Union Of India v. Surendra Kumar S/o Late Shri Mangu Ram
2024-09-06
PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J: 1. This Special Appeal has been preferred against the order dated 04.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4797/2024, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner (respondent herein) was allowed. 2. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by Mr.Mukesh Rajpurohit, learned Deputy Solicitor General alongwith Ms.Dimple Purohit appearing on behalf of appellants (respondents in the writ petition) before this Court are that the respondent-writ-petitioner Mr. Surendra Kumar was enrolled in the Indian Air Force on 28.03.2007, and was posted at 33 SU, Air Force Unit, Jodhpur w.e.f. 10.05.2021 for trade duties on a co-locating posting, vide order dated 08.03.2021. 2.1. Thereafter, vide transfer order dated 08.02.2024, the respondent-writ petitioner has been ordered to be posted at 314 TRU (Darbhanga, Bihar) from Jodhpur with effect from 06.05.2024. The respondent-writ petitioner submitted applications before the appellants for cancellation of the said transfer order, on the grounds that his mother was unwell, wife being a government employee (posted at Jodhpur) and his daughter being five years of age; however, the said applications were rejected by the appellants. 2.2. Thus, laying challenge to the said transfer order dated 08.02.2024, the respondent-writ petitioner preferred a writ petition (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4794/2024) before this Hon’ble Court against the order dated 08.02.2024, which was allowed by the learned Single Bench vide the impugned order dated 04.04.2024, while quashing and setting aside the order dated 08.02.2024, qua the respondent-writ petitioner, with a direction to the appellants to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of co-locating posting contained in posting policy dated 24.02.2020/24.11.2022 keeping into consideration that the age of the respondent-writ petitioner’s daughter as well as the fact that the respondent-writ petitioner has not completed 7 years of service at Jodhpur; it was further directed that the tenure of the respondent-writ petitioner be extended till his daughter attains the age of 10 years or till he completes 7 years of service at Jodhpur, whichever is earlier. 3. Learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Air Headquarters Human Resource Policy Part-II/PA (Air Warrior)/PD/01/2020 dated 24.02.2020 (in short, ‘Policy of 2020’) was superseded by Air Headquarters Human Resource Policy Part-II/PA /PD/01/2022 dated 24.11.2022 (in short, ‘Policy of 2022’).
3. Learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Air Headquarters Human Resource Policy Part-II/PA (Air Warrior)/PD/01/2020 dated 24.02.2020 (in short, ‘Policy of 2020’) was superseded by Air Headquarters Human Resource Policy Part-II/PA /PD/01/2022 dated 24.11.2022 (in short, ‘Policy of 2022’). He further submits that as per para 29 of the Policy of 2022, “the Airman will posted to the requested place as far as possible on TPU and tenure will be depending on utilisation driven by organisational requirement”. 3.1. Learned Deputy Solicitor General further submits that the posting of the respondent-writ petitioner vide order dated 08.03.2021 was not a posting on co-location ground but was a ‘request posting’ as governed by paras 21-32 of the Policy of 2022; the said request posting was restricted for a tenure of two years and the respondent-writ petitioner has already completed the said posting tenure, and thus, was not entitled for any extension beyond the normal tenure of 2 years on a request posting. 3.2. Learned Deputy Solicitor General also submits that the Airmen is initially engaged for 20 years, and is supposed to be posted at various places, like Hard Area, Field Area, Modified field area, North East etc. He further submits that the home zone posting is reserved for an Air Warrior on compassionate grounds for 2 years, that too on merit basis, generally for a restricted tenure; if out of 20 years, the Air Warrior concerned is permitted to spend 7 years at home zone, followed by same treatment being sought and granted to all Air Warriors, the administration and discipline of the Defence Forces, particularly in regard to the defence operations, would get adversely affected, if not collapsed. 3.3. Learned Deputy Solicitor General further submits that the posting order, as impugned by the respondent-writ petitioner in the aforementioned writ petition, was passed on the administrative exigencies. 3.4. Learned Deputy Solicitor General also submits that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case Anil Kumar Vs Union of India & Ors.
3.4. Learned Deputy Solicitor General also submits that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case Anil Kumar Vs Union of India & Ors. (S.B.C.W.P. No.4687/2022, decided on 14.07.2023) and affirmed by a Division Bench of this Hon’ble in D.B. Special Leave Writ Petition No.841/2023 vide order dated 02.02.2024; the said order of the Hon’ble Division Bench was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.25134/2024, wherein vide order dated 15.07.2024, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench shall not be cited as precedent in any other case. Therefore, as per learned Deputy Solicitor General, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Bench is not sustainable in the eye of law. 3.5. In support of such submissions, learned Deputy Solicitor General relied upon the following judgments:- (a) Mrs. Shilpi Bose & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659; (b) Union of India & Ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 ; (c) Major General J.K. Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 227 ; (d) Major Amod Kumar Vs. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 18 SCC 478 ; 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellants, submits that the respondent-writ petitioner’s wife is serving as a Teacher in the Education Department of the State of Rajasthan, and presently posted at Government School, Didwana. He further submits that the respondent-writ petitioner was ordered to be posted at Jodhpur, as per Policy of 2020; as per clause 29 of the Policy of 2020, the husband and wife should be posted at the same station to enable them to lead a normal life. 4.1. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent-writ petitioner has a daughter aged only 5 years, and by making the respondent-writ petitioner to stay away from her, would impede the daughter’s physical, mental as well as emotional growth.
4.1. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent-writ petitioner has a daughter aged only 5 years, and by making the respondent-writ petitioner to stay away from her, would impede the daughter’s physical, mental as well as emotional growth. He also submits that the respondent-writ petitioner is entitled to remain posted at Jodhpur, till completion of the normal tenure of 7 years or till his daughter attains the age of 10 years, whichever is earlier, as per Policy of 2020, and thus, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Bench does not warrant any interference by this Court. 4.2. Learned counsel also submits that there are numbers of Air Warriors posted at different Air Force Stations and have completed more than 6 years tenure at a particular posting, and that, they are enjoying the benefits of Policy of 2020. Therefore, the transfer order dated 08.02.2024 was rightly quashed by the learned Single Bench vide the impugned order. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar. 6. This Court observes that the respondent-writ petitioner was ordered to be posted at 33 SU, Air Force Unit, Jodhpur from 10.05.2021 for trade duties on co-locating posting, vide order dated 08.03.2021. Thereafter, vide transfer order dated 08.02.2024, the respondent-writ petitioner has been posted out to 314 TRU (Darbhanga, Bihar) with effect from 06.05.2024. The respondent-writ petitioner submitted applications before the appellants for cancellation of the said transfer order, but the said applications were rejected by the appellants, against which the respondent-writ petitioner has preferred the writ petition, which was allowed by the learned Single Bench of this Hon’ble Court, vide the impugned order, in the manner as stated hereinabove. 7. This Court further observes that the Policy of 2020 was superseded by the Policy of 2022. This Court also observes that the respondent-writ petitioner was posted, vide order dated 08.03.2021, at No.33 Signal Unit Air Force at Jodhpur on the ground of “Posting on Co-location”, which puts him in the category of “Request Posting” and the same was covered under Clauses 21 to 32 of the Policy of 2022. As per Note 3 of Clause 24 of the Policy of 2022, “All request postings will generally be for a restricted tenure of two years, unless considered on TPU/service grounds/merits of the case”.
As per Note 3 of Clause 24 of the Policy of 2022, “All request postings will generally be for a restricted tenure of two years, unless considered on TPU/service grounds/merits of the case”. In the present case, the respondent-writ petitioner was ordered to be posted at Jodhpur vide order dated 08.03.2021, and thereafter he was transferred vide order dated 08.02.2024 at Darbhanga (Bihar), after completion of posting tenure of 2 years at Jodhpur. This Court further observes that the stipulation, as contained in aforesaid Note 3, regarding automatic entitlement beyond the prescribed 2 years period is not applicable in the present case. The relevant portion of Clause 24 of the Policy of 2022 is reproduced as hereunder:- “24. An airman may apply for posting to a specific place due to domestic issues or any other compassionate grounds. Posting should normally be done on TPU as far as possible. In exceptional circumstances, airman can be posted out of the system at the place of his request to fill up trade duty manning level (ML), however, the tenure of such posting would generally be for a specific duration only and same would be driven by the organisational requirement. There are some frequently asked grounds for posting for which relevant documents are required. List of documents supporting the application for posting on these grounds is placed as Appendix M. Note : 1 to 2. . . . . . . . 3. All request postings will generally be for a restricted tenure of two years, unless considered on TPU/service grounds/merits of case.” 8. This Court also observes that as per Clause 29 of the Policy of 2022, the Airman will be posted at the requested place as far as possible on TPU (Trade Proficiency Utilization) and the tenure would depend on utilization driven by organizational requirement. Clause 29 of the Policy of 2022 is reproduced as hereunder:- “29. Co-location Posting – (Spouse Employed in Central/State Govt./Public Sector Undertakings). As per the GoI policy as amended from time-to-time on the subject, as far as possible and within the constraints of administrative feasibility, husband and wife should be posted at the same Station to enable them to lead a normal family life and look after welfare of their children, especially until the children are ten years of age depending on TPU.
Airman will be posted to requested place as far as possible on TPU and tenure will be depending on utilisation driven by organisational requirement. Airmen whose spouse is a permanent employee of Central/State Govt./Public Sector Undertakings only are eligible for consideration for co-location posting. However, this privilege is not applicable for the airmen whose wife is working in Central/State Govt aided institutions. Appointment letter and latest serving certificate (certifying permanent employability) from the employer/head of the organisation should be attached with the application.” 9. At this juncture, this Court considers it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Major General J.K. Bansal (supra) and Major Amod Kumar (supra), as hereunder: Major General J.K. Bansal (supra) : “8. Before we advert to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, it will be useful to take notice of the law regarding the scope of interference in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing an order of transfer. 9. In Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar [1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 127 : (1991) 17 ATC 935 : AIR 1991 SC 532 ] the appellants, who were lady teachers in primary schools, were transferred on their requests to places where their husbands were posted. The contesting respondents, who were displaced by the appellants, challenged the validity of the transfer orders before the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which was allowed and the transfer orders were quashed. This Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court by observing as under : (SCC p. 661, para 4) “4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights.
A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department.” 11. Similar view has been taken in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 21] wherein it has been held that no government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to another is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such orders, as though they were the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management. 12. It will be noticed that these decisions have been rendered in the case of civilian employees or those who are working in public sector undertakings. The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.” Major Amod Kumar (supra): “8.5. The petitioners have not made any submission that the postings are in violation of any statutory rules, executive policies or instructions.
The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.” Major Amod Kumar (supra): “8.5. The petitioners have not made any submission that the postings are in violation of any statutory rules, executive policies or instructions. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in J.K. Bansal v. Union of India [J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 227 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 932] , which was cited by the counsel for the respondents during the hearing. In the said decision, this Court had referred to a number of its precedents [Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 127; Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 230 and National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, (2001) 8 SCC 574 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 21] on the scope of interference of Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where transfer orders had been challenged. The Court held that matters of transfers are best left to the discretion of the competent authority, and should not be tinkered with, in the absence of a demonstrable violation of statutory rules, or an instance of mala fides on the part of the competent authority. This Court noted as follows: (SCC p. 233, para 12) “12. … The scope of interference by the courts in regard to members of the armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.” The petitioners have not alleged any mala fides against the respondents. Hence, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be entertained. 8.6. The respondents have made a reference to the oath administered to Officers and Sepoys alike at the time of commissioning.
Hence, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be entertained. 8.6. The respondents have made a reference to the oath administered to Officers and Sepoys alike at the time of commissioning. The said oath is reproduced hereinbelow for reference: “I (Name) hereby solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India, as by law established and that I will, as in duty-bound honestly and faithfully, serve in the regular Army of the Union of India and go wherever ordered, by land, sea or air, and that I will observe and obey all the commands of the President of the Union of India and the commands of any officer set above me, even to the peril of my life.” (emphasis supplied) This oath is administered to all personnel, irrespective of the arm or service to which they are commissioned. As per the oath, personnel are duty-bound to serve wherever they are ordered to.” 10. This Court further observes that the respondent-writ petitioner is serving the Indian Air Force and was already posted at a co-location, as requested, for period of more than 2 years, and thereafter, the claim of respondent-writ petitioner pertaining to the transfer order dated 08.02.2024, is not sustainable in the eye of law. The posting at a specific place cannot be claimed as a matter of right. This Court also observes that the Air warrior is required to be posted at various locations and the case pertaining to home zone posting can be considered on compassionate grounds, that too on merit basis, generally for a restricted tenure. 11. Thus, looking into the Policy of 2022 as well as the factual matrix of the present case, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 04.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Bench, deserves interference by this Court. 12. This Court is aware of the fact that the Air Force is a fighting arm of the Armed Forces and combining the Policy with the welfare of the spouse cannot be given a very strict meaning as it would frustrate the purpose of Trade Proficiency Utilization (TPU) driven by organizational requirement pertaining to movement of the Armed Forces. The discretion of the Air Force is always greater than the welfare policy, and thus, such discretion is having an overriding effect on the welfare policy.
The discretion of the Air Force is always greater than the welfare policy, and thus, such discretion is having an overriding effect on the welfare policy. Thus, the challenge to such discretion while seeking implementation of such policy as a matter of right, cannot be laid. 13. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed, and accordingly, the impugned order dated 04.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Hon’ble Court is quashed and set aside. Though as a consequence of the present order, the transfer order dated 08.02.2024 transferring the respondent-writ petitioner from Jodhpur (Rajasthan) to Dharbhanga (Bihar) stands revived, but looking into the lapse of time since passing of the same, the appellants shall be required to pass transfer order afresh, in case the administrative exigency still exists. All pending applications stand disposed of.