JUDGMENT 1. Heard Sri A.Satya Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri N.Ashwin Kumar, learned counsel for the plaintiff - respondent No.1 and perused the material available on record. 2. In the present Revision, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenge is to the order dtd. 1/11/2023, passed by the Court of the XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada, allowing I.A.No.262 of 2019 in O.S.No.191 of 2011, filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein under the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Respondent No.1 herein filed the aforesaid suit against the petitioners and four others, seeking the relief of specific performance of contract of sale deed. Suit schedule property, which consists of three items, is totally an extent of Ac.07.56 cents situated at Mantena Village, Gannavaram Mandal, Krishna District. The suit instituted by the respondent No.1 herein came to be dismissed by the learned XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada, for non-prosecution. Seeking restoration of the suit, by setting aside the order of default, the plaintiff - respondent No.1 herein filed the instant Interlocutory Application under the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the defendants - petitioners herein resisted the said application by filing counter. The learned XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada, by way of the order impugned in the present Revision, allowed the said Interlocutory Application and consequently restored the suit. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition. 4. The learned XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada, by way of the order impugned in the present Revision, allowed the said Interlocutory Application and consequently restored the suit. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Sri A.Satya Prasad, representing Sri Prakash Buddarapu, learned counsel for the petitioners on record, contends that the impugned order is highly erroneous, contrary to law and defeats the very object and intention of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that having regard to the negligence exhibited by the plaintiff in prosecuting the suit, the learned Judge grossly erred in allowing the application; that the impugned order is completely bereft of valid and convincing reasons, as such, the same is liable to be set aside; that the past conduct of the plaintiff also disentitles the plaintiff to claim the benefit of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the learned Judge failed to take into consideration the contents/averments in the counter filed by the defendants opposing the Interlocutory Application for restoration; the respondent No.1-plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for non-appearance nor the Court recorded any satisfaction in terms of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the learned Judge did not properly consider the parameters of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and eventually, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the impugned order is unreasonable. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that the respondent No.1 ought not to have requested the Court for two reliefs in one application, namely, to set aside the dismissal order in the suit and also in Interlocutory Application. 5. To bolster his submissions and contentions, learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the following judgments: 1) Meena Chaudhary Vs. Commissioner of Delhi Police And Others, (2015) 2 SCC 145 . 2) P.Arjun Vs. P.Subbaratanamma, 2022 SCC ONLINE AP 751. 3) Order dtd. 4/12/2012 in C.R.P.No.1610 and 1874 of 2012. 4) Order dtd. 24/9/1996 in C.R.P.No.266 of 1994. 5) T.Bhanumathi Vs. R.Hanumantha Rao (Died) and Ors., 1996 (1) ALT 52 . 6. Commissioner of Delhi Police And Others, (2015) 2 SCC 145 . 2) P.Arjun Vs. P.Subbaratanamma, 2022 SCC ONLINE AP 751. 3) Order dtd. 4/12/2012 in C.R.P.No.1610 and 1874 of 2012. 4) Order dtd. 24/9/1996 in C.R.P.No.266 of 1994. 5) T.Bhanumathi Vs. R.Hanumantha Rao (Died) and Ors., 1996 (1) ALT 52 . 6. On the other hand, emphatically refuting the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 - plaintiff that there is absolutely no error nor there exists any infirmity in the impugned order and in the absence of the same, the questioned order is not amenable for any correction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; that since the impugned order is supported by valid reasons, the same does not warrant any interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; that having regard to the reasons assigned in the affidavit filed in support of the Interlocutory Application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the impugned order cannot be faulted; that without any delay, the present application for restoration was filed, as such the learned XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada correctly allowed the application. 7. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned counsel places reliance on the following judgments: 1) Robin Thapa Vs. Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359 . 2) Kiran Krishna Real Estate and Constructions Vs. P.V.A.Prasad, 2023 SCC ONLINE AP 580. 8. In the above background now the issues that stem for consideration of this Court are: "1. Whether the order of the learned Additional District Judge is sustainable and tenable in the facts and circumstances of the case? And 2. Whether the same warrants any interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?" 9. The aim and motto of the Courts should always be in the direction of adjudicating the issues on merits and there may be certain exceptions for the said normal rule. Unless the conduct of the parties is reprehensible, completely and patently bereft of bono-fides, the said principle is required to be adhered to scrupulously. It is no doubt true that because of the failure to attend the Court, the suit came to be dismissed by the Court for non-prosecution on 19/7/2019. Unless the conduct of the parties is reprehensible, completely and patently bereft of bono-fides, the said principle is required to be adhered to scrupulously. It is no doubt true that because of the failure to attend the Court, the suit came to be dismissed by the Court for non-prosecution on 19/7/2019. It is equally true that the present application for restoration was filed on 30/7/2019. 10. Broadly, the case of the plaintiff - respondent No.1 herein is that he was sick and unable to move due to leg injury, consequent upon an accident, and that he invested more than Rs.1.00 Crore for the property in the year 2008 and that on account of the conduct of the defendants, he landed in a litigation and his counsel could not represent the case on 19/7/2019, as he was appearing in other Court and that by the time he reached the Court, the suit came to the dismissed because of non-appearance. 11. On the other hand, the case of the defendants - petitioners is that the plaintiff was not diligent at any time and his conduct was highly callous and that the plaintiff wantedly failed to cooperate with the Commissioner for fixing the date for his cross-examination by the defendants, though he got the Commissioner appointed for the said purpose and that the plaintiff intentionally prolonged the matter for several years and in view of the said reasons there is no justification in directing restoration of the suit. 12. The learned Judge allowed the application by imposing costs of Rs.15, 000.00 payable to Mandal Legal Services Authority, Vijayawada. In the impugned order, the learned Additional District Judge recorded the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to proceed with the suit on day-to-day basis and it is further clear from the impugned order that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of controversy, the learned Judge in exercise of the discretion, decided to afford opportunity to the plaintiff to prosecute the case on merits. The learned Judge also took into consideration the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the composite High Court and the Kolkata High Court. 13. In this context, it would be apt and appropriate to refer to the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent No.1-plaintiff. 14. In the case of P.Arjun Vs. The learned Judge also took into consideration the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the composite High Court and the Kolkata High Court. 13. In this context, it would be apt and appropriate to refer to the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent No.1-plaintiff. 14. In the case of P.Arjun Vs. P.Subbaratanamma (2nd cited supra), cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court at paragraph No.18 held as under: "In the present case, for about fifteen (15) adjournments, the plaintiff failed to appear. Moreover, the petitioner does not show diligence to get the matter expeditiously disposed of, but on the other hand, he seems to have filed another application to appoint a Commissioner to record his cross-examination, which would in normal course take further time. In an old suit of the year 2008, the petitioner is not showing much interest in getting the dispute resolved. The reason assigned for absence on the relevant day is that he had been to Delhi on his occupational work. Except the bare statement, nothing on record justifies truth in the statement. A mere statement on oath cannot be treated as a gospel truth in the light of circumstances in this case. If there is something more on record throwing light on the veracity of the statement, the same can be believed. In the present case, there is no such material available. Just to settle a dispute through Court, lenient approach cannot be stretched to the extent of accommodating even a party not diligent in pursuing his remedy in the proceeding before a Court. Thus, there is no irregularity or illegality committed by the trial Court in the impugned order." 15. In the case of D.Manemma Vs. V.Anantha Reddy, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in C.R.P.No.1610 & 1874 of 2012 at paragraph No.18 held as under: "There is one other factor which weighs with this Court in favour of the petitioners/defendants. The suit is for specific performance of the agreement of sale. The property is situated at Karmanghat, which has become one of the hubs of the city of Hyderabad. There is a radical change of the profile of Hyderabad from 1978. The value of the properties has increased manifold. The suit is for specific performance of the agreement of sale. The property is situated at Karmanghat, which has become one of the hubs of the city of Hyderabad. There is a radical change of the profile of Hyderabad from 1978. The value of the properties has increased manifold. What the original plaintiff would have paid to the petitioners would have been a pittance in the year 1978 and it will be more than a windfall if their suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale of the year 1978 is decreed, post 2012. The respondents/plaintiffs cannot be allowed to run away with such an unintended benefit on account of their own default in prosecuting the suit. The Court below has completely failed to keep these relevant facts in mind and has reasoned that since the suit filed by the respondents in the year 2005 is pending, no harm will be caused if the present suit is restored. In my opinion, such an approach cannot be sustained. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the lower Court has wrongly exercised the discretion vested in it in restoring the suit nearly eight years after its dismissal for default. Accordingly, order dtd. 18/1/2012 of the lower Court passed in I.A.No.564/2012 is set-aside. For the above mentioned reasons, C.R.P.No.1610/2012 is allowed. C.R.P.No.1874/2012 is dismissed." 16. The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Shaik Rahima Begum and Ors. Vs. Kadiri Narayanamma, in C.R.P.No.266 of 1994 at paragraph No.10 held as under: "The present petition was filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay involved in filing the appeal. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A C.P.C. state that the delay involved in filing the appeal can be condoned only if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause' no doubt deserves to receive a liberal construction, but striking a just and equitable balance between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievance on the merits of the appeal for cause beyond his reasonable control. This is a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion of the Court and each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. "Sufficient cause" should be given to a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no ignorance nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. In condoning the delay, the Court should consider that by lapse of time a legal right has been accrued to the other side and that right should not be disturbed lightly without sufficient cause. But if 'sufficient cause' is shown the Court has ample power to condone the delay. If the delay is to be condoned as a matter of course even when no such 'sufficient cause' is shown and when there is inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant by putting forth the theory of liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause', it will clearly lead to undesirable results and will amount to encourage the inaction and mala fides on the part of the persons trying to take recourse to the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act by approaching the Court whenever they want to do so for questioning the orders of the Court by filing an application for condonation of delay at their will and pleasure. If liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is to be extended to such an extent, then practically there is no necessity for having Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act on the statute as it will amount to saying that the affected party can come and file a petition for condonation of delay at whatever time he wants by putting forth some reason or other, whether true or false and soliciting the discretion of the Court in his favour. I am afraid that such a liberal construction cannot be imported into the expression 'sufficient cause' as incorporated in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 41 Rule 3-A C.P.C. The facts of the present case reveal that the respondent was grossly negligent in prosecuting her litigation and there are also no bona fides on her part in putting forth the cause for delay involved and as such, the orders of the lower Court allowing such petition cannot be sustained." 17. The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of T.Bhanumathi Vs. The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of T.Bhanumathi Vs. R.Hanumantha Rao (Died) and Ors, (3rd cited supra) at paragraph No.3 held in the following manner: "It is now well settled that when once the lower Court found that the cause for the absence of the petitioner-plaintiff has not been established, the Court has no jurisdiction to allow the application overriding the express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure. This point has been decided in a catena of decisions, e.g., K. Suryaprakasa Rao v. V. Satyanarayana, 1970 1 APLJ 111 (SN); Futolite Colour Labs. v. Aver Foto Print System, ; Managing Director, APSRTC v. L. Leelavathi, ; Malti Devi v. Hon'ble Board of Revenue, U.P., AIR 1995 Allahabad 27, etc. Following these decisions, I hold that the lower Court having found that the respondent has not established that on account of failure of the bus in which he was travelling he could not attend the Court, erred in allowing the petition. This revision petition is therefore allowed and the order impugned is set aside. No costs." 18. Coming to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 - plaintiff; 1. In the case of Robin Thapa Vs. Rohit Dora (4th cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.7 held in the following manner: "Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits." 2. In the case of Kiran Krishna Real Estate & Constructions (P) Limited vs. P.V.A.Prasad (5th cited supra), this Court at paragraph Nos.9 to 20 held as follows: "9. Order IX of C.P.C. deals with "Appearance of parties and consequence of nonappearance." Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. provides for restoration of suits dismissed under Order IX Rule 8 for non-appearance. When once a suit is dismissed wholly or partly, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, however Rule 9 permits for filing of an application to set aside the dismissal order. When once a suit is dismissed wholly or partly, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, however Rule 9 permits for filing of an application to set aside the dismissal order. As seen from the rule, for an application for the restoration of the suit to be allowed, "sufficient cause" must be shown to the satisfaction of the court for non-appearance, when the suit was called. However, restoration application cannot be ordered unless notice of application has been served on the opposite party. 10. The interpretation of "sufficient cause" is of relevance at this juncture. There exists no straitjacket formula for "sufficient cause." The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Road Master Cycle Limited v. Smt.Sushma Nangia defined "sufficient cause" at para 7 as follows; "...Any cause, which prevents a person approaching the Court within time, is sufficient. In doing so, it is a test of reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. The test whether or not a 'cause' is 'sufficient' is to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention..." 11. Whereas, a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Ram Charan (deceased) through his LRs observed that an illustrative list of facts or circumstances constituting "sufficient cause" would hamper the free exercise of the courts discretion in the interests of justice. 12. The satisfaction of the court on the "sufficient cause" is the crux in deciding restoration applications under Order IX Rule 9. It is reiterated as a principle of law that Order IX Rule 9 being procedural in nature, "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal consideration as an elastic expression in order to do substantial justice rather than being struck on technical rigidities. 13. In the present case, the suit is filed for recovery of amount. When the matter came up for trial, the plaintiff on a particular date of hearing failed to appear before the Court. The record shows that the application under Order IX Rule 9 of CPC filed by the plaintiff within a period of one month. Furthermore, the plaintiff filed evidence affidavit along with the petition. When the matter came up for trial, the plaintiff on a particular date of hearing failed to appear before the Court. The record shows that the application under Order IX Rule 9 of CPC filed by the plaintiff within a period of one month. Furthermore, the plaintiff filed evidence affidavit along with the petition. The contention of the defendant is that since they have taken a plea in the written statement that the suit claim is barred by limitation, the plaintiff avoided to pursue the suit is not tenable since the trial is not yet commenced and the plea is not examined by the trial Court. 14. It is the contention of the petitioner that he suffered from viral fever for three days and that his nephew was admitted in a hospital, therefore, he could not appear before the Court. In a case where the party approaches the Court immediately within the statutory time prescribed for recourse, the discretion needs to be exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not with any malafide intention. 15. In the context of Order IX Rule 9, a Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Mohd. Khaja v. C. Nand Kumar, observed that when substantial rights are involved, it is expedient to decide the matter on merits than to dismiss for default. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Samotibai v. Dhannalal & Ors., opined that when the non-appearance does not smack mala fide and does not seem to be false or frivolous, court should enable the claimant to substantiate his case. 16. Furthermore, sufficient cause for nonappearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for dismissal of the suit cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. The impugned order is clear on that point. The learned trial judge observed about the non-filing of any evidence to demonstrate illness. A similar point has been dealt by His Lordship Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court in M.Ravi v. Smt. Rajeswari wherein no medical certificate was produced to substantiate ill-health on the day of non-appearance. The impugned order is clear on that point. The learned trial judge observed about the non-filing of any evidence to demonstrate illness. A similar point has been dealt by His Lordship Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court in M.Ravi v. Smt. Rajeswari wherein no medical certificate was produced to substantiate ill-health on the day of non-appearance. It was observed by His Lordship that though premium should not be given to the negligence of litigant, a liberal approach leaning in favour of litigants who are incapacitated should be taken since dismissal of a suit would operate as a bar for initiating fresh suit on the same cause of action. 17. In the present case, the reason for absence is due to fever and sickness of his nephew. The restoration petition was filed immediately along with the evidence affidavit and that itself shows the readiness of the plaintiff to commence the trial. This court is of the view that the learned trial judge had adopted a technical, narrow, and pedantic view on simple ground that the reason is not supported by medical record. It is highly unlikely to expect a medical record for each illness which incapacitate the party from appearing on a given day, particularly when bona fide of the party is exercised in due time to rectify his absence. 18. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kamla Bai v. Harishankar Arora, held that when non-appearance of the plaintiff is only for one day and when the defendant doesn't appear in the appeal against the dismissal of the restoration application under Order IX Rule 9, the suit must be restored to original file. The factual matrix of the present case squarely fit in as the plaintiff in the subject suit has also not appeared on a given day i.e., on 29/9/2005. 19. Absence of a party in the case on the date of hearing may lead to the delay in disposal of the matter, but the other side can be compensated by adequate cost and the lis can be decided on merits to meet the ends of justice. However, this Court by this view is not giving a free ticket to the negligence and lethargic attitude of the parties who do not pursue their matters as per the timelines. 20. However, this Court by this view is not giving a free ticket to the negligence and lethargic attitude of the parties who do not pursue their matters as per the timelines. 20. Before parting with the case, it is interesting to note that the suit is of the year 2003, it was dismissed for default on 29/9/2005, the restoration petition under Order IX Rule 9, vide I.A.No.2017 of 2005 was filed within 30 days' time limit. The restoration petition vide impugned order was dismissed on 5/8/2015, i.e., nearly after a period of 10 years. For the absence of the plaintiff for one day, the litigation stood stalled for a period of 10 years in the trial court thereby forcing the plaintiff to carry the matter in an Appeal before this Court. Nevertheless, it took 18 years to set the clock right for being absent on one day. This Court has serious concern about the difficulty of the parties to adduce their evidence apart from securing the presence of witnesses proving their respective contentions as much water might have flown down the bridge in these two decades that passed from the institution of the suit." 19. Having regard to the principles laid down in the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 - plaintiff, in the considered opinion of this Court, the judgments which the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance would not render any assistance to the case of the petitioners. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order cannot be faulted, in the absence of any malafides on the part of the respondent No.1 - plaintiff. Though, it is the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that previous conduct of the plaintiff would disentitle him from seeking the relief, in view of the settled legal position that while considering the applications of the present nature, the earlier conduct needs no consideration, the contention contra of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners stands rejected. It is also to be noted that the suit properties are valuable and substantial in nature, as such, the trial Court is perfectly justified in affording opportunity to the plaintiff. It is also to be noted that the suit properties are valuable and substantial in nature, as such, the trial Court is perfectly justified in affording opportunity to the plaintiff. It is also pertinent to note that though in the present I.A.No.262 of 2019, the plaintiff - respondent No.1 sought for restoration of the suit along with I.A.No.404 of 2011, the learned Judge by way of the order impugned, had set aside the default order dtd. 19/7/2019 only. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. However, the costs imposed by the learned XIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, (FTC), Vijayawada in the impugned order stand enhanced from Rs.15, 000.00 to Rs.50, 000.00 and out of the same Rs.35, 000.00 shall be paid to the defendants - petitioners and Rs.15, 000.00 to the Mandal Legal Service Authority, Vijayawada, within a week from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is also made clear that failure to pay the said amounts within the time stipulated would disentitle the plaintiff to prosecute the suit. It is made clear that if any amount is paid pursuant to the impugned order, the same shall be given credit to. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this case, shall stand closed.