JUDGMENT : Bandaru Syamsunder, J. The plaintiff in OS.No.135 of 1998 on the file of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam is the appellant. The respondent is the defendant in the suit. 2. Originally, the suit was filed by the appellant, represented by her General Power of Attorney Holder for declaration of her title to the suit schedule property, for eviction of the defendant, and for future profits and costs. 3. The appellant and the respondent hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and defendant as arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendant, stating that she is the absolute owner of 315 square yards of site, situated in Marripalem village, covered by Patta No.284 in RS No.90/4 of Visakhapatnam District. The plaintiff submits that a total extent of 464 square yards, part of which is the schedule property was purchased by her from one Mr.P.Venkata Rao under original of Ex.A9/registered sale deed, dated 10.03.1981 along with thatched house therein, and the plaintiff took possession of the property from her vendor, and she was in continuous enjoyment and possession of the property till June, 1997. It is the contention of the plaintiff that her vendor Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife Smt P.Mahalakshmi purchased 920 square yards of site each from one Mr.M.Jagannadha Swamy and Mr.Sudarshana Swamy through two separate sale deeds (Exs.A1 and A2) on 14.06.1974 and in total they purchased 1840 square yards of site under two registered sale deeds, which is in RS No.90/4 of Marripalem village. The plaintiff submits that said Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife died issueless and Smt P.Mahalakshmi died in or about the year 1977, and after the death of his wife, her property was devolved on her husband Mr.P.Venkata Rao and during his life time he sold different extent of site to different persons, and in total Mr.P.Venkata Rao sold 2007 square yards, which is 167 square yards more than what was really possessed by him and his wife Smt P.Mahalakshmi. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that she filed OS No.75 of 1987 on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam for declaration of her title to the property purchased by her from Mr.P.Venkata Rao under original of Ex.A9/sale deed for the site to an extent of 464 square yards, wherein the Court passed decree in her favour, declaring her right to the site to an extent of 315 square yards only, out of total extent of 464 square yards, which Judgment became final. The plaintiff has stated that the defendant has filed OS No.242 of 1991 on the file of III Additional Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam against her and her brother Mr.Durga Prasad, seeking permanent injunction on the basis of their alleged right and possession, on the ground that she said to be purchased the site from one Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman, under registered sale deed, dated 22.01.1985, on the ground that said Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman is said to be the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao, who is the vendor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submits that the defendant said to be purchased to an extent of 563 square yards from said Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman, wherein the boundaries of the site have been shown, which are same as to the present suit schedule land, which is purchased by her under original of Ex.A9/sale deed from one Mr.P.Venkata Rao. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that she contested the suit filed by the defendant for permanent injunction, wherein she stated that Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman is not the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao and even if he is the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao, who left nothing to sell the site, as he sold excess site than he had during his life time, but the said suit was decreed in favour of the defendant on 04.03.1997, against which the plaintiff said to be preferred an appeal in AS No.177 of 1997 on the file of V Additional District Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam, which was said to be pending on the date of filing of the plaint. It is stated by the plaintiff that the defendant filed IA No.1001 of 1992 in OS No.242 of 1991, seeking for temporary injunction, which was dismissed on merits, and an appeal was preferred by her was also dismissed, but taking advantage of decree passed in a suit for injunction on 04.03.1997, the defendant occupied the suit property for a few months before filing of the present suit with the aid of police. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant has no right, title or interest or lawful possession over the suit schedule property or her vendor himself did not have any right, title, interest or possession over the property and much less on the date of alleged execution of sale deed (Ex.B3), but the said document is created without any valid title, which is not binding on her, who is the purchaser of the property from original vendor, even prior to purchase of property by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant trespassed into the suit schedule property after passing of a decree in OS No.242 of 1991, wherein she put temporary constructions therein and her possession was never adverse to her, due to that the plaintiff filed suit for declaration of her title and for recovery of possession. 5. The defendant filed written statement, resisting the claim of the plaintiff. It is the contention of the defendant that she purchased the property from the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao by name Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman, which is site to an extent of 563 square yards under Ex.B3/sale deed, and she has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property. As the plaintiff and her brother were tried to interfere her possession, she filed OS No.242 of 1991 on the file of III Additional Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Visakhapatnam, seeking for permanent injunction, which was decreed after due contest, against which the plaintiff filed AS No.177 of 1997, which was also dismissed, and she has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and she also perfected her right by adverse possession, and she never forcibly entered into the plaint schedule property. She prays to dismiss the suit. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues: 1. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and vacant possession of the suit schedule property? 2. She prays to dismiss the suit. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues: 1. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and vacant possession of the suit schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for further profits of Rs.1,000/- per month? 3. Whether the defendant perfected title by adverse possession? 4. To what relief”? 7. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiff, PW.1 to PW.3 were examined, and Exs.A1 to A12 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, DW.1 and DW.2 were examined, and Exs.B1 to B7 were marked. 8. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff, and observed that the plaintiff failed to prove her title in respect of plaint schedule property, and the defendant also perfected her title by adverse possession. 9. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff presented AS.No.230 of 2006 on the file of II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, which was also dismissed by the First Appellate Court, confirming the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court. 10. In these circumstances, the present Second Appeal is presented. 11. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellant Mr.S.Madhava Rao as well as learned Counsel for the respondent Mr.T.V.Jaggi Reddy. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that the plaintiff purchased plaint schedule site from original owner, which is prior to alleged purchase of site by the defendant in the year 1985. He would further submit that the vendor of the defendant said to be the adopted son of vendor of the plaintiff and his wife, but admittedly he was more than 15 years on the date of Ex.B2/Adoption Deed, dated 29.10.1971, due to that it is not a valid adoption and he cannot claim to be adopted son of vendor of the plaintiff. He argued that the vendor of the plaintiff has already sold more extent of site than they purchased under original of Ex.A12, due to that nothing is left to sell by the alleged adopted son to the defendant under Ex.B3/sale deed, which is created to knock away the property. He argued that the vendor of the plaintiff has already sold more extent of site than they purchased under original of Ex.A12, due to that nothing is left to sell by the alleged adopted son to the defendant under Ex.B3/sale deed, which is created to knock away the property. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff filed OS No.75 of 1987, seeking for declaration of her title and for injunction, which suit was decreed against the vendor of the plaintiff for the site to an extent of 315 square yards, which Judgment has become final, which is also binding on the defendant, who cannot claim better title than her vendor had. He further argued that the defendant filed suit for injunction simplicitor, against the plaintiff and her brother mentioning the same boundaries as stated in the present suit schedule, which suit was erroneously decreed by the trial Court, and confirmed by the Appellate Court, but as per observation of the trial Court in OS No.242 of 1991, the plaintiff filed suit for declaration of her title and recovery of possession, as possession obtained by the defendant by force after decreeing OS No.242 of 1991 in the year 1997. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the alleged adoption of vendor of the defendant by vendor of the plaintiff is not proved and even the said adoption is not valid one, in view of Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. He argued that the defendant also pleaded that she perfected title by an adverse possession and when she said to be purchased the property under original of Ex.B3/sale deed, which plea is not tenable and there is no pleading and evidence with regard to alleged adoption in the written statement filed by the defendant. He argued that the defendant also pleaded that she perfected title by an adverse possession and when she said to be purchased the property under original of Ex.B3/sale deed, which plea is not tenable and there is no pleading and evidence with regard to alleged adoption in the written statement filed by the defendant. He further submits that though there was a discussion in OS No.242 of 1991 with regard to adoption of Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman, the vendor of the defendant, there was no issue with regard to validity of adoption and the finding with regard to adoption in the said suit filed by the defendant for injunction simplicitor is not operates as ‘res judicata’ in the present suit, when admittedly the suit filed by the plaintiff against the vendor of the defendant, seeking for declaration, which was not contested by him, and decreed which became final. He argued that there is no custom in the family of vendor of the plaintiff adopting of child more than 15 years, due to that the precedent law relied on by the First Appellate Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case, due to that the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court by following the said precedent law with regard to adoption cannot be sustained. He relied on following precedent law: 1) Bhimashya and others. Appellants. vs. Janabi (Smt) Alias Janawwa. (2006) 13 SCC 627, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court explained proof of custom for adopting child more than 15 years, and held that there must be specific plea to adopt child in the pleadings with regard to custom to adopt child more than 15 years and in the absence of which it cannot be considered. 2) The State of A.P. vs. Manthena Pullamraju. 1980 (1) APLJ (HC) 356, wherein it is discussed adoption of child more than 15 years in Kshatriyas community and held that there is a custom or usage to adopt a boy or girl aged more than 15 years in Kshatriyas community in Andhra Pradesh, for which a lot of oral and documentary evidence has been adduced showing instances of such adoption, and held that adoption of boy more than 15 years belongs to Kshatriyas community is valid. 3.Sri Lakhi Baruah and others. Appellants vs. Sri Padma Kanta Kalita and others. Respondents. 3.Sri Lakhi Baruah and others. Appellants vs. Sri Padma Kanta Kalita and others. Respondents. AIR 1996 SC 1253 , wherein it is held that presumption under Section 90 does not apply to a copy or a certified copy even though thirty years old, but if a foundation is laid for the admission of secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act by proof of loss of destruction of the original and the copy which is thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature authenticating the copy may under Section 90 be presumed to be genuine. He prays to allow the Appeal. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that two house sites have been purchased by Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife under original of Exs.A1 and A2, and the original sale deed of wife of Mr.P.Venkata Rao is with the defendant, which he purchased and marked as Ex.B4. He would further submit that the vendor of the defendant is the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife, as he was adopted by them in the year 1970 and entered into Adoption Deed in the year 1971, due to that as per Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, when the adoption is reduced into writing and registered one, it is presumed that there is a valid adoption, which cannot be denied by the plaintiff. He further submits that vendor of the plaintiff had no right to sell the entire property purchased by himself and his wife, wherein the adopted son is also having equal share and admittedly the plaint schedule property was the property, which purchased by the wife of Mr.P.Venkata Rao, who is adopted mother of vendor of the defendant, due to that vendor of plaintiff has no right to sell the property, which fell to the share of adopted son, which also stated in Ex.B3/sale deed. He argued that in OS No.75 of 1987 though the plaintiff has shown vendor of the defendant as one of the defendants, by that time he already sold plaint schedule property to the defendant, but the plaintiff has not added the defendant as a party to the said suit, due to that both Courts have rightly held that Judgment and Decree in the said suit are not binding on the defendant. He further argued that in Ex.B2/Adoption Deed, the age of vendor of the defendant who is the adopted son is not mentioned, and it is nowhere stated in the plaint that adoption of vendor of the defendant is not valid. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that in OS No.242 of 1991 filed by the defendant, seeking for permanent injunction against the plaintiff and her brother, the adoption of vendor of the defendant was upheld, which was confirmed in the Appellate Court, which decision is binding on the plaintiff, due to that again she cannot agitate the validity of the adoption in the present suit. He argued that though no issue is framed with regard to the adoption and when parties adduced evidence and also pleaded that there was adoption, which was upheld in a suit for permanent injunction between the same parties in respect of same schedule property and the said decision is binding on the plaintiff, which she cannot re-agitate in the present suit. He prays to dismiss the Appeal. 14. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law, which raised at Ground No.10 (ii) of memorandum of appeal, which reads as under: ii)“Whether the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit for declaration while giving a finding that the adoption of the respondent’s vendor is already decided by the competent Civil Court in OS No.242 of 1991 and need not be again adjudicated, without considering the applicability of the very same res judicata of a decision on the point of title in favour of the appellant herein against the respondent’s vendor in OS No.75 of 1987 by the Civil Court, the appellant herein is the owner of the suit schedule property”? 15. As per Section 100 of CPC, this Court can interfere with the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case involves a substantial question of law. A finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court is binding on this Court, unless there is any error of law in such finding. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) Through LRs. A finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court is binding on this Court, unless there is any error of law in such finding. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased) Through LRs. And Others – Appellants vs. Saraswati and Others – Respondent(s) in Civil Appeal No.NIL of 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8736 of 2016) Judgment dated 22.09.2022, explained the scope of Section 100 of CPC and laid down the principles relating to Section 100 of CPC at Para No.33 of the Judgment, which reads as under: "33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in constructing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (Emphasis supplied) (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which effects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence," it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 17. Both Courts gave concurrent findings that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek declaratory title in respect of plaint schedule property against the defendant, and the defendant also perfected title by an adverse possession. It is admitted fact that originally plaint schedule property and other properties were purchased by Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife Smt P.Mahalakshmi under two separate registered sale deeds, and copies of the same marked as Exs.A1 and A2, wherein they purchased site to an extent of 920 square yards each. It is also not in dispute that Mr.P.Venkata Rao sold the property to different persons under original of Exs.A3 to A8, and likewise sold plaint schedule property to the plaintiff under original of Ex.A9 on 10.03.1981. The contention of the plaintiff is that she purchased the property from Mr.P.Venkata Rao, who succeeded the plaint schedule property after the death of his wife, due to that he has right to sell the property and even he sold the property more than they purchased, under Exs.A1 and A2/sale deeds. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that nothing is left over by Mr.P.Venkata Rao to sell the property by the alleged adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao to the defendant. 18. The contention of the defendant is that Mr.P.Venkata Rao alone has no right to sell the plaint schedule property, which property purchased by Smt P.Mahalakshmi, under original of Ex.A2/sale deed, which fell to the share of the adopted son, as there was valid registered Adoption Deed in favour of her vendor. 18. The contention of the defendant is that Mr.P.Venkata Rao alone has no right to sell the plaint schedule property, which property purchased by Smt P.Mahalakshmi, under original of Ex.A2/sale deed, which fell to the share of the adopted son, as there was valid registered Adoption Deed in favour of her vendor. A perusal of plaint filed by the plaintiff, which shows that in previous litigation between the parties in a suit filed by the defendant, seeking for permanent injunction against the plaintiff and another, they pleaded that as Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman is not the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao and that even if he is the adopted son, he has nothing left to sell as said Mr.P.Venkata Rao sold excess site than what he actually had even during his life time. A perusal of Ex.B7/certified copy of Judgment in OS No.242 of 1991 filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and another, seeking for permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property, wherein it is categorically held that the vendor of the defendant is the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife, as he also signed as an attestor in the sale deed executed by Mr.P.Venkata Rao in favour of third parties as adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao, and it is also held in the said suit that there is ample evidence to show that Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman is the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao. Though, there is no issue framed with regard to validity of adoption of vendor of the defendant in OS No.242 of 1991 in view of pleadings of both parties, in respect of same schedule property, there is a finding in favour of the defendant with regard to adoption. Section 11 of CPC, which reads as under: “11.Res judicata:- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. 19. So, the principles of res judicata apply when the lis is inter parties in respect of same property, which attained finality of the issues involved. 19. So, the principles of res judicata apply when the lis is inter parties in respect of same property, which attained finality of the issues involved. In the present case, the defendant as plaintiff in OS No.242 of 1991 has stated that her vendor is the adopted son of Smt P.Mahalakshmi and Mr.P.Venkata Rao, who sold the plaint schedule property to her, which denied by the plaintiff as per her own pleadings in the present suit, due to that in OS No.242 of 1991 though the suit is filed for injunction simplicitor, wherein there is a finding with regard to validity of adoption of vendor of the defendant, which decided by competent Civil Court, against which an appeal was also preferred by the plaintiff, which was dismissed, which reached finality. 20. The contention of the plaintiff is that she obtained declaratory decree against vendor of the defendant and others in OS No.75 of 1987, which copy of the same filed and marked as Ex.A11. A perusal of Ex.A11, which shows that vendor of the defendant, not contested the suit, and the said suit is filed against 8 persons, out of which only defendant No.3 alone contested the suit. Even, on the date of filing of OS No.75 of 1987, the vendor of the defendant already sold the plaint schedule property to the defendant, under Ex.B3/sale deed, dated 22.01.1985. Therefore, the vendor of the defendant had no interest to deny the title of the plaintiff in the said suit on the date of filing of the suit in the year 1987, which property he already sold to the defendant, whom the plaintiff failed to add as one of the defendants in the present suit. 21. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff has not stated in her written statement filed in OS No.242 of 1991 with regard to obtaining declaratory decree against the vendor of the defendant in OS No.75 of 1987, which rightly observed by both Courts. Even otherwise, the contention of the plaintiff is that the adoption of vendor of the defendant is not valid, as he was admittedly more than 15 years on the date of original of Ex.B2/Adoption Deed, dated 29.10.1971, due to that vendor of the defendant had no right to sell the property to the defendant. Even otherwise, the contention of the plaintiff is that the adoption of vendor of the defendant is not valid, as he was admittedly more than 15 years on the date of original of Ex.B2/Adoption Deed, dated 29.10.1971, due to that vendor of the defendant had no right to sell the property to the defendant. In OS No.75 of 1987, the plaintiff has stated the age of vendor of the defendant as 32 years, which suit was not contested by him. It is deposed by DW.1, who is General Power of Attorney Holder of the defendant that by the date of Ex.B3/sale deed, said Mr.P.Venkata Siva Subbaraman was aged about 30 years. When the age of vendor of the defendant was taken as 30 years in the year 1985, i.e. 22.01.1985 on the date of Ex.B3, his age in the year 1970 would be less than 15 years or about 15 years. 22. A perusal of Ex.B2/certified copy of Adoption Deed, which shows that vendor of the defendant was given in adoption on 28.06.1970 itself, but the registered document deed has been executed on 29.10.1971. In view of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, there is a presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions. The Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. The plaintiff who filed suit, seeking for declaration of her title, shall succeed on the strength of her own case, not on the weakness of the defendant, and it is for the plaintiff to prove that vendor of the defendant is more than 15 years on the date of adoption by Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife, which she failed to prove. In view of statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, it is presumed that adoption of vendor of the defendant by Mr.P.Venkata RAo and his wife is valid. 23. In view of statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, it is presumed that adoption of vendor of the defendant by Mr.P.Venkata RAo and his wife is valid. 23. As rightly held by both Courts that Mr.P.Venkata Rao alone has no right to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and there was a finding with regard to validity of adoption in OS No.242 of 1991, which cannot be agitated again, and decree passed in OS No.75 of 1987 is rightly held by both Courts that not binding on the defendant in view of the fact that on the date of institution of the suit, vendor of the defendant already sold the plaint schedule property to the defendant, under Ex.B3/sale deed, dated 22.01.1985, due to that he also not contested the suit. As per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, any person can institute a suit for declaration of his right to any property against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title not against person who has no interest in the property by the date of filing of the suit. 24. The plaintiff obtained declaratory decree in OS No.75 of 1987 against vendor of the defendant, who had no interest in the plaint schedule property by the date of filing of the suit, as by that time he already sold plaint schedule property to the defendant under Ex.B3/sale deed. Though, finding in OS No.242 of 1991 with regard to validity of adoption of vendor of the defendant is binding on the plaintiff, which operates as ‘res judicata’ in the present suit, and declaratory decree passed in OS No.75 of 1987 in favour of the plaintiff is not binding on the defendant, which rightly held by the Courts below. There is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, but in view of finding in OS No.242 of 1991 with regard validity of adoption and also in view of statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, when the deed of adoption is registered and in view of failure on the part of the plaintiff to prove that vendor of the defendant is more than 15 years on the date of adoption. The ratio laid down in those decisions, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 25. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court in Manthena Pullamraju case referred supra held that if there is a custom to adopt child more than 15 years, it is valid adoption and the said custom is prevailing in Kshatriyas community proved in the said case, and it is not held in the said decision that there is custom in Andhra Pradesh State adopting child in all communities though more than 15 years. In a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, the entire burden is on the plaintiff to prove her case and she has to succeed on the strength of her own title by adducing sufficient evidence irrespective of fact whether the defendant has proved her case or not. Even mere denial of defendant’s title in the absence of establishing her own title carries the plaintiff nowhere. The plaintiff, who failed to prove that her vendor has got absolute right over the plaint schedule property to sell the same to her under Ex.A9, not entitled to seek declaratory relief and recovery of possession of plaint schedule property from the defendant, who also purchased the property from the adopted son of Mr.P.Venkata Rao and his wife Smt P.Mahalakshmi. 26. Basing on the material and evidence, both Courts have rightly appreciated the evidence and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 27. The substantial question of law framed in the present appeal is answered accordingly. 28. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, both parties are directed to bear their own costs. Consequently, all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. The Interim Orders granted earlier, if any, shall stand vacated.