JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. By way of the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State laid a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 24.04.1998 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases) & Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner (‘Trial Court’), in Sessions Case No.51/96 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Mohanlal & Ors.), whereby accused-respondent-Mohini was acquitted of the charge against her under Section 302/109 IPC; accused-respondents, namely, Bheraram, Mohanlal, Ms. Manju, Ms. Seema & Ms. Kiran, were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 147 & 302 IPC & in alternate, under Section 302/149 IPC. 2. At the outset, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State produced before this Court a report dated 23.08.2024 received from the Office of Station House Officer, Police Station, Kotgate, District Bikaner, which reflects that accused-respondent no.1-Mohan Lal, accused-respondent no.3-Ms.Manju, and accused-respondent no.5- Smt. Mohini have already expired, and hence. Thus, now the present appeal may be heard and decided on qua the surviving accused-respondents Bheraram, Ms.Seema and Smt. Kiran. 2.1. The aforesaid report dated 23.08.2024 is taken on record. In light of the above-said report, the present appeal qua the aforementioned deceased accused-respondents stands abated. Accordingly, the present adjudication is made only to the extent of surviving accused-respondents Bheraram, Ms.Seema and Smt. Kiran. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submitted that the main role of committing the crime in question has been attributed to accused-respondent no.3-Kumari Manju (now deceased). 3.1. It was further submitted that the deceased was burnt by the accused-respondents and the dying declaration was also recorded by the concerned Magistrate (PW.2-Rajendra Kumar Sharma), but the learned Trial Court discarded the said dying declaration and passed the impugned judgment of acquittal, as above. 3.2. It was also submitted that the role and involvement of the accused-respondents in commission of the crime in question is clearly corroborated by the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses, who have completely supported the prosecution story. It was further submitted that the death in question was caused by setting the deceased on fire within 10 months of marriage by the in-laws, and the evidence placed on record clearly proves the prosecution case against the accused-respondents, beyond all reasonable doubts. 4. It was further submitted that the death in question was caused by setting the deceased on fire within 10 months of marriage by the in-laws, and the evidence placed on record clearly proves the prosecution case against the accused-respondents, beyond all reasonable doubts. 4. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal, while disbelieving the prosecution story, which in the given circumstances is not justified in law and thus, deserves to be quashed and set aside, while convicting the surviving accused-respondents under Section 302 IPC. 5. The matter was called twice, but no one appeared on behalf of the surviving accused-respondents, and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State were heard and the record of the case was perused. 6. This Court observes that the dying declaration (Ex.P/2) of the deceased was recorded by PW.2-Rajendra Kumar Sharma wherein the deceased had clearly stated that the accused-respondent no.3- Ms.Manju (since deceased) poured the kerosene oil and burnt the deceased, while the other accused-respondents caught-hold of her, which shows that the main role in commission of the crime in question has been attributed to said the deceased accused-respondent. 7. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court disbelieved the dying declaration on the ground that the deceased sustained burns to the extent of 70-80%, but there is nothing on record showing any certificate issued by the concerned Doctor, to the effect that the deceased was in a state of mind, which could have enabled her to give such dying declaration; the certificate (Ex.P/1) was issued by PW.9- Dr. Manoj at 10 A.M., while the dying declaration was recorded at 11:30 A.M. 7.1. This Court also observes that in the dying declaration, the deceased stated that her husband, namely, Rajendra and one Shukhi were present at the time of incident and her husband came to save her, but the deceased’s husband-Rajendra and Shukhi were not produced as prosecution witnesses, rather the said Rajendra was produced as defence witness. 7.2. This Court further observes that as bedhead ticket (Ex.D/8) was prepared by PW.9-Dr.Manoj and at the time when the deceased was asked about the incident in question, she stated that she suffered burns due to blast in stove. 7.2. This Court further observes that as bedhead ticket (Ex.D/8) was prepared by PW.9-Dr.Manoj and at the time when the deceased was asked about the incident in question, she stated that she suffered burns due to blast in stove. This Court also observes that the said stove was found at the time of preparation of Naksha Mauka (Ex.P/16) of the place of the incident and the same was supported by PW.10- Hardeep Singh and PW.4- Shiv Shankar (brother of deceased), but no investigation was carried out in regard to the said stove. 7.3. This Court further observes that after the incident in question, the deceased’s family was immediately informed and PW.4-Shiv Shankar (brother of deceased) and PW-6 Rukma came at night before recording of the dying declaration. PW.2 stated that at the time of recording of the dying declaration, 4-5 patients were in the ward, wherein the deceased was admitted. 8. This Court also observes that there is nothing on record which could show any motive on part of the surviving accused-respondents to commit the crime in question. This Court further observes that PW-6 Rukma (mother of deceased), PW-5 Udaram (father of deceased) and PW.4- Shiv Shankar (brother of deceased) made improvements in their testimonies before the learned Trial Court, from the ones that were rendered before the police, and therefore, such testimonies were suffering material contradictions. 9. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: - “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/ omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 10. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal qua the surviving accused-respondents under Sections 147 & 302 in alteration 302/149 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, particularly as regards category VI, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 11. 11. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, and that a mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment. Thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 12. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 13. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 13.1. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., each of the surviving accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the surviving accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 13.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith.