JUDGMENT : 1. Employer – Gujarat Vidhyut Board (erstwhile) now Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd., (hereinafter referred as Corporation) has filed this petition challenging the award of Industrial Court, Rajkot dated 06.02.2017 in Reference (IT) No.79 of 2015 (Old Reference (IT) No.51 of 2004) wherein the petitioner was directed to count service of the respondent – employee as continuous in the establishment from his initial date of appointment. 2. Facts in brief as referred in the petition are as under: 2.1. Respondent employee was appointed on 05.06.1980 as Helper at 66 K.V. Sub Station, Kandla-Kutch. On 16.10.1982, the petitioner-corporation (erstwhile GEB) issued circular No.371 wherein, it was decided to consider individual employee’s services rendered on work charge establishment and/or on temporary basis, as continuous service if the terms and conditions of circular are fulfilled. It is case of the petitioner that the respondent employee worked as a temporary work charge Helper from 14.07.1983 to 14.09.1983 continuously i.e. 60 days before he was regularized as a permanent employee on 04.06.1984. The employee addressed a communication in the year 1986, with a request to consider his case for regularization from the date of joining. In response to communication of the employee, relying upon Circular No.371 dated 16.10.1982, a letter dated 28.01.1986 was addressed by petitioner replying that under the said circular, you would not be entitled to benefit. Thereafter, the employee raised dispute in the year 2004, raising demand of regularization from initial date of appointment registered as Reference (IT) No.51 of 2004, which was thereafter renumbered as Reference (IT) No.79 of 2015. Upon adjudication, Industrial Court, Rajkot directed the petitioner-corporation to count service of respondent-employee as continuous service in the establishment from his initial date of appointment, aggrieved by which, present petition is filed. 3. Heard Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner – employer and Mr. Kiritdev Dave, learned advocate for respondent No.1 – employee. 4. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the award of the Industrial Court, Rajkot dated 06.02.2017 is erroneous on the following grounds: (i) Undisputedly, the employee’s services were regularized as permanent employee in the establishment w.e.f. 04.06.1984. Thereafter, the employee addressed communication dated 28.01.1986, seeking regularization from his initial date of appointment. It was replied under letter dated 28.01.1986, and informed that respondent-employee would not be entitled for regularization under GEB circular No.371. Thereafter, the employee addressed communication dated 28.01.1986, seeking regularization from his initial date of appointment. It was replied under letter dated 28.01.1986, and informed that respondent-employee would not be entitled for regularization under GEB circular No.371. Since the said communication was not challenged by the respondent- employee, it was not open to raise a dispute before Industrial Court. (ii) Further, though the service of the respondent-employee was regularized w.e.f. 04.06.1984, the dispute was raised in the year 2004, i.e. after 24 years. The Industrial Court therefore, erred in not considering the delay in raising the dispute. On this ground alone the award of Industrial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. Thus, the reference itself deserved to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches and acquiescence. (iii) On merits, the respondent – employee had worked as temporary work charge helper from 14.07.1983 to 14.09.1983 continuously (only for two months). Thus, the employee had completed only 60 days before he was regularized as permanent employee on 04.06.1984. Circular No.371 of GEB, provides that for regularization, the employee is to work continuously for 240 days during period of 12 calendar months or 120 days during the period of 06 calendar months. In this case admittedly, neither the employee had worked continuously for 240 days during 12 calendar months nor he had completed 120 days during the period of 06 calendar months and, therefore, the benefits of the circular No.371 of GEB cannot be extended to him. (iv) Placing reliance on employee’s cross-examination, learned advocate submitted that in the cross-examination dated 18.07.2013, the employee had stated that prior to his regularization w.ef. 04.06.1984, he had not completed 240 days. (v) Placing heavy reliance on the statement of claim, learned advocate submitted that as per his own statement of claim the employee had completed 120 days in the year 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983. Thus, admittedly, the respondent – employee had not completed had not completed 120 days during the period of 06 calendar months and therefore Circular No. 371 would not be applicable. (vi) Further, the Tribunal had placed sole reliance on the cases of other employees namely, Mr. R.M.Goswami, Mr. M.N.Bhatt and Y.B. Joshi. The said contention is misconceived because all have been granted benefits by mistake. Benefit erroneously granted may not be ground for claiming relief and negative equality cannot be extended for granting the benefits. (vi) Further, the Tribunal had placed sole reliance on the cases of other employees namely, Mr. R.M.Goswami, Mr. M.N.Bhatt and Y.B. Joshi. The said contention is misconceived because all have been granted benefits by mistake. Benefit erroneously granted may not be ground for claiming relief and negative equality cannot be extended for granting the benefits. Relief wrongly given cannot be claimed. In this case, respondent – employee was rightly granted the benefit from 04.06.1984 and, therefore, the award deserves to be quashed and set aside. Further, the employee had raised the dispute after delay of 24 years and that too on the ground of relief erroneously granted to some other employees. If the same is considered at this stage it will upturn the seniority of many employees, which is not permissible under the settled principle of law and, therefore, also the petition deserves consideration. (vii) Reliance has been placed on following decisions by the petitioner :(1) R. Muthukumar & Ors. vs. Chairman and Managing Director, Tangedco & Ors. reported in 2022 (3) SCC 240 and (2) Ghulam Rasool Lone vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in 2009 (15) SCC 321 . 5. On the other hand, Mr. Kiritdev Dave, learned advocate for the respondent – employee submitted that the award of the Industrial Court being based on the evidence on record does not call for interference. He submitted that the Tribunal has rightly considered that in cases of similarly situated employees, benefits have been extended from the date of their initial appointment. More so in the cases on which the reliance has been placed by the Industrial Court, the employees have not completed 240 days in a year and, therefore, the case of the respondent cannot be discriminated. Most importantly, it is not disputed by the petitioner – corporation that in cases of Mr. R.M.Goswami, Mr. M.N. Bhatt and Mr. Y.B. Joshi, the benefits have not been extended to them and, therefore, no interference in the award is called for. 6. Considered the submissions and decisions relied upon. From the documents on record, it is noticed that the respondent – employee joined the services of the petitioner establishment in the year 1980 was made permanent by regularizing his services on 04.06.1984. Thus, the service of the employee was regularized as permanent on 04.06.1984. 6. Considered the submissions and decisions relied upon. From the documents on record, it is noticed that the respondent – employee joined the services of the petitioner establishment in the year 1980 was made permanent by regularizing his services on 04.06.1984. Thus, the service of the employee was regularized as permanent on 04.06.1984. As he was not considered for regularization from his initial date of appointment, when he had worked on temporary/work charge basis, he made an application dated 28.01.1986, 20.06.2002 and 25.09.2002. 6.1. Let’s consider the issue of merits first. From initial application of the workman in the year 1986 and from statement of claim before the Labour Court it is noticed that, respondent – employee is seeking regularization on two grounds, (i) Establishment circular No.371 dated 16.10.1982 and (ii) the benefits granted to similarly situated employees. Establishment’s circular No.371 dated 16.10.1982, refers to continuity of service as per the award in reference (IT) No.86/73, No.133/73 and No.170/74. Further, the principles to consider the service of employee to be continuous as defined in section 25-B of the Act reads as under: “A workman shall be said to be in continuous service if the workman during a period of twelve calender months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than two hundred forty days and not less than one hundred and twenty days during a period of six calender months.” 6.2. From above condition, it is evident that for seeking continuous service, prior to the date of calculation, the employee is required to work under the employer for not less than 240 days in a calendar year and not less than 120 days during a period of 06 calender months. In view of above, the twin conditions need to be satisfied for counting continuous service. Reverting to the facts of this case, in this case, admittedly, the employee had not completed 240 days in any of the previous year prior to his date of regularization w.e.f. 04.06.1984. Non completion of 240 days from 1980 to 1984 is supported by cross-examination of the employee dated 18.07.2013 below Exh.12. Reverting to the facts of this case, in this case, admittedly, the employee had not completed 240 days in any of the previous year prior to his date of regularization w.e.f. 04.06.1984. Non completion of 240 days from 1980 to 1984 is supported by cross-examination of the employee dated 18.07.2013 below Exh.12. Moreover, from the details provided by respondent-employee, under letter dated 25.09.2002, in relation to number of days worked by him, it is stated as under: Year 1980 120 Days Year 1980 120 Days Year 1981 120 Days Year 1982 120 Days Year 1983 150 Days 6.3. Thus, respondent-employee, had not completed 240 days in a calendar year and, therefore, since he is not fulfilling the first condition, as provided under the Circular No. 371, in the opinion of this Court, he would not be entitled for the relief of regularization from his initial date of joining. Now, reverting to sole contention on which reliance has been placed by learned advocate for the respondent that in other similarly situated employees, the benefit has been extended, it would be apt to refer to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Muthukumar & Ors. vs. Chairman and Managing Director, Tangedco & Ors. reported in 2022 (3) SCC 240 wherein, is it held as under: “[24] A principle, axiomatic in this country's constitutional lore is that there is no negative equality. In other words, if there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people, without legal basis or justification, that benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a principle of parity or equality. In Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 14 SCC 81 , this court ruled that: "8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated." Other decisions have enunciated or applied this principle (Ref: Chandigarh Admn. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated." Other decisions have enunciated or applied this principle (Ref: Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, 1995 1 SCC 745 Anand Buttons Ltd. v State of Haryana 2005 9 SCC 164 K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. 2006 3 SCC 581 : Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2010 11 SCC 455 , and Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, 2014 15 SCC 715 ). Recently, in The State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati, 2019 SCC Online SC 1207 this court observed as follows: "If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.” 6.4. In one more decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Lone vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in 2009 (15) SCC 321 , in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 it is held as under: “11. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that keeping in view the equal protection clause contained in Articles 14 of the Constitution of India as also Article 16 thereof, all the employees should be treated equally. Equality clause, however, must be enforced in legality and not illegality. 12. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that Article 14 is a positive concept. The Constitution does not envisage enforcement of the equality clause where a person has got an undue benefit by reason of an illegal act. In Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan [ (2009) 2 SCC 589 ], this Court held: "...Article 14 of the Constitution of India has a positive concept. Equality, it is trite, cannot be claimed in illegality. The Constitution does not envisage enforcement of the equality clause where a person has got an undue benefit by reason of an illegal act. In Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan [ (2009) 2 SCC 589 ], this Court held: "...Article 14 of the Constitution of India has a positive concept. Equality, it is trite, cannot be claimed in illegality. Even otherwise the writ petition as also the review petition have rightly not been entertained on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the appellant." 13. The Court in a given case may be inclined to pass similar order as has been done in the earlier case on the basis of equality or otherwise. 14. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution may, however, be denied on the ground of delay and latches. It is now well settled that who claims equity must enforce his claim within a reasonable time. For the said proposition, amongst others, we may notice a decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 ], wherein it has been opined :- "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." The question yet again came up for consideration before this Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh, [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ], wherein it has been observed :- "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage." 6.5. In this case, admittedly, from the reading of Circular No.317 of GEB, it is amply clear that the regularization in the establishment is extended upon fulfillment of the twin conditions and in this case, the respondent – employee had not fulfilled both the conditions stated therein. Therefore, the benefit of regularization cannot be extended from initial date of appointment. Moreover, on the ground of benefits extended to similarly situated employees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Muthukumar & Ors. vs. Chairman and Managing Director, Tangedco & Ors. held that, negative equality cannot be extended to secure any undue benefit. In this case, since the employee is not fulfilling the conditions and erroneous relief has been extended to some other similarly situated employees by inadvertent error, the benefits awarded to respondent-employee, by the Industrial Court in the opinion of this court is erroneous, and therefore the award of the Labour Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. In view of above, the award of the Industrial Court, Rajkot, dated 06.02.2017, is hereby quashed and set aside. The petition is allowed with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute. 8. Since the petition of the employer-corporation has been allowed on merits, the ground raised of delay and latches in raising the dispute is not considered at this stage.