of its thickness and then fracturing it. In the same manner, the right lower limb and the left lower limb were amputated. The accused does not dispute the injuries nor has he a case that the injuries were sustained in a different manner. In that view of the matter, the case of the prosecution that Sindhu had died owing to the injuries inflicted by the accused is to be held as established. 12. The extra-judicial confession: a) The prosecution relies on the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 to bring home the guilt against the appellant. The foundation of the case of the prosecution is the extrajudicial confession made by the appellant to PWs 1 to 3. b) We shall deal with the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and thereafter deal with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel. c) PW1 stated that he had been residing at Prapayil, Cherupuzha, for almost two decades. Prior to that, he used to reside at Ponkunnam in Kottayam. He knows the accused as he has been residing at Prapayil for the past two years. Even before that, he is having acquaintance with the accused as he is originally from Ponkunnam. He stated that the appellant had fallen in love with Sindhu, who was earlier married and had two children in the said wedlock. According to him, after starting to reside at Prapayil, Sindhu used to suspect about the fidelity of her husband and they used to pick up quarrels. This was told to him by the appellant himself. About four years back, at about 6:30 p.m., the accused called him to his home. When he reached there, Varghese was standing with the appellant. The appellant told him in the presence of Varghese that his wife had hanged herself to death. Since the door was found closed, they did not enter. They called Rajan, who is a social worker, and thereafter, went to his house and informed the matter. They returned back to the house of the appellant. He stated that Rajan entered the house and found three cloth bags kept inside with blood dripping from them. Since the door was found closed, they did not enter. They called Rajan, who is a social worker, and thereafter, went to his house and informed the matter. They returned back to the house of the appellant. He stated that Rajan entered the house and found three cloth bags kept inside with blood dripping from them. When they enquired with the appellant, he is alleged to have stated that he picked up a quarrel with his wife at 10:00 p.m. on the previous day and thereafter, he used a cable wire to strangulate her. He also told them that he had cut and removed the upper and lower limbs of Sindhu. This was done to dispose of her dead body. He stated that on receiving the information, he approached the police and lodged the First Information. During cross-examination, Ext.D1 contradiction was brought out wherein, he denied his earlier version that he along with PW2 and PW3 had entered the home of the appellant. However, in re-examination, he turned around and admitted that he had given Ext.D1 portion to the police. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the version of PW1 is not consistent and his evidence cannot be regarded as credible. d) PW2, Varghese, is a marriage broker. He was aged about 70 years when he was examined in court. He stated that he is residing just about 20 meters away from the house of the appellant. As he has no electricity supply in his house, he used to go to the house of the appellant to get his mobile phone charged. On the day on which Sindhu was found dead, he went to the house of the appellant at about 6:30 a.m. When he went there, the appellant was standing on the doorsteps of the house. After about half an hour, he went to take back his phone, the appellant was still standing outside. When PW2 enquired about Sindhu, the appellant responded by saying that his wife had gone to Pariyaram for medical issues. He went to Cherupuzha and returned back at about 5:30 p.m. His wife requested him to enquire about Sindhu as she was not seen around. He then went to the house of the appellant and he was found standing outside. When the response of the accused was evasive, he insisted on knowing about Sindhu’s whereabouts. He went to Cherupuzha and returned back at about 5:30 p.m. His wife requested him to enquire about Sindhu as she was not seen around. He then went to the house of the appellant and he was found standing outside. When the response of the accused was evasive, he insisted on knowing about Sindhu’s whereabouts. The appellant then told him to get Somanathan and assured him that he would disclose everything. The appellant himself then called Somanathan over the phone and asked him to come. When PW1 came, the accused told him that Sindhu was no more. When PW1 probed further, the accused pointed to an inside room and said she was there. However, he did not enter. PW1 then called Rajan and they both went to the house of Rajan, which was quite nearby to get him. They all entered the house of the appellant. They found three cloth bags in the small room adjacent to the central hall. Blood was dripping from the same. They all came outside and asked what had happened. The accused divulged that on the previous day, he had strangulated Sindhu using a cable wire and cut the body into pieces to dispose of the same. They then intimated the incident to the police and the crime was registered. During cross-examination, PW2 denied his earlier statement to the effect that he persuaded the appellant to remain in the place by giving an assurance that he would save him. This portion was marked as Ext.D2. He emphatically denied that he had made any such statement to the police. It would be pertinent to note that the appellant has no case that the witness has any animosity towards him or that they had any reason to implicate him falsely. e) PW3 stated that he is an agriculturist. He is also the Branch Secretary of the CPIM and the local Panchayat Member. He is having close acquaintance with the accused. He stated that he was told about the death of Sindhu, by Somanathan at about 6:30 p.m. on the day she was found dead. Varghese was also with him. They told him that the appellant had informed them that his wife had committed suicide. The witness went along with PWs 1 and 2 to the house of the appellant. He was standing on the doorstep. They entered the house and found cloth bags dripping with blood. Varghese was also with him. They told him that the appellant had informed them that his wife had committed suicide. The witness went along with PWs 1 and 2 to the house of the appellant. He was standing on the doorstep. They entered the house and found cloth bags dripping with blood. When they enquired about the incident, the appellant is stated to have told them that he picked up a fight with his wife on the previous day and that he had strangulated his wife with a cable wire. He also stated the body was cut into pieces for the purpose of disposal of the same. In cross-examination, he stated that his house was situated about 500 meters away from the house of the appellant. He said that he was present when the inquest was prepared. Absolutely nothing was brought out in cross-examination to cause a dent in the evidence of PW3. f) On evaluating the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, what is discernible is that the appellant has no case that any of the witnesses had any reason to falsely implicate him. Varghese is the person who is staying very close to the house of the appellant. It has also come out from the evidence that Sindhu was very active as a worker of the Kudumbasree and she was having close acquaintance with the wife of Varghese. It was when Sindhu was not seen around the whole day that she persuaded her husband to enquire. The appellant does not dispute the assertion of Varghese that he had gone to his house of the appellant at 6:30 a.m. on the fateful day and that he had gone to take back his phone at 7:00 a.m., and all the while, the appellant was standing outside. Insofar as PW1 is concerned, he was originally from Ponkunnam, from where the appellant also hails. Obviously, the appellant was much closer to PW1 and it is for the said reason that he had secured the presence of PW1 when PW2 insisted that the whereabouts of Sindhu be disclosed to him. PW3 is also residing very close to the residence of the appellant. g) The evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession must be judged in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Extra-judicial confession, if voluntarily made and fully consistent with the circumstantial evidence, no doubt, establishes the guilt of the accused. PW3 is also residing very close to the residence of the appellant. g) The evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession must be judged in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Extra-judicial confession, if voluntarily made and fully consistent with the circumstantial evidence, no doubt, establishes the guilt of the accused. The extra-judicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. However, the extra-judicial confession cannot ipso facto be termed to be tainted. An extra-judicial confession, if made voluntarily and proved, can be relied upon by the courts. [See: S. Arul Raja v. State of T.N., [ (2010) 8 SCC 233 )] h) In Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2009) 11 SCC 262 ], it was observed as follows by the Apex Court in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment: “8. We shall first deal with the question regarding claim of extra-judicial confession. Though it is not necessary that the witness should speak the exact words but there cannot be vital and material difference. While dealing with a stand of extra-judicial confession, court has to satisfy [itself] that the same was voluntary and without any coercion and undue influence. Extra-judicial confession can form the basis of conviction if persons before whom it is stated to be made appear to be unbiased and not even remotely inimical to the accused. Where there is material to show animosity, court has to proceed cautiously and find out whether confession just like any other evidence depends on veracity of witness to whom it is made. It is not invariable that the court should not accept such evidence if actual words as claimed to have been spoken are not reproduced and the substance is given. It will depend on circumstance of the case. If substance itself is sufficient to prove culpability and there is no ambiguity about import of the statement made by the accused, evidence can be acted upon even though substance and not actual words have been stated. Human mind is not a tape recorder which records what has been spoken word by word. The witness should be able to say as nearly as possible actual words spoken by the accused. That would rule out possibility of erroneous interpretation of any ambiguous statement. Human mind is not a tape recorder which records what has been spoken word by word. The witness should be able to say as nearly as possible actual words spoken by the accused. That would rule out possibility of erroneous interpretation of any ambiguous statement. If word by word repetition of statement of the case is insisted upon, more often than not evidentiary value of extra-judicial confession has to be thrown out as unreliable and not useful. That cannot be a requirement in law. There can be some persons who have a good memory and may be able to repost exact words and there may be many who are possessed of normal memory and do so. It is for the court to judge credibility of the witness' capacity and thereafter to decide whether his or her evidence has to be accepted or not. If court believes witnesses before whom confession is made and is satisfied that confession was voluntary basing on such evidence, conviction can be founded. Such confession should be clear, specific and unambiguous.” i) It has been clarified by the Apex Court that it is not mandatory for a witness to reproduce the exact words of the confession, however, it needs to be ensured that there is no significant or material discrepancy. A duty is cast upon the court to ensure that the confession was made voluntarily, without coercion or undue influence. If the above conditions are complied with, then extra-judicial confessions can serve as the basis for conviction, provided the persons before whom the confession was made are impartial and are not having any animosity towards the accused. The Court dealing with a credible confession may not reject such evidence on the ground that the witness was not able to recall and state the exact words uttered by the accused while making the confession, as long as the substance is clear and sufficiently proves culpability. The focus is on the substance of the confession, not an exact repetition of the words used by the confessor. The court is also required to evaluate the ability of the witness to recall the confession accurately to avoid any misinterpretation on ambiguous statements. It is up to the court to assess the credibility of the witness and determine whether their evidence is reliable. The court is also required to evaluate the ability of the witness to recall the confession accurately to avoid any misinterpretation on ambiguous statements. It is up to the court to assess the credibility of the witness and determine whether their evidence is reliable. If, after a proper and careful evaluation, the court comes to a conclusion that the witnesses before whom the confession was made are credible and the confession was voluntary, and if the confession is clear, specific, and unambiguous, the Court can well act upon it and a conviction can be based on such evidence. However, if the accused is able to bring out that the witnesses who speak about the confession are persons nursing animosity towards him/her and they have a reason to falsely implicate him/her, then a duty is cast upon the Court to proceed with caution and carefully assess the credibility of the witness. j) PWs 1 to 3 are nearby residents and there is no case for the appellant that they are persons who are having animosity towards him. He has no case that he is not residing in the house along with his wife. He also does not dispute that the mutilated body of his wife was found in his house at about 6:30 p.m. by the witnesses on 28.07.2008. He does not even dispute the testimony of PW2, when he says that the appellant was standing outside the house when he went to charge his phone at 6:30 a.m., when he went to get back the phone after half an hour, and at 5:30 p.m. when he went to enquire about the whereabouts of his wife. Though some minor contradictions were brought out from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, it is trite that minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the case, are only to be ignored. Having carefully scrutinized the evidence of PWs 1 to 3, we are of the view that there is absolutely no reason for us to suspect the credibility of the evidence tendered by the witnesses. One circumstance pointed out by the learned Counsel concerns Ext. D2 contradiction brought out during cross-examination to the effect that an assurance was given that he would be saved if he were to remain there. One circumstance pointed out by the learned Counsel concerns Ext. D2 contradiction brought out during cross-examination to the effect that an assurance was given that he would be saved if he were to remain there. PW2 is a person aged 70 years and not a person with any sort of influence or the wherewithal to save the accused. As a person with no electricity supply in his house, he frequents the house of the accused to charge his mobile phone. As rightly submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor, the witness has emphatically denied that he had given such a statement, and even if he had stated so, it was only to ensure that the appellant did not make good his escape after making the confession. Having evaluated the submissions, we are of the view that the voluntariness of the confession made will not be adversely affected by Ext. D2. 13. Whether the failure of the appellant to offer an explanation provides an additional link: a) The appellant does not dispute Ext.P9 Marriage Certificate, evidencing the marriage between himself and Sindhu. He also does not dispute the evidence of PW12, Special Grade Panchayat Secretary, and Ext.P10 certificate produced by him, which reveals that the house in which the body of Sindhu was found is owned by the appellant herein. An evaluation of the evidence of PW9, the Doctor who conducted the autopsy, the death of Sindhu could have occurred between 18 to 36 hours prior to the postmortem. In other words, she would have been killed and mutilated after midnight on 28.07.2008 and before the sun rose on 29.07.2008. PW6 is a neighbor of the appellant and he stated that he used to usually go to the house of the accused to watch television. He stated that on the previous day of the incident, he and his mother had gone to the house of the appellant and had watched a movie. In his evidence, he stated that he was in the house till 8:30 - 9:00 p.m. However, he resiled from his earlier version that while he was in the house, the appellant had come home at about 9:30 p.m. and that he and Sindhu had an altercation. That portion was marked as Ext.P4. PW7 is the mother of PW6. In his evidence, he stated that he was in the house till 8:30 - 9:00 p.m. However, he resiled from his earlier version that while he was in the house, the appellant had come home at about 9:30 p.m. and that he and Sindhu had an altercation. That portion was marked as Ext.P4. PW7 is the mother of PW6. She also stated that she had gone to the house of the appellant on the day prior to the day on which Sindhu was found dead. Though in chief examination she stated that she left the house of the appellant, only when he had come back home, she later stated that the said statement made by her was a mistake. However, on the next day morning at 6:30 a.m., the accused was found standing on the doorsteps by PW2. The appellant has no case that he had not reached his home on the previous day or that he was out of station. Another witness of some importance is PW10, who stated that while returning back to her house after work, she saw smoke coming out from the house of the accused. When she enquired from outside as to whether Sindhu was at home, she heard a male voice saying that Sindhu had gone to Kamballoor. However, the said witness did not state that the voice was that of the appellant. The murder of Sindhu, the wife of the appellant had taken place in the confines of his house. When he was found standing outside at 6.30 am on 29.07.2008, the mutilated remains of Sindhu were lying in the room adjacent to the main hall. The blood was also dripping from the three sacks. He has no justification as to why he stood outside guarding the building from 6.30 a.m. and failed to mention about the sordid scene inside his house to any person of authority or his neighbours. In cases where a murder is committed in secrecy within a house, the initial burden to prove the case would of course lie with the prosecution. However, the burden upon the prosecution is lighter than in cases wherein the prosecution rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding obligation on the part of the accused to provide a reasonable explanation to justify his action or inaction. However, the burden upon the prosecution is lighter than in cases wherein the prosecution rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding obligation on the part of the accused to provide a reasonable explanation to justify his action or inaction. He cannot choose to remain silent, leaving the entire burden on the prosecution without any obligation on his part to offer an explanation. b) In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , in quite similar circumstances, the Apex Court has reiterated the position by expatiating as under: 14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence is insisted upon by the courts. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. xxxxx xxxxxxx c) The question of burden of proof where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused was examined in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors., [ (2000) 8 SCC 382 ]. The facts of the case were that the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased, one Mahesh from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night. The next day in the morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to 10 years' RI. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for murder charge. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by them. The learned Sessions Judge after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital and had concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. The Apex Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports: (SCC p. 392) 31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof on the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court while maintaining the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC reversed the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and convicted the accused under the said provision and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. d) In Ram Gulam Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, [ (2001) 8 SCC 311 ], the accused after brutally assaulting a boy carried him away and thereafter the boy was not seen alive nor his body was found. The accused, however, offered no explanation as to what they did after they took away the boy. It was held that for the absence of any explanation from the side of the accused about the boy, there was every justification for drawing an inference that they had murdered the boy. It was further observed that even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the court to draw a different inference. e) In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eyewitness account is available, there is another principle of law that must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of T.N. v. Rajendran, [ (1999) 8 SCC 679 ]; State of U.P. v. Dr. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of T.N. v. Rajendran, [ (1999) 8 SCC 679 ]; State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, [ (1992) 3 SCC 300 ]; State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, [ (2000) 1 SCC 471 ]; Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan, [ (2002) 1 SCC 731 ] and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. [ (1995) 3 SCC 574 ] f) In Nika Ram v. State of H.P. [ (1972) 2 SCC 80 ], it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with “khukhri” and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, [ (1992) 3 SCC 106 ], the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of the murder of his wife. g) In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, [ (1992) 3 SCC 300 , the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicting him under Section 302 IPC. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicting him under Section 302 IPC. h) In State of T.N. v. Rajendran, [ (1999) 8 SCC 679 , the wife was found dead in a hut that had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime. i) Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that the offence had taken place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for the commission of the crime. In the case on hand, the accused has failed to offer any explanation whatsoever. 14. Recovery of the weapons : The next circumstance is the recovery of MO20 to MO22 from the house wherein the appellant was residing with Sindhu. PW19 in his evidence stated that when the accused was questioned, he had stated that the cable wire, hacksaw blade, and the small cutting knife were concealed by him on the western side of the kitchen, and based on his statement the weapons and the wire were recovered from among the firewood. The prosecution had also examined PW19, the owner of the shop from where the accused had purchased the hacksaw blade. MO26 hacksaw blade was also seized by PW19 in the course of the investigation from the window sill of the house. The prosecution had also examined PW19, the owner of the shop from where the accused had purchased the hacksaw blade. MO26 hacksaw blade was also seized by PW19 in the course of the investigation from the window sill of the house. PW5 is the attestor to the recovery mahazar. We are of the view that the recovery of weapons at the instance of the accused is yet another circumstance linking him with the commission of the crime. 15. Motive: One of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is the apparent failure of the prosecution to prove any motive. His contention is that the witnesses who were cited to prove that the accused had quarrelled with Sindhu had not supported the case of the prosecution. As held in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80], motive if proved would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal, [ (2008) 16 SCC 73 ], the Apex Court examined the importance of motive in cases of circumstantial evidence and observed that motive is a thing which is primarily known to the accused themselves and it is not possible for the prosecution to explain what actually promoted or excited them to commit the particular crime. The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the failure of the prosecution to prove a strong motive would not help the accused. 16. Discrepancy with regard to blood grouping: One of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel is with regard to the discrepancy in the grouping of blood. From Ext.P7 postmortem certificate, the blood group of the deceased is noted as ‘O’ Group. However, PW17, the Assistant Chemical Examiner noted blood belonging to ‘AB’ group in the clothes which were marked as MO3, MO4 and MO12. The learned Sessions Judge noted that the clothes seized as per Ext.P2 inquest report on 30.7.2008 were analysed only on 24.3.2009. From Ext.P7 postmortem certificate, the blood group of the deceased is noted as ‘O’ Group. However, PW17, the Assistant Chemical Examiner noted blood belonging to ‘AB’ group in the clothes which were marked as MO3, MO4 and MO12. The learned Sessions Judge noted that the clothes seized as per Ext.P2 inquest report on 30.7.2008 were analysed only on 24.3.2009. The clothes were dripping in blood and it was kept bundled till the date of analysis. PW17 had stated before court that long delay and bacterial infection may lead to change in the blood group. We do not think that the discrepancy in the blood grouping would affect the core of the prosecution case. 17. Conclusion: After evaluating the entire material, we are of the view that the facts established are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. We have no doubt in our mind that there is a chain of evidence so far consistent and complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the appellant and it must be such as to show that in all probability the act must have been done by the accused and the accused alone. In that view of the matter, we hold that the judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge finding the appellant guilty for the offence under Sections 201 and 302 of the IPC does not warrant any interference. This appeal will stand dismissed confirming the judgment, conviction, and sentence.

Jayan @ Jayakumar v. State Of Kerala Represented By Public Prosecutor