JUDGMENT : (K. Vinod Chandran, CJ.,) By the impugned judgment in appeal, the order of punishment of dismissal issued by the General Manager-cum-Disciplinary Authority, confirmed by the Chairman-cum-Appellate Authority of the respondent-bank; pursuant to a departmental proceeding, was set aside. The respondent-bank is aggrieved by the judgment. 2. Mr. Ranjeet Kumar Pandey learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-bank submits that the appellant was proceeded against on an allegation of taking bribe. It is pointed out that the fardbeyan of the FIR was marked as MEx3, FIR MEx4 and the arrest memo has been marked as MEx11. This more than demonstrates the complicity of the delinquent employee and validates the allegation. It is argued that insofar as departmental proceedings are concerned, the standard of proof is preponderance of probability as distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt; which is the standard of proof in criminal cases. The delinquent employee’s name was not found in the FIR only since it was added later when Rs. 1000/-was recovered from his possession. Reliance is placed on State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ranjeet Singh reported in 2022 (2) PLJR 196 (SC) to contend that even if there is defect in enquiry, the employer should be permitted to resume the enquiry from the stage at which the defect occurred. The appellant-bank while seeking to uphold the punishment, in the alternative seeks for resumption of the enquiry proceedings for the purpose of examining witnesses. 3. Mr. Vivek Prasad learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-petitioner relies on two Division Bench Judgments of this Court in LPA No. 415 of 2023 (State of Bihar and Ors Vs. Bharat Purbey) dated 06.12.2023 and LPA No. 389 of 2024 (Ram Lagan Ram Vs. the State of Bihar & Anr) dated 06.08.2024, to contend that without any witness there can be no valid proof of the delinquency; even for the purpose of preponderance of probability. Both the decisions as relied upon relies upon Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 . On the question of remand, it is pointed out that the disciplinary authority having not conducted the enquiry properly and having not examined any witness, the employer cannot be given a premium for its own default. Reliance is placed on the decisions of co-ordinate benches of this Court in LPA No. 446 of 2024 (State of Bihar Vs. On the question of remand, it is pointed out that the disciplinary authority having not conducted the enquiry properly and having not examined any witness, the employer cannot be given a premium for its own default. Reliance is placed on the decisions of co-ordinate benches of this Court in LPA No. 446 of 2024 (State of Bihar Vs. Vikash Kumar) dated 21.08.2024, LPA No. 58 of 2024 (Srikant Singh Vs. State of Bihar) dated 03.09.2024 and LPA No. 770 of 2024 (State of Bihar Vs. Anil Kumar Sinha) dated 20.11.2024. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satyendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3325, to further buttress the above contentions. 4. Admittedly, no witness was examined during the enquiry. The allegation was also that the petitioner was arrested on an accusation of taking bribe due to which the image and interest of the bank had suffered. The enquiry was initiated on the basis of Annexure-P/1 wherein there was no allegation against the delinquent employee. However, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant bank, the delinquent employee was implicated later, on recovery of money from the delinquent employee. True, the allegations are serious especially with respect to the employee of a financial institution who is acting in a fiduciary capacity. Be that as it may, only based on the gravity of allegation, there can be no finding of guilt entered even in a departmental enquiry, without any valid evidence regarding the allegations levelled. 5. We fully concur with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-bank that the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities in a departmental proceeding. But, even for the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority to enter satisfaction on the preponderance of probabilities, there should be some evidence led at the enquiry. 6. In this context, we notice the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) wherein, it was held that mere production of documents would not be proof even in a departmental enquiry. The legal position is that the documents produced will have to be proved by examining witnesses who are either the author of such document or from whose custody the document was produced. The legal position is that the documents produced will have to be proved by examining witnesses who are either the author of such document or from whose custody the document was produced. In fact, in the cited decision, it was held that an FIR in itself is not evidence without actual proof of facts stated therein. Mere production of a. first information statement and an FIR cannot be looked into by an enquiry officer or a disciplinary authority to find the allegations to be true, even on preponderance of probabilities. The department would have to examine the witnesses or the person who registered the FIR or the person who arrested the delinquent employee or at least the person who recovered the money from the possession of the delinquent employee. The mere production of documents regarding the FIR and the arrest would not suffice. 7. Now we come to the issue of remand, which was considered in the following manner, in paragraph no. 8 to 12 of Vikash Kumar (supra):- “8. The decisions in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 and ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ; considered the issue of denial of reasonable opportunity, when the enquiry report was not supplied to the delinquent employee; after the 42nd amendment of the Constitution of India. Before the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, there was a requirement to issue notice to the delinquent employee to show-cause against the punishment proposed, for which a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed was a mandatory condition under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The 42nd amendment removed the above condition and it was the contention of the employers that there was no requirement to supply the enquiry report. It was categorically held that whenever the Enquiry Officer is someone other than the Disciplinary Authority and the report of the Enquiry Officer holds the employee guilty of all or any of the charges; with proposal for any punishment or not, the delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the report to enable him to make a representation to the Disciplinary Authority against the findings in the report. 9. 9. The non-furnishing of the report, hence amounts to violation of principles of natural justice; in which context a remand is necessitated, to supply the enquiry report and afford a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent to represent against the prejudicial findings. The remand is to cure the technical defect, so as to avoid any prejudice being caused to the delinquent, by reason of denial of a reasonable opportunity, before being penalized and not to clear up the lacuna committed by the Management in the conduct of the enquiry; especially when the enquiry was carried out in a negligent manner without adducing any valid evidence. 10. ECIL (supra) by a larger Bench, on a reference made, reaffirmed the dictum in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra). These were cases in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that a reasonable opportunity, to defend the allegation of misconduct levelled and represent against the findings of the enquiry report, was not afforded to the delinquent employee; in which case alone there could be a remand made for the purpose of curing the defect and affording a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee. 11. The learned Single Judge has relied on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran; (2015) 2 SCC 610 from which we extract Paragraph 12 and 13: 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (underlining & bold font supplied, for emphasis) 8. We also extract paragraph no. 17 from Satyendra Singh (supra):- “Thus, even in an ex-parte inquiry, it is sine qua non to record the evidence of the witnesses for proving the charges. Having tested the facts of the case at hand on the touchstone of the Rules of 1999, and the law as expounded by this Court in the cases of Roop Singh Negi (supra) and Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. Having tested the facts of the case at hand on the touchstone of the Rules of 1999, and the law as expounded by this Court in the cases of Roop Singh Negi (supra) and Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 , we are of the firm view that the inquiry proceedings conducted against the appellant pertaining to charges punishable with major penalty, were totally vitiated and non-est in the eyes of law since no oral evidence whatsoever was recorded by the department in support of the charges.” 9. With the above precedents in mind, we have to find that mere production of documents would not be valid evidence as has been held in Roop Singh Negi (supra). We also reiterate that a remand, on finding the enquiry proceeding to be vitiated on a technical ground, is to avoid prejudice to the delinquent employee when the enquiry has not been carried out in accordance with the fundamental principles, thus causing prejudice to the employee. Then we cannot permit the employer to further conduct an enquiry; which in fact would prejudice the delinquent employee. The employer’s laxity cannot be condoned and in such circumstances, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We direct the appellant-bank to reinstate the employee, if the date of superannuation is not reached and pay him the entire back wages during the period of suspension and when he was kept out of employment due to the termination; relying on Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya & Ors reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 and Pawan Kumar Agarwala Vs. General Manager-II and Appointing Authority, State Bank of India reported in (2015) 15 SCC 184 . 10. If the respondent-petitioner has reached the age of superannuation his pay and benefits from the date of suspension till the date of retirement; minus the subsistence allowance shall be paid, and the retirement benefits shall also be computed and paid to him. 11. The LPA would stand dismissed. 12. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.