ORDER : 1. This habeas corpus petition assails detention order dated 11.12.2023 passed by the Government of Rajasthan (Department of Home) by which the husband of the petitioner has been detained for a period of one year under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1988’). 2. Quintessential facts, necessary for decision of the present case, are that the petitioner is the wife of detenue Mohammad Ali @ Bablu. She has stated on affidavit that on the basis of requisition made by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jaipur, South, Jaipur to the Secretary, Home (Law) for initiating action and detention of her husband, proceedings were drawn under the Act of 1988 which culminated into passing of impugned order dated 11.12.2023 on recording satisfaction that it has become necessary to pass an order with a view to preventing the detenue from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The basis for such satisfaction was registration of eight criminal cases against the detenue under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1985’). 3. In the petition, it has also been stated that charge sheets have been filed only in five cases which are under trial, but so far the detenue has not been convicted in any of the cases and has been granted bail in all cases by the concerned court. Aggrieved by order of detention, earlier D.B. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 6/2024 was filed which came to be disposed off vide order dated 06.03.2024 granting liberty to the petitioner to take appropriate remedy in case order of detention is confirmed by the Advisory Board. The petitioner, thereafter, came to know that vide order dated 19.02.2024, order of detention has been extended for a period of one year till 10th December, 2024. It is also stated that the detenue was not provided with complete set of documents except those mentioned in the petition regarding detention but the order passed by the Advisory Board was also not supplied. 4. In the reply filed by Respondents No. 1 to 4 and Respondent No. 7, the averments made in the petition have been denied. It is also stated that the detenue was not provided with complete set of documents except those mentioned in the petition regarding detention but the order passed by the Advisory Board was also not supplied. 4. In the reply filed by Respondents No. 1 to 4 and Respondent No. 7, the averments made in the petition have been denied. According to the respondents, husband of the petitioner is continuously involved in commission of offences under the Act of 1985, which is reflected from the fact that as many as eight criminal cases under that very Act have been registered against him. Satisfaction was arrived at on the basis of repeated commission of offences under the Act of 1985 and upon consideration of various material on record and relevant information, the authority arrived at satisfaction that it has become necessary to pass an order of detention to prevent the petitioner’s husband (detenue) from committing further offences under the Act of 1985. It is also stated that not only the order of detention, but the grounds thereof were also supplied to the detenue. The order of detention was sent for approval of the Advisory Board, which held its meeting and after consideration of the material, the Advisory Board found that there is sufficient cause for detention. According to the respondents, petitioner’s husband is involved in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and despite repeated action and arrests, he has not shown any signs of improvement and has become serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and to prevent the society from this menace, it was considered necessary to pass an order of detention of the detenue. 5. On the earlier date of hearing, this Court directed learned counsel for the official respondents to produce the opinion of Advisory Board, which has also been placed before the Court for perusal and the same is taken on record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner made following submissions: 6.1 Though the detenue had demanded various documents, the documents except those annexed with the petition, were not supplied to him. Therefore, this is serious breach of the material provisions contained in the Act of 1988 and on that basis itself, the order of detention is liable to be set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner made following submissions: 6.1 Though the detenue had demanded various documents, the documents except those annexed with the petition, were not supplied to him. Therefore, this is serious breach of the material provisions contained in the Act of 1988 and on that basis itself, the order of detention is liable to be set aside. 6.2 Though number of cases have been registered against the detenue, he has been granted bail in all the cases, which prima facie indicates that the cases are baseless and the detenue is being falsely implicated time and again by the police authorities. Once the detenue has been granted bail in criminal cases registered against him, the power of detention as provided under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 could not be invoked as the same has been excluded by necessary implication. 6.3 Even before the order of detention could be passed in the case of the detenue, proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [as was in force], (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) were drawn and an order was passed on 13.10.2023 requiring the detenue to submit bond and surety for good behaviour and peace. Once that order has been passed, there was no occasion for the detaining authority to invoke power under Section 3 of the Act of 1988, unless it is found that the detenue has breached and violated the terms and conditions of the bond to maintain good behaviour. 6.4 It is not that in all the cases, charge sheets have been filed. Charge sheets have been filed only in five cases and in remaining three cases, investigation is pending. Therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of prima facie nature against the detenue, so as to warrant invocation of extreme provisions of preventive detention under Section 3 of the Act of 1988, which has the effect of keeping a person in detention without trial and even without proof of allegation of commission of offences in number of criminal cases, which are still pending at various stages. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Others (1984) 3 SCC 14 ; Ashok Kumar Vs. In support of the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Others (1984) 3 SCC 14 ; Ashok Kumar Vs. Delhi Administration & Others (1982) 2 SCC 403 ; Sushanta Kumar Banik Vs. State of Tripura & Others, AIR 2022 SC 4715 ; Smt. Azra Fatima Vs. Union of India & Others (1991) 1 SCC 76 ; decisions of High Court of Jammu & Kashmir & Ladakh at Srinagar in the cases of Burhaan Mushtaq Vs. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir (WP (Crl) No. 287/2023 decided on 22.03.2024 and Mukhtar Ahmad Dar Vs. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir (WP (Crl) No. 120/2023 decided on 26.12.2023; decision of High Court of Delhi in the case of Shahid Khan @ Chote Pradhan Vs. Union of India & Another (W.P. (CRL) No. 224/2023 decided on 15.04.2024. 7. Per contra, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondent-State as well as Union of India would submit that the order of preventive detention has been validly passed by the competent authority upon arriving at satisfaction as provided under the provisions of law and after due observance and compliance of various provisions contained in the Act of 1988. It is submitted that the competent police authority forwarded a requisition to the Government for initiating proceedings for detention as it was found that the detenue was repetitively involved in commission of offences under the Act of 1985 and against him, as many as eight criminal cases were registered. Upon receipt of the report and the material, the competent detaining authority applied its mind, took into consideration the relevant factors and the material placed before it, which also included the fact regarding the detenue having been bailed out in the criminal cases as also the fact regarding there being an order passed by the Executive Magistrate on 13.10.2023. After taking into consideration all the relevant material as aforesaid, the detaining authority arrived at satisfaction that it has become necessary to detain the detenue i.e. husband of the petitioner with a view to prevent him from commission of offences under the Act of 1985. The order passed by the State Government was sent for consideration and opinion of the Advisory Board under the law. The order passed by the State Government was sent for consideration and opinion of the Advisory Board under the law. The Advisory Board afforded the detenue an opportunity of being heard and after hearing him as also upon consideration of the material placed on record, the Advisory Board recorded its opinion that there were sufficient grounds for passing an order of detention. After receipt of opinion of the Advisory Board, the State Government passed the order of detention of the detenue for a period of one year in accordance with the provisions of law. It is further argued that the provisions of the Act of 1988 do not require the detaining authority to supply any document other than the order of detention and the grounds of detention. Both the orders, after being passed, were duly communicated to the detenue which fact has not been disputed. 8. Further submission of learned counsels for the respondents is that even though the detenue was granted bail in various criminal cases mainly for the reason that the quantity involved in those cases was below the commercial quantity, but the same does not improve the case of the detenue, much less take away the jurisdiction of the competent detaining authority to examine and in appropriate case, pass an order of detention. According to learned counsels for the respondents, the scheme of the Act of 1988 does not contain any such fetter and it is, otherwise, too well settled in catena of decisions that merely because the detenue was granted bail, the order of detention cannot be interferred with. 9. In answer to the submission regarding passing of an order under Section 110 of Cr.P.C. prior to passing of order of detention, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that Section 110 of Cr.P.C. operates in different field and it does not come in the way of exercising powers of detention under the special enactment, i.e., the Act of 1988, which is enacted to deal with those, who are involved in commission of offences under the Act of 1985 and powers are granted under the Act of 1988 to prevent commission of such offences. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents would lastly submit that the charge-sheets have been filed in all eight criminal cases registered against the detenue, which is clearly spelt out in the order passed by the detaining authority. 11. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents would lastly submit that the charge-sheets have been filed in all eight criminal cases registered against the detenue, which is clearly spelt out in the order passed by the detaining authority. 11. In addition to common submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Union of India raised another issue that this petition styled as habeas corpus petition is not maintainable because present is not a case of illegal detention, but the detention order passed by the detaining authority under the provisions of the Act of 1988. 12. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record as also the opinion of the Advisory Board which has been placed before us for our perusal. 13. The impugned order of detention passed by the State Government reveals that the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jaipur (South) sent a complaint against the detenue to the State Government with the request to pass an order of detention under the provisions of the Act of 1988 on the facts stated in the complaint that against the detenue, eight criminal cases have been registered alleging commission of offences under the Act of 1985 and in all those cases, charge-sheets have already been filed before the competent court. The complaint further stated that against the detenue, criminal cases for commission of alleged offences under the Act of 1985 are being registered since 2019 and in almost all the cases, cash collected by sale of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances has also been seized. Against the detenue, as many as three criminal cases were registered in 2023, one criminal case in 2022, one criminal case in 2021, two criminal cases in 2020 and one criminal case in 2019 and cash in Rs. 8,63,710/- has also been seized. It was also stated in the complaint that the detenue himself is a drug addict and is continuously involved in trafficking of drugs since long which is affecting the health and welfare of the society at large, apart from this, being a threat to the economy as well. It was also stated that even though attempts were made to keep the detenue away from such activities, he has continuously been found involved in commission of such offences. 14. It was also stated that even though attempts were made to keep the detenue away from such activities, he has continuously been found involved in commission of such offences. 14. Upon receipt of the aforesaid complaint from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jaipur (South), the State Government examined the material on record and noted the details of various criminal cases which were filed against the detenue since 2019 upto 2023. The details included the quantity and nature of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances allegedly seized from the detenue as also the cash amount seized from him. The material placed before the detaining authority reflected seizure of ‘Ganja’ and ‘Smack’ both from the detenue. The detaining authority also took into consideration that against the detenue, proceedings under Section 110 of Cr.P.C. were also drawn and an order was also passed by the Executive Magistrate on 13.10.2023. Upon consideration of the aforesaid material placed before it, the State Government arrived at satisfaction that with a view to prevent the detenue from committing the offences under the Act of 1985, it has become necessary to pass an order of detention in exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the Act of 1988. 15. As has been stated in the reply and also placed on record by the petitioner, along with the order, the grounds of detention were also communicated to the detenue vide memo of even date. The petitioner, in her pleadings, has not raised any dispute regarding non-compliance of the provisions relating to communication of order of detention along with the grounds of detention to the detenue. Therefore, we have to hold that insofar as, communication of order of detention along with the grounds of detention is concerned, the requirement of law as stated in Section 3(3) of the Act of 1988 has been complied with. 16. Section 9 of the Act of 1988 provides that the appropriate Government shall be required to make a reference to the Advisory Board constituted under the law. Section 9(f) of the Act of 1988 inter alia provides that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 17. Section 9(f) of the Act of 1988 inter alia provides that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 17. Section 11 of the Act of 1988 provides for maximum period of detention to the effect that the maximum period for which any which the provisions of Section 10 of the Act of 1988 do not apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of Section 9 of the Act of 1988 shall be one year from the date of detention. It further provides that in cases where the detention is under Section 10 of the Act of 1988, it may extend to two years from the date of detention. 18. Section 3 of the Act of 1988 provides that an order of detention may be passed if the Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do. 19. There can be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that the detention laws require strict construction and an order of detention which is in contravention of the provisions of detention law, would not be sustained as it relates to personal liberty of a person detained. On facts of the present case, we do not find that there is violation of any of provisions of the Act of 1988. 20. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the detenue has not been supplied with any documents, other than those annexed with the petition, is an admission of fact that the order of detention and the grounds of detention both were supplied to the detenue. More than that, the provisions of the Act of 1988 do not mandate the detaining authority to communicate the detenue any other order. More than that, the provisions of the Act of 1988 do not mandate the detaining authority to communicate the detenue any other order. The argument that copy of the opinion of the Advisory Board has not been supplied to the detenue, in our opinion, would not vitiate the order of detention because the provisions of the Act of 1988 nowhere require that after opinion is rendered by the Advisory Board to the Government, the Government is obliged to supply a copy of the opinion of the Advisory Board to the detenue. It can be a different thing that even after demand, copy of the opinion of the Advisory Board has not been supplied to the detenue. But, that by itself, without anything more, would not amount to contravention of any of the mandatory provisions of the Act of 1988. Furthermore, the averments made in the petition with regard to non-supply of documents are vague. It is nowhere mentioned in the petition as to which document was mandatorily required to be supplied, but has not been supplied to the detenue. Therefore, first ground of challenge to the order of detention of the detenue does not appeal to us and the same is rejected being sans substratum. 21. The second submission, which has been pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner is that once bail is granted to the detenue in criminal cases, the power of detention provided under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 could not be invoked. To buttress this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh (supra). The petitioner, in that case, a student, was involved in a case of murder of two persons on account of non-fulfillment of demand of ransom. The petitioner therein was put to trial and later on, directed to be enlarged on bail vide order dated 09.08.1983. However, before he could be released on bail, an order of detention came to be passed on 16.08.1983. Aggrieved person filed a writ petition seeking issuance of writ of habeas corpus which eventually came to be dismissed, though with liberty that if and when the petitioner therein is served with copy of detention order and placed under detention in prison, he could file fresh petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus. Aggrieved person filed a writ petition seeking issuance of writ of habeas corpus which eventually came to be dismissed, though with liberty that if and when the petitioner therein is served with copy of detention order and placed under detention in prison, he could file fresh petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus. However, instead of moving the High Court, the petitioner therein filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The factual background of that case was examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “32. In the present case the District Magistrate has relied on three incidents to hold that the petitioner is an anti-social element. They are-(i) that on April 15, 1975 the petitioner along with his associates had gone to the shop of a cloth dealer of Bhagalpur Town armed with an unlicensed pistol and had forcibly demanded subscription at the point of a gun and (ii) that on June 17/18, 1982 the petitioner was found teasing and misbehaving with females returning from a cinema hall. The third ground is the criminal case now pending against the petitioner in the Sessions Court. The first incident is of the year 1975. It is not stated how the criminal case filed on the basis of that charge ended. The next incident relates to the year 1982. The detaining authority does not state how the criminal case filed in that connection terminated. If they have both ended in favour of the petitioner finding him clearly not guilty, they cannot certainly constitute acts or omissions habitually committed by the petitioner. Moreover the said two incidents are of different kinds altogether. Whereas the first one may fall under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, the second one falls under sub- clause (iv) thereof. They are, even if true, not repetitions of acts or omissions of the same kind. The District Magistrate does not appear to have applied his mind to the above aspects of the case. Whereas the first one may fall under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, the second one falls under sub- clause (iv) thereof. They are, even if true, not repetitions of acts or omissions of the same kind. The District Magistrate does not appear to have applied his mind to the above aspects of the case. The third ground which is based on the pending Sessions case is no doubt of the nature of acts or omissions referred to in sub- clause (i) of Section 2(d) but the interval between the first ground which falls under this sub-clause and this one is nearly eight years and cannot, therefore, make the petitioner a habitual offender of the type falling under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d).” 22. In the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, particularly taking into consideration that the requirement of law applicable in that case and as to whether in those circumstances, the person concerned therein could be branded as habitual offender, it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below: “32. ……… But the point for consideration now is whether the filing of the charge-sheet is sufficient to bring the petitioner within the mischief of the Act. The Court should examine the case without being overwhelmed by the gruesomeness of the incident involved in the criminal trial.” 23. It was in the peculiar facts of the aforesaid case, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court found a singular criminal case of alleged heinous nature was made a basis and the other background would not make out a case of habitual offender, it was held that the law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail. Even while recording so, it was clearly observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that such course may not be available unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. Even while recording so, it was clearly observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that such course may not be available unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. The aforesaid verdict does not lay down any proposition of law of universal application that in all cases where an accused is enlarged on bail, the provisions of preventive detention should not be invoked and no order of preventive detention can be passed. Following are the pertinent observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “32. ……. It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 24. The aforesaid decision, therefore, does not advance the case of the detenue because present is a case where against the detenue as many as eight criminal cases, involving commission of alleged offences under the provisions of the Act of 1985 were registered. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra) in support of the contention that where once bail is granted to the accused, detention order could not be passed. In the aforesaid case, on facts, it was found that detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing order of detention, the detenue was ordered to be released by the Special Court. In the aforesaid case, on facts, it was found that detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing order of detention, the detenue was ordered to be released by the Special Court. On this factual premise, it was observed that a material and vital fact of the detenue being released on bail in criminal cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the concerned authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass appropriate order of preventive detention. Moreover, another striking feature of that case was that the bail was granted by the Special Court despite the rigours of Section 37 of the Act of 1985. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that grant of bail in cases where Section 37 of the Act of 1985 is applicable would show that if an accused was ordered to be released on bail despite rigours of Section 37 of the Act of 1985 then the same is suggestive of the fact that the Court concerned might not have found any prima facie case against the accused and had this fact been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, then it would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make an order of detention. In the facts and circumstances of that case, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act of 1985, following observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “22. As noted above, in the case on hand, in both the cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of preventively detaining the appellant herein, the appellant was already ordered to be released on bail by the concerned Special Court. Indisputably, we do not find any reference of this fact in the proposal forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura District while requesting to process the order of detention. The reason for laying much stress on this aspect of the matter is the fact that the appellant though arrested in connection with the offence under the NDPS Act, 1985, the Special Court, Tripura thought fit to release the appellant on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The reason for laying much stress on this aspect of the matter is the fact that the appellant though arrested in connection with the offence under the NDPS Act, 1985, the Special Court, Tripura thought fit to release the appellant on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 reads thus: “Section 37. Offences to be cognizable and non- bailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 23. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that the accused arrested under the NDPS Act, 1985 can be ordered to be released on bail only if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If the appellant herein was ordered to be released on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, then the same is suggestive that the Court concerned might not have found any prima facie case against him. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, then it would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make an order of detention. The State never thought to even challenge the bail orders passed by the special court releasing the appellant on bail.” 26. The State never thought to even challenge the bail orders passed by the special court releasing the appellant on bail.” 26. Having so considered the facts of that case, the law laid down in the cases of Asha Devi Vs. Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat & Another, 1979 Crl LJ 203 and SK Nizamuddin Vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 395 was relied upon to propound that if material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make a detention order, are not placed or not considered by the detaining authority, it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction, rendering the detention order illegal. It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court thus: “26. From the above decisions, it emerges that the requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order. 27. It is clear to our mind that in the case on hand at the time when the detaining authority passed the detention order, this vital fact, namely, that the appellant detenu had been released on bail by the Special Court, Tripura despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, had not been brought to the notice and on the other hand, this fact was withheld and the detaining authority was given to understand that the trial of those criminal cases was pending.” 27. It is, therefore, clear that in the aforesaid case, it was non- disclosure of material/vital facts which were considered as the vitiating factor. Thus, the aforesaid view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not support the proposition, as argued before us, that whenever bail is granted, power to pass order of preventive detention under the detention laws could not be taken recourse to. 28. The law of precedents was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation & Another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Another (2002) 3 SCC 496 as below: “19. 28. The law of precedents was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation & Another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Another (2002) 3 SCC 496 as below: “19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statues, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737 (at P. 761) Lord MacDermot observed: (All ER p. 14C-D) "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge." 20. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970) 2 All ER 294 Lord Reid said (at All ER p. 297g-h), "Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c) "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 21. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 22. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 22. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. * * * "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” 29. In one of the recent pronouncements, in the case of Secundrabad Club Etc. Vs. C.I.T.-V Etc., AIROnline 2023 SC 702, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated settled proposition of law that only the ratio decidendi of a judgment is binding as a precedent. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below: “13. It is a settled position of law that only the ratio decidendi of a judgment is binding as a precedent. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480 , it has been observed that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but with regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. In this context, reference could also be made to Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 (HL), wherein it was observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found. In other words, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. 14. In other words, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. 14. Reliance could also be placed on the dissenting judgment of A.P. Sen, J. in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1384 ), wherein his Lordship observed that a decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less “law declared” within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution so as to bind all courts within the territory of India. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic ingredients: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above. For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision, for, it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedent, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. 15. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, 1959 AC 743, it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. A judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties to the lis themselves), nor are the findings of fact. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. A judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties to the lis themselves), nor are the findings of fact. This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the court, the judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case. 16. The legal principles guiding the decision in a case is the basis for a binding precedent for a subsequent case, apart from being a decision which binds the parties to the case. Thus, the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent for a subsequent case. Therefore, while applying a decision to a later case, the court dealing with it has to carefully ascertain the principle laid down in the previous decision. A decision in a case takes its flavour from the facts of the case and the question of law involved and decided. However, a decision which is not express and is neither founded on any reason nor proceeds on a consideration of the issue cannot be deemed to be law declared, so as to have a binding effect as is contemplated under Article 141, vide State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139 .: (AIROnline 1991 SC 57) Article 141 of the Constitution states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. All courts in India, therefore, are bound to follow the decisions of Supreme Court. This principle is an aspect of judicial discipline. 17. If a decision is on the basis of reasons stated in the decision or judgment, only the ratio decidendi is binding. The ratio or the basis of reasons and principles underlying a decision is distinct from the ultimate relief granted or manner of disposal adopted in a given case. It is the ratio decidendi which forms a precedent and not the final order in the judgment, vide Sanjay Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, Allahabad; (2007) 3 SCC 720 : ( AIR 2007 SC 950 ). Therefore, the decision applicable only to the facts of the case cannot be treated as a binding precedent. 18. xxxxxx 19. It is the ratio decidendi which forms a precedent and not the final order in the judgment, vide Sanjay Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, Allahabad; (2007) 3 SCC 720 : ( AIR 2007 SC 950 ). Therefore, the decision applicable only to the facts of the case cannot be treated as a binding precedent. 18. xxxxxx 19. What is binding, therefore, is the principle underlying a decision which must be discerned in the context of the question(s) involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour. In a subsequent case, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide. Therefore, the context or the question, while considering which, a judgment has been rendered assumes significance. 20. xxxxx 21. In the context of understanding a judgment, it is well settled that the words used in a judgment are not to be interpreted as those of a statute. This is because the words used in a judgment should be rendered and understood contextually and are not intended to be taken literally. Further, a decision is not an authority for what can be read into it by implication or by assigning an assumed intention of the judges and inferring from it a proposition of law which the judges have not specifically or expressly laid down in the pronouncement. In other words, the decision is an authority for what is specifically decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.” 30. Therefore, two decisions in the cases of Vijay Narain Singh (supra) and Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra) cited at the bar do not advance the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that once bail is granted in a criminal case, no order of preventive detention can be passed. The decisions in the cases of Mukhtar Ahmad Dar (supra) and Shahid Khan @ Chote Pradhan (supra) do not advance the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner as those are the cases where the order of detention was found to be vitiated on the ground that material and vital facts were not brought to the notice of detaining authority and the aforesaid decisions also do not lay down any proposition of law that where bail has been granted, no order of preventive detention can be passed. 31. 31. On the contrary, the settled legal position as adumbrated in the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardhan Saha Vs. The State of West Bengal & Others (1975) 3 SCC 198 is that merely because a detenue is liable to be tried in a criminal court for commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of Cr.P.C. would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the detention law. It has also been reiterated in the aforesaid decision that the fact that the police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the provisions of Cr.P.C. and even lodges first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate to issue an order under preventive detention law. Following are the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made in the aforesaid case: “34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. The State of W. B. (1972) 2 SCC 550 , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W. B. (1973) 4 SCC 76 ; Abdul Aziz v. The District Magistrate, Burdwan (1973) 1 SCC 301 and Debu Mahto v. State of W. B. (1974) 4 SCC 135 correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The, decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 573 which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” 32. In the aforesaid landmark judicial pronouncement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly distinguished between preventive detention and punitive detention as below: “32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu.” 33. In another decision, in the case of Commissioner of Police & Others Vs. C. Anita (Smt.) (2004) 7 SCC 467 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with and explained the purpose as also the intent of the preventive detention as below: “5. …… Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence, while criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law concerned. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner, the failure to conform to which should lead to detention. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance, with great latitude in the exercise of its discretion. The detaining authority may act on any material and on any information that it may have before it. Such material and information may merely afford basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion to take action, but may not satisfy the tests of legal proof on which alone a conviction for offence will be tenable. The detaining authority may act on any material and on any information that it may have before it. Such material and information may merely afford basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion to take action, but may not satisfy the tests of legal proof on which alone a conviction for offence will be tenable. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in the society without which the enjoyment of all rights, including the right to personal liberty of citizens would lose all their meanings provide the justification for the laws of preventive detention. Laws that provide for preventive detention posit that an individual's conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or to the security of State or corroding financial base provides grounds for satisfaction for a reasonable prognostication of possible future manifestations of similar propensities on the part of the offender. This jurisdiction has at times been even called a jurisdiction of suspicion. The compulsions of the very preservation of the values of freedom of democratic society and of social order might compel a curtailment for individual liberty. "To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law" said Thomas Jefferson "would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty and all those who are enjoying with us, thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the needs". This, no doubt, is the theoretical jurisdictional justification for the law enabling preventive detention. But the actual manner of administration of the law of preventive detention is of utmost importance. The law has to be justified by striking the right balance between individual liberty on the one hand and the needs of an orderly society on the other. These aspects were highlighted in Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda (2004) 3 SCC 75 .” 34. The aforesaid decisions also answer the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that once an order under Section 110 Cr.P.C. is passed, the order of detention could not be passed under the detention law. Section 110 Cr.P.C. provides for taking security for good behaviour from habitual offenders. The aforesaid decisions also answer the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that once an order under Section 110 Cr.P.C. is passed, the order of detention could not be passed under the detention law. Section 110 Cr.P.C. provides for taking security for good behaviour from habitual offenders. Clause (g) thereof provides that when an Executive Magistrate receives information that there is within his local jurisdiction, a person who is so desperate and dangerous to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community, such Magistrate may, in the manner provided under the law, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit. The aforesaid provision, at the first place, only requires bond to be executed and does not empower the Magistrate, at that stage, to detain the person. However, the scheme of preventive detention is provided under special statute, i.e. the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 which specifically deals with cases where the law permits detention of a person with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Act of 1988, in its opening part, records that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and the activities of the persons engaged in such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy and, therefore, having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in which such activities are organised and carried on and having regard to the fact that in certain areas, which are highly vulnerable to illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as the activities of a considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on, it is necessary for the effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of persons concerned in any manner therewith. It is, therefore, clear that the power of detention conferred on the detaining authority under the scheme of the Act of 1988 is intended to prevent the persons from engaging in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It is, therefore, clear that the power of detention conferred on the detaining authority under the scheme of the Act of 1988 is intended to prevent the persons from engaging in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Act of 1988 being special statute, the power of detention conferred under that Act is not, in any manner, restricted or controlled by proceedings drawn and an order passed by an Executive Magistrate under Section 110 Cr.P.C., which is a general law. Therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1988, being special statute, will prevail over the general statute. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that once order under Section 110 Cr.P.C. is passed, the State Government is denuded of its power to pass an order of preventive detention under Section 3 of the Act of 1988, is rejected as untenable in law. 35. The invocation of power of preventive detention by the detaining authority under Section 3 of the Act of 1988 in the present case is premised on the ground that the detenue is repetitively involved in commission of offences punishable under the Act of 1985 and eight criminal cases have been registered against him in a span of five years with more than one case in 2023 having been committed by the detenue, which provided basis to form an opinion regarding the detenue continuously involved in commission of offences punishable under the Act of 1985 and, therefore, satisfaction was arrived at that with a view to prevent the detenue from engaging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it was necessary to detain him. Present is not a case of punitive detention, but only preventive detention. The detaining authority has not only taken into consideration the registration of criminal cases against the detenue, but also that he is involved in commission of offences after he was granted bail. The fact regarding grant of bail to the detenue in criminal cases has been specifically taken into consideration by the detaining authority and it is not a case where the detaining authority was oblivious of the fact that bail has been granted to the detenue. Moreover, present is not a case where the detenue claims to have been released despite rigours of Section 37 of the Act of 1985. Moreover, present is not a case where the detenue claims to have been released despite rigours of Section 37 of the Act of 1985. During the course of arguments, it is stated that in all the criminal cases which have been registered against the detenue, commercial quantity is not involved and therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the Act of 1985 did not apply and that explains why the detenue, despite being repetitively involved in commission of offence of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, has been released on bail from time to time by the criminal courts. Furthermore, the detaining authority has also taken into consideration the fact that order under Section 110 Cr.P.C. was also passed by the Executive Magistrate against the detenue. These are the distinguishing features of the present case and, therefore, it cannot be said that on facts, present is a case where relevant material and vital facts affecting decision making process and exercise of discretion and satisfaction were not brought to the notice of the detaining authority so as to say that the order of detention is vitiated. 36. The petitioner could not point out any other illegality in the order of detention, much less violation of any of the provisions of the Act of 1988. Upon perusal of the opinion of the Advisory Board, it is found that the detenue was afforded an opportunity of hearing and thereafter, the Advisory Board, upon consideration of material on record, formed an opinion that there was sufficient ground for passing an order of detention of the detenue. The order of detention as well as grounds of detention both were also duly communicated to the detenue. 37. In the result, there is no merit in this habeas corpus petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.