JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. The petitioner makes a rather uncommon request, that the first respondent-Union of India, be directed to mask his name and identity from Ext.P1 judgment, which he had obtained from this Court in W.P. (C) No. 8857/2009. 2. Sri. Santhosh Kumar - learned counsel for the petitioner, explained that, even though his client exercised his statutory and constitutional rights, in having approached this Court through the afore writ petition, seeking that his name be ordered to be corrected in his official records, since Ext.P1 judgment has now been uploaded in the online arena, he is facing difficulties answering his employer and other persons, particularly those who are outside India, as to why he had done so. He submits that this is causing him prejudice and therefore, has been constrained to approach this Court, especially since “the right to be forgotten” has been globally recognised as a valid right, which also finds recognition in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Another vs. Union of India and Others, (2017) 10 SCC 1 . He thus prays that the reliefs sought for in this writ petition be granted, particularly because the fifth respondent - which is an online legal reporting portal - has reported Ext.P6 on their site, thus intruding into his privacy. 3. Sri. B.G. Harindranath - learned standing counsel for the third respondent - High Court of Kerala, responded to the afore submissions of Sri. Santhosh Kumar, contending that the apprehension of the petitioner appears to be wholly untenable and baseless. He submitted that Ext.P1 clearly indicates that the petitioner has done no wrong, nor has he asked for any relief which is impermissible or illegal; and therefore, that the mere record of the case proceedings, which is normal in all such judgments, cannot cause him any prejudice. He added that there are several hundreds of judgments delivered by this Court and by the other Courts in our country, as also Internationally and that solely because a person has invoked legitimate legal remedy, he can never be victimised or found fault with by any person, whether that be in India or outside. He added that there are several hundreds of judgments delivered by this Court and by the other Courts in our country, as also Internationally and that solely because a person has invoked legitimate legal remedy, he can never be victimised or found fault with by any person, whether that be in India or outside. He then proceeded to say that if the request impelled in this case is to be allowed, then it will become open and possible for every litigant to seek that his name be masked in every judgments, which will be practically impossible and legally not permissible. He concluded saying that, in any event, this writ petition is not maintainable because a prayer to the first respondent to mask a judgment delivered by this Court is untenable. 4. Sri. K.V. Sreevinayakan - learned Central Government Counsel representing respondents 1 and 2, adopted the afore submissions of Sri. B.G. Harindranath, affirming that the Government of India has no role to play in the masking of the cause title of the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble High Court, or by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, or any other Court for that matter. He explained that it is only if the respective Courts are to either anonymise the identity of the litigants, or mask their names and such other credentials, can the petitioner seek any relief qua its publication in the public domain. He, therefore, left it to this Court to issue appropriate orders. 5. Sri. Riji Rajendran - learned counsel for the 7th respondent, submitted that his client has done no wrong because they have only faithfully allowed the publication of judgment delivered by a competent Court, as per law. He argued that the attempt of the petitioner is to blame the publication of the judgment, but conceding that the Courts have committed no wrong in having published the judgments in the manner as is presently available. 6. In reply, Sri. Santhosh Kumar - learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that, even if this Court is not inclined to grant the first prayer in the writ petition - namely to direct the Union of India to mask his client's name and address from Ext.P1 judgment - the further prayers, particularly against respondents 5 to 7, to deindex the link to the judgment, are deserving of being granted. He then pointed out that the further plea against the fifth respondent, to declare that the publication of the judgment is improper and that it be ordered to be removed, is also liable to be granted. 7. I am afraid that this Court cannot find favour with the afore submissions of the petitioner for several reasons. 8. For the first, it is the petitioner who had approached this Court, to obtain Ext.P1 judgment and this Court - being a Court of Record, as is constitutionally recognised and mandated - is obligated to maintain every judgment on record, as per the applicable Rules and Regulations. The names and identity of litigants are anonymised or masked - as the case may be - on a case to case basis, depending upon the circumstances attracted; and this is, normally, resorted to only in cases where the protection of privacy and identity becomes a statutory requirement or a constitutional imperative, like in the case of victims of sexual abuse, child victims and such other. 9. In the case at hand, the petitioner had earlier approached this Court, only seeking a change of his name in the official records and this was acceded to by this Court, since the said prayer was found to be tenable and without any forensic inhibition. The name of the petitioner, obviously, would have been changed based on the directions in Ext.P1 judgment; and one, therefore, fails to understand what prejudice would be caused to him, even if the said judgment is published, as is normally done in the case of every other. The petitioner has not pointed out any prejudice caused to him on account of the publication of the judgment, except saying that his prospective employees outside India find it suspicious that he had approached a court of law. This statement is rather incredulous because, nowhere in a civilized world can it be believe that a person who has approached a Court seeking the enforcement of a tenable right has committed any wrong, or that such an action should clog him with a suspicion of things not being in order. This Court cannot fathom the reasons for the apprehension of the petitioner, particularly when, as rightly argued by Sri. This Court cannot fathom the reasons for the apprehension of the petitioner, particularly when, as rightly argued by Sri. B.G. Harindranath, hundreds, if not more, judgments are uploaded through the Internet from various Courts in this country on a daily basis, as also from other parts of the world; and accept in circumstances whether the petitioner can establish clear breach of privacy, as is statutorily inhibited, he cannot seek that his identity be masked, as has now been sought for. 10. For the second, in Vysakh vs. Union of India, 2023 (1) KHC 193 (DB), a learned Division Bench of this Court has rightly held that the right to be forgotten cannot be claimed in respect of current proceedings or proceedings concluded recently and cannot be relied on to prevent the uploading of judgments in the Court Information System. The judgment further emphasizes that individual privacy rights must yield to the larger public interest, in the absence of any legislation. 11. Subsequent to the afore Division Bench decision, the Digital Personal Protection Act of 2023 was enacted on 11-08- 2023, aiming to regulate the processing of digital personal data, while acknowledging the rights of individuals to safeguard their personal data and the necessity of processing such data for lawful purposes. This Act stipulates that personal data of a “Data Principal” may only be processed in compliance with its provisions and for lawful purposes, either with the individual's consent, or for specified legitimate purposes. Furthermore, the Act requires a “Data Fiduciary” to furnish a notice to the “Data Principal”, to obtain consent under Section 6 of the “Act.” However, Section 17(b) thereof, then provides an exemption wherein “the processing of personal data by any Court or Tribunal or any other body in India which is entrusted by law with the performance of any judicial or quasi-judicial or regulatory or supervisory function, where such processing is necessary for the performance of such function” is exempted from the stringent conditions imposed by the “Act.” Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and Another vs. State of T.N. and Others, 1994 KHC 900 had also held that the right to privacy does not extend to Court records and other public records. 12. 12. For the third, the challenge in regard to permitting the use of Court Information System by Technology Innovators in the legal domain like Indian Kanoon, was also addressed in the aforesaid Division Bench decision. It was held that, judgments included in the Court records are classified as public documents under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no contention regarding the publication of the contents of judgments, even if specific details pertaining to the parties are ordered to be redacted, to safeguard their anonymity. The Court is enjoined to acknowledge the protection afforded to publishers of judgments under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Reporting and publishing judgments are integral components of the Freedom of Speech and expression, which cannot be arbitrarily curtailed without the intervention of legislation. 13. While certain individuals argue that the right to be forgotten primarily addresses privacy concerns and supports the concept of “digital redemption,” it can also be seen as potentially jeopardizing the free flow of information for the public. By associating the right to be forgotten solely with privacy claims, we may overlook the broader issue of maintaining information integrity and the harmful effects of erasure on collective memory, potentially resulting in what are colloquially termed “memory holes.” [See Kristie Byrum, The European Right to be Forgotten] 14. As I have already said above, the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court - being Courts of record, are constitutionally mandated to maintain the record of judgments; and anonymisation or masking cannot be resorted to as a matter of right, but only in exceptional circumstances, as and when a warrant for such arises, or is presented. 15. In the case at hand, I cannot find any such reason to be attracted; and this Court, hence, cannot accede to any request for masking of judgments merely on apprehensions voiced by litigants, particularly when they themselves have obtained them. The reliefs sought for can, therefore, not be brought under the doctrine of the right to be forgotten, because the credentials of a litigant are part of the judgment and are expected to be maintained as a part of record, and no more. 16. The reliefs sought for can, therefore, not be brought under the doctrine of the right to be forgotten, because the credentials of a litigant are part of the judgment and are expected to be maintained as a part of record, and no more. 16. To reiterate, since the petitioner has obtained relief in Ext.P1 as is statutorily entitled to him, for which, no fault can ever be attributed against him, I find no reason to accede to the requests made by him in this writ petition, finding it to be rather superfluous and based on an untenable apprehensions.