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2024 DIGILAW 116 (HP)

Gopal Krishan v. State of H. P.

2024-02-26

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The informant was going to his home on 06.08.2021. When he reached near the shop of Ashok Kumar, he saw the petitioner/accused moving with a gun. The accused was challenging the people to touch the fence and threatening them to shoot, in case, any person dared to touch the fence. Surjeet Singh etc. were standing near the fence. When Surjeet Singh reached near the fence, Gopal Krishan shot at him. Surjeet Singh suffered an injury on his chest and fell. The wife of Gopal Krishan was moving with a bag, which was containing the cartridges. Gopal Krishan took the cartridge from his wife and again started threatening the people. The people ran away. Gopal Krishan and his wife remained on the spot. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR. Subsequently, Surjeet Singh succumbed to his injuries and Section 302 of IPC was added. The police conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC after the completion of the investigation. 2. The Learned Trial Court framed the charges against the accused-Gopal Krishan for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act. The learned Trial Court also framed charges against the petitioner-Asha Rani for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. 3. Being aggrieved from the order framing the charge, the present revision has been filed asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in framing the charge. No reasons were assigned while framing charges. The learned Trial Court is to sift the evidence to find out whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not. The petitioner-Gopal Krishan fired in exercise of his right of private defence against the crowd, which was damaging the property of the petitioner. The first fire was shot in the air to warn the hostile crowd. There was a grave and sudden provocation as per the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the charge should not have been framed against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4. In the petition filed by Asha Rani it was asserted that no offence is established against the petitioner. There was a grave and sudden provocation as per the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the charge should not have been framed against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 4. In the petition filed by Asha Rani it was asserted that no offence is established against the petitioner. There was no common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between Asha Rani and her husband. There was a demarcation dispute and the main accused fired in self-defence. No case is made out against the petitioner and continuation of the proceedings will result in harassment. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order framing the charge be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr. Mohit Thakur and Mr. Pawan Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 6. Mr. Mohit Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Court framing the charge is bound to record the reasons and failure to record the reasons vitiates the order passed by the learned Trial Court. In the present case, no reasons have been assigned and the orders suffer from patent illegality. He relied upon the judgments in Ghulam Hassan Beigh versus Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Ors., 2022 (12) SCC 657 , Kanchan Kumar vs. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 1562 of 2022 decided on 14.09.2022 Vikramjit Kakati versus State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No. 1140 of 2022 decided on 0408.2022, Shaji versus State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No. 2293 of 2023 and judgments of this Court in Suresh Chand versus State of H.P. in Cr.MMO No. 554 of 2018 decided on 31.08.2020, State of H.P versus Rajinder Singh, CrMMO No. 113 of 2019 decided on 26.11.2019 and Varun Bhardwaj vs. State of H.P., Latest HLJ 2017 (H.P.) 707 in support of his submission. He has also filed the written arguments, which have also been perused by me. 7. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that there is no requirement to record the detailed reasons and the learned Trial Court had recorded the detailed reasons while dismissing the application for discharge filed by Asha Rani. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that the Court has to look into the material placed before it at the time of framing of charge. It was observed: “7. It is trite law that the application of judicial mind is necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only. 9. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only. 9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O. 10. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held: “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.” 11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 10. It was submitted that the Court is required to record the reasons while framing the charge. In Tara Dutt versus State of H.P., 1991 Cr. Law Journal, 3339, this Court discussed the relevant law and held that there is no requirement of writing a detailed order and it is sufficient that an inference can be drawn that the Court was aware of the material on the record justifying the framing of the charge. It was observed: “42. Both under Ss. 228 and 240 Cr. P.C. the accused person has a right to be heard before the trial Court forms an opinion that there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. This right, coupled with the fact that the trial court has to consider the record of the case and the evidence brought by the prosecution on it till then, does suggest that the attention of the Court should, at that stage, be attracted to the material for and against the accused even for the opinion that the material disclosed grave suspicion that the accused person has committed an offence. The trial court should, therefore, pass a speaking order in the sense that it should appear to a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over it that the trial court was alive to the material for and against the accused existing on the record of the case till that stage. The order should not be cryptic or laconic or a bald one merely saying that “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. Such an order, by itself, cannot be characterised as disclosing application of mind by the Court but where the order ex - facie, or read with some earlier order made by the trial court, can reasonably lead to an inference that the trial court was alive to the material which was relevant, the order would be unexceptionable and would not call for interference only on the ground that it does not specifically refer to each and every piece of evidence incriminating the accused persons which had been placed on the record of the case for the consideration of the Court till that stage. 43. There is another manner of looking at the matter. Since, giving elaborate reasons for the opinion that a charge should be framed in the case is ruled out, by necessary implication, by the provisions of the Code noticed earlier, all that the law would require in such a case would be that the order of the trial court is such as leads to an inference that the Court was aware of the material on the record justifying the framing of charge. In other words, the order should disclose ex facie that the Court had not proceeded mechanically in framing the charge merely because an accusation had been made by the prosecution against the accused persons but that it had looked into the material brought on the record till then. That would be sufficient compliance with the requirements of law. After all, the opinion that there was material disclosing ‘grave suspicion’ that the accused persons had committed an offence, is to be formed by a judicial officer trained to examine things objectively without being influenced by considerations of policy or expediency. The training of the judicial mind in that respect is a sufficient guarantee of the fact that he would base his opinion on relevant material. 44. The training of the judicial mind in that respect is a sufficient guarantee of the fact that he would base his opinion on relevant material. 44. One of the submissions of Shri Chandel is that inasmuch as the correctness or propriety of the order was also open to scrutiny by the revisional Court, the requirement of a speaking order in the sense that it contains reasons, therefore, should be necessarily there even in the matter of framing of a charge by the trial court. This submission overlooks that while exercising powers of revision under S. 397 Cr. P.C. the revisional Court may call for and examine the record of any proceedings before an inferior criminal court before deciding whether the order under challenge merits interference or not. The revisional court invariably does so except where it feels that the challenge is unsustainable on the face of it for some legally permissible ground. This ensures that the fact of the existence or otherwise of relevant material, leading to the opinion formed by the trial court that the case was one in which there existed grounds to do so, on the record will normally be available for scrutiny by the revisional court. xxx 46. The submission that the order should be so worded as to give an idea to the accused person as to why the plea made on his behalf for not framing the charge against him came to be rejected by the Court overlooks, firstly, that reasons are not to be given for such an order under the Scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, secondly, that an order of the nature canvassed for by Shri Chandel may sometimes give rise to a plea on behalf of the accused person that the Court had disclosed its mind regarding his culpability at that early stage itself. Obviously, such a situation is to be avoided when the culpability or otherwise of the accused person is yet to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be brought before the Court at the trial.” 11. This question was also considered in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 303: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 137, and it was held that there is no legal requirement to pass an order specifying the reasons for framing charges. This question was also considered in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 303: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 137, and it was held that there is no legal requirement to pass an order specifying the reasons for framing charges. Framing of the charge itself is a prima facie order that the Trial Judge has formed the opinion upon considering the police record and the documents that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. It was observed: “8. We wish to point out that if the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of the charge itself is a prima facie order that the trial Judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. Chapter XIX deals with provisions for a trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report. Section 239 reads thus: “239. When accused shall be discharged.—(1) If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.” 9. The said section shows that the Magistrate is obliged to record his reasons if he decides to discharge the accused. The next section (Section 240) reads thus: “240. Framing of charge.—(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 10. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 10. It is pertinent to note that this section required a Magistrate to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he forms the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence which he is competent to try. In such a situation he is only required to frame a charge in writing against the accused. 11. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per the first sub-section of Section 245, if a Magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub-section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections, he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a Court of Session, the Judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge. 12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such extra work? The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate it if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as the issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, and passing over to the next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the court should avoid expressing one way or the other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 13. In the present case as the Metropolitan Magistrate has chosen to frame the charge, the High Court, when moved by the accused for quashment of the charge, could have re-examined the records to consider whether the charge framed was sustainable or not. If the High Court decides to quash the charge it is open to the High Court to record the reasons thereof. The present order of the High Court is one of setting aside the charge without stating any reason. But the direction to the Magistrate to consider the materials once again and then to frame a charge for the same offence (if the Magistrate reaches the opinion that there is ground for presuming the commission of the offence) is simply to repeat what the Metropolitan Magistrate had done once at the first instance. To ask him to do the same thing over again is adding unnecessary extra work on the trial court. Be that as it may, the State has not challenged the order of the High Court. Hence we are not in a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. We leave the order as such by making the aforementioned observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or Section 240 of the Code as he deems fit in the light of the observations made above.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. We leave the order as such by making the aforementioned observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or Section 240 of the Code as he deems fit in the light of the observations made above.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. It was held in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2014) 13 SCC 137 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 614: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 545, that the reasons are required to be recorded for discharging the accused but no reasons are required to frame the charge. It was observed: “7. Chapter XVIII CrPC deals with “Trial before a Court of Session”. As per Section 226, when the accused person is brought before the court in pursuance of a commitment of the case under Section 209, the prosecutor is required to open his case by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. 8. Section 227 deals with discharge and it reads as follows: “227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” As per the aforesaid provision, upon consideration of the records of the case and the documents submitted before him and after hearing the submissions of the party accused and the prosecution if the Judge is of the opinion that no sufficient ground is made out to proceed against the accused, he is required to discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. 9. Section 228 relates to the framing of charge as follows: “228. 9. Section 228 relates to the framing of charge as follows: “228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” From sub-section (1) of Section 228, it is clear that after such consideration and hearing, as given under Section 227, if the Judge forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the Judge may frame the charge(s). 10. From Section 228 it is clear that no separate hearing is required to be given for framing the charge if the accused is not discharged upon consideration of the record of the case and documents and after hearing the submissions under Section 227. 11. Relative scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC was noticed and considered by this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [ (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986]. This Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 477-79, paras 17 & 19) “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. This Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 477-79, paras 17 & 19) “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the ‘record of the case’ and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exist, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for the exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. *** 19. At the initial stage of framing a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is whether the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] : (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) ‘4. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] : (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) ‘4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If “the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, “the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused”, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for the conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for the conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of the pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.’ (emphasis in original) 12. In the instant case, it is not alleged that the Sessions Judge has not followed Sections 226 and 227 CrPC before framing the charge. In the instant case, it is not alleged that the Sessions Judge has not followed Sections 226 and 227 CrPC before framing the charge. Further, it is not the case of the appellant that the court has not given him a hearing at the stage of discharge under Section 227 CrPC. For framing of a charge under Section 228, the Judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such a charge is framed. On perusal of the record and hearing the parties at the stage of discharge under Section 227 CrPC if the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is competent to frame a charge for such offence even if not mentioned in the charge-sheet. We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.” 13. It was held in Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 581: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1540, that the Judges are not required to record detailed reasons or conduct an elaborate inquiry while framing charges. It was observed: 17. As discussed above, in the present case, upon hearing the parties and considering the allegations in the charge sheet, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The order dated 12-12-2018 framing the charges is not a detailed order. For framing the charges under Section 228 CrPC, the Judge is not required to record detailed reasons. As pointed out earlier, at the stage of framing the charge, the court is not required to hold an elaborate enquiry; only a prima facie case is to be seen. As held in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 303, while exercising power under Section 228 CrPC, the Judge is not required to record his reasons for framing the charges against the accused. Upon hearing the parties and based upon the allegations and taking note of the allegations in the charge sheet, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and framed the charges against the accused-Respondents 1 and 2. Upon hearing the parties and based upon the allegations and taking note of the allegations in the charge sheet, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge was satisfied that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and framed the charges against the accused-Respondents 1 and 2. While so, the High Court was not right in interfering with the order of the trial court framing the charges against the accused-Respondents 1 and 2 under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and the High Court, in our view, erred in quashing the charges framed against the accused. The impugned order cannot therefore be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 14. Thus, it is apparent from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court that the Court is not required to give elaborate reasons while framing the charges and the order framing the charge by itself is sufficient to show that the mind was applied and the material was perused. 15. In Kanchan Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court does not act as a mere post office and it has to sift the evidence to determine that there is sufficient material on record to frame the charge. This judgment does not state that elaborate reasons are required to be recorded while framing the charge and does not help the petitioner. 16. In Vikramjit Kakadi (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where there was no material on record to connect the accused with the commission of an offence, the accused was entitled to be discharged. In Shaji (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a duty is cast upon the Court to satisfy itself whether a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is made out or not before proceeding with the trial of an accused for murder. 17. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a criminal trial, the prosecution can lead the evidence as per the charge framed by the learned Trial Court; therefore, it is more prudent and rationale that the charge should be framed for the allegations originally put forth. It was observed: “34. We may now proceed to consider the issue on hand from a different angle. It was observed: “34. We may now proceed to consider the issue on hand from a different angle. It is a settled position of law that in a criminal trial, the prosecution can lead evidence only in accordance with the charge framed by the trial court. Where a higher charge is not framed for which there is evidence, the accused is entitled to assume that he is called upon to defend himself only with regard to the lesser offence for which he has been charged. It is not necessary then for him to meet evidence relating to the offences with which he has not been charged. He is merely to answer the charge as framed. The Code does not require him to meet all evidence led by the prosecution. He has only to rebut 12 pieces of evidence bearing on the charge. The prosecution case is necessarily limited by the charge. It forms the foundation of the trial which starts with it and the accused can justifiably concentrate on meeting the subject-matter of the charge against him. He need not cross-examine witnesses with regard to offences he is not charged with nor need he give any evidence in defence in respect of such charges. 35. Once the trial court decides to discharge an accused person from the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and proceeds to frame the lesser charge for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution thereafter would not be in a position to lead any evidence beyond the charge as framed. To put it otherwise, the prosecution will be thereafter compelled to proceed as if it has now to establish only the case of culpable homicide and not murder. On the other hand, even if the trial court proceeds to frame a charge under Section 302 IPC in accordance with the case put up by the prosecution still it would be open for the accused to persuade the Court at the end of the trial that the case falls only within the ambit of culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 of IPC. In such circumstances, in the facts of the present case, it would be more prudent to permit the prosecution to lead appropriate evidence whatever it is worth in accordance with its original case as put up in the chargesheet. In such circumstances, in the facts of the present case, it would be more prudent to permit the prosecution to lead appropriate evidence whatever it is worth in accordance with its original case as put up in the chargesheet. Such approach of the trial court at times may prove to be more rationale and prudent.” 18. The judgment in Ghulam Hassan Beigh (supra) was delivered by a Three Judge Bench and shows that the Court can frame the charge under Section 302 of IPC and the defence can always claim that the accused should be held guilty of the commission of the lesser offence, whereas, if the charges are framed for the commission of offence punishable under Section 304 of IPC, no evidence can be led to prove the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Therefore, the former course is preferable to the latter course. Hence, the judgment Shaji (supra) will not help the petitioner. 19. In Suresh Chand (supra), the Court was concerned with the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and held that the Court is not expected to act as a post office and charge the accused based on the material presented before it. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law. 20. In Rajender (supra), the Court held that an elaborate inquiry is not to be conducted and the Court has to see whether the evidence on record would connect the accused with the commission of crime or not. Ultimately, it was held that no offence was made out and the learned Sessions Judge was justified in discharging the accused. The question whether detailed reasons are required to be recorded or not was never considered in these judgments. 21. In the present case, the petitioner accused Asha Rani filed an application for seeking discharge. The Court dismissed the application after passing a detailed reasons. It was held in para 4 of the order that Asha Rani along with co-accused in furtherance of their common intention had committed a murder by gunshot. She was carrying cartridges in the polythene, which were supplied to the co-accused, who loaded the gun. She was aware that her husband had fired a gunshot, but still, she helped him to reload the gun. This shows that the learned Trial Court had considered the relevant material on record before deciding to frame the charges. 22. She was carrying cartridges in the polythene, which were supplied to the co-accused, who loaded the gun. She was aware that her husband had fired a gunshot, but still, she helped him to reload the gun. This shows that the learned Trial Court had considered the relevant material on record before deciding to frame the charges. 22. It was mentioned in the charge sheet presented before the Court that the accused-Gopal Krishan revealed on inquiry that he had fenced his land. The brothers of Ashok Kumar had constructed the shops on the land purchased by their father. Ashok Kumar had filed an application for demarcation. No demarcation was conducted and the revenue official left the spot. Some persons remained on the spot including Surjeet Singh. Gopal Krishan and his wife Asha Rani came to the spot with a gun. Surjeet Singh was trying to damage the fence on which Gopal Krishan became angry. He fired a gunshot in the air and when Surjeet Singh did not run away, he shot at him and Surjeet Singh fell. 23. Reliance was placed upon this part of the charge sheet to submit that the accused had exercised of his right of private defence. This submission is not acceptable. First, the statement made by the accused to the police during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be used as a legally admissible piece of evidence. Secondly, Section 103 of IPC provides that the right of private defence of the property extends to causing the death in case of robbery, house breaking by night, mischief by fire committed to any building used as a human dwelling, theft, mischief or house-trespass which will cause an apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence. 24. In the present case, even if the statement of the petitioner/accused is accepted to be correct, it was a case of mischief by causing damage to the fence but there was no apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be caused; hence, there was no right of private defence extending to the causing of the death. 25. The accused/petitioner-Gopal Krishan was armed with the double barrel gun. His wife was carrying the cartridges with her. 25. The accused/petitioner-Gopal Krishan was armed with the double barrel gun. His wife was carrying the cartridges with her. The mere fact that he had fired in the air will not take his case out of the purview of Section 300 of IPC when he had fired the second shot towards Surjeet Singh, which had hit him in the eye, as per the result of the investigation, causing his death. Aiming the shot towards the eye — a vital part of the body can lead to no other inference except that the petitioner intended to cause death, hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in framing the charges for the commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 26. Petitioner-Asha Rani was carrying a polythene having cartridges in it, which were supplied to the petitioner/accused Gopal Krishan after he had fired the gunshot. These facts clearly show that she was aiding him and was sharing the common intention with him. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charge for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC. Section 34 of IPC was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jasdeep Singh vs. State of Punjab 2022 (2) SCC 545 as under: 17. We shall first go back into history to understand Section 34 IPC as it stood at its inception and as it exists now. Old Section 34 of IPC New Section 34 of IPC "When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone" "When a Criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were by him alone" 18. On comparison, one could decipher that the phrase "in furtherance of the common intention" was added to the statute book subsequently. It was first coined by Chief Justice Barnes Peacock presiding over a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, while delivering its decision in Queen v. Gorachand Gope, (1866 SCC OnLine Cal 16) which would have probably inspired and hastened the amendment to Section 34 IPC, made in 1870. It was first coined by Chief Justice Barnes Peacock presiding over a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, while delivering its decision in Queen v. Gorachand Gope, (1866 SCC OnLine Cal 16) which would have probably inspired and hastened the amendment to Section 34 IPC, made in 1870. The following passage may lend credence to the aforesaid possible view: "It does not follow that, because they were present with the intention of taking him away, that they assisted by their presence in the beating of him to such an extent as to cause death. If the object and design of those who seized Amordi was merely to take him to the thannah on a charge of theft, and it was no part of the common design to beat him, they would not all be liable for the consequence of the beating merely because they were present. It is laid down that, when several persons are in a company together engaged in one common purpose, lawful or unlawful, and one of them, without the knowledge or consent of the others, commits an offence, the others will not be involved in the guilt, unless the act done was in some manner in furtherance of the common intention. It is also said, that although a man is present when a felony is committed, if he takes no part in it, and does not act in concert with those who commit it, he will not be a principal merely because he did not endeavour to prevent it or to apprehend the felon. But if several persons go out together for the purpose of apprehending a man and taking him to the thannah on a charge of theft, and some of the party in the presence of the others beat and ill-treat the man in a cruel and violent manner, and the others stand by and look on without endeavouring to dissuade them from their cruel and violent conduct, it appears to me that those who have to deal with the facts might very properly infer that they were all assenting parties and acting in concert and that the beating was in furtherance of a common design. I do not know what the evidence was, all that I wish to point out is, that all who are present do not necessarily assist by their presence every act that is done in their presence, nor are consequently liable to be punished as principals." 19. Before we deal further with Section 34 IPC, a peep at Section 33 IPC may give a better understanding. Section 33 IPC brings into its fold a series of acts as that of a single one. Therefore, in order to attract Section 34 to 39 IPC, a series of acts done by several persons would be related to a single act which constitutes a criminal offence. A similar meaning is also given to the word omission, meaning thereby, a series of omissions would also mean a single omission. This provision would thus make it clear that an act would mean and include other acts along with it. 20. Section 34 IPC creates a deeming fiction by infusing and importing a criminal act constituting an offence committed by one, into others, in pursuance to a common intention. The onus is on the prosecution to prove the common intention to the satisfaction of the court. The quality of evidence will have to be substantial, concrete, definite and clear. When a part of evidence produced by the prosecution to bring the accused within the fold of Section 34 IPC is disbelieved, the remaining part will have to be examined with adequate care and caution, as we are dealing with a case of vicarious liability fastened on the accused by treating him at par with the one who actually committed the offence. 21. What is required is proof of common intention. Thus, there may be an offence without common intention, in which case Section 34 IPC does not get attracted. 22. It is a team effort akin to a game of football involving several positions manned by many, such as defender, mid-fielder, striker, and keeper. A striker may hit the target, while a keeper may stop an attack. The consequence of the match, either a win or a loss, is borne by all the players, though they may have their distinct roles. A goal scored or saved may be the final act, but the result is what matters. As against the specific individuals who had impacted more, the result is shared between the players. The consequence of the match, either a win or a loss, is borne by all the players, though they may have their distinct roles. A goal scored or saved may be the final act, but the result is what matters. As against the specific individuals who had impacted more, the result is shared between the players. The same logic is the foundation of Section 34 IPC which creates shared liability on those who shared the common intention to commit the crime. 23. The intendment of Section 34 IPC is to remove the difficulties in distinguishing the acts of individual members of a party, acting in furtherance of a common intention. There has to be a simultaneous conscious mind of the persons participating in the criminal action of bringing about a particular result. A common intention qua its existence is a question of fact and also requires an act "in furtherance of the said intention". One need not search for concrete evidence, as it is for the court to come to a conclusion on a cumulative assessment. It is only a rule of evidence and thus does not create any substantive offence. 24. Normally, in an offence committed physically, the presence of an accused charged under Section 34 IPC is required, especially in a case where the act attributed to the accused is one of instigation/exhortation. However, there are exceptions, in particular, when an offence consists of diverse acts done at different times and places. Therefore, it has to be seen on a case-to-case basis. 25. The word "furtherance" indicates the existence of aid or assistance in producing an effect in future. Thus, it has to be construed as an advancement or promotion. 26. There may be cases where all acts, in general, would not come under the purview of Section 34 IPC, but only those done in furtherance of the common intention having adequate connectivity. When we speak of intention it has to be one of criminality with the adequacy of knowledge of any existing fact necessary for the proposed offence. Such an intention is meant to assist, encourage, promote and facilitate the commission of a crime with the requisite knowledge as aforesaid. 27. The existence of common intention is obviously the duty of the prosecution to prove. However, a court has to analyse and assess the evidence before implicating a person under Section 34 IPC. Such an intention is meant to assist, encourage, promote and facilitate the commission of a crime with the requisite knowledge as aforesaid. 27. The existence of common intention is obviously the duty of the prosecution to prove. However, a court has to analyse and assess the evidence before implicating a person under Section 34 IPC. A mere common intention per se may not attract Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance. There may also be cases where a person despite being an active participant in forming a common intention to commit a crime, may actually withdraw from it later. Of course, this is also one of the facts for the consideration of the court. Further, the fact that all accused charged with an offence read with Section 34 IPC are present at the commission of the crime, without dissuading themselves or others might well be a relevant circumstance, provided a prior common intention is duly proved. Once again, this is an aspect which is required to be looked into by the court on the evidence placed before it. It may not be required on the part of the defence to specifically raise such a plea in a case where adequate evidence is available before the court. xxxxx 36. Referring to the facts of this case, the short question which arises for adjudication in this appeal is whether the appellant Virendra Singh can be convicted under section 302 with the aid of section 34 IPC. Under the Penal Code, the persons who are connected with the preparation of a crime are divided into two categories: (1) those who actually commit the crime i.e. principals in the first degree; and (2) those who aid in the actual commission i.e. principals in the second degree. The law does not make any distinction with regard to the punishment of such persons, all being liable to be punished alike. 37. Under the Penal Code, a person is responsible for his own act. A person can also be vicariously responsible for the acts of others if he had a common intention to commit the acts or if the offence is committed by any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, then also he can be vicariously responsible. A person can also be vicariously responsible for the acts of others if he had a common intention to commit the acts or if the offence is committed by any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, then also he can be vicariously responsible. Under the Penal Code, two sections, namely, Sections 34 and 149, deal with the circumstances when a person is vicariously responsible for the acts of others. 38. The vicarious or constructive liability under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions stand fulfilled i.e. the mental element or the intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual participation in one form or the other in the commission of the crime. 39. The common intention postulates the existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds. It is the intention to commit the crime and the accused can be convicted only if such an intention has been shared by all the accused. Such a common intention should be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such a crime is committed. In most of the cases, it is difficult to procure direct evidence of such intention. In most cases, it can be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances. Therefore, in inferring the common intention under section 34 IPC, the evidence and documents on record acquire great significance and they have to be very carefully scrutinized by the court. This is particularly important in cases where evidence regarding the development of the common intention to commit the offence graver than the one originally designed, during the execution of the original plan, should be clear and cogent. 40. The dominant feature of Section 34 is the element of intention and participation in action. This participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert. 41. The essence of Section 34 IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons participating in a criminal action to bring about a particular result. Russell in his celebrated book Russell on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. This participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert. 41. The essence of Section 34 IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons participating in a criminal action to bring about a particular result. Russell in his celebrated book Russell on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. 1 indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect in future and adds that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken for the purpose of effecting that felony. It was observed by Russell that any act of preparation for the commission of a felony is done in furtherance of the act. 42. Section 34 IPC does not create any distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of constructive liability. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In order to incur joint liability for an offence there must be a prearranged and premeditated concert between the accused persons for doing the act actually done, though there might not be a long interval between the act and the premeditation and though the plan may be formed suddenly. In order that Section 34 IPC may apply, it is not necessary that the prosecution must prove that the act was done by a particular or a specified person. In fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and on the facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under that section read with section 34." 27. In R vs. Rahman, 2008 UKHL 45 one of the assailants was armed with a knife and the appellants were armed with sticks. There was no evidence that the appellants had inflicted injuries. These facts were noticed as under: 4. There was no evidence that any of the appellants inflicted the fatal injuries. The participant who did was probably not apprehended. There was no evidence that the appellants had inflicted injuries. These facts were noticed as under: 4. There was no evidence that any of the appellants inflicted the fatal injuries. The participant who did was probably not apprehended. The prosecution alleged that the role of each appellant in the attack involved either the deliberate and intentional infliction of serious physical harm to the deceased or, by their conduct, the intentional encouragement of others to do likewise; that each appellant shared a common intention that serious bodily harm should be inflicted; and that the circumstances of the attack were such that each of them knew that weapons such as baseball bats, a scaffolding pole and a knife or knives might be used to inflict serious bodily harm. 5. The evidence of each appellant was that he had joined the enterprise with at most an intention to cause serious harm, without knowledge or foresight that anyone else involved in the assault intended to kill, that he did not have a knife and did not know or foresee that anyone else had a knife and that, accordingly, the acts of the primary offender were outside the scope of any joint enterprise to inflict serious bodily harm. The first, second and fourth-named appellants denied participation in the fatal assault. The third-named appellant admitted being present, wearing a balaclava, with intent to join in the assault but said that before striking any blow he had been stunned by a blow to his head caused by a brick thrown by the deceased’s friend. 28. It was held that when one knew about the availability of the weapon which could cause the fatal injury, all would be liable. It was observed: 10. But there is what Sir Robin Cooke in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, p 175, called a “wider principle". In R v Powell (Anthony), R v English, above, as Lord Hutton made plain in the opening sentence of his leading opinion (p 16), the House had to consider a more difficult question: the liability of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise when another participant in that enterprise is guilty of a crime, the commission of which was not the purpose of the enterprise. In the first appeal, that of Powell and Daniels, three men (including the two appellants) had gone to the house of a drug dealer in order to buy drugs, but when he had come to the door one of the three men (it was not clear which) had shot him dead. Since neither Powell nor Daniels could be identified as the gunman, they could be convicted only as accessories, but it was submitted on their behalf that they could not be convicted as accessories unless it was proved against them, to the criminal standard, that they had had the mens rea necessary for murder, namely an intention to kill or to cause really serious injury. An accessory could not, it was argued, be convicted on a basis, which would not suffice to convict the primary killer. 11. While acknowledging an element of an anomaly in its decision (Lord Steyn, p 14; Lord Hutton, p 25), the House rejected that submission. Drawing on a strong line of authority which included R v Smith (Wesley) [1963] 1 WLR 1200; R v Anderson; R v Morris [1966] 2 QB 110; Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, above; Hui-Chi-ming v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 34; and McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 69 ALJR 621 the House held (p 21) that “participation in a joint criminal enterprise with foresight or contemplation of an act as a possible incident of that enterprise is sufficient to impose criminal liability for that act carried out by another participant in the enterprise". Thus the House answered the certified question in the appeal of Powell and Daniels and the first certified question in the appeal of English by stating that (subject to the ruling on the second certified question in English) “it is sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary party to have realised that in the course of the joint enterprise, the primary party might kill with intent to do so or with intent to cause grievous bodily harm". Thus in this context, the touchstone is one of foresight. In the case of Powell and Daniels the Crown, the case was that the two appellants knew that the third man was armed with a gun, and the Crown accepted that if the jury did not find that they knew this they would not be guilty of murder (p 17). Thus in this context, the touchstone is one of foresight. In the case of Powell and Daniels the Crown, the case was that the two appellants knew that the third man was armed with a gun, and the Crown accepted that if the jury did not find that they knew this they would not be guilty of murder (p 17). Since the jury was convicted, it may be inferred that they found the appellants did have this knowledge. Possession of the gun was not of itself conclusive, but it was evidence from which the jury could infer that the appellants foresaw (or “realised” or “contemplated”) that the gun might be used to inflict, at least, really serious injury. 29. Closer home, this question was considered in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 and it was held that when the accused went to the house of the deceased armed with deadly weapons, their common intention was duly proved. It was observed: “42. In Ram Tahal and others v. The State of U.P. AIR 1972 SC 254 , while dealing with the applicability of Section 34 of the IPC, a two-judge Bench observed: “There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert, and though it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, yet it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence, for instance, that all of them had left the scene of the incident together, and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted.” 43. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted.” 43. In Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2000 SC 160 , a two-judge Bench has held that: “the existence of common intention can be inferred from the attending circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties. No direct evidence of common intention is necessary. For the purpose of common intention, even the participation in the commission of the offence need not be proved in all cases.” 44. In Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato and others v. State of West Bengal AIR 2006 SC 302 , it has been held that for the purpose of attracting Section 34 of the IPC, a specific overt act on the part of the accused is not necessary. He may even wait and watch. Inaction on the part of an accused may sometimes go a long way to achieving a common intention or an object with others. 45. In Manik Das and others v. State of Assam AIR 2007 SC 2274 , it has been held as follows:- “The Section does not say “the common intention of all”, nor does it say “and intention common to all”. Under the provisions of Section 34, the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law, it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused the death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1993 SC 1899 ). Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1993 SC 1899 ). Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.” 46. Coming to the case at hand, the appellant had an inimical relationship with the deceased and his family as the previous occurrences would show. Despite a consensus being arrived at that, there would be a panchayat on 26.9.2002, they, armed with deadly weapons, went to the house of the deceased and dragged the deceased. The previous meeting of minds with a pre-arranged plan or prior concert, as has been held by a number of authorities, is difficult to establish by way of direct evidence. They are to be inferred from the conduct and circumstances. As is evincible, the weapons they carried were lethal in nature. The deceased was absolutely helpless and not armed with any weapon. It was most unexpected on their part as normally it was expected that there would be a panchayat on the next day.” 30. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charge against petitioner-Asha for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. 31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that the revisional court does not sit in appeal over the order sought to be revised and only examines the legality or regularity of the procedure. It was observed: 13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “12. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 14. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has also laid down principles to be considered for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P.C. is sought for as under: “27. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 14. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has also laid down principles to be considered for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr. P.C. is sought for as under: “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for the proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.9. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material based on which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit the continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 15. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.” 32. In the present case, order framing charge is duly supported by the charge-sheet. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with the same. 33. Hence, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever, on the merits of the case.