JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State laying challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 12.07.1997, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Bhilwara Camp - Shahpura in Sessions Case No.3/1995 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Chhotu), whereby the accused respondent was acquitted of the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred on 17.09.1994 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1998. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that on 17.09.1994, Rati Ram and deceased Ram Lal who were grazing their cattle towards Bhandariyan Wala Well, took turns to sleep. While Ram Lal was looking after the sheep, Rati Ram was sleeping for the first part of the night. In the second part of the night, Ram Lal slept and Rati Ram looked after the sheep. In the midnight, it is alleged, that the accused-respondent Chhotu came there and while Rati Ram hide behind the bushes and remain accompanied, he gave an axe blow to the Ram Lal who was his nephew. 4. The dead body of the Ram Lal was recovered and the FIR was lodged for the offence under Section 302 IPC and the investigation commenced. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC against the accused-respondent, and the trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 23 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 40 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution and 5 documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondent; whereafter, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused-respondent pleaded innocence and his false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as after considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondent, vide the impugned judgment dated 12.07.1997, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant-State fairly submits that Rati Ram was not examined, thus, casting a basic doubt upon the prosecution witnesses because he was the only eye-witness and could have provided valuable evidence. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant-State fairly submits that Rati Ram was not examined, thus, casting a basic doubt upon the prosecution witnesses because he was the only eye-witness and could have provided valuable evidence. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, submits that there is a recovery of Dhoti and an axe, at the instance of the accused though he admits that there is no other witness. He has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the statements of P.W.9 - Madu (the mother of the deceased) who submitted that she does not know about any previous animosity, though the deceased is the real brother-in-law. She also does not suspect anyone. Although she says that there is a previous animosity between Uda, Harla, Prabhu and Nanda. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor has also shown the statement of P.W.12– Jagdish who is the brother of Ram Lal who has mentioned about the dispute between Ram Lal and Chhotu regarding the grazing of the cattle. 9. Heard learned counsel for the appellant-State as well as perused the material available on record. 10. This Court has also taken note of the statement of P.W.1 – Mangi, who is the wife of the deceased and who has not stated anything which is relevant to support the prosecution story. The postmortem report indicates death by an axe blow. 11. The learned trial Court has examined all the witnesses and exhibits. The trial Court has opined that after perusal of the evidence, it did not find any connecting evidence against the present accused with the crime. Ram Lal (the deceased) was last seen with Rati Ram. The learned trial Court has observed that the prosecution has miserably failed in its case because Rati Ram has not been examined even when he was the only eye-witness to the whole incident. 11.1. The learned trial Court also observed that P.W. 12 Jagdish, in his statement, has stated that there was an altercation between the deceased Ram Lal and the accused Chhotu regarding the grazing of cattle, but at the same time there is no corresponding evidence that any kind of damage to the field of accused-respondent Chhotu was caused by Ram Lal. It was also observed by the learned trial Court that no witness/evidence indicates any kind of damage which could have provoked the accused Chhotu to cause the act in question. 11.2. It was also observed by the learned trial Court that no witness/evidence indicates any kind of damage which could have provoked the accused Chhotu to cause the act in question. 11.2. The learned trial Court has also taken into account the statement of P.W.11 – Surajmal who has not corroborated the differences between Chhotu and Ram Lal. It was further observed in Para 55 of the judgment that only evidence was one Dhoti and one axe which have been recovered and one set of Juti which was sent to FSL for examination, but the FSL report indicated human blood on axe, Dhoti and Juti. The learned trial Court has also observed that the recovery is from an open place where anybody could approach and hide the axe. Thus, it cannot be said to be in exclusive domain of the accused-respondent – Chhotu. 11.3. The learned trial Court has further discussed, the conduct of the accused respondent– Chhotu that after the incident he was available with the family members and was crying while seeing the dead body of his nephew – Ram Lal which was not a conduct appropriate to a person who has caused the death in question. 11.4. The learned trial Court has also observed that the accused Chhotu did not make any efforts to conceal himself or to abscond from the scene of crime. It was further observed that the recovery was made after 9 days of the incident which was sufficient time for the accused to have destroyed the evidence in question in case it was his intention. 12. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder:- Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder:- Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. In view of the aforesaid precedent law, this Court finds that in the present case, the sole eyewitness i.e. Rati Ram to the incident in question was not produced during the trial; the recovery of the Axe (weapon) was made after nine days of the incident in question from an open place and; no evidence was placed on record before the learned Trial Court, which could, in any way, establish the prosecution case regarding prior enmity between the deceased and the accused-respondent. 14. This Court has carefully gone through the judgment of the learned trial Court and find that the reason arrived at by the learned trial Court for the acquittal does not call for any interference from this Court as the flow of the judgment does not indicate any kind of deviation from the facts or the evidence which has been adduced. 15. This Court should ordinarily not interfere with the judgment of the learned trial Court unless there are grave reason for such interference. 16. This Court also notes that there is no incriminating evidence connecting the accused-respondent with the crime in question. 15. This Court should ordinarily not interfere with the judgment of the learned trial Court unless there are grave reason for such interference. 16. This Court also notes that there is no incriminating evidence connecting the accused-respondent with the crime in question. The mere presence of the accused at the site or the differences between the accused and the deceased unless acted upon would not bring him in the purview of conviction or absolute making out of the crime. 17. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondent under Section 302 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 19. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 20. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 21. 19. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 20. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 21. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as she would be called upon to do so. 22. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.