ORDER : 1. The Petitioner/A.1 has filed the Criminal Petition, as per Section 480 and 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (for short, “BNSS”), seeking regular bail concerning Crime No.53 of 2024, registered at the Rentachinthala Police Station of Palnadu District. 2. A case has been registered against the petitioner and others for the offences punishable under Section 147, 148, 324, 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC) and Section 131(2) of The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“RP Act”). 3. In brief, the Prosecution’s case is that on 13.05.2024, general elections were conducted in the Andhra Pradesh State. The defacto complainant, acting as an agent for the Telugu Desam Party at polling station 202 of Palavaigate, reported that the Petitioner visited the polling booth at 10:30 AM and subsequently left. Later, around noon, the Petitioner returned to the polling booth with A.2 and A.3 and allegedly damaged the EVM machine. When questioned by the defacto complainant about the incident, the Petitioner reportedly threatened him. After this altercation, the Petitioner left the polling station but returned shortly after that. Upon leaving again, polling officials closed the doors of the booth. Outside the polling booth, as soon as the complainant stepped out, the Petitioner allegedly instigated others to attack him. Following the initial incident, 15 individuals, identified as followers of the Petitioner, gathered unlawfully and retrieved weapons such as sticks, rods, and knives from their vehicles. One of them, A.3, allegedly attacked the defacto complainant with an iron rod, aiming to cause fatal injuries while A.1 was present. The others proceeded to beat him with sticks, causing him to fall to the ground. Subsequently, the accused departed from the scene of the offence. 4. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner (A.1) contends that, despite the alleged incident occurring on 13.05.2024, the FIR was only registered on 23.05.2024. This delay indicates an attempt to create multiple FIRs against the Petitioner. The crime has been fabricated against the Petitioner and others, as no such incident occurred as described by the Defacto Complainant. Crime No. 48 of 2024, registered at Rentachintala Police Station under sections 448, 427 read with 34 of the IPC and section 3 of the PDPP Act, involves the Petitioner and others. The Petitioner (A.1) sought anticipatory bail through Crl.P.No.3775 of 2024, and the Hon'ble High Court granted an interim protection order. Crime No. 48 of 2024, registered at Rentachintala Police Station under sections 448, 427 read with 34 of the IPC and section 3 of the PDPP Act, involves the Petitioner and others. The Petitioner (A.1) sought anticipatory bail through Crl.P.No.3775 of 2024, and the Hon'ble High Court granted an interim protection order. Subsequently, the Petitioner was named as A.24 in Crime No.59 of 2024 at Karampudi Police Station. This new case was registered ten days after the alleged incident, on 23.05.2024, at around 9:30 PM, following a memo filed before the Court at about 8:00 PM. The investigation officer, acting on directives from superiors, exceeded their authority by implicating the Petitioner in this case, even though it appears related to the earlier Crime No.48 of 2024 at Rentachintala Police Station. 5. The learned Special Counsel representing the Respondent-State has submitted a counter, refuting all the allegations presented in the Petition. The contentions outlined in the Counter need not be reiterated, as they essentially mirror the report's content dated 23.05.2024. Additionally, the counter asserts that the Petitioner is a former Member of the Legislative Assembly, involved in violent activities. The Petitioner is the primary accused in this case and has numerous ruthless associates. The Petitioner had previously filed anticipatory bail applications in Crl.P.Nos.3775, 3788, 3789, and 3790 of 2024, which this Court observed the crimes alleged against the Petitioner to be heinous and dismissed the applications. The Petitioner had not cooperated with the Police authorities at the time of investigation and had not answered any query posed by the Police authorities. The incident described is a heinous crime, as the Petitioner and his accomplices attempted to immolate a person in a car, indiscriminately assaulted anyone who intervened, and even attacked a police officer on duty. The Petitioner showed a clear intent to commit further crimes when he assaulted a person outside the Court while being brought in for remand. This incident, recorded as Crl.No.134 of 2024 at Macherla Town P.S. is under investigation. Emphasizing the Petitioner's status as a former Member of the Legislative Assembly and alleged involvement in violent activities, granting anticipatory bail could potentially lead to further criminal activities. The Petitioner is implicated in 14 cases, underscoring concerns about his potential to engage in additional unlawful activities if released. 6. Emphasizing the Petitioner's status as a former Member of the Legislative Assembly and alleged involvement in violent activities, granting anticipatory bail could potentially lead to further criminal activities. The Petitioner is implicated in 14 cases, underscoring concerns about his potential to engage in additional unlawful activities if released. 6. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned counsel, for the Petitioner/A.1, and Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned Special Counsel, representing the Respondent-State (vide G.O.Rt.No.577, dt.12.06.2024). Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and Counter. Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel need not be reproduced. 7. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner had previously sought bail from the Sessions Court, however, those petitions were dismissed; the sessions Court should have granted regular bail to the Petitioner after applying the requisite triple test, which would establish that there is no risk of flight, no possibility of tampering with evidence, and no likelihood of influencing witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the Petitioner be released on bail. 8. The learned Special Counsel representing the Respondent contends that the gravity of the offence and the role of the Accused should be considered in the matter of bail. He further argued that the Petitioner’s involvement has been sufficiently established, and given the heinous nature of the offence, the Petitioner is not entitled to any concession regarding bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court outlined the parameters for granting bail in Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar, MANU/SC/0924/2023, as under: 12. The grant of bail is a discretionary relief, which necessarily means that such discretion would have to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The grant of bail is dependent upon contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the Court and may vary from case to case. There cannot be any exhaustive parameters set out for considering the application for a grant of bail. The grant of bail is dependent upon contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the Court and may vary from case to case. There cannot be any exhaustive parameters set out for considering the application for a grant of bail. However, it can be noted that; (a) While granting bail, the Court has to keep in mind factors such as the nature of accusations, the severity of the punishment, if the accusations entail a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations; (b) reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the Court in the matter of granting bail. (c) While it is not accepted to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt there ought to be always a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. (d) Frivolity of Prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the Prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to have an order of bail. 10. In the case of Ansar Ahmad versus the State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/0872/2023, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had expanded the horizon of the broad parameters, which are to be primarily taken into account, for considering the claim for regular bail or anticipatory bail as under: "11. Mr R. Basant, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for one of the private respondents, said that the Court, while granting bail is not required to give detailed reasons touching the merits or de-merits of the prosecution case as any such observation made by the Court in a bail matter can unwittingly cause prejudice to the Prosecution or the accused at a later stage. The settled proposition of law, in our considered opinion, is that the order granting bail should reflect the judicial application of mind taking into consideration the well-known parameters including: (i) The nature of the accusation weighing in the gravity and severity of the offence; (ii) The severity of punishment; (iii) The position or status of the accused, i.e. whether the accused can exercise influence on the Victim and the witnesses or not; (iv) Likelihood of accused to approach or try to approach the victims/witnesses; (v) Likelihood of accused absconding from proceedings; (vi) Possibility of accused tampering with evidence; (vii) Obstructing or attempting to obstruct the due course of justice; (viii) Possibility of repetition of offence if left out on bail; (ix) The prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge including frivolity of the charge; (x) The different and distinct facts of each case and the nature of substantive and corroborative evidence. 11. I have gone through the case diary and the material on record, including the First Information Report (F.I.R.) and the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. 12. Although the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has expounded arguments contending that this case is foisted against the Petitioner, formerly an M.L.A., with the Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP). This maneuver, it is argued, is a calculated attempt to subject the Petitioner to harassment and humiliation through the deliberate distortion of factual circumstances. 13. This Court, having given due consideration, holds the view that it is unnecessary to delve into the contentious issue of the motives ascribed to the Police officials. This Criminal Petition must be adjudicated based solely on its merits, without regard to the underlying motivations attributed to either party. 14. As seen from the record, the defacto complainant submitted a report to the Station House Officer on 23.05.2024 concerning the incident in question. The report indicates that the incident occurred on 13.05.2024 at 12 hours, with the information being received at the police station at 9:30 hours on 23.05.2024. 15. There is a delay of 10 days in lodging the report to the Police. The material placed prima facie indicates that the defacto complainant acted as a Poling Agent for the Telugu Desam Party and there were political differences between the defacto complainant and the petitioner. 15. There is a delay of 10 days in lodging the report to the Police. The material placed prima facie indicates that the defacto complainant acted as a Poling Agent for the Telugu Desam Party and there were political differences between the defacto complainant and the petitioner. The F.I.R. in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence, though it may not be substantive. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the F.I.R. in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed. If there is a delay in lodging the F.I.R., it loses the advantage of spontaneity; danger creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of many consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the F.I.R. is an assurance regarding the truth of the informant's version. A promptly lodged F.I.R. reflects the first hand account of what happened and who was responsible for the offence. (In this regard, reference can be made to Thulia Kali V. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 .) 16. Given the delay in giving report to the Police and the likelihood of levying accusations with the intention of harming or embarrassing the Petitioner is not improbable, especially in the context of political disputes. Though the delay may not be fatal to the criminal proceedings as it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contends that as there was inordinate delay in filing the report, the Petitioner makes at least a case out for grant of regular bail U/Sec.439 of Cr.P.C. 17. The Petitioner's Counsel has submitted that an interim application, I.A. No.1 of 2024, was filed before this Court concerning F.I.R.Nos.53 of 2024 and 52 of 2024 seeking to release the Petitioner on bail in the event of his arrest. 18. The Petitioner contends that he has been implicated in this case as this Court had previously granted interim protection to him. It is important to note that the crime in question has been registered against the Petitioner and others under Section 307 of I.P.C. 19. The Petitioner's Counsel contends that if the defacto complainant had sustained injuries during the incident, such details would have been recorded in the First Information Report (F.I.R.). It is important to note that the crime in question has been registered against the Petitioner and others under Section 307 of I.P.C. 19. The Petitioner's Counsel contends that if the defacto complainant had sustained injuries during the incident, such details would have been recorded in the First Information Report (F.I.R.). The Counsel submits that it is only after the Court granted protection to the Petitioner in other related matters, this case came to be foisted with a view to arrest the petitioner. 20. The truthfulness or insufficiency of the allegations pertains to the realm of evidence and cannot be pre-judged at this initial stage. This matter will be addressed by the trial Judge in due course. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that although a case has been filed under Section 307 IPC, there is no material provided by the investigation authorities to show that the defacto complainant sustained injuries in the incident. Therefore, the ingredients for applying Section 307 of IPC are not satisfieds. 21. Section 307 of the Penal Code reads as under: “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.” 22. From a bare perusal of the said provision, it is evident that the first part does not contemplate that receipt of any injury on the part of the Victims is a prerequisite for convicting an accused. 23. For the purposes of Section 307 of the I.P.C., the critical factor is the intention or knowledge of the accused, rather than the outcome of their actions. To invoke this section, it is sufficient if there is intent to kill combined with some overt act in furtherance of that intent. It is not necessary for the injury inflicted to be one capable of causing death. The section distinguishes between the accused”s actions and their consequences. The Court must determine whether the act was performed with the requisite intention or knowledge, regardless of its result. It is not necessary for the injury inflicted to be one capable of causing death. The section distinguishes between the accused”s actions and their consequences. The Court must determine whether the act was performed with the requisite intention or knowledge, regardless of its result. Whether there was an intention to kill or awareness that death could result is a factual question, dependent on the specifics of the case. 24. Intention is a state of mind that is not easily proven directly, as it is internal to the accused. Consequently, proof of intention is rarely available in a strict sense and must be inferred from the accused”s overt acts. Even if the accused did not have the specific intention to kill, if they acted with the knowledge described in Section 300, Clause Fourth of the I.P.C., which pertains to causing death with awareness of the likely consequences, then their actions could still constitute murder. If the death resulted from their actions and they acted with such knowledge, they would be guilty under that section. Based on the submissions, it cannot be concluded at this stage that the ingredients of Section 307 of IPC are not applicable. Although the defacto complainant is not shown to have sustained a simple injury, it is premature to assert definitively that Section 307 IPC does not apply. 25. A perusal of the order passed by the Sessions Court reveals that bail was not granted based on the Petitioner's status as a former M.L.A. The Sessions Court expressed concerns regarding the Petitioner's significant influence in both societal and official spheres and his involvement in nine distinct criminal cases. 26. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner was acquitted in Cr.Nos.64 of 2009, 34 of 2017 and 97 of 2014; there are ongoing judicial proceedings against the Petitioner vide S.C. No.52/2020 before IV Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, which pertains to Cr. No.75 of 2014; Cr. No.78 of 2014, involving the Petitioner, was amicably settled before Lok Adalat on 09.09.2007; additionally, Cr. No.252 of 2015 against the Petitioner was withdrawn by the Prosecution on 02.12.2019; the Petitioner did not receive a summons in relation to Cr.Nos.331 of 2018, 92 of 2019 and 125 of 2019; the Petitioner is implicated in the present crime, i.e., Cr. No.78 of 2014, involving the Petitioner, was amicably settled before Lok Adalat on 09.09.2007; additionally, Cr. No.252 of 2015 against the Petitioner was withdrawn by the Prosecution on 02.12.2019; the Petitioner did not receive a summons in relation to Cr.Nos.331 of 2018, 92 of 2019 and 125 of 2019; the Petitioner is implicated in the present crime, i.e., Cr. No.59 of 2024 of Karampudi P.S., as well as in other crimes, i.e., Cr.Nos.48, 52 and 53 of Rentachinthala P.S, and Cr. No.130 of 2024 of Macherla Town P.S. Regrettably, the abovementioned fact was not duly presented to the Sessions Court. Consequently, the Sessions Court, operating under the erroneous belief that the cases had not been disposed of, considered the Petitioner's prior criminal antecedents and subsequently denied the grant of bail. 27. The Sessions Court observed in the bail order that, should the Petitioner be granted bail, there is a significant risk that the Petitioner might attempt to interfere with the evidence, leveraging both his influence and his position as an Ex-MLA. The Sessions Court also expressed an apprehension that the Petitioner, if released on bail, could potentially intimidate witnesses, exert undue pressure on the investigative authorities, and instigate law and order issues. 28. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner has been in detention for over 58 days. The learned Senior Counsel asserts that the Petitioner will not interfere with the ongoing investigation and, to prevent any undue implications, the petitioner is prepared to reside outside the State until the investigation is completed, if the Court puts such condition. As several criminal cases came to be registered against the accused, which are pending for trial and investigation, the potential for conducting an investigation in those cases and the trial in criminal cases could be impacted, if the petitioner remains outside the State. 29. When ascertained, the learned Special Counsel indicated that the majority of the investigation had been concluded, with the exception of recording statements from a few remaining witnesses, which is anticipated to be completed within the next one to two months. He contends that the release of the accused at this juncture would impede the ongoing investigation. 29. When ascertained, the learned Special Counsel indicated that the majority of the investigation had been concluded, with the exception of recording statements from a few remaining witnesses, which is anticipated to be completed within the next one to two months. He contends that the release of the accused at this juncture would impede the ongoing investigation. Additionally, the Counsel pointed out that there have been two prior orders rejecting bail by the Court of Sessions and argued that, according to the precedent in Puran Mal V. State of Haryana and another, 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1879, High Court may refrain from granting bail to the Petitioner. However, upon going through the cited decision, this Court observes that it does not lay down a principle precluding the High Court's jurisdiction to grant bail merely because the Sessions Court has denied two successive bail applications. 30. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception ". This basic principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court way back in 1978 in its landmark judgment titled "State of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay, MANU/SC/0152/1977". This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Though the underlying objective behind the detention of a person is to ensure easy availability of an accused for trial, without any inconvenience, in case the presence of an accused can be secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory. 31. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of a detained person. However, in deciding an application for regular bail, the courts must also consider the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, namely, the presumption of innocence and the gravity of the offence(s) involved. 32. It is well-settled law that an accused cannot be detained merely under the guise of punishment based on a presumption of guilt. In Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: “8. The law of bail, like any other branch of law, has its own philosophy, and occupies an important place in the administration of justice and the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt.” 33. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 16. In support of his submission, Shri Basant, learned Senior Counsel, placed reliance on Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, A.P. High Court [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, A.P. High Court, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 S.C.C. (Cri) 115], which prescribes the approach of a court while granting bail. The Court considering an application seeking bail must refrain from entering into an in-depth analysis of the case to hold a mini-trial of the case. It is also unnecessary to give lengthy reasons at the time of granting bail. It was contended that bail is the norm and jail is the exception. Once a court has granted bail, it is only in very rare cases that there is interference, as it would have the effect of cancellation of bail. The liberty of a person cannot be interfered with unless the situation warrants it. 34. In State of Kerala v. Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC 784 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 15. In deciding bail applications, an important factor that should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail but is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the Constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course, this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the most important factors in deciding whether to grant bail. In the present case, the Respondent has already spent 66 days in custody (as stated in Para 2 of his counter-affidavit), and we see no reason why he should be denied bail. A doctor incarcerated for a long period may end up like Dr. Manette in Charles Dicken's novel A Tale of Two Cities, who forgot his profession and even his name in the Bastille. 35. At the stage of granting bail, this Court's role is limited to determining whether a prima facie case has been established for granting bail. A doctor incarcerated for a long period may end up like Dr. Manette in Charles Dicken's novel A Tale of Two Cities, who forgot his profession and even his name in the Bastille. 35. At the stage of granting bail, this Court's role is limited to determining whether a prima facie case has been established for granting bail. This Court cannot assess the credibility or reliability of the Prosecution's witnesses at this point, as these issues are to be addressed during the trial. 36. Considering the fact that nothing further needs to be recovered from the Petitioner and as there is a delay of 10 days in lodging the report and no medical certificate is produced to show that the defacto complainant sustained injuries in the incident in question, there appears to be no justification for continuing the Petitioner”s incarceration for an indefinite period. The Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court have consistently held that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty in accordance with the law. In this case, the guilt of the Petitioner remains to be established by the Investigating Agency through cogent and convincing evidence. Therefore, the Petitioner”s freedom cannot be restricted indefinitely during the trial. 37. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the purpose of bail is solely to ensure the accused's presence at trial. Bail is neither punitive nor preventive; deprivation of liberty should be seen as a punishment unless necessary to guarantee that the accused will attend their trial when required. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held in numerous judgments that denying bail to an individual who has not yet been convicted contravenes the principle of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution, except where there is reasonable belief that the accused might influence witnesses. Thus, pre- conviction detention should be avoided except when necessary to secure the accused's attendance at trial or to prevent witness tampering if the accused is released. 38. At this stage, the allegations against the Petitioner are subject to the trial's outcome. The trial is anticipated to take a considerable amount of time. Bail serves the purpose of allowing an accused to remain free until their guilt or innocence is determined. 38. At this stage, the allegations against the Petitioner are subject to the trial's outcome. The trial is anticipated to take a considerable amount of time. Bail serves the purpose of allowing an accused to remain free until their guilt or innocence is determined. It is settled law that mere apprehension that the accused would tamper with the prosecution evidence or intimidate the witnesses cannot be grounds to refuse bail unless the Prosecution shows that the accused tried for such tampering/intimidation. The Petitioner, being a fourterm M.L.A. with strong community ties, is unlikely to flee from justice. 39. In contrast, the Petitioner has been in detention since 26.06.2024, he has undergone approximately 57 days. The Petitioner's continued preventive custody is based on an unsubstantiated suspicion that he might tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. Given the penal provisions invoked viz-aviz pre-trial custody, coupled with the prima facie analysis of the nature of allegations, and the other factors peculiar to this case, there would be no justifiability further pre-trial incarceration at this stage, subject to the compliance of terms and conditions mentioned in this order. 40. In these circumstances, the Petitioner's availability for further investigation, interrogation, and trial is not at risk. The Petitioner has been assessed as not being a flight risk. Considering these factors, along with the duration of the Petitioner's custody, the Petitioner is entitled to bail. It is important to clarify that any observations made regarding the merits of the case, whether in the Sessions Court's order or in this order, should not be interpreted as an order on the merits. All contentions will remain open for consideration during the trial. 41. Considering the above facts and circumstances, and noting that most of the witnesses have already been examined, the release of the Petitioner will not impede the investigation. This Court has examined the instant petition in light of the established legal principles outlined above and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable to being allowed. Accordingly, without commenting on the merits, lest it may prejudice the trial, the present petition is allowed subject to the following conditions: i. The petitioner shall be released on bail on his executing a personal bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two (2) sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Macherla; ii. The Petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; iii. The petitioner shall attend before the investigating officer once in a week till filing of charge sheet and he shall appear before the investigating officer as and when his presence is required by the investigation officer for the purpose of investigation; iv. The Petitioner shall inform to the investigation officer immediately after his release, specifying his place of residence, functional mobile phone number. In the event of any change in his place of residence or mobile number, he shall promptly update the details with the Police. v. The Petitioner shall not make any comment in print or electronic media about his role in the present case. vi. The Petitioner is expected to have deposited his Pass Port before the Magistrate as per the orders given by this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.No.3788 of 2024 and he is directed to deposit his Passport if already not deposited and the petitioner shall not leave the country without permission of the Court. vii. The Respondent-State is at liberty to move this Court for modification or cancellation of bail if the circumstances so necessitate or in case of violation of any of the conditions mandated herein. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.