JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the order dated 03.03.2015 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur and the resultant proceedings against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. It has been asserted that Food Inspector, Manjit Singh, inspected the shop of Raj Kumar-respondent No.2 on 22.08.2009 and found 30 Dibbas originally sealed each weighing 500 ml of Ghee kept for sale manufactured by Maa Vaishno Food Products Malanpur Bhind (M.P). He took a sample after serving a notice in Form VI. Three original sealed packets were sent to Public Analyst Kandaghat, who issued a report No.743 dated 30.09.2009 stating that the sample was adulterated. The report was received in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Hamirpur, which was forwarded to the Food Inspector for further necessary action. The Food Inspector obtained the consent for launching the prosecution and filed a complaint in the Court of learned CJM, Hamirpur on 04.01.2010, which was assigned to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. IV for disposal as per the law. The notice under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was issued to Raj Kumar for getting the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory; however, Raj Kumar did not avail the opportunity afforded to him and filed an application under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for impleading respondent No.3 as an accused. This application was allowed and respondent No.3 was impleaded as an accused. Respondent No.3 filed an application under Section 20(A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for impleading the petitioner as an accused. This application was allowed on 03.03.2015 and the petitioner was impleaded as accused No.3. An application under Section 20(A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act can be filed during the trial when it has been established that the sale of adulterated article was made and the article remained intact. No evidence was adduced by respondent No.2 that Ghee was purchased by him through Bill No.68 dated 05.05.2009 or he had stored it and sold it in the same State as was purchased by him. It was necessary for him to adduce such evidence to connect the manufacturer, distributor or dealer with the commission of the offence. No evidence was adduced by respondent No.2 that Ghee was purchased by him through Bill No.68 dated 05.05.2009 or he had stored it and sold it in the same State as was purchased by him. It was necessary for him to adduce such evidence to connect the manufacturer, distributor or dealer with the commission of the offence. It was also to be proved that the adulterated article was kept in the same condition, in which it was purchased. This could have been done by making the statement on oath and by producing other evidence. No such evidence was led and this minimum requirement was not satisfied. The Court also did not conduct any inquiry and straightway proceeded to summon the petitioner. There is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner was responsible for selling the ghee and ensuring its quality. No one was examined by the prosecution before the appearance of the accused no. 2. The application was premature and could not have been filed before the commencement of the evidence. The application was moved in the year 2015 after six years of taking the sample. The application was barred by limitation provided under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. The name of the petitioner was ascertainable from the dealer-respondent No.3, whose name was disclosed by respondent No.2. The prosecution after the lapse of six years is likely to cause great harassment and the application was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It was nowhere mentioned in the complaint that Ghee was heated to change it into a liquid state or it was stirred, which was necessary to make it homogenous. The Public Analyst found the sample to be adulterated because the Butyro Refractometer Reading at 40 degrees centigrade is 47.2 against the minimum and maximum prescribed standard of 40 to 43. There cannot be an equal distribution of the Ghee to make the sample homogenous without heating and stirring. The Ghee should have been wrapped in thick paper to rule out the possibility of the sample being affected by moisture. Ghee kept for a long time deteriorates due to chemical action, which takes place in the presence of light and moisture. The sample was analyzed after a month of its seizure and no precaution was taken to avoid exposure to the light and air. Ghee kept for a long time deteriorates due to chemical action, which takes place in the presence of light and moisture. The sample was analyzed after a month of its seizure and no precaution was taken to avoid exposure to the light and air. The Food Inspector should have visited the manufacturer instead of going after the retail dealers; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner be ordered to be quashed. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a reply making a preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability. It was asserted that there is no material irregularity or abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner has not filed the proper petition before the appropriate Court. The accused No.2 filed an application under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and submitted that he had purchased the Ghee from Bharat Fruit Products, Arya Samaj Road Nawanshahar and sold the Ghee in the same condition in which it was purchased. He produced the invoice and the learned Trial Court had rightly impleaded the petitioner as an accused. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. The sample of Ghee was adulterated as per the report of the Public Analyst. The sample indicated that Ghee was prepared from the fat not found in the milk. The pleas taken by the petitioner can be taken before the learned Trial Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr. G.S. Sawhney, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State. 5. Mr. G.S. Sawhney, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in impleading the petitioner without recording the evidence. It is not permissible to implead the petitioner at the instance of the dealer and the order passed by the learned Trial Court suffers from jurisdictional error. The order was passed after the lapse of so many years and is not sustainable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint be quashed qua the petitioner. 6. Mr R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State submitted that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. The order was passed after the lapse of so many years and is not sustainable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint be quashed qua the petitioner. 6. Mr R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State submitted that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Respondent No.3 filed an application before the learned Trial Court stating that he had purchased the Ghee from the present petitioner and the basic requirement for impleading the petitioner was duly satisfied; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6 . The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 9. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 9. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: “10. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: “10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 11. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 12. It appears from the perusal of the record that the learned Trial Court put the notice of the accusation to the accused Raj Kumar on 19.04.2010. The matter was listed for defence evidence on 22.11.2013 when an application under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was filed. The application was allowed by the learned Trial Court on 22.02.2014 and respondent No.2, namely, Rattan and Sons were ordered to be summoned. The matter was listed for consideration of charge on 31.10.2014. Notice of accusation was put to Rattan Chand who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. He filed an application under Section 20(A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for impleading the present petitioner. This application was not opposed by the Food Inspector. The application was allowed by the learned Trial Court on 03.03.2015 after holding that the Ghee was purchased from the present petitioner and it was kept in the same condition, in which it was purchased. 13. Thus, it is apparent from the perusal of the order sheet maintained by the learned Trial Court that the order was passed without holding an inquiry and on the concession of the Food Inspector, who stated that he has no objection, in case the application is allowed and the proceedings under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act be initiated against the present petitioner. 14. In Managing Director, HP State Civil Supplies Corporation and anr. 14. In Managing Director, HP State Civil Supplies Corporation and anr. vs State of H.P and Ors., 2008 (2) Shim. LC 255 = Latest HLJ 2008(2) 1104 (HPHC), a similar situation arose. Proceedings were initiated against the seller for selling 600 grams of super fine rice, which were found to be adulterated. He stated that he had purchased the rice from the Dehra Corporation Marketing-cum-Processing Society. An application under Section 20A was filed, in which it was mentioned that the rice was purchased from sub-Depot, In-charge, Dehra, HP State Civil Supplies Corporation. The application was not opposed and was allowed by the learned Trial Court. It was held that the Court cannot summon an accused under Section 20A without conducting the inquiry simply based on the concession of the Food Inspector. It was observed: “6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in the application under Section 20-A of the Act, it has been specifically stated that the rice was purchased from the sub-depot Incharge, Dehra of the Corporation and prayer was made for summoning the sub-depot, Incharge, Dehra of the Corporation as accused. He has also submitted that except for the application, there was no legal evidence on record to show that in fact the rice was purchased from the sub-depot, Incharge, Dehra of the Corporation. The learned trial Magistrate has not conducted any enquiry in accordance with law and simply on the basis of no objection of the Food Inspector has summoned the Managing Director of the Corporation as accused in the case. He has submitted that summoning of a person as accused in the case is a serious matter and a person cannot be summoned as an accused in a routine manner. He has submitted that summoning of a person as accused in the case is a serious matter and a person cannot be summoned as an accused in a routine manner. He has referred to Section 20-A of the Act which is as follows:- "Power of Court to implead manufacturer, etc.-Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20." The learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by any accused. 7. In Krishan Kumar Jain v. State of H.P. and another, 1997 (1) Sim. L.C. 363, the facts were that an application under Section 20-A of the Act was filed for summoning the petitioner, in that case as co-accused on the averments that Haldi was purchased from the petitioner which was sold to the Food Inspector. The learned Magistrate without holding an inquiry into the averments made in the application under Section 20-A of the Act merely on the concession of the Food Inspector directed the summoning of the petitioner as co-accused in that case. On those facts, it was held that summoning of the petitioner as co-accused in that case under Section 20-A of the Act is bad and cannot be sustained. On those facts, it was held that summoning of the petitioner as co-accused in that case under Section 20-A of the Act is bad and cannot be sustained. Before a person can be summoned under Section 20-A of the Act, the Court has to hold an enquiry to find out whether prima facie the article of food of which the sample was taken by the Food Inspector was purchased as alleged by the person making the application. In the present case also the impugned order was passed on the basis of concession made by the Food Inspector. The learned Magistrate has not conducted any enquiry regarding the allegations made in the application under Section 20-A of the Act. Moreover in the application, the prayer was made to summon sub-depot Incharge, Dehra of the Corporation as accused in the case. There was no averment in the application concerning the Managing Director of the Corporation nor any prayer was made for summoning the Managing Director of the Corporation as accused in the case. Therefore, the learned trial Magistrate has erred in summoning under Section 20-A of the Act, the Managing Director of the Corporation as accused in the case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order is not sustainable.” 15. In the present case, such inquiry was conducted. There is a force in the submission of Mr. G.S. Sawhney, learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no legally admissible evidence, at this stage, to show that Ghee was purchased by respondent No.3 from the present petitioner and that it remained in the same condition, in which it was purchased; hence, the order passed by learned Trial Court is based upon no evidence and cannot be sustained. 16. Since the order suffers from basic infirmity; hence, the other pleas taken by the petitioner do not arise for consideration and are not being adjudicated. 17. In view of above, the present petition is allowed and the order dated 03.03.2015 passed by the learned Trial Court summoning the petitioner without recording the evidence is ordered to be quashed. 18. The matter is remitted to the learned Trial Court for proceeding as per the law. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 27.03.2024. 19. 18. The matter is remitted to the learned Trial Court for proceeding as per the law. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 27.03.2024. 19. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.