JUDGMENT : 1. By way of present appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC” for short), the appellants have challenged the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 17.07.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Palanpur in Sessions Case No.28/1998, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offences under Sections 498(A), 306 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC” for short) and thereby sentenced them to undergo three years simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo two months simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 498(A) read with Section 114 of the IPC and also sentenced to undergo five years simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to undergo five months simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 306 read with Section 114 of the IPC. It is also ordered to run both the sentences concurrently and appellants shall be given set off for the period which they have undergone during trial. 2. At this stage, it is required to be mentioned that pending this appeal, the appellant no.3 – original accused no.3 passed away and, hence, the present appeal qua the appellant no.3 – original accused no.3 stood abated vide order dated 07.10.2019 and is confined to appellant nos.1 and 2. 3. The brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal are as under, 3.1 An FIR being C.R. No.I-53/1997 came to be registered with Dhanera Station for the offences under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC alleging inter alia that the sister of the complainant married with the original accused no.1 three years prior to registration of the FIR and out of said wedlock, they have been blessed with one boy, who was aged about 5 months at the time of registration of the FIR. It is alleged that the accused persons have meted out mental and physical torture to the deceased on account of insufficient dowry and when the deceased used to visit her parental home, she complained about the ill-treatment at the hands of the accused persons but to save marriage life, the deceased was sent back to matrimonial house. It is alleged that the accused persons have meted out mental and physical torture to the deceased on account of insufficient dowry and when the deceased used to visit her parental home, she complained about the ill-treatment at the hands of the accused persons but to save marriage life, the deceased was sent back to matrimonial house. It is alleged that because of the constant mental and physical harassment at the hands of the accused persons, the deceased committed suicide by jumping into the well. 3.2 On the basis of the registration of the FIR, the investigation was carried out and on conclusion of investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed before the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhanera, where it has been registered as Criminal Case No.816/1997. 3.3. Since the case registered against the appellants-accused was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhanera after making inquiry about the suppliance of copies of papers, free of cost to the accused as provided under Section 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and upon satisfaction that the accused have engaged own Advocate for defence, committed the case to the Court of Session Judge, Palanpur under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which came to be registered as Session Case No.28 of 1998. 3.4 On committal, the case was transferred and placed for trial before the Learned Sessions Judge, Palanpur, who had initially framed charge against the accused vide Exh.3 for the alleged offences. The charge was read over and explained to them. Plea of each accused came to be recorded, wherein they pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. 3.5 Thereafter in order to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant – accused, the prosecution has examined 06 prosecution witnesses and also produced 08 documentary evidence, details of which are mentioned in the impugned order. 3.6 After recording of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was over, the learned Sessions Court explained to the accused the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statements under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In their further statements, they denied the case of the prosecution in entirety. According to them, they have been roped in a false case. In their further statements, they denied the case of the prosecution in entirety. According to them, they have been roped in a false case. 3.7 At the end of trial, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants – accused by impugned judgment and order and imposed sentence as stated in Paragraph No.1 of the judgment. 4. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Padmaraj Jadeja for the appellant and learned APP Mr. Dhanwan Jayswal for the responded – State of Gujarat. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. Jadeja submitted that at the time of passing impugned judgment and order of conviction, the learned Judge has not properly appreciated and evaluated the material placed on record in its true spirit and perspective. Learned advocate submitted that for the purpose of proving the charges levelled against the appellants – accused, the prosecution has examined 6 witnesses. Learned advocate submitted that it is the case of the prosecution that the appellants – accused were taunting the deceased on account of insufficient dowry brought by her and thereby used to give mental and physical torture to her and whenever the deceased used to pay visit to her parental home, she used to make complaint about the mental and physical harassment meted out to her by the accused persons and thus the said fact has come to the notice of the complainant as well as family members. Learned advocate, however, submitted that so far as the allegations with regard to demand of dowry is concerned, inconsistence evidence was led by the prosecution and during trial, the prosecution has come with specific case that insufficient dowry was brought by the deceased at the time of marriage, however at the time of cross-examination of the witnesses, different story has been narrated by the witnesses and the father and brother of the deceased had come with a specific case that the deceased had never complained to them directly about the demand of dowry made by the appellants but they had supplemented that the deceased used to tell the said fact to her mother and sister-in-law and admittedly at the time of leading evidence, the mother of the deceased was not examined, whereas the sister-in-law was examined but she had not supported the version of the prosecution case, therefore, she was declared hostile and during the course of cross-examination, certain important questions were being asked by the learned APP but the prosecution could not be able to elicit correct facts, which damaged the case of the prosecution. 6. 6. Learned advocate submitted that it is found out from the record that immediately after the occurrence of the incident, the deceased was taken to hospital for the purpose of immediate medical treatment and at that time, she was alive but at the time of giving preliminary treatment, she had not given any history regarding the occurrence of an incident to the doctor and thus, conducts of the appellants are also required to be seen because when immediately they took the deceased to hospital for the purpose of medical treatment and not only that, they had also sent messanger to the complainant’s house to inform the family members of the deceased about the occurrence of the incident and immediately after receiving the said information, the family members of the deceased had come to the hospital and at that relevant point of time, as per the evidence of the independent witness i.e. the doctor, the father of the deceased had made request to him not to perform postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased, however despite the said request, the concerned doctor had informed to the concerned officer of the police station about the said incident but somehow for the reasons best known to the concerned police officer, he had not come to the hospital and not recorded complaint of the complainant and the postmortem of the deceased was also not conducted. Learned advocate submitted that even FIR has been registered belatedly. Learned advocate submitted that so-called incident had taken place on 11.04.1997 and FIR came to be lodged on 07.06.1997 and during interregnum period, the complainant has tendered one application in the form of complaint to concerned DSP, copy of which is also forming part and parcel of the record and if the Hon’ble Court would make a cursorily glance upon the contents of the said application as well as FIR, in that event, it would be found out that there are so many discrepancies and contradictions in the sequence of events of story as well as charge of accussation levelled against the accused. Learned advocate further submitted that immediately after the occurrence of the incident, the father of the deceased reached the hospital and he has seen the body of the deceased and could not find out any unusual injury upon the body of the deceased and also not informed to the police officer and on the contrary, he had given consent by putting his thumb impression upon the medical papers to the effect that he does not wish to carry out postmortem upon the body of the deceased. Learned advocate submitted that there was statutory liability on the part of the doctor that as and when medico-legal case comes before him, he has to inform to the concerned officer of nearest police station about the occurrence of the incident and on the strength of the same, the police officer has to register the complaint of the cognizable offence committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Learned advocate submitted that both the officers have failed to discharge their duties and, hence while delivering judgment and/or assigning reasons, the learned Judge has very strongly criticized the conduct and approach of the doctor concerned and also referred the matter to the Medical Council to initiate appropriate actions against the doctor concerned as prima facie there was evidence regarding dereliction of duty on the part of the doctor. Learned advocate submitted that so-called incident occurred on 11.04.1997, for which, FIR has been lodged on 07.06.1997, therefore, there was gross delay in registering the complaint against the accused persons. Learned advocate submitted that if the Hon’ble Court would make a cursorily glance upon the contents of the FIR then, it would be found out that the complainant has not come with any reason worth explanation in the body of the FIR for such delay. Learned advocate submitted that if the Hon’ble Court would make a cursorily glance upon the contents of the FIR then, it would be found out that the complainant has not come with any reason worth explanation in the body of the FIR for such delay. Learned advocate submitted that in fact, as per the case of the prosecution, the complainant was far away at distance place on the date of incident and he came back to his home after two days of the incident and then after, he himself has made discreet inquiry about the occurrence of the incident and on 17.04.1997, he has given an application in the form of complaint to the Police Inspector at Dhanera alleging that total five persons have abetted his sister to commit suicide and along with present appellants, name of other two persons viz., Jivaji Rajput and Karshanji Majirana were also stated in the said complaint and, thereafter subsequently copy of the said application was also forwarded to Superintendent of Police, Banaskantha and, thereafter on 07.06.1997, the present FIR has been filed by the complainant, wherein the allegations were leveled against the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law, therefore, stance of allegations leveled against the accused persons have been changed drastically within few days and the said application and complaint have been exhibited vide Exhs.25 & 23 and if the Hon’ble Court would go through the allegations leveled in both the complaint, in that event, there are so many dissimilarity in the allegations found out. 7. 7. Learned advocate further submitted that it is the specific case of the prosecution that the deceased had never made any complaint to the complainant about the demand of dowry and ill-treatment but the deceased used to make complaint to her mother and sister-in-law but admittedly deposition of the mother of the deceased was not recorded, whereas sister-in-law of the deceased was brought into the witness box but she had not supported the case of the prosecution, therefore, she was declared hostile whereas in the chief examination of other witnesses, they have deposed that the deceased had never told them directly about any mental and physical torture meted out to her and it is the specific case of the prosecution that they have come to know about the said fact from the sister- in-law as deceased told her ordeal to her but said fact has not been disclosed and/or stated by the said witness, therefore on the strength of the evidence available on record so far as this witness is concerned, the order of conviction cannot be sustained. Learned advocate submitted that evidence of the father of the deceased was recorded, wherein he has stated that after solemnization of the marriage, whenever his daughter used to come to his house, she had complained that she was being harassed by her in- laws but no any specific reasons of harassment have been stated in his deposition. Learned advocate submitted that deposition of the said witness is quite contrary to the deposition of the complainant, hence, the reliance cannot be placed upon the said evidence. 8. Learned advocate submitted that during the course of recording of evidence, the prosecution has recorded the evidence of one Nanjibhai Pratapji (PW No.4, Exh.18), who is hearsay witness and in his examination in chief, the said witness has stated in a very categorical terms that that the deceased had never told him about the mental and physical torture meted out to her by her in-laws and the said witness has reiterated the said fact and deposed that the deceased used to tell to her mother and sister-in-law about the ill-treatment meted out to her. Learned advocate submitted that it is the specific case of the prosecution that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental home, she was weeping but during the course of cross-examination of sister-in-law, a very pertinent query was put by the defence about the said custom in their society and she replied that it is the custom in their community that whenever any woman comes to her parental house from her matrimonial house, generally she used to weep just to show her love/ affection/ feeling towards her parents and in her deposition, she has clearly stated that at no relevant point of time, the deceased has ever told him that her husband and in-laws are giving mental and physical torture to her on account of insufficient dowry. 9. Learned advocate submitted that for the purpose of proving charge leveled against the accused, the prosecution has also examined doctor, who had given primary treatment to the deceased and he has fairly conceded that on the fateful day of incident, the deceased was brought to hospital and primary treatment was given to the deceased as deceased was fallen in well and sustained very severe and grievous injuries and she was suffering from acute pain, however though she was very much alive, she could not be able to giver history qua occurrence of incident to the doctor. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased had not given any history as well as oral dying declaration about the occurrence of the incident before the doctor. Learned advocate submitted that the father of the deceased was very much available at the hospital and he had given consent in writing by making thumb impression upon the papers before the doctor about not carrying out postmortem ans to register the complaint. Learned advocate submitted that the father of the deceased was very much available at the hospital and he had given consent in writing by making thumb impression upon the papers before the doctor about not carrying out postmortem ans to register the complaint. Learned advocate submitted that at the time of appreciating the evidence of the said witness, the learned Judge has opined that instead of thumb impression of the father of the deceased, somebody else’s made thumb impression was there as the father of the deceased has bluntly refused the sid suggesstion in his deposition and, therefore without verifying the said evidence through scientific experts, version narrated by the doctor cannot be considered and believed as a gospal truth and thus, the learned Judge has jumped to erroneous conclusion solely on the basis of the conjectures and surmises and has not given due weightage to the corroborative piece of evidence placed by the doctor in support of his claim. Learned advocate submitted that during cross- examination of the said witness, a particular query was being put by the defence specifically stating that the father of the deceased was very much there and he has given consent for not carrying out postmortem as well as not registering complaint against the in-laws and after fulfilling all formalities, thumb impression of the father of the deceased was obtained upon the paper, the said answer was replied in affirmative. Learned advocate submitted that not only that, those set of documents are also placed on record by the doctor, therefore, the view adopted by the learned Judge is erroneous one and against the evidence available on record. 10. Learned advocate submitted that not only that, those set of documents are also placed on record by the doctor, therefore, the view adopted by the learned Judge is erroneous one and against the evidence available on record. 10. Learned advocate further submitted that during the course of investigation, panchnama of the place of occurrence as well as inquest panchnama of the deceased were drawn by the IO and it is found out that the appellants and the deceased were residing together in the dwelling house at farm, where very close to their house, a kachha well was constructed by the family members of the appellant no.1 but parapet wall surrounding the area of the well had not been constructed, therefore, the area encircled the well was open, therefore, there are all other possible chances that the deceased might have gone there to fetch water or for doing any domestic work, at that relevant point of time, due to mistake, she might have slipped and fallen in the well and thus, the incident might have occurred and that possibility cannot be ruled out that the deceased might have fallen in the well accidentally. Learned advocate submitted that it is also admitted position of fact that at the time of occurrence of the incident, the in-laws were not available at the place of occurrence and they had gone outside of the home for the purpose of doing their agriculture activities and as soon as they came to know about the said fact, immediately the deceased was taken outside from the well and then, shifted to hospital for treatment and during the interregnum period, one messenger was also sent to the house of the complainant to inform them about the occurrence of the incident and thus, the conduct, act and behavior clearly goes on to show that there was no bad intention on the part of the appellants. Learned advocate submitted that considering the above factual aspects, it is found out that there is no mental or physical torture meted out to the deceased by the in-laws on account of insufficient dowry. 11. Learned advocate submitted that considering the above factual aspects, it is found out that there is no mental or physical torture meted out to the deceased by the in-laws on account of insufficient dowry. 11. Learned advocate submitted that it is settled proposition of law that for the purpose of proving the charge leveled against the accused so far as the abetment to commit suicide are concerned, the prosecution has to prove that there was proximate cause on the part of appellants to be made to the deceased soon before the incident and the appellants had aided and instigated the deceased to commit suicide and as per the deposition of the father of the deceased, after solemnization of the marriage, she had come to her parental home on 3 to 4 occasions, whereas sister-in-law of the deceased deposed that 6 to 7 times, the deceased had come to her parental home, therefore, there was contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses. Learned advocate submitted that the father and brother had come with specific case that the harassment in the form mental and physical torture was meted out with sole intent to demand dowry by the in-laws. 12. Learned advocate has place reliance upon following decisions, (1) the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, delivered in Criminal Appeal No.1722/2010 on 22.02.2024; (2) the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Heera Lal & Anr., Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 11 SCC 323 ; (3) the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Gurucharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2017) 1 SCC 433 ; (4) the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3837 ; 13. Learned advocate, therefore, urged that considering the facts of the case on hand as stated above and in view of the ratio enunciated in the aforesaid decision, the present appeal may be allowed and the appellants may be acquitted. 14. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3837 ; 13. Learned advocate, therefore, urged that considering the facts of the case on hand as stated above and in view of the ratio enunciated in the aforesaid decision, the present appeal may be allowed and the appellants may be acquitted. 14. On the other hand, learned APP has opposed the present appeal with a vehemence and submitted that for the purpose of proving the charge leveled against the accused, the prosecution has examined total 6 witnesses and during the course of recording of evidence, all the witnesses have deposed in a very consistent manner and the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record are corroborative with each other, which ultimately proves the guilt of the accused persons, therefore after appreciating and considering the material and evidence available on record, the learned Judge has passed just, fair and reasonable order and it does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. Learned APP submitted that at the time of appreciating the evidence in detailed, the learned Judge has discussed all the aspect of law and reached to a definite conclusion that the involvement of the present appellants is clearly found out on the basis of clear, clinching and reliable evidence produced by the prosecution and depositions of all the witnesses are in consistence and corroborative with each other. Learned APP submitted that admittedly the span of marriage life of the deceased is less than 7 years, therefore, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act would come into play. Learned APP submitted that admittedly the span of marriage life of the deceased is less than 7 years, therefore, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act would come into play. Learned advocate further submitted that as per the case of the prosecution, after the occurrence of the incident, immediately the deceased was shifted to hospital for the purpose of getting primary treatment, where the doctor concerned had given primary treatment, however, she died in the hospital during treatment and considering the occurrence of medico-legal case, the doctor concerned has to inform to nearest police station about the occurrence of the incident and not only that, he has to recommend and/or carry out postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased, inspite of specific and requisite requirement of statute, he had handed over the dead body to the family members after obtaining thumb impression upon certain medical papers and those set of documents are also placed on record and, thereafter, the family members have fulfilled the social rituals as per custom and disposed off the body through cremation. Learned APP submitted that apparently incident of dereliction of duty on the part of the doctor is found out as doctor being responsible medical officer has not behaved and acted in a responsible manner. Learned APP submitted that the father of the deceased being illiterate person has candidly stated in his deposition that he was very much available in the hospital but he had not made thumb impression upon any documents and he had also not orally requested to the concerned doctor about not to carry out postmortem of the deceased and not only that, the police officer had not reached to the hospital despite the fact that one young lady has lost her valuable life and the said fact has also brought to the notice of concerned Police Inspector. Learned APP submitted that it is clearly stated by the doctor in his deposition that he had also informed to the concerned I/c. Police officer by making telephone call but could not recollect the name of the said officer, with whom he had talked, therefore, at the time of appreciating the evidence, the learned Judge has made certain caustic comment and also ordered to initiate appropriate actions as per the Medical Council Rules. Learned APP further submitted that it is also admitted position of fact that despite lady died in the hospital and the said fact was also brought to the notice of concerned police officer to register the complaint against the guilty person, reasons best known to the officer concerned, he has not registered the complaint against the accused within time framed, therefore, the complainant was constrained to prefer an application in the form of the complaint to DSP and after getting order from the DSP, Banaskantha, the present complaint has been registered, therefore, there is delay in registering the complaint, therefore by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that there was delay on the part of the complainant to register the complaint belatedly. 15. At this stage, learned APP submitted that before going through the evidence available on record, he would like to read further statement of the accused recorded before the concerned court. Learned APP has read the further statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC and submitted that it is an admitted position of fact that on the basis of evidence available on record, at the end of day, the accused were directed to submit their explanations about the evidence led by the prosecution and the explanation given by the accused clearly goes on to show that they had intentionally not disclosed certain information which was well within their knowledge and tried to give evasive answer. Learned APP submitted that it is the specific case of the prosecution that immediately after the solemnization of the marriage, the deceased had gone to her matrimonial home and the in-laws have started harassment on account of insufficient dowry and the said fact is also disclosed by the deceased to other family members as and when she had gone to her parental home. Learned APP submitted that the deceased has committed suicide within a period of three years of marriage life and at the time of commission of suicide, the age of the deceased was 23 years. Learned APP submitted that the deceased has committed suicide within a period of three years of marriage life and at the time of commission of suicide, the age of the deceased was 23 years. Learned APP submitted that if the deceased was happy and everything was in order, in that event, within short span, one would not commit suicide, therefore, it suggests that constant and incessant harassment is meted out to her by the in-laws, due to which, she had made complaints to her family members as and when she got opportunity but at the relevant point of time, she was persuaded by the family members by stating that after certain period of time, everything would be settled but there was no change in the behavior of in-laws, therefore, the deceased committed suicide and the said fact is also found out from the evidence available on record and all the witnesses have deposed in a very categorical and consistent manner and the depositions of all the witnesses are corroborated with each other. Learned APP submitted that it is true that the witnesses were having very rustic background and residing in village and, hence at the time of cross examination, certain minor omissions and contradictions in the depositions of the said witnesses have been found out but those minor contradictions and omissions would not affect the case of the prosecution and on the basis of said set of documents and evidence, benefit of doubt cannot be extended in favour of the accused persons. It is, therefore, urged that the present appeal may be dismissed. 16. In view of the aforesaid submissions canvassed by learned advocates for the parties, the question, which I am tasked to decide, is whether, based on the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in returning a finding that the appellants were guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 read with Section 114 of the IPC and liable to be sentenced as a consequence thereof, as has been imposed on them. 17. 17. In the facts of the case, as stated above, it is found out that an FIR has been registered against the appellants – accused for the offences under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC inter alia alleging about the cruelty meted out by the accused to the deceased on account of insufficient dowry, which led to committing suicide by her by jumping into the well and, hence, the accused were tried by the court concerned and at the end of trial, an order of conviction has been passed against him, which led to filing of the aforesaid appeal challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 18. In the present case as stated above, the basic bone of contentions raised by learned advocate for the appellants is that there is gross delay in registration of FIR, there are so many contradictions in the depositions of witnesses, narration of different stories by the witnesses, non-examination of important witness, not existence of oral dying declaration and/or history given before the doctor concerned at the time of primary treatment though the victim was alive and conduct of the father of the deceased after the occurrence of incident. Therefore to consider the aforesaid submissions of learned advocate for the appellants, evidence of prosecution witnesses is required to be considered. 19. PW No.1 viz., Dr. Kishorbhai Shambhubhai Thakkar is examined at Exh.8. In his deposition, the said witness has stated in a very categorical terms that on 11.04.1997, he was discharging his duty as Medical Officer of Community Health Centre, Dhanera and at that time, one Maniben Shankarbhai was brought before him for treatment and at that point of time, she was alive and conscious and upon making inquiry from her, history was given that she fell down in the well and, thereafter, the said witness had given primary treatment to her, however because of injuries sustained by her, she died at about 12:30 hours in the night. In the cross-examination of said witness, he has stated that he had informed the occurrence of the incident to Dhanera Police Station through telephone and also stated that no postmortem was carried out upon the dead body of the deceased as the family members of the deceased did not want to do and also they have stated that they do not want to file any case and the said fact has been recorded by the said witness in the case papers and also took thumb impression of the father of the deceased. 20. PW No.2 viz., Maganbhai Pratapbhai, who has been examined at Exh.12. This witness is the brother of the deceased and complainant in the present case. This witness has stated in his deposition that his sister married with Shankarji Chamanji before three years of the incident and after the marriage, whenever she used to visit her parental home, she complained about the mental and physical torture at the hands of the accused on account of insufficient dowry. This witness has also stated that on the day of occurrence, he was at Deesa and after two days, when he reached home, he was informed about the said incident and, thereafter on 17.04.1997, he filed a complaint before Police Sub Inspector, Dhanera Police Station, however as no action was taken, he submitted an application to District Superintendent of Police on 23.04.1997 and, thereafter, the investigation was carried out. 21. PW No.3 viz., Pratapji Lakhmanji has been examined at Exh.17. This witness is the father of the deceased. This witness has stated in his deposition that his daughter married with one Shankarji three months prior to alleged incident. This witness also stated that after the marriage, once when deceased had visited his house, she stated about the mental and physical torture meted out to her by the accused but she did not disclose about the reasons for the same but with a view to save his marriage life, she was persuaded back to her matrimonial house. This witness stated that before two months of the incident, the deceased had come to his house and at that time, she stated about the harassment meted out to her by the accused but she was sent back after persuasion. This witness stated that before two months of the incident, the deceased had come to his house and at that time, she stated about the harassment meted out to her by the accused but she was sent back after persuasion. This witness has stated that on the fateful night, he was at his field, at that time, one Jivaji Pemaji Rajput had come to him and informed about the occurrence of incident and on hearing this, this witness along with other rushed to hospital, where he found the dead body of the deceased and upon making inquiry from the accused, it was informed that the deceased died because of falling down into the well and, thereafter, his son has lodged the case. In his cross-examination, the said witness has stated in a very categorical terms that when the doctor had asked him to register the case and to carry out postmortem, he said No and the doctor has taken his thumb impression on the writing/papers. 22. PW No.4 viz., Nanjibhai Pratapbhai has been examined at Exh.18. This witness is the brother of the deceased. This witness has stated that after the marriage, when the deceased had come to her parental home, she complained about the ill- treatment at the hands of the accused and informed the said fact to his wife, mother and sister-in- law but the said witness was never informed about the cruelty meted out to her. This witness has also stated that on the day of occurrence, he was on his job at Deesa and on the next day, when he came back, he came to know about the incident. 23. PW No.5 viz., Pyariben Nanjibhai has been examined at Exh.19. This witness is the sister-in-law of the deceased. This witness has stated that whenever the deceased had come to her parental home, the deceased was weeping and when the deceased was asked about the reason for such weeping, the deceased had not stated anything. This witness has also stated that the deceased had never stated about the taunting and/or mental and physical harassment at the hands of the accused on account of insufficient dowry to her. This witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile by the prosecution. 24. PW No.6 viz., Umedji Ravaji Thakor has been examined at Exh.22. This witness is the Investigating Officer of the present case. This witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile by the prosecution. 24. PW No.6 viz., Umedji Ravaji Thakor has been examined at Exh.22. This witness is the Investigating Officer of the present case. This witness has stated that on receipt of the information, FIR has been lodged and, thereafter, carried out further investigation including drawing of panchnama of the place of occurrence, recorded statements of the witnesses, collected treatment certificate and death certificate of the deceased, arrested the accused persons and also submitted chargesheet before the court concerned. 25. Thus after having carefully examined and scrutinized the depositions of witnesses, it is found out that there are contradictions in the depositions of witnesses with regard to the harassment meted out by the accused to the deceased and there are different stories stated by the witnesses in the depositions because it is the specific case of the prosecution that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental house, she complained about the harassment meted out to her by the accused to her mother and sister-in-law but in the facts of the present case, the mother of the deceased has not been examined by the prosecution and though the sister-in-law of the deceased has been examined, she has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile and thus, it can be said that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove guilt against the appellants – accused. Over and above that, there is also contradictions with regard to the details of coming to parental home by the deceased and narration of incident of harassment and there is also improvisation in the depositions. 26. It is an admitted position of fact that in the present case, there is no dying declaration of the deceased. It is also admitted position of fact that when the deceased was taken to hospital after the occurrence of incident, she was alive and, thereafter, she succumbed to the injuries sustained by her. But at the time of giving primary treatment, history has been recorded by the doctor wherein she has stated that she had fallen in the well and sustained injuries. 27. But at the time of giving primary treatment, history has been recorded by the doctor wherein she has stated that she had fallen in the well and sustained injuries. 27. So far as the contention of learned advocate for the appellants with regard to the conduct of the father of the deceased is concerned, it is an admitted position of fact that in the present case, postmortem of the deceased has not been carried out by the doctor. It is also found out from the evidence that when the specific question was asked by the doctor to the father of the deceased for registration of the FIR and for performing postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased, the father of the deceased stated that he is not willing to carry out postmortem upon the dead body of his daughter and, therefore, the concerned doctor took thumb impression of the father of the deceased upon the medical papers, wherein consent was obtained and those medical papers were produced by the doctor at the time of recording his deposition, which are part and parcel of the record. 28. Now so far as the contention raised by learned advocate for the appellants with regard to delay in registration of FIR is concerned, it is an admitted position of fact that the alleged incident has taken place on 11.04.1997 and FIR came to be lodged on 07.06.1997. It is found out from the deposition of Maganbhai Pratapbhai (PW No.2, Exh.12), on 17.04.1997, complaint was filed before Police Sub Inspector, Dhanera Police Station, however as no action was taken by him, therefore, he was constrained to submit an application to District Superintendent of Police on 23.04.1997 and, thereafter on 07.06.1997, the FIR has been registered. It is, however, required to be noted at this stage that though FIR has not been registered by the concerned Police Officer but no steps have been taken by them for registration of FIR. However from the facts narrated hereinabove above and as can be seen from the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, there was no specific incident and/or time about harassment meted out by the accused to the deceased. 29. However from the facts narrated hereinabove above and as can be seen from the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, there was no specific incident and/or time about harassment meted out by the accused to the deceased. 29. The contention has been raised by learned APP with regard to the mental and physical harassment to the deceased by the accused within short span of marriage life, which is less than seven years and, hence, presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act would come into play. At this stage, this Court would like to refer to Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, which deals with 'Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman'. Section 113A reads as under, "113A: When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative or her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 30. Bare reading of section 113(A) of the Evidence Act indicates that along with rule of presumption, legislature has employed express “having regard to other circumstances of the case”. It means that presumption which is slated in section 113(A) is subject to other circumstances of the case, so merely on presumption the Court cannot convict the accused. The expression stated herein above makes presumption as discretionary. It also transpires from the aforesaid provision that this section requires proof that (1) that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. If these facts are proved, the court 'may' presume. The words are not 'shall' presume. Such a presumption can be drawn only after the court has taken into account all the circumstances of the case. The inference would then be that the 'husband or relatives' abetted her suicide. If these facts are proved, the court 'may' presume. The words are not 'shall' presume. Such a presumption can be drawn only after the court has taken into account all the circumstances of the case. The inference would then be that the 'husband or relatives' abetted her suicide. If there is no evidence of cruelty, the section does not apply. In a judgment in case of State of Punjab Vs. Iqbal Singh, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1532 as well as in a judgment in case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nikku Ram, reported in AIR 1996 SC 67 , it was held that in the absence of any evidence to show that the diseased was being harassed within the meaning of Explanation I(b) of section 498A IPC, the presumption under section 113A cannot be raised. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment in case of State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal reported in AIR 1994 SC 1418 has considered the question as to 'standard of proof'. It observed that in a criminal trial, the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceeding. In a criminal trial, however intriguing may be the facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against may be in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code and section 113-A in the Evidence Act. It is also observed in catena of decisions that the court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under section 113A for finding out if cruelty was meted out. If it transpires that a victim committing suicide was hyper sensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court would not be satisfied for holding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide was guilty. It is cardinal rule that whenever principle of presumption applies in the statue and certain facts said to have been presumed, such presumption is always rebutable. Accused is not required to led evidence beyond reasonable doubt to rebut presumption. It is cardinal rule that whenever principle of presumption applies in the statue and certain facts said to have been presumed, such presumption is always rebutable. Accused is not required to led evidence beyond reasonable doubt to rebut presumption. The person who is burdened to disprove presumption can discharge presumption by leading evidence in the nature of preponderance of probability. 31. In the present case, charge for the offence under Section 498(A) of the IPC is also leveled against the appellants – accused, which defines “cruelty” and it reads as under :- “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— a) anywilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a decision in the case of V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat, reported in AIR 1994 SC 710 , in regard to word ‘cruelty’ has observed following : - “The context and the set-up in which the word “cruelty” has been used in the section, seems...., that intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty” 33. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty” 33. The cruelty therefore, has to be understood in its ordinary sense of the matrimonial terms, yet general wear and tear of matrimonial life of vague allegations having no mentioning of specific incident of demand of dowry by the accused or hostile attitude of husband and/or his relatives cannot be termed as cruelty. Differences arising, momentarily between husband and wife also cannot be construed as cruelty or harassment. In order to establish and prove cruelty as stated in section 498(A) of the IPC, it must be in nature that it is arising from willful conduct and it is intended to harm, harass or hurt the victim. 34. At this stage, this Court would like to place reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Mangat Ram Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 595 , the Hon’ble Apex Court considering the provisions of Section 498A and 306 of IPC in the light of the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, observed as under: - “30. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term “the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband” would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. The term “the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband” would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor would the reasoning adopted by the courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. 31. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana [ (2004) 12 SCC 257 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 217], wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A, etc. and held that, unlike Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are established, the court is not bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A, therefore, gives discretion to the court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word “cruelty” in Section 498-A IPC.” 35. Therefore in view of the above facts, if the facts of the case on hand are examined, in that event, it is an admitted position of fact that the prosecution has failed to prove cruelty upon the deceased by the accused, which attracts the provision of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act. 36. At this juncture, I would like to refer to certain case laws wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as different High Courts have very succinctly crystallized the position of law so far as Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned. 36. At this juncture, I would like to refer to certain case laws wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as different High Courts have very succinctly crystallized the position of law so far as Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Geo Verghese Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2021 SC 4764 , observed and held as under: “13. In our country, while suicide in itself is not an offence as a person committing suicide goes beyond the reach of law but an attempt to suicide is considered to be an offence under Section 309 IPC. The abetment of suicide by anybody is also an offence under Section 306 IPC. It would be relevant to set out Section 306 of the IPC which reads as under :- “306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 14. Though, the IPC does not define the word ‘Suicide’ but the ordinary dictionary meaning of suicide is ‘self-killing’. The word is derived from a modern latin word ‘suicidium’, ‘sui’ means ‘oneself’ and ‘cidium’ means ‘killing’. Thus, the word suicide implies an act of ‘self-killing’. In other words, act of death must be committed by the deceased himself, irrespective of the means adopted by him in achieving the object of killing himself. 15. Section 306 of IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same. Abetment is defined under Section 107 of IPC which reads as under :- “107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.—Whoever either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” 16. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh has defined the word ‘instigate’ as under :- “Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act.” 17. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC has been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In the case of S.S.Cheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr., it was observed as under:- “Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 18. In a recent pronouncement, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., while considering the co-relation of Section 107 IPC with Section 306 IPC has observed as under :- “47. The above decision thus arose in a situation where the High Court had declined to entertain a petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of the However, it nonetheless directed the investigating agency not to arrest the accused during the pendency of the investigation. This was held to be impermissible by this Court. The above decision thus arose in a situation where the High Court had declined to entertain a petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of the However, it nonetheless directed the investigating agency not to arrest the accused during the pendency of the investigation. This was held to be impermissible by this Court. On the other hand, this Court clarified that the High Court if it thinks fit, having regard to the parameters for quashing and the self restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation ?and may pass appropriate and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law. Clearly therefore, the High Court in the present case has misdirected itself in declining to enquire prima facie on a petition for quashing whether the parameters in the exercise of that jurisdiction have been duly established and if so whether a case for the grant of interim bail has been made out. The settled principles which have been consistently reiterated since the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal (Bhajan Lal) include a situation where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. This legal position was recently reiterated in a decision by a two-judge Bench of this Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar vs State of Maharashtra. 48. The striking aspect of the impugned judgment of the High Court spanning over fifty-six pages is the absence of any evaluation even prima facie of the most basic issue. The High Court, in other words, failed to apply its mind to a fundamental issue which needed to be considered while dealing with a petition for quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court, by its judgment dated 9 November 2020, has instead allowed the petition for quashing to stand over for hearing a month later, and therefore declined to allow the appellant‘s prayer for interim bail and relegated him to the remedy under Section 439 of the CrPC. In the meantime, liberty has been the casualty. The High Court, by its judgment dated 9 November 2020, has instead allowed the petition for quashing to stand over for hearing a month later, and therefore declined to allow the appellant‘s prayer for interim bail and relegated him to the remedy under Section 439 of the CrPC. In the meantime, liberty has been the casualty. The High Court having failed to evaluate prima facie whether the allegations in the FIR, taken as they stand, bring the case within the fold of Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court is now called upon to perform the task.” 19. In the case of M. Arjunan Vs. State, Represented by its Inspector of Police, a two-Judge Bench of this Court has expounded the ingredients of Section 306 IPC in the following words:- “The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.” xxx xxx xxx 23. In the backdrop of the above discussion, we may now advert to the facts of the present case to test whether the ingredients of offence under Section 306 IPC exist, even prima-facie, to continue with the investigations. 24. The FIR recites that victim boy was under deep mental pressure because the appellant herein had harassed and insulted him in the presence of everyone and he was not willing to go to school on 25.04.2018 but was persuaded to go to school by the complainant. When he returned from the school, again he was under very much pressure and on being enquired told that today again he was harassed and insulted by the GEO, PTI Sir (the appellant). The boy was informed that the parents have been called to school next day and this brought him under further severe pressure and tension. 32. When he returned from the school, again he was under very much pressure and on being enquired told that today again he was harassed and insulted by the GEO, PTI Sir (the appellant). The boy was informed that the parents have been called to school next day and this brought him under further severe pressure and tension. 32. Considering the facts that the appellant holds a post of a teacher and any act done in discharge of his moral or legal duty without their being any circumstances to even remotely indicate that there was any intention on his part to abet the commission of suicide by one of his own pupil, no mens rea can be attributed. Thus, the very element of abetment is conspicuously missing from the allegations levelled in the FIR. In the absence of the element of abetment missing from the allegations, the essential ingredients of offence under section 306 IPC do not exist.” 37. Plain reading of Section 306 with Section 107 of IPC indicates that there must be some nexus between suicide of the victim and alleged offensive acts of the accused. In other words, prosecution is required to prove offensive acts of accused, which drive deceased to commit suicide. In addition thereto, there should be proximity of offensive acts, which led deceased to commit suicide. In the case of Wazir Chand v/s. State, reported in AIR 1989 SC 378 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “Reading sections 306 and 107 together, it is clear that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under section 306 for abetting the commission of suicide. A plain reading of the provisions shows that before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed suicide.” 38. In the facts of the present case, clause secondly and thirdly in Section 107 will have no application. Now, the question remains is as to whether the appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide. To attract the first clause, there must be a instigation in some form on the part of the accused to cause the deceased to commit suicide. In the facts of the present case, clause secondly and thirdly in Section 107 will have no application. Now, the question remains is as to whether the appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide. To attract the first clause, there must be a instigation in some form on the part of the accused to cause the deceased to commit suicide. Hence, the accused must have ‘mens rea’ to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. The act of instigation must be of such intensity that it is intended to push the deceased to such a position under which she has no choice but to commit suicide. Such instigation must be in close proximity to the act of committing suicide. In the present case, taking the contents of the FIR and the statements of the witnesses as correct, it is impossible to conclude that the appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide on account of insufficient dowry and by no stretch of the imagination, the alleged acts of the appellants can amount to instigation to commit suicide. 39. As discussed hereinabove, the marriage span of the appellant no.1 with the deceased is less than 7 years but from the oral evidence in the form of depositions of witnesses as well as documentary evidence, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused have meted out mental and physical harassment to the deceased on account of insufficient dowry, which led to committing suicide by her. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any intention on their part to abet the commission of suicide and, therefore, no mens rea can be attributed. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the very element of abetment is missing from the allegations levelled in the FIR and in absence of the element of abetment from the allegations, the offence under Section 306 IPC would not be attracted. 40. At this stage, I would like to refer to the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh Vs. State of Gujarat in Criminal Misc. Application No.16032 of 2014 & allied matters decided on 10th April, 2015, wherein the following observations were made: “11. 40. At this stage, I would like to refer to the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh Vs. State of Gujarat in Criminal Misc. Application No.16032 of 2014 & allied matters decided on 10th April, 2015, wherein the following observations were made: “11. Abetment of suicide is made punishable by Section 306 which provides that "if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished." (emphasis supplied) The section does not define the expression" "abet", nor is the expression defined in Chapter II of the Code which deals with the general explanations". However, Chapter V of the Code incorporates an elaborate statement of "abetment". Section 107 in this Chapter defines "abetment of a thing", while Section 108 defines the expression "abettor". This is how these sections run : Section 107 - Abetment of a thing "A person abets the doing of a thing, who First.- Instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the .doing of that thing. Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.---Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 12. Section 108 - Abettor- "'A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor". Explanation 1.- The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act. Explanation 1.- The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act. Explanation 2.- To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. Explanation 3.- It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, of any guilty intention or knowledge. Explanation 4.- The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment also an offence. Explanation 5.- It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy than the abettor should concern the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed." 13. As the expressions "abetment" and "abettor" have been legislatively defined, the ordinary dictionary meaning of the expressions would not be determinative of their import. It may, however, be useful to have a look at the ;dictionary meaning of the expression "abet". According to Webster, Webster's Third New International Dictionary Vol. I, the expression "abet", means to incite, encourage instigate, or countenance-now usually used disparagingly. According to Wharton, Whartone's Law Lexicon, 14th ed., "abet" means to stir up or excite, to maintain or patronize : to encourage or set on and the "abettor" is an instigator or setter on, one who promotes or procures a crime to be committed. Stroud, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th ed., has given various meanings of the expression "aid" or "abet", based on judicial pronouncements in England, in the context of different statutes. Thus, according to Hawkins, 51 L J.M.C. 78-R. v. Coney, J., "To constitute an aider or abettor, some active steps must be taken, by word or action, with intent to instigate the principal or principals. Encouragement does not, of necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be intentional or unintentional. A man may unwillingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted gestures, or by his silence or non-interference- or he may encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify approval. Encouragement does not, of necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be intentional or unintentional. A man may unwillingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted gestures, or by his silence or non-interference- or he may encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify approval. In the latter case, he aids and abets; in the former he does not." Stroud also cites the case of Du Cros v. Lambourne, 1907 (1) K. B. 40.. in which it was held that "the owner in, and in control of, a motor car which is being driven at an improper speed by a driver who is not his servant, "aids or abets" in the offence if he (the owner) does not interfere." It is further noticed on the basis of decision in the case of Rubie v. Faulkner, 1980 (1) K.B. 571 : "For a supervisor of a learner driver to see that an unlawful act is about to be done and to fail to prevent it is he can is for him to aid and abet." It is further noticed, on the authority of the decision in the case of Callow v. Tillstone, 83 L.T. 411, that "A man does not by negligence aid and abet a person to expose unsound meat for sale." It is further noticed, on the basis of the decision in the case of Ackroyds Air Travel v. Director of Police Prosecutions, 1950 (1) All. E.R. 933 and Thomas v. Lindop, 1950 (1) All. E.R. 966, that "If a person knows all the circumstances which constitute the offence he will be guilty of aiding and abetting whether he knew that they did in fact constitute the offence or not " Stroud also quotes Lord Goddard C J. in Ferguson v. Weaving, 1951 (1) K.B 814, that "it is well know that the words 'aid and abet are apt to describe the action of a person who is present at the time of the commission of an offence and takes some part therein." 14. It may be useful to refer to some of the early English decisions, dealing with different ways of taking part in a felony, it was recognised that a felony may be committed by the hand of an "innocent agent" who, having no blamable intentions in that he did, incurred no criminal liability by doing it. It may be useful to refer to some of the early English decisions, dealing with different ways of taking part in a felony, it was recognised that a felony may be committed by the hand of an "innocent agent" who, having no blamable intentions in that he did, incurred no criminal liability by doing it. In such a case, the man who "instigates" this agent is the real offender; his was the last mens rea that preceded the crime, though it did not cause it "immediately but mediately". "Thus, if a physician provides a poisonous draught and tells a nurse that it is the medicine to be administered to her patient, and then by her administration of it the patient is killed, the murderous physician-and not the innocent nurse-is the principal in the first degree Kel. 52 (T.A.C.)." In English Law, as it stood before the later developments, "a principal in the second degree is one by whom the actual perpetrator of the felony is aided and abetted at the very time when it is committed; for instance, a car-owner sitting beside the chauffeur who kills some one by over-fast driving, or a passenger on a clandestine joy-riding expedition which results in manslaughter 1930 (22) Cr, App. R. 70 : 144 L.T. 185, "or bigamist's second 'wife' if she knows he is committing bigamy, or even be spectators if they actively encourage such a contest even by mere applause. "But a spectator's presence at a prize-fight docs not of itself constitute sufficient encouragement to amount to an aiding and abetting 1882 (8) Q.B.D. 534." It was also recognised that a man may effectively "aid and abet" a crime and at the very moment of its perpetration, without being present at the place where it is perpetrated. "To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must either render effective aid to the principal offender or else must be present and acquiesce in what he is doing. Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence, be must at least know the essential matters which constitute the offence 1951 (1) All. E.R. 412(414)." "But acquiescene sufficient to constitute the offence may be established by evidence of the accused persons motive and of his subsequent conduct 1951 (1) All. Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence, be must at least know the essential matters which constitute the offence 1951 (1) All. E.R. 412(414)." "But acquiescene sufficient to constitute the offence may be established by evidence of the accused persons motive and of his subsequent conduct 1951 (1) All. E.R. 464." In the category of "accessory before the fact" comes a person who "procures or advises" one or more of the principals to commit the felony. This "requires from him an instigation so active that a person who is merely shown to have acted as the stakeholder for a prize-fight which ended fatally, would nut be punishable as an accessory 1875 (2) C.C.R. 147." "The fact that a crime has been committed in a manner different from the mode which the accessory had advised will not excuse him from liability for it. But a man who has councelled a crime does not become liable as accessory if. instead of any form of the crime suggested, an entirely 'different offence is committed 1936 (2) All. E.R. 813." Kenny, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, New ed. by J.W.C. Turner, p. 88, points out that it is not always easy to decide whether or not the crime actually committed comes within the terms of the "incitement." so as to make the inciter legally responsible for it. He further observed that the courts in some of the older cases tended to "take a strict view of the facts" and refers by illustration to the case of R. v. Saunders, Kel. 52 (T.A.C ) and Archer in 1578. referred to in Plowden. 15. For obvious, reasons an act of suicide is not penal, even though an unsuccessful attempt at it is punishable. Suicide takes the victim or the perpetrator outside the purview of penal consequences, even though the common law in England at one time endeavoured to deter men from this crime by the threat of degradations to be inflicted upon the "suicide's corpose", which by a natural, if unreasoning association of ideas, were often a "potent deterrent", and also by threatening the forfeiture of his goods, a "vicarious punishment" which though falling wholly upon his surviving family, was likely often to appeal strongly to his sense of affection. Thus the man who feloniously took his own life was at one time "buried in the highway", with a stake through his body; and his goods were "forfeited". The burial of suicides lost its gruesome aspect in 1824 when the original mode was replaced by the practice of burial "between the hours of nine and twelve at night", without any service. In 1870, the confiscation of the goods of suicides was put to an end in the general abolition of forfeitures for felony. And in 1882, the statute removed every penalty, except the purely ecclesiastical one that the interment must not be solemnised by a burial service in the full ordinary Anglican form, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, New ed. by J.W.C.,, Turner, p. 138. 16. Halsbury, in Halsbury's Law of England, 4th -ed. paras 42 to 44 notices some of the English decisions in the matter of classification of offence and complicity in the crime. Thus, a person who '"assists the perpetrator at the time of its commission, or if he assists or encourages the perpetrator before its commission, was held liable 1970 (2) Q.B. 54 ." According to R.V. Gregory (1867) L.R.I. C.C.R. 77 "any person who aids, counsel or procures the commission of an offence, whether an offence at common law or by statute, and whether indictable or summary, is liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender." Mere presence at the commission of the crime is not enough to create criminal liability, nor is it enough that a person is present with a secret intention to assist the principal should assistance be required. Some encouragement or assistance must have been given to the principal either before or at the time of the commission of the crime with the intention of furthering its commission. Presence without more may, however, afford some evidence of aid and encouragement. It is an indictable offence at common law for a person to incite or solicit another to commit an offence. For an incitement to be complete, there must be some form of actual communication with a person whom it is intended to incite, where, however, a communication is sent with a view to incite, but does not reach the intended recipient the sender may be guilty of an attempt to incite. For an incitement to be complete, there must be some form of actual communication with a person whom it is intended to incite, where, however, a communication is sent with a view to incite, but does not reach the intended recipient the sender may be guilty of an attempt to incite. Incitement is complete though the mind of the person incited is unaffected and notwithstanding that person incited intends to inform on the inciter ; but there can be no incitement unless one person seeks to persuade or encourage another Halsbury's Laws of England, Paras 42 to 44. 17. It may be useful to notice some of the Indian decisions on the question of abetment. Among the early cases of abetment of suicide arose out of unfortunate incidents of Sati, which was common in India, at one time. A person who induced the woman to return to the pyre after she had once retired from it, and immolated herself, was held to have abetted suicide 1863 (1) R.L.P.J. 174. Where a women prepared to commit suicide in the presence of certain persons who followed her to the pyre, stood by her and one of them told the women to say 'Ram Ram' and "She would became sati", the facts were held sufficient to prove the active connivance of these persons and to justify the inference that they had engaged with her in a conspiracy to commit suicide 1871 (3) N.W.P. 316; (1933) A.L.J.R. 7. Where the accused prepared the funeral pyre, placed the victim's husband's body over it, and did not use any force to prevent her from sitting on the pyre and supplied her with ghee which she poured over the pyre were found guilty of abetment of suicide. Where a Hindu women was burnt in the act of becoming sati, those who assisted her in taking off her ornaments, supervised the cutting of her nails and the dying of her feet, prepared the pyre on which she sat herself and put the corpse upon the pyre, were all held guilty of abetment of suicide. The defence that the abettors were in fact "expecting a miracle and did not anticipate that the pyre would be ignited by human agency was rejected, 1928 (8) Pat. 74. The defence that the abettors were in fact "expecting a miracle and did not anticipate that the pyre would be ignited by human agency was rejected, 1928 (8) Pat. 74. Similarly, where the accused, who were members of a crowd, who had joined the funeral procession from the house of the victim to the cremation ground, and were shouting "Sati Mata Ki Jai" it was held that all those persons, who joined the procession were aiding the widow in becoming sati and were guilty of an offence under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1958 Cr. L J. 967, 1958 Raj. 143. 18. Some later decisions arising out of other instances of instigation throw further light on the question. In the case of Parimal Chatterjee and others A.l.R 1932 Cal. 760, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed that the word "instigate" literally means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act. A person may however not only instigate another, but he may co-operate with him and his Co- operation - may consist of a conjoint action and that would amount to abetment. In the case of State of Bihar v. Ranen Nath and other A.I.R. 1958 Patna 259, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court was construing Section 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act which uses the expressions Instigation and incitement' and observed that the words "should be read to signify something deeper than a mere asking of a person to do a particular act. There must be something in the nature of solicitation to constitute instigation or incitement" and it was held that the words seem to convey the meaning "to goad or urge forward or to provoke or encourage the doing of an act." It was further observed that what acts should amount to instigation or incitement within the meaning of that section will depend upon the "particular facts of each case", and that in some circumstances a "throw of a finger" or "a mere turning of the eye' may give rise to an inference of either "incitement or instigation", and yet in others even "strong words, expressly used, may not mean that the person using them was stimulating or suggesting to anyone to do a particular act." The court expressed the view that there must be something "tangible" in evidence to show that the persons responsible for such action were "deliberately trying to stir up other persons to bring about a certain object". According to a division bench of the Calcutta High Court, a person abets the doing of a thing when he or she, inter alia. "instigates any person to do that thing." The other modes of abetment, besides instigation, are "conspiracy and intentional aid". The word "instigation" literally means "to goad or urge forward to do an act." "It is something more than co- operation." In the case of Shri Ram and another, 1975 (2) S.C.R. 622 , the Supreme Court observed that in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have "intentionally" aided the commission of the crime. "Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abetter is not enough compliance with the requirements of Section 107". A person may, for example, "invite another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the invitee". But unless the invitation was extended "with intent to facilitate the commission of the murder", the person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor "happens to facilitate the commission of the crime". "Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Section 107". 19. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor "happens to facilitate the commission of the crime". "Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Section 107". 19. In case of suicide how the evidence is required to be appreciated has been stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of judgments. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, 2010 AIR(SC) 512, after considering various earlier judgments in para 15 observed that, "15. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, 2010 AIR(SC) 512, after considering various earlier judgments in para 15 observed that, "15. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable." "16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC." 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 has reiterated the legal position as regards Section 306 IPC which is long settled in para 12 and 13. Para 12 and 13 reads thus : "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigation a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. Para 12 and 13 reads thus : "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigation a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W. B. v. Orilal Jaiswal this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive or ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belongs and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstances individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 22. In Gcngula Mohan Reddy v. State of A.P., (2010) 1 SCC 750 the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 306 IPC held that: "Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, there cannot be any conviction. It was further held that to attract Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens tea to commit the offence." 23. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh., (2001) 9 SCC 618 . the Supreme Court held that "Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 24. In Sanju alias Sanjay v. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371 . the deceased committed suicide on 27.7.1998. whereas, the alleged quarrel had taken place on 25.7.1998 when it was alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. The Supreme Court in the said circumstances held that the fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27.7.1998 would itself clearly point out that it was not the direct result of the quarrel taken place on 25.7.1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had used the abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. 25. Taking note of various earlier judgments, in M. Mohan v. State Represented the Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3 SCC 626 . the Supreme Court held that "Abetment involves mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. There should be clear mens rea to commit offence under Section 306. It requires commission of direct or active act by accused which led deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and such act must be intended to push victim into a position that he commits suicide." 26. There should be clear mens rea to commit offence under Section 306. It requires commission of direct or active act by accused which led deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and such act must be intended to push victim into a position that he commits suicide." 26. On a close reading of the above provisions of the IPC, and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions, it is apparent that in a case under Section 306 IPC, there should be clear mens-rea to commit the offence under this Section and there should be direct or active act by the accused, which led the deceased to commit suicide, that is to say that there must be some evidence of "instigation", "cooperation" or "initial assistance" by the accused to commit suicide by the victim/deceased. 27. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 the Supreme Court observed vide Para 7 that: "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." It was a proposition relating to criminal prosecution. 28. In Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 . the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings under Section 306 on the ground that the allegations were irrelevant and baseless and observed that the High Court was in error in not quashing the proceedings. 29. Accepting the allegations made against the applicants by the prosecution as it is, they do not constitute the offence of abetment. the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings under Section 306 on the ground that the allegations were irrelevant and baseless and observed that the High Court was in error in not quashing the proceedings. 29. Accepting the allegations made against the applicants by the prosecution as it is, they do not constitute the offence of abetment. I am conscious of the fact that five persons of one family lost their lives on account of drastic step taken by them for no reason. It is very difficult to understand the mental state of mind of such persons who take an extreme step of putting an end to their life voluntarily by committing suicide." 41. I would also like to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Kishori Lal (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in Paragraph Nos.6 and 7 as under, “6. Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Sec. 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. 'Abetted' in Sec. 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence 7. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the deceased-wife with cruelty is not enough. See Mahinder Singh V/s. State of M.P., 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 4570. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the deceased-wife with cruelty is not enough. See Mahinder Singh V/s. State of M.P., 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 4570. Merely on the allegation of harassment conviction in terms of Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable. There is ample evidence on record that the deceased was disturbed because she had not given birth to any child. PWs. 8, 10, and 11 have categorically stated that the deceased was disappointed due to the said fact and her failure to beget a child and she was upset due to this.” 42. I would like to refer to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of S.S. Chheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan & Ors., reported in (2010) 12 SCC 190 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the ingredients for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC and where explaining the concept of abetment, Justice Dalveer Bhandari wrote as under, “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Sec. 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 43. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 43. Having regard to the provisions of Section 107 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions referred to in the case of Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh (supra) as well as other decisions as stated above, it is apparent that in a case under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, there should be correct mens rea to commit the offence under this section and there should be direct and active role by the accused, which led the deceased to commit the suicide, that is to say that there cannot be same evidence of "instigation" or "initial assistance" by the accused to commit suicide by the victim/deceased. However in the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the prosecution has failed to prove mens rea on the part of the appellant – accused by leading cogent, convincing, reliable and direct evidence, which clearly goes on to show the active involvement of the accused in the commission of crime. Therefore in view of the observations made hereinabove, I am persuaded to conclude that the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence under challenge cannot be sustained and, hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 44. 25. In the background of above law, if we re- examine the evidence on record, what appears that no specific incident of cruelty or willful conduct of the accused are narrated by any of the witnesses. Even such ingredients are missing in FIR. There are only general allegations. She was beaten, but when, why and for what circumstances or for what demand, nothing is coming on record by way of evidence. Also at no point of time, dispute between husband and wife arose or atleast surfaced on record. Thus neither direct nor inferential evidence regarding “cruelty” appears or proved by the prosecution. The stray domestic quarrels, perfunctory abuses by husband or in laws are common in Indian society. Also at no point of time, dispute between husband and wife arose or atleast surfaced on record. Thus neither direct nor inferential evidence regarding “cruelty” appears or proved by the prosecution. The stray domestic quarrels, perfunctory abuses by husband or in laws are common in Indian society. Crude and uncultured behaviour by the husband towards his wife being mundane would not form and constitute abetement unless these acts or conduct signally or cumulatively are found to be of such formidable and compelling nature as may lead to commission of suicide. Abetment is mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, accused cannot be convicted under section 306 of IPC. Therefore in view of the above observations, it can safely be said that the prosecution has failed to prove case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence cannot sustain and the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 45. In the result, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 17.07.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Palanpur in Sessions Case No.28/1998 is hereby quashed and set aside and the appellants – original accused nos.1 and 2 are acquitted of the offences with which they were charged by giving them the benefit of doubt. The appellants are on bail and, hence, their bail bonds stand cancelled and they shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Record & Proceedings be sent back to the concerned court forthwith.