JUDGMENT : Harisankar V. Menon, J. The 1st petitioner, a registered trade union, functioning at the 2nd and 3rd respondents' establishment, along with the 2nd petitioner- affected employee–has filed this writ petition challenging the findings contained in Ext.P7 award of the Labour Court, Ernakulam. 2. The short facts, arising for consideration in this writ petition, are as under: The 2nd petitioner–affected employee–entered the services of the management pursuant to Ext.P5 appointment order dated 31.10.1996. She was working as a Senior Clerk in the 2nd respondent establishment, at its office at Kaloor represented by the 3rd respondent herein. It is pointed out that the 2nd petitioner participated in certain lawful union activities which were not tolerable for the management. Therefore, it is alleged that by Ext.P1 order dated 20.01.2018, the management victimized the 2nd petitioner by transferring her from Kaloor Office to Thrissur Bureau office. It is pointed out that on 23.01.2018, the 2nd petitioner went to Thrissur office, but the office was found locked and on enquiry, it was made known to her that the office was not regularly functioning. The petitioner points out that this was intimated to the Deputy General Manager on 23.01.2018 itself and that she proceeded on leave on medical grounds for 15 days from 22.10.2018 onwards, which leave is being extended till date-on medical grounds. 3. The Union preferred a claim statement at Ext.P2 contending that the transfer is illegal, since the same is issued against the Model Standing Orders in force in the State of Kerala. It was pointed out that, with reference to Ext.P3 notification dated 23.03.2010, the clause regarding “transfer” was deleted from the Model Standing Orders. Ext.P4 was relied upon by the petitioner to point out that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam, had also effected deletion of the “transfer clause” in the Certified Standing Orders of the management dated 29.04.2014. The management filed a written statement producing the appointment order and contending that even as per the appointment order, the 2nd petitioner could be transferred. It was further pointed out that there is no victimisation or unfair labour practice as alleged by the union. 4. The management filed a written statement producing the appointment order and contending that even as per the appointment order, the 2nd petitioner could be transferred. It was further pointed out that there is no victimisation or unfair labour practice as alleged by the union. 4. However, the Labour Court, Ernakulam issued Ext.P7 award dated 23.11.2021, finding that on an analysis of the entire evidence, the transfer is found to be one in connection with the administration of the establishment and not based on any victimisation or pursuant to any unfair labour practice. It is noticed that the distance between Kochi and Thrissur is only around 70 kilometres and the allegations levelled by the 2nd petitioner have not been proved. In the result, the award at Ext.P7 was issued justifying the transfer of the 2nd petitioner from Kaloor office to Thrissur branch. 5. It is challenging the order at Ext.P7 that the captioned writ petition is filed, also pointing out to the judgment of this Court in O.P.No13150 of 1991 produced as Ext.P8 whereby, it is held by this Court that “transfer” is not a condition of service enumerated in the Model Standing Orders. The petitioner has also produced Ext.P9 Government order, dated 16.02.1999 as per which the “transfer” provisions were introduced in the Standing Orders which have been subsequently deleted pursuant to Exts.P3 and P4. 6. I have heard Sri.K.S.Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri. Benny P. Thomas, the learned senior counsel appearing for the management. 7. Sri.K.S.Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the award at Ext.P7 is issued without taking note of Exts.P3 and P4 by which “transfer clause” has been deleted from the Standing Orders. He points out further that the findings as regards the transfer in paragraph 15 of the impugned award are also not correct or legal. Sri. K.S.Madhusoodanan also relies on the judgments of the Apex Court in Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen [ (1974) 3 SCC 330 ], Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Others [ (1999) 1 SCC 626 ], Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasang v. Jet Airways (M/s.) Ltd. [ AIR 2023 SC 3596 ] and Somesh Thapliyal and Another v. Vice Chancellor, H.N.B. Garhwal University and Another [ AIR 2021 SC 4158 ]. 8. 8. Per contra, Sri.Benny P. Thomas, the learned senior counsel for the management would contend that the letter of appointment, the Standing Orders as well as the settlement between the workmen were regulated. However, the transfer has taken place since by the letter of appointment issued in the year 1996, the second petitioner is liable to be transferred. He points out that in 1999, the transfer clause was included in the Standing Orders which stood deleted in 2010, adding that even after such deletion, the transfer can be effected on the basis of the provisions under the appointment order. He points out further that the 2nd petitioner is even as of now continuing on medical leave, and therefore the writ petition is not to be entertained. 9. I have considered the rival submissions as well as the connected records. 10. In the impugned order at Ext.P7, the findings are essentially contained in paragraph 15 of the order. In the said paragraph, there is a positive finding to the effect that the transfer order dated 20.01.2018 was in connection with the administration of the management and not based on any victimisation or unfair labour practice as alleged by the workman. Though Sri.K.S.Madhusoodanan has contended that the said finding is not correct, I notice that the above finding has been entered into on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Labour Court, Ernakulam. No reasons have been pointed out, by which, the said findings can be said to be perverse. The petitioners, apart from contending that the transfer was pursuant to victimisation, have not produced any sort of evidence before the Labour Court. In such circumstances, the findings contained in paragraph 15 with reference to the alleged victimisation–unfair labour practice, is upheld. 11. The next contention raised by the petitioners in this writ petition is to the effect that the transfer effected by the management after the “transfer clause” was deleted pursuant to Exts.P3 and P4, is illegal and arbitrary. It is true, by Ext.P3, the Government had deleted the transfer clause from the Kerala Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1958. On the basis of Ext.P3, Ext.P4 is also issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam by deleting Clause No.16 of the Certified Standing Orders as regards the 2nd respondent management. It is true, by Ext.P3, the Government had deleted the transfer clause from the Kerala Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1958. On the basis of Ext.P3, Ext.P4 is also issued by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam by deleting Clause No.16 of the Certified Standing Orders as regards the 2nd respondent management. Therefore, the question to be considered is as to whether the transfer can be effected by the management dehors Exts.P3 and P4. The learned Senior Counsel Sri.Benny Thomas, on behalf of the management, took me through Ext.P5 appointment order dated 31.10.1996. In Clause 9 of the said appointment order, it is specifically pointed out that “you are liable to be transferred to any place in India, in any of our Branch offices, associate concerns, or publications or allied offices in existence or to be established hereafter as and when necessary”. 12. Therefore, a reading of Clause 9 of the appointment order at Ext.P5 makes it clear that the 2nd petitioner has also admitted to the condition in the appointment order to the effect that the appointment is not a permanent one at a particular place. She was informed that she is liable to be transferred to any place in India, to any of the Branches of the management, as and when necessary. Therefore, it is for the management to decide as to whether under the exigencies of service, the workmen is to be transferred to any of the Branch offices. 13. In this connection, I notice that the petitioner has relied upon Ext.P8 judgment of this Court in O.P.No.13150 of 1991 dated 11.03.1997. That was a case where the Union approached this Court seeking for a declaration that the Certified Standing Orders concerning “transfer” is null and void. This Court in Ext.P8 judgment, after making reference to the provisions under which the Standing Orders were issued, came to the following findings: “14. So I am of the view that relying on item No.11 in the Schedule to the Act anything cannot be included in the standing order unless it is a matter prescribed by the State Govt. and included in the Model Standing Orders. As transfer is not a condition of service enumerated in the model Standing Orders or has not been prescribed as an additional item to the Schedule to the Act, it cannot be included as a condition in the certified Standing Orders. and included in the Model Standing Orders. As transfer is not a condition of service enumerated in the model Standing Orders or has not been prescribed as an additional item to the Schedule to the Act, it cannot be included as a condition in the certified Standing Orders. In the case of the workers under the first respondent, the standing orders were certified as early as in 1978 and that did include a standing order regarding transfer, obviously because no one did contest with regard to the legality of inclusion of the said standing order. But the Certifying Officer had a duty cast on him under Sec.4 of the Act to see that the standing orders were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act and it was fair and reasonable. Some thing opposed to the Statute cannot be said to be fair. Therefore, while certifying the standing order in 1978, this duty cast upon the Certifying Officer under Sec.4 of the Act was not properly performed. 17. Apart from that, in this case, as I have already found above, the standing orders certified in 1978 contained a standing order on transfer which could not have been included in it. Therefore it is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act. The Certifying Officer has a special function or duty under Sec.6 of the Act to see that standing orders are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and are fair. Something opposed to the statute is not fair. Apart from exercising power under Sec. 10, he can also modify the standing orders by reason of the power conferred by Sec.6 deleting that part of the certified Standing Orders which is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act. So it cannot be said that, as decided by the Certifying Officer in Ext.P5, an application for deletion of a clause is not an application for modification or that he has no jurisdiction to delete any standing order.” Thus, this Court has only found in the afore judgment that the Standing Orders cannot be issued independent of the power under which the said orders are issued. It was found that insofar as the transfer is not an item upon which the Standing Order can govern, the challenge raised in the writ petition was justified. It was found that insofar as the transfer is not an item upon which the Standing Order can govern, the challenge raised in the writ petition was justified. However, in the case at hand, it is noticed that even on the face of Exts.P3 and P4, the right of the management to effect transfer on the basis of the letter of appointment is existing. The letter of appointment is issued in 1996. At that point of time, the Standing Order did not contain any clause regarding transfer since that is included only in the year 1999 as evidenced by Ext.P4. Even the said inclusion is subsequently deleted by Ext.P3. However, as already noticed, the letter of appointment gives an independent power to the management to carry out a transfer and the said power of the management is not curtailed in any manner by the Standing Orders relied on by the petitioners. 14. Coming to the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners, the judgment in Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen [ (1974) 3 SCC 330 ] was rendered in a situation where there were agreements which were inconsistent with the Standing Orders. It was found by the Apex Court in paragraph 8 of the said judgment that an employer cannot enforce two sets of Standing Orders governing the classification of workmen and it is also not open to him to enforce simultaneously the Standing Order regulating the classification of workmen and a special agreement between him and an individual workman settling his categorisation. However, the case at hand is not similar to the facts and circumstances considered by the Apex Court. Here, the management is seeking for the enforcement of the power reserved by virtue of the letter of appointment. The judgment of the Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Others [ (1999) 1 SCC 626 ] is cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the Certified Standing Orders constitute the conditions of service which are binding upon the management and the employees. However, the Apex Court did not consider the question as to whether transfer of an employee can be affected on the basis of the conditions in the letter of appointment while rendering the above judgment. However, the Apex Court did not consider the question as to whether transfer of an employee can be affected on the basis of the conditions in the letter of appointment while rendering the above judgment. The judgment of the Apex Court in Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasang v. Jet Airways (M/s.) Ltd. [ AIR 2023 SC 3596 ] held that the Certified Standing Orders would not prevail over the private agreement/settlement between union and employees. The judgment of the Apex Court in Somesh Thapliyal and Another v. Vice Chancellor, H.N.B. Garhwal University and Another [ AIR 2021 SC 4158 ] is cited by Sri.K.S.Madhusoodanan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, to contend that the employee is perfectly justified in challenging the conditions in the appointment orders. He relies on paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment, which reads thus: “42. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants have accepted the terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment deserves rejection for the reason that it is not open for a person appointed in public employment to ordinary choose the terms and conditions of which he is required to serve. It goes without saying that employer is always in a dominating position and it is open to the employer to dictate the terms of employment. The employee who is at the receiving end can hardly complain of arbitrariness in the terms and conditions of employment. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that if an employee takes initiation in questioning the terms and conditions of employment, that would cost his/her job itself. 43. The bargaining power is vested with the employer itself and the employee is left with no option but to accept the conditions dictated by the authority. If that being the reason, it is open for the employee to challenge the conditions if it is not being in conformity with the statutory requirement under the law and he is not estopped from questioning at a stage where he finds himself aggrieved.” There is no dispute regarding the propositions laid down in the above judgment. As regards the case at hand, it is noticed that the clause regarding transfer stood omitted from the Standing Orders. As regards the case at hand, it is noticed that the clause regarding transfer stood omitted from the Standing Orders. However, the appointment of the 2nd petitioner is not on the basis of any condition regarding “transfer” which was there in the Standing Order, on the date of her appointment. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel on the above judgment does not appear to be apposite. 15. On the other hand, it is noticed that the Labour Court has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Cipla Ltd. v. Jayakumar R. and Another [ 1999(1) SCC 300 ]. There, in the letter of appointment, there was a clause by which the employer company could transfer the employee to any of its establishments. It was further declared that the Standing Orders of the Company would be applicable and the said Standing Orders only permitted intra-establishment transfer mentioning nothing about inter- establishment transfer. In the above situation, the question arose as to whether an inter-establishment transfer can be effected. Considering this question, the Apex Court held as under: “12. In our opinion, the aforesaid construction does not flow from the provisions of the Standing Orders when read along with the letter of appointment and, therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court was not correct. As has already been noticed the letter of appointment contains both the terms namely for the respondent being transferable from Bangalore as well as with regard to the applicability of the Standing Orders. These clauses, namely, clauses 3 and 11, have to be read along with the Standing Orders, the relevant portion of which has been quoted hereinabove. Reading the three together we do not find that there is any conflict as has been sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent. Whereas the Standing Orders provide for the department wherein a workman may be asked to work within the establishment itself at Bangalore, clause 3 of the letter of appointment, on the other hand, gives the right to the appellant to transfer a workman from the establishment at Bangalore to any other establishment of the Company in India. Whereas the Standing Orders provide for the department wherein a workman may be asked to work within the establishment itself at Bangalore, clause 3 of the letter of appointment, on the other hand, gives the right to the appellant to transfer a workman from the establishment at Bangalore to any other establishment of the Company in India. Therefore, as long as the respondent was serving at Bangalore he could be transferred from one department to another only in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders but the Standing Orders do not in any way refer to or prohibit the transfer of a workman from one establishment of the appellant to another. There is thus no conflict between the said clauses.” The principles laid down in the above judgment would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Insofar as the letter of appointment issued by the management to the 2nd petitioner specifically provided for transfer from one office to another, the transfer effected by the management cannot be found fault with. On the whole, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. Resultantly, the writ petition would stand dismissed.