JUDGMENT : Deepak Gupta, J. Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been invoked for assailing the order dated 30.09.2023 (Annexure P-11) passed by Learned Executing Court, Sohna, whereby objections filed by the judgment-debtors (petitioner herein) along with the objection filed by the third party objector (not party to this petition) have been dismissed. 2.1 On perusing the paper-book and hearing both sides the facts in brief emerge are as under. 2.2 An agreement to sell dated 26.06.1986 was executed between Narayan Swarup Agal (vendee) and Lekhu Ram (vendor) regarding the property in dispute. Lakhu Ram died in November, 1986. Suit for specific performance filed in 1989 by Narayan Swarup Agal against legal heirs of Lakhu Ram was decreed on 20.02.1999 vide judgment Annexure P-2. During pendency of the suit, Narayan Swarup Agal had died and his widow Smt. Kanta was impleaded in his place. 2.3 After depositing the balance sale consideration as per the decree, the execution was filed by Smt. Kanta Agal, the widow of Narayan Swarup Agal on 03.06.1999. Sale deed was executed in terms of the decree on 03.11.1999 and pursuant to the order passed by the Court, warrants of possession were issued. As per the order dated 10.11.2001 (Annexure P-4) of the Executing Court, it emerged that JDs had already sold the land in dispute to Sanjay Goyal & Sachin Goyal (third party objectors), regarding which mutation No.1524 dated 08.03.1996 had been sanctioned. On 19.12.2002, the execution was dismissed as withdrawn on the basis of statement made by counsel for the decree-holder, as per order Annexure P-5. 2.4 On 17.12.2018, second execution was filed by Jitendra Agal son of Narayan Swarup Agal, without whispering about the earlier execution. During the pendency of this execution, an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was moved by Sanjay Goyal & Sachin Goyal to be impleaded as a party but the same was dismissed on 03.12.2018 vide Annexure P-7, to be not maintainable. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors as well as third party objectors filed separate objections (Annexure P-8 & P-9) against the execution mainly on the ground that the execution was barred by limitation, although some other grounds to oppose the execution were also raised. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors as well as third party objectors filed separate objections (Annexure P-8 & P-9) against the execution mainly on the ground that the execution was barred by limitation, although some other grounds to oppose the execution were also raised. After taking reply Annexure P-10 of the DH, objections of both of them i.e. JDs as well as third party objectors were dismissed vide impugned order dated 30.09.2023 (Annexure P-11), by relying upon “V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab Ali” AIR 1998 SC 1168 . 3.1 Assailing the aforesaid order, it is contended by learned counsel for the judgment-debtors (petitioner herein) that it was the specific contention of the petitioners that execution had been filed after a lapse of 12 years from the date of passing of the decree and therefore, it was barred under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Learned counsel contends that limitation once started, cannot be stopped. The litigant cannot extend the limitation against statute. The execution can be filed within a period of 12 years and therefore, execution filed in 2018 i.e. after a lapse of almost 20 years for implementation of decree passed in 1999 is clearly barred by limitation. Learned counsel has referred to “Manohar Lal v. Sunder Lal” reported as Law Finder Doc ID #754406. 3.2 It is further pointed out that objection was also raised that vide mutation No.1726 dated 29.05.2001, mutation of inheritance was already sanctioned in favour of Jitendra Agal, who has filed the present second execution and his sisters, in the same Revenue Estate, where the suit land is situated and thus, he had due knowledge about the decree in question. Learned counsel contends further that authority cited by learned Executing Court i.e. “V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab Ali” is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the case before Hon’ble Supreme Court, the earlier execution petition was pending, whereas in the present case, the first execution petition had been dismissed as withdrawn and thus, was not pending, when the second execution was filed. 3.3 It is further argued that the second execution even suffers from the vice of concealment, inasmuch as there is not even a whisper in the said execution about the filing of the first execution petition, which had been dismissed as withdrawn and thus, the decree-holder, has not come to the Court with clean hands and so, is not entitled for any relief. 4. Refuting the aforesaid contentions and defending the impugned order, learned counsel for the respondent/decree-holder contends that the earlier execution was dismissed as withdrawn based upon the statement dated 19.12.2002 made by the counsel for the then decree-holder Smt. Kanta Goyal, as per which Smt. Kanta Agal had expired and none of her LRs had contacted the counsel for the long time and it is for this reason that he prayed for consigning the execution and that the LRs will file the fresh execution later. Learned counsel contends that in these circumstances, the present execution filed in 2018 shall be considered to be in the continuation of the earlier execution and therefore, bar of limitation is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel has referred to the following authorities: V. Uthirapathi V. Ashrab Ali (cited supra); Prem Chand vs. Swaran Singh, Cr N:8488 of 2015 decided by this Court on 4.10.2017 Smt. Vithabai G. Ghidake vs. United Western Bank Ltd., AIR 2003 (Karnataka) 266; Radhakrishnanan vs. State of Kerala 2006 (1) CivCC (Kerala high Court); and Gopal Chander Naskar vs. Hiranya Prova Moulick AIR (Calcutta) 338. 5. I have considered submissions of the both sides and have perused the record. 6. Factual position is not disputed to the effect that suit for specific performance filed by Narayan Swarup Agal, who was replaced by his window Smt. Kanta Agal during pendency of the suit, was decreed on 20.02.1999 and that the first execution was filed by her on 03.06.199.during the pendency of the aforesaid execution, execution, statement was made by Shri R.P.Goyal, Advocate for the decree-holder 19.12.2002, the English translations of which is as under: “Stated that Smt. Kanta Agal/decree-holder has expired. None of her legal representative has contracted me for a long time. Therefore, present execution be consigned to the records. Her legal representatives shall later on file the fresh execution.” 7. None of her legal representative has contracted me for a long time. Therefore, present execution be consigned to the records. Her legal representatives shall later on file the fresh execution.” 7. Based upon the aforesaid statement, following order (Annexure P-5) was passed by the Executing Court on the same day i.e.19.12.2002:- Statement of Sh. RP Goyal, counsel for the decree holder has been recorded separately, in which he has stated that he does not want to proceed further with the present execution because of death of decree holder and the same be dismissed as withdrawn Heard. In view of the statement, present execution is hereby dismissed. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.” 8. Thereafter, the second execution has been filed by Shri Jitendra Agal son of Shri Narain Swarup Agal on 07.12.2018 (Annexure P-6). The perusal of this execution would reveal that there is not even a whisper about filing of the first execution by his mother or that earlier execution was dismissed as withdrawn for any reason whatsoever. 9. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides the limitation period of 12 years for fillings an executions. Within the said limitation period 12 years, any number of executions can be filed for getting the decree implemented. 10. The questions in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case are: Whether the statement made on 19.12.2002 by the counsel for the decree holder in the earlier execution, cold extend the period of limitation for filing the fresh execution beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree.? Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay in limitation period can be condoned, is applicable to the execution proceedings.? Whether the learned Executing Court in the impugned order has correctly applied the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Uthirapathi’s Case (supra).? 11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that the he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 12. Bare perusal of above provision makes it evident that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to any application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As such, no application to extend the period of limitation can be entertained by condoning the delay in filing the execution beyond prescribed period of limitation. Even the Court cannot enlarge the period of limitation. Simply because the earlier execution filed in time was withdrawn by counsel for decree holder, on account of death of decree holder, the second execution filed beyond limitation by LR of the decree holder, can neither extend the period of limitation nor can it be considered as continuation of the earlier execution, which was dismissed for any reason. 13. Reliance can be made to Manohar Lal v. Sunder Lal (supra). In that case, a decree for specific performance was passed on 01.10.1994. First execution was filed within time and the sale deed was executed in terms of the order passed by Court. However, the said execution was dismissed as withdrawn on 9.9.2006 with liberty to file fresh execution for taking the possession of the suit property. However, the second execution was filed beyond 12 years from the date of the decree. In the second execution, there was not even a whisper about reviving of the previous execution petition, although it was mentioned that the second execution was being filed as per the order dated 09.09.2006. in these circumstances, it was held by this Court that even the liberty granted by the Court could not enlarge the period of limitation and in essence, such a liberty is against the statute, as valuable rights of the other side has been taken away. 14.1 Coming to V. Uthirapathi’s Case, referred by Ld. counsel for the respondent and also relied by Ld. Executing Court in the impugned order, in that case, eviction petition filed in 1982 by the landlord under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 [in short ‘Act, 1960’] was allowed. Order of eviction was affirmed by the by the Appellate Authority. The landlord/ decree holder filed execution within the limitation period on 27.02.1993. During the proceedings, landlord expired and an application was moved by his legal representatives to be brought on record in Pending execution on 26.04.1994. Order of eviction was affirmed by the by the Appellate Authority. The landlord/ decree holder filed execution within the limitation period on 27.02.1993. During the proceedings, landlord expired and an application was moved by his legal representatives to be brought on record in Pending execution on 26.04.1994. As Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act of 1960 provided a limitation period of 30 days to bring on record the LRs, therefore the application moved by the LRs to implead them as a party was dismissed by the Executing Court. Civil revision was filed before the High Court by the LRs of the landlord, which was allowed. The review application filed by the tenant was dismissed. Both these orders were challenged by the tenant before Hon’ble Supreme Court. The point for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court was as to whether Rule 25 referred by the Executing Court was intended to apply the execution proceedings and whether in any event, a fresh execution petition could have been filed by the legal representatives of the decree holder. 14.2 Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to Section 18 of the Act, 1960 as per which every order as passed by the rent controller or order passed on appeal, was to be executed by the controller, as if such order is an order of the civil Court and for this purpose the controller shall have all the powers of the all civil Court. In the light of this Rule, Hon’ble Supreme Court considered as to what are the powers of the civil Court while executing the orders passed by it. 14.3 It is in the aforesaid background facts that Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “9. “If during, the pendency of a regular execution proceeding filed on the basis of a decree or order of a Civil Court, the decree holder or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representative are not brought on record within ninety days, can the civil Court dismiss execution petition as abated? 10. “If during, the pendency of a regular execution proceeding filed on the basis of a decree or order of a Civil Court, the decree holder or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representative are not brought on record within ninety days, can the civil Court dismiss execution petition as abated? 10. Order 22 Rule of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: “Order 22 Rule 12: Application of order to execution proceedings: Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and shall 8 apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.” In other words the normal principle arising in a suit- before the decree is passed- that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a particular period and if not, the suit could abate, - is not applicable to cases of death of the decree holder or the judgment debtor in execution proceedings. 11. In Venkatachalam vs. Ramasawami [1932 ILR 55 Mad. 352= AIR 1932 Mad. 73 (FB)], a full bench of the Madras High Court has held that this Rule enacts that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to execution proceedings. Mulla’s commentary on CPC (Vol.3) p.2085 (15th Ed., 1997) refers to a large number of judgments of the High Courts and says: “Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides that where a party to execution proceedings dies during its pendency, provisions as to abatement do not apply. The Rule is, therefore, for the benefits of the decree holder, for his heirs need not take steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may apply immediately or at any time while the proceedings is pending, at to carry on the proceedings or they file a fresh execution application.” In our opinion, the above statement of Mulla’s commentary on the CPC, represents the legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the powers of the Civil Court. 12. It is clear, therefore that if after the filing of an execution petition in time, the decree holder dies and his legal representatives do not come on record – or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, then there is no abatement of the execution petition. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the executive petition remains pending on the file of the execution Court. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the executive petition remains pending on the file of the execution Court. If it remains pending and if no time limit is prescribed to bring the legal representatives on record in execution proceedings it is open in case of death the decree holder, for his legal representative to come on record at any time. The execution application cannot even be dismissed for default behind the back of the decree holder, for his legal representative. In case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder could file an application to bring the legal representative of the judgment debtor on record, at any time. Of course in case of death of judgment debtor the Court can fix a reasonable time for the said purpose and if the decree holder does not file an application for the aforesaid purpose, the Court can dismiss the the execution petition for default. But in any event execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated. Alternatively, it is also open to the decree holder’s legal representatives, to file a fresh execution petition in case of death of the decree holder; OR, in case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder can file a fresh execution petition, if filed, is, in law, only a continuation of the pending executions petition – the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. This is the position under the Code of Civil Procedure.” 15. It is, thus, clear that as per the legal position expounded by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if the execution petition remains pending on the file of the Executing Court no time limit is prescribed to bring on record the legal representatives in the execution proceedings , then it is open in the case of the death of the decree holder, for his legal representatives to come on record at any time and the execution petition cannot be dismissed in default in behind the back of the said legal representative of the decree holder. This legal position is applicable when the execution petition is pending and the death of the decree holder occurs and in his eventuality, the execution petition is not to be abated and application to bring on record the LRs can be brought by them at any time. This legal position is applicable when the execution petition is pending and the death of the decree holder occurs and in his eventuality, the execution petition is not to be abated and application to bring on record the LRs can be brought by them at any time. Hon’ble Supreme Court explained further that through in any event, the execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated but alternatively, it is also open to the decree holder’s legal representative to file a fresh execution petition in the case of death of the decree holder. However, in case of the death of judgment debtor, the decree holder can file a fresh execution petition by impleading the legal representative of judgment-debtor and that such a fresh execution petition, if filed in law is only continuation of the pending execution petition, the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. 16. It will be clear from the aforesaid legal position that it is only in the case of death of the judgment-debtor, when a fresh execution petition is filed by the decree holder by impleading the legal representatives of the deceased judgement-debtor that such an execution petition, is to be considered only the continuation of the pending execution petition, the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. However, this is not applicable in the case of death of the decree holder. Although it is open to the decree holder’s legal representatives to file a fresh execution petition in the case of death of the decree holder, but such an execution is to be filed within the period of limitation of 12 years from the date of decree and it cannot be considered as continuation of earlier execution which was filed in time and which is not pending and which was earlier either dismisses as withdrawn or dismissed in default or disposed of for any other reason. 17. In the aforesaid facts and circumstance, it held that learned Executing Court in the impugned order wrongly applied the legal position as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Uthirapathi’s case because in the present case, the second execution was filed by Jitendra Agal, the legal representatives of the decree holder in December, 2018 i.e. after more than 19 years from the date of decree 20.02.1999. So much so, the said second execution was filed 16 years the dismissal as withdrawn of the earlier execution and evidently, it was clearly barred by limitation. 18. Coming to the authorities cited by learned counsel for the respondents/decree holders, in Prem Chand v. Swaran Singh (supra), decree for mandatory injunction was passed which was sought to be executed. The first execution filed within time was withdrawn with liberty to file fresh and with further making the statement that proceedings were to be kept intact for filing the fresh execution filed with the time was withdrawn with the liberty to file fresh and with further making the statement that proceedings were to be kept intact for filing the fresh execution and said was liberty was granted as to no objection was endorsed by counsel for the opposite party. It was in these circumstances, that second execution filed beyond 12 years was held to be in the continuation of the first execution. Cited authority is not applicable to the present case for the simple reason that in that case a decree for mandatory injunction was under execution, to which Article 136 of the limitation Act is not applicable. 19. In Smt. Vithabai G Ghodake V. The United Western Bank Ltd. (supra), relied by the counsel for the respondents, it was held that when the first execution is dismissed in default and application is moved for restoration, within time, and there is sufficient cause for non-appearance of the decree holder on the date of hearing, the Court can restore the dismissed petition to file and that such restoration does not amount to fresh execution and so, the question of Limitation dies not arise to bar the execution. In Radhakrishan vs. State of Kerala (supra), it was held that there is no time limited prescribed for filling an application for restoration by invoking Section 151 of the CPC. None of these authorities are applicable are applicable to the facts of this case as in the present case, no such application was moved by the decree holder/respondents for reviving of the first executing petition and rather as noticed earlier that in the second execution filed by him in December, 2018 there is not even a whisper to the effect that earlier execution had been dismissed as withdrawn on 19.12.2002. 20. 20. In Gopal Chander Naskar vs. Hiranya Prova Moulick (supra), relied by learned counsel for the respondent, execution commenced in 1995. Judgment debtor died on 21.01.1996. Application for his substitution was filed on 15.05.1978. it was held that execution is not barred by time in view of Rule 12 of order 22 CPC and is covered by Section 31(b) of limitation Act, as Article 136 of the limitation act does not apply to the application for brining on records the LRs. Clearly the said authority is not applicable to this case, because in the above case application for substitution of the LRs was moved during the pending execution, which is not position in present in case. 21. In view of all the aforesaid discussion of the factual as well as of the legal position, it is held that the impugned order dated 30.09.2023 (Annexure P-11) passed by the Executing Court, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. It is held that the execution filed on 07.12.2018 (Annexure P-6) by the respondent/decree holder is not maintainable being clearly barred by limitation. As such, the present petition is hereby accepted.