JUDGMENT This criminal appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment dated 29.10.2010, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dewas, in Sessions Trial No. 11/2010, whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence under Sections 325, 452, 294, 506 (Part-II) of IPC, 1860, and sentenced to undergo 02 years, 06 months, 03 months and 03 months R.I with fine of Rs. 5000/-, Rs.100/-, nil and nil respectively with default stipulations. 2. The prosecution case in brief is that on 16.08.2009, at about 9.00 pm complainant Vikramsingh, constable, Police Station Bank Note Press, Dewas got a phone call from appellant, who happens to be a constable, enquiring about Constable Shyambahadur, for which the complainant replied that Shyambahadur is in night patrol. Thereafter again complainant received a call from the appellant with regard to Shyambahadur. When the complainant was giving necessary information, then the appellant hurled abuses and later on appellant armed with wooden stick came to the police station and started assaulting the complainant due to which he sustained injury on his left hand wrist, left hand finger, shoulder and in hip. Thereafter, the appellant hurled abuses when the complainant left the police station in rescue, the appellant chased him with wooden stick till Sai Mandir, however, the complainant fled away from the spot. It is alleged that the appellant was under liquor intoxication. Subsequently, the complainant lodged a report under sections 333, 294, 506 (part-II) and 452 of IPC at crime no. 448/2009 against the accused. Then, the investigation into the matter started. 3. In the course of investigation, a spot map of the incident place was prepared, the injured Vikramsingh was medically examined, the accused was arrested and after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was presented before the Court of Session. After completion of investigation, charges under aforementioned offences were framed and read over to the accused. On which, the accused denied and claimed to be tried. 4. In order to bring home the ingredients of the case, the prosecution has produced as many as 11 witnesses namely Vikram Singh (PW-1), Hemant Kumar Dhabi (PW-2), Deepak (PW-3), Rajesh Parmar (PW-4), Dr.R. C. Verma (PW-5), Dr. S.S. Malviya (PW-6), Vishnu Prasad (PW-7), Anil Evan (PW-8), Thakesingh (PW-9), Ravindra Yadav (PW-10) and Satish Samadiya (PW-11). Kishore Singh (DW-1) was examined on behalf of defence witness. S.S. Malviya (PW-6), Vishnu Prasad (PW-7), Anil Evan (PW-8), Thakesingh (PW-9), Ravindra Yadav (PW-10) and Satish Samadiya (PW-11). Kishore Singh (DW-1) was examined on behalf of defence witness. In Examination of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C appellant has also taken the plea of alibi that at the time of the incident he was on duty at State Bank of India, Moti Bungalow Branch and in this way he has taken the plea of alibi. Having analyzed the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant as aforesaid. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is innocent and the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant wrongly without considering the evidence available on record. No eye-witness except complainant has supported the prosecution story. As per the statement of the complainant incident was witnessed by Deepak Pujari (P.W.3), Rajesh Parmar (P.W.4) however, they have not supported the prosecution case. So far as the intoxication of the present appellant is concerned, there is no MLC report available in this regard. 6. It is further submitted that the complainant has also stated that the incident has been witnessed by two police personals one is Head Constable – Thakesingh (P.W.9) and other one is Hemant Dabi (P.W.2), however both of them have not supported the prosecution story. Thakesingh (P.W.9) is an hearsay witness. With regard to injuries sustained by complainant, the statement of Dr.R.C. Verma (PW-5) is required to be seen especially para 3, in which it has been deposed that the weapon/instrument by which the injury was caused has not been produced before him. Doctor has opined that the injury might have been caused by collusion of vehicle. 7. The counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph two of the statement of Dr. S.S. Malviya (PW-6). Counsel further submitted that no CDR with regard to call details of the incident has been produced before the Court. Counsel for the appellant has also drawn the attention of the Court to Para 6 of the statement of Investigating Officer. Learned counsel further submitted that there are material omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. He alternatively confines his arguments on the point of sentence. Counsel for the appellant assures that the appellant will not involve in such criminal activities in future. He also submitted that the appellant has suffered approximately thirty days custody period. Learned counsel further submitted that there are material omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. He alternatively confines his arguments on the point of sentence. Counsel for the appellant assures that the appellant will not involve in such criminal activities in future. He also submitted that the appellant has suffered approximately thirty days custody period. He is having regard to all circumstances which resulted in appellant's conviction and further keeping in view the fact that the appellant was facing trial before the concerned Court for more than 14 years, therefore, he prayed that the appeal be partly allowed and the sentence awarded to the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone by enhancing the fine amount. 8. On the contrary, learned Govt. Advocate has opposed the prayer. He supported the judgment by submitting that the case is well fortified by statement of the complainant as well as the testimony of medical evidence and it is also well supported by FIR, hence testimony of injured witness cannot be disbelieved, therefore, he prays for dismissal of the appeal. 9. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. 10. In view of the rival submissions, arguments advanced by both the counsels for the parties and the evidence available on record, the point of consideration is as to whether the finding of the Trial Court of convicting and sentencing the appellant is incorrect in the eyes of law and facts? 11. So far as the offence under Section 294/506 of IPC is concerned, it would be appropriate to consider that Vikram Singh Rathore (P.W.1) himself has stated in his Examination in Chief that accused has hurled abuses, however, he has not stated anything as to whether he was annoyed by the abuse. In this regard complainant Vikram Singh Rathore (P.W.1) has admitted in cross examination regarding obscene abuses of accused over phone, but nothing has been mentioned regarding annoyance. After going through the whole testimony, the annoyance has not been emerged. On this aspect the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhal Singh v. State of M.P. reported as 1957 MPLJ -21 "That in the class of society to which the parties belonged the abuses had no more significance than mere platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of the persons mind. On this aspect the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhal Singh v. State of M.P. reported as 1957 MPLJ -21 "That in the class of society to which the parties belonged the abuses had no more significance than mere platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of the persons mind. As the accused were villagers and filthy abuses were not uncommon among villagers and in the strata of society to which they belonged, the sting was taken out of the words and they could not be characterised as obscene within the meaning of Section 294 of the IPC. Annoyance is the gist of the offence under Section 294 and in the absence of positive proof of annoyance, there could be no offence under Section 294, IPC." 12. In view of the above case law, it is envisaged that annoyance is main substance of the offence punishable u/s 294 IPC. The above proposition has been followed by Hon'ble High Court of M.P. in Roshanlal v. State of M.P. reported in 1966 MPLJ-87 Note-172 and Kamal Singh v. State of M.P., reported as 2002 (4) MPHT-7. 13. Virtually, in colloquial language such type of abuses are often used and therefore, they cannot be accepted in their literal sense. In Om Prakash Vs. State of M.P. reported in 1989 MPLJ 657 , it has been held by Hon'ble High Court that no literal significance can be attached to the abuses. They only delineate the enraged state of mind. Further, in Sharad Dave and another Vs. Mahesh Gupta and others, reported in 2005 LawSuit (MP) 442, Hon'ble High Court of M.P. endorsing the aforesaid ratio decidendi adumbrated as under:- "Mere platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of the person's mind would not be sufficient to attract the application of the provisions of section 294, of the Indian Penal Code. Thus mere 'vulgar abuses' do not constitute offence under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code." 14. In light of the aforesaid propositions, in the case at hand, since no prosecution witness deposed any thing about causing annoyance before the Court, the prosecution, therefore, has failed to prove that accused committed obscene act by abusing complainant, which annoyed others. In the upshot, accused persons deserve to be acquitted from the charge of the offence u/s 294 of IPC. 15. In the upshot, accused persons deserve to be acquitted from the charge of the offence u/s 294 of IPC. 15. Now coming to the point of criminal intimidation, in order to bring home the evidence of criminal intimidation to cause death punishable under Section 506(Part-II) of IPC, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused threatened the victim to cause his death or grievous hurt to a person or another in whom, he is specially interested. On this aspect after considering the definition of criminal intimidation under Section 506 of IPC, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnatka and another reported as 2015 LawSuit (SC)52 ordained as under: "14. A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do." 16. In view of the aforesaid propositions, the threatening is most important ingredient of criminal intimidation. If the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, the offence would be punishable under Section 506 (Part-II) of I.P.C, however in the whole testimony of complainant Vikram Singh Rathore, nothing has been mentioned regarding threatening anywhere. Vikram Singh Rathore (P.W-1) has stated that he has been threatened by the conduct of accused, however, it is also not mentioned in Roznamcha Sana and other documents. Other witnesses have also not adverted anything in this regard. As such since threatening or causing fear has not been revealed by the prosecution witnesses, hence the offence punishable under Section 506 (Part-II) is not proved and therefore, appellant deserves to be acquitted from the charge of offence under Section 506 (Part-II) of IPC. In this sequence the findings of learned trial Court regarding conviction under Section 294 and 506 (Part-II) is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 17. In this sequence the findings of learned trial Court regarding conviction under Section 294 and 506 (Part-II) is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 17. Further turning to the issue of house trespass as well as causing grievous injury in order to fortify this aspect prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt that appellant has committed trespass by entering in the Police Station with the intention of cause injury to the complainant and thereafter caused grievous injury by using stick. As such the findings of learned trial Court regarding conviction of accused under Section 325, 326 and 452 of IPC is found flawless and immaculate in the eyes of law and fact. 18. In order to fortify this aspect, Vikram Singh Rathore - Head Constable (502)/Complainant (P.W.1) has deposed that on 16.08.2009 at 10.30 pm accused Ramsnehi called him on telephone he has asked as to where Shyambahadur resides and what is his mobile number. In reply, this witness stated that he is not remembering the mobile number and Shyambahadur resides in quarters situated behind kothwali. After that Constable Ramsnehi came in person and started hurling abuses. At 10.30 pm when complainant started having his dinner, Constable Ramsnehi assaulted on his head with lathi initially, he rescued himself by backing from the place, further he again assaulted and caused injury on his hand. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that had the incident happened the complainant would have informed to his senior officers, however, the statement of complainant found support from Hemant Kumar Dabi Constable 329 (P.W.2), who has clearly stated that he had heard obnoxious sounds. 19. In this consequence, Hemant Kumar Dabi Constable 329 (P.W.2) has also stated that he has seen complainant Vikram Singh (P.W.1) whose hand was injured and blood was oozing. Further he also articulated that after asking about the incident Vikram Singh has adverted that accused Ramsnehi has abused and beaten him. The statement of this witness has also not been rebutted in cross examination. Certainly, other witnesses Deepak (P.W.3), Rajesh Parmar (P.W.4) have not supported the prosecution case, but the testimony of complainant also finds support from the statement of Dr. R.C. Verma (P.W5) the medical witness who has opined in his Examination in Chief regarding four injuries: 1. Lacerated wound - 3.5 x 0.5x 0.5 cms on the front side of left hand. 2. R.C. Verma (P.W5) the medical witness who has opined in his Examination in Chief regarding four injuries: 1. Lacerated wound - 3.5 x 0.5x 0.5 cms on the front side of left hand. 2. Swelling of 3.8 x 1.0 cm in the little finger of the left hand. 3. Swelling of 5.5 x 3.8 cm in the right upper thigh. 4. Swelling of 3.5 x 1.8 cm in the left cheek. 20. In cross examination the doctor has been challenged on many points but he has clearly stated that such type of injuries cannot be caused in one accident. That apart Dr. S. S. Malviya (P.W.6) has also supported the prosecution case and stated that he has conducted X-ray examination on the left hand of the complainant and found fracture thereon as per X-ray report (Ex.P/7). Vishnu Prasad (P.W7) has also supported the prosecution case and stated that on 16.08.2009 his duty was on Cheeta Patrolling Squad and he has obtained wireless message from the B.N.P. Dewas Police Station and he was informed that complainant Vikram Singh had received injuries. In para-3 of his Examination in Chief he has also stated about the fact that Ramsnehi, the accused was intoxicated by taking liquor. Anil Evane (P.W.8) is the witness of investigation and he has arrested the appellant and seized wooden stick from him. The statement of this witness has not been rebutted in his cross-examination. Thake Singh Dholiya (P.W.9) has also supported the prosecution case although on some point he has been declared hostile. Ravindra Yadav -Sub Inspector (P.W.10) and Satish Samadiay (P.W.11), the witnesses of investigation have also supported the prosecution case. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently demonstrated that even when the police witness have not supported the prosecution case, how the person who is also the police constable can be convicted only on the basis of complainant's testimony. In reply learned Govt. Advocate submitted that since the complainant is an injured person, his testimony has greater weight and when the complainant's testimony is supported by medical report of doctor the same must be relied upon. 22. In reply learned Govt. Advocate submitted that since the complainant is an injured person, his testimony has greater weight and when the complainant's testimony is supported by medical report of doctor the same must be relied upon. 22. In this case the defence witness Kishore Singh-Constable No.223 (D.W.1) has also been examined and he has stated that at the time of the incident Ramsnehi was on duty with him but in cross examination he graphically conceded that after 8.00 pm on 6.08.2009 he had no knowledge regarding the incident. As such the testimony of defence witness is also of no use. 23. It is pertinent to mention that being an injured witness the testimony of Vikramsingh (P.W.1) has special status in the eyes of law. On this aspect Chandrashekar Vs. State of Tamilnadu reported in (2017) 13 SCC 585 ], endorsing another case of the Supreme Court, viewed as under :- 10. Criminal jurisprudence attaches great weightage to the evidence of a person injured in the same occurrence as it presumes that he was speaking the truth unless shown otherwise. Though the law is well settled and precedents abound, reference may usefully be made to Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 observing as follows: "28. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone." 24. In the light of the aforesaid principle the testimony of injured Vikram Singh (P.W.1) has its immanent value because it finds support from the testimony of Dr. A.S. Malviya (P.W6) and Dr. R.C. Verma (P.W.5). That apart the testimony of this complainant is also backed by Hemant Kumar Dhabi - Constable 329 (P.W.2) and Rajesh Parmar (P.W.4) and other police witnesses on same aspects. 25. As per section 134 of Evidence Act, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. On this aspect the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vithal Pundalik Zendge Vs. State of Maharashtra reported, AIR 2009 SC 1110 is worth referring to the context of the case. As per section 134 of Evidence Act, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. On this aspect the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vithal Pundalik Zendge Vs. State of Maharashtra reported, AIR 2009 SC 1110 is worth referring to the context of the case. Relevant para 6 and 7 of the said judgment is reproduced below:- 6. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions o f the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (i) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a s ingle witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (ii) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (iii) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. 7. Therefore, there is no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated." 26. So far as the arguments regarding non supporting of other independent witnesses it is well settled that no criminal case can be overboarded due to non availability of independent prosecution witnesses. In this regard, the following verdict of landmark judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Appa Bhai vs. State of Gujarat, reported as AIR 1988 SC 696 is worth referring here as under: "10.......Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability if any, suggested by the accused......" 27. In the case of Mohd. Naushad Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in 2023 LawSuit (SC) 659, the Full Bench of Hon’ble the Apex Court, considering the kind of apathy adopted by the general public in not coming forward to depose to associate with the prosecution, endorsed the aforesaid verdict. As such, only on the basis of non-examination of any independent witness, the prosecution case cannot be thrown out, specially when the testimony of witnesses inspires confidence. 28. At this juncture, the attention of this Court drawn by learned counsel of accused towards the opinion of Hon'ble Apex Court in Subhash Harnarayanji Laddha v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 12 SCC 545 , wherein it was held that "Suspicion, howsoever grave may be is no substitute for proof." It is further contended that in lack of any independent eye witness, the accused can not be convicted on basis of fictitious story. 29. On this point, this Court intends to rely on State of Rajasthan v. N.K., The accused reported in (2000) 5 SCC 30 , wherein, Hon'ble R.C. Lahoti J. on behalf of the Full Bench viewed as under :- "....It is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cob-web of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to echnicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists..." 30. Regarding the plea of alibi taken by the appellant that at the time of the incident, he was on duty at State Bank of India, Moti Bungalow Branch, it may be possible that after the alleged incident the appellant would have gone to that place. It is by now well settled that if a plea of alibi has been taken by accused that must be proved by accused himself and if he fails it will be taken as another incriminating circumstances in favour of prosecution case. On this aspect the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukesh and Another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. reported as (2017) 6 SCC 1 is relevant to be considered which as under:- "While weighing the plea of ‘alibi’, the same has to be weighed against the positive evidence led by the prosecution, i. e. , n o t o nly the substantive evidence of PW-1 and the dying declarations, Ex.PW-27/A and Ex.PW-30/D-1, but also against the scientific evidence, viz., the DNA analysis, finger print analysis and bite marks analysis, the accuracy of which i s scientifically acclaimed. Considering the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the evidence of ‘alibi’ led by the accused against the positive evidence of the prosecution, including the scientific one, we hold that the accused have miserably failed to discharge their burden of absolute certainty qua their plea o f ‘alibi’. The plea taken b y them appears to be an afterthought and rather may be read as an additional circumstance against them." 31. In view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis of the evidence it can be safely concluded that prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant has committed house tress pass with preparation for causing hurt to injured/complainant and in this sequence he has voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the complainant. In view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis of the evidence it can be safely concluded that prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant has committed house tress pass with preparation for causing hurt to injured/complainant and in this sequence he has voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the complainant. As such the findings of learned trial Court regarding conviction of appellant under Section 452 & 325 of IPC is immaculate and infallible in the eyes of law. 32. Now turning to the sentencing part of the case, learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on the judgment of Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1986) 4 SCC 401 , Manohar Das Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and other reported as (2007) 2 MPWN 60 has submitted that the appellant has already suffered approximately 30 days of jail sentence and deposited the fine amount, hence the punishment of imprisonment may be reduced to the period already undergone by enhancing the fine amount. It is also contended that the appellant has lost his job on account of this case. On this aspect, the view of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh (dead) through legal representative Vs. Navjot Singh and others reported in AIR 2022 SC 2481 Para No. 26, 27 and 28 are reproduced below : "26. An important aspect to be kept in mind is that any undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to justice system and undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. The society can not long endure under serious threats and if the courts do not protect the injured, the injured would then resort to private vengeance and, therefore, it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. It has, thus, been observed that the punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated. 27. It has, thus, been observed that the punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated. 27. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa 12 while discussing the purpose of imposition of adequate sentence opined in para 18 that “.....Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence.” Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Singh (2014) 7 SCC 323 . 28. The sentencing philosophy for an offence has a social goal that the sentence has to be based on the principle that the accused must realise that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social fabric. While opportunity to reform has to be kept in mind, the principle of proportionality also has to be equally kept in mind." 33. Hence, I am not inclined to let off the appellant with period already undergone. This is a case, where a police constable has assaulted another head constable who had sustained grievous injuries. Owing to that injury caused by appellant, the injured had suffered a grave pain threatening his life. In such circumstances, the accused may not be offered for any leniency or sympathy. However, the fact, that the appellant has suffered ordeal of this case since 2009 i.e. approximately 14 years, is to be considered as mitigating circumstance. 34. Looking to the factual matrix of the case and considering the aforesaid mitigating circumstance, the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment under Section 325 of IPC seems to be on the higher side and the same is required to be rectified. 35. Having contemplated all circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the sentenced for the offence under Section 325 of I.P.C. be reduced to 6 months by enhancing the fine amount of Rs.10,000/- and in default, he will suffer 3 months and the period which he has already suffered be adjusted. Insofar as, the sentence awarded under Section 452 of IPC is concerned, is hereby affirmed. 36. In view of the aforesaid terms, the present appeal is partly allowed and disposed off. 37. Insofar as, the sentence awarded under Section 452 of IPC is concerned, is hereby affirmed. 36. In view of the aforesaid terms, the present appeal is partly allowed and disposed off. 37. A copy of this judgment alongwith the record be sent to the learned trial Court for information and necessary compliance. 38. The appellant is directed to surrender before the learned trial court within 15 days from the pronouncement of this judgment. If he fails to surrender before the learned Trial Court, the Trial Court will proceed to comply with order and send the appellant in jail for suffering the remaining jail sentence, as aforesaid. 39. The order of learned trial Court regarding disposal of the seized property stands confirmed. Certified copy as per rules.