JUDGMENT : Abdul Moin, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no. 1 to 3. 2. Under challenge is the dismissal order dated 24.05.2019, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition. 3. The short argument as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that a perusal of the impugned dismissal order would indicate that it is alleged that the petitioner secured appointment in the department on the post of Constable by submitting a fake caste certificate consequently by following the provisions of Rule 8(2)(b) of Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1991) as it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, hence, without holding an inquiry, the petitioner has been dismissed. 4. The argument of learned counsel or the petitioner is that though Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules 1991 clearly empowers the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person for some reasons to be recorded by the authority in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, yet the reasons should emerge from the order impugned. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that a perusal of the order impugned would indicate that the only reason that has been recorded by the competent authority for dismissing the petitioner from service without holding of an inquiry by exercising power as conferred under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules 1991 is that as the petitioner has secured appointment on the basis of fake caste certificate consequently it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. 6. The aforesaid reasoning on the part of the competent authority is not understood in as much as no reasons emerge from the order impugned as to why simply because the petitioner has secured an appointment on the basis of a fake caste certificate as to why a regular departmental inquiry cannot be held. 6. The aforesaid reasoning on the part of the competent authority is not understood in as much as no reasons emerge from the order impugned as to why simply because the petitioner has secured an appointment on the basis of a fake caste certificate as to why a regular departmental inquiry cannot be held. Once Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules 1991 casts a duty upon the competent authority to record reasons as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry as such some practical reasons should emerge from the order impugned but the reasons as have been recorded by the competent authority while dismissing the petitioner from service by not holding any inquiry do not inspire any confidence and also cannot be said to be such a reason whereby the competent authority was precluded from holding an inquiry. 7. Learned Standing Counsel has also not been able to indicate as to how the aforesaid reason as has been recorded by the competent authority appeals to reason and as to what precluded the competent authority from holding a regular departmental inquiry against the petitioner neither are the reasons contained in the counter affidavit. 8. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having perused the record it emerges that the petitioner was working on the post of Constable and has been dismissed under provisions of Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 by recording that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. 9. From perusal of the order impugned no reasons emerge as to why the competent authority has not found it reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the petitioner. A regular employee like the petitioner has been dismissed without holding regular inquiry and even the reasons as emerge from the perusal of the order impugned do not inspire confidence of there being some reason whereby it was not reasonable practicable to hold an inquiry. No reasons also emerge from a perusal of the counter affidavit as to why regular inquiry was not found practicable to be held against the petitioner. 10. No reasons also emerge from a perusal of the counter affidavit as to why regular inquiry was not found practicable to be held against the petitioner. 10. This aspect of the matter has been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tarsem Singh vs. State of Punjab and others, 2008 (2) SCC (L&S) 140 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that inquiry may be dispensed with only on the ground that it is reasonably not practicable and that subjective satisfaction of the authority while recording finding with regard to reasonable practicability of inquiry proceedings based on objective criteria is must. The reasons for denial of inquiry must be supported by document and other related material. 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Singh vs State of Punjab and others, 1991 (1) SCC 362 has held as under: "5. The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the appellant. There are (i) the appellant has thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and (ii) he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now as stated earlier after the two revision applications were allowed on October 13, 1980, the appellant had rejoined service as Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued against him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause notices were served on him at about 10.00 p.m., on April 6, 1981. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause notices were served on him at about 10.00 p.m., on April 6, 1981. Before the appellant could reply to the said show cause notices respondent 3 passed the impugned order on the very next date i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and there is no allegation that the department had found any difficulty in examining witnesses I n the said inquiries. After the revision applications were allowed the show cause notices were issued and 10 days time was given to the appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore, enquired from the learned counsel for the respondents to point out what impelled respondent 3 to take a decision that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by Article 311 (2). The learned counsel for the respondents could only point out clause (iv) (a) of sub-para 29 (A) of the counter which reads as under: "The order dated April 7, 1981 was passed as the petitioner's activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow police officials to cause-indiscipline, show insubordination and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged harmful." This is no more than a mere reproduction of para 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and they would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case (SCC p. 504, para 130). Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case (SCC p. 504, para 130). "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail." The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by respondent 3 it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats etc. when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material respondent 3 came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in para 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. Respondent 3's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. Respondent 3's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained." (emphasis by the Court) 12. Likewise Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Security Officer vs. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991 (1) SCC 729 while considering the aforesaid proposition of law and considering an identical rule with regard to employee of the Railway Protection Force has held that in the absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with inquiry, the recourse of Article 311 (2) proviso (b) cannot be adopted by the authorities. 13. Likewise Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prithi Pal Singh vs State of Punjab, 2008 (2) SCC (L & S) 135 has held that holding of departmental inquiry is the rule and the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India provides for exception and that it is trite law that existence of such exceptional situation must be shown to exist on the basis of relevant materials. 14. Likewise a division bench of this Court in the case of Moti Lal vs State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2008 (26) LCD 93 while considering the provision of Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 has held as under: "12. It has been settled by the catena of decisions of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court that denial of opportunity provided by the statute or non-compliance of statutory provisions falls in the category of exception. Ordinarily, the authority should adopt the recourse of departmental proceedings in accordance with Rules before awarding major penalty. The order for dismissal from service which takes away the right of livelihood of an employee should be passed only with due compliance of principles of natural justice and the service rules. Ordinarily, the authority should adopt the recourse of departmental proceedings in accordance with Rules before awarding major penalty. The order for dismissal from service which takes away the right of livelihood of an employee should be passed only with due compliance of principles of natural justice and the service rules. The provisions contained in rule 8 (2) (b) of the rules, is an exception to the general rule which requires compliance of principles of natural justice. The recourse of Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules, should be adopted only in exceptional cases and justified grounds where the departmental inquiry against the delinquent is not possible or in case departmental inquiry his held, it shall affect the national integrity, security or alike matters." (emphasis by the Court) 15. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 24.05.2019, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition, is quashed. 16. Consequences to follow. 17. However, it would be open for the respondents to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law.