ORDER : BHARGAV D. KARIA, J. 1. This appeal is filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) by the Appellant-Revenue proposing the following substantial question of law arising out from the common order dated 26.7.2023 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Rajkot (for short “the Tribunal”) in ITA No. 201 to 204/ RJT/2018 for the Assessment Year 2007-08 to 2010-2011:- “1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Hon’ble ITAT Rajkot is correct in holding that notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been issued by the Assessing Officer on incorrect presumption of facts and accordingly liable to be quashed. 2. Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that this appeal is filed in respect of Assessment Year 2010-2011, and pertains to ITA No. 204/Rj/2018. 3. The respondent-assessee Trust is registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The respondent-Trust is registered under Superannuation Scheme and was granted approval of Superannuation Fund under rule 2(1) of Part-B of Schedule – IV of the Act. 4. The Assessing Officer issued the notice under Section 148 of the Act for re-opening of the Assessment Year 2007-08 to 2010- 2011 on the basis that the excess funds do not form part of “approved refund” and hence is not exempt from taxation. The Assessing Officer recorded the reasons on the basis of the date of issuance of notice dated 24.3.2014. He was of the belief that the fund is not approved. 4.1 However, as per the order passed under Rule 3 of Part B of Schedule IV of the Act dated 31.3.2014, the approval of the fund was only withdrawn with effect from the date of passing of the said order i.e. 31.3.2014. 4.2 The Assessing Officer passed an order under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 of the Act dated 19.2.2015 disallowing Rs.84.00 Lakhs for the year under consideration which was earned from approved fund as defined in Section 2(6) and under Section 10(25)(Hi) whereby all income received by such fund is exempt. However, in view of the aforesaid belief the interest income was held to be taxable. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant preferred appeal before CIT (Appeals) who rejected the appeal filed by the assessee. 6. Assessee therefore preferred an appeal before the tribunal. However, in view of the aforesaid belief the interest income was held to be taxable. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant preferred appeal before CIT (Appeals) who rejected the appeal filed by the assessee. 6. Assessee therefore preferred an appeal before the tribunal. The Tribunal considered the order dated 31.3.2014 and held as under:- “6. From a perusal of the relevant extracts of Rule 2 of Part B of Schedule-IV of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it is evident that order for withdrawal of approval of the superannuation fund must mention the date from which withdrawal is to take effect. Accordingly, since in the instant facts, the order for withdrawal of approval dated 31-03-2014 did not make any specific mention of the date from which the order for withdrawal of approval shall take effect, the same shall take only effect from the date on which such order has been passed i.e, 31.03.2014. We cannot read any retrospectivity as to the date of operation of the aforesaid order dated 31-03-2014. This is coupled with the fact that the notice for reopening of assessment has been based on an incorrect factual assumption that as on the date of issuance of notice for re-opening of assessment on 24-03-2014, the approval of the assessee stands withdrawn. However, as noted above, the approval of the assessee trust was withdrawn from 31-03-2014. Therefore, clearly, from the facts placed on record, the approval of the fund had not been withdrawn as on the date of issuance of notice for reopening of assessment.” 7. Considering the above facts and applying the decision of this Court in case of Mumtaz Haji Mohamad Menon (Supra), the tribunal held that notice dated 24.3.2014 issued under Section 148 of the Act was on incorrect presumption of fact and accordingly quashed and set aside the notice as well as consequential assessment order. 8. Considering the above facts and applying the decision of this Court in case of Mumtaz Haji Mohamad Menon (Supra), the tribunal held that notice dated 24.3.2014 issued under Section 148 of the Act was on incorrect presumption of fact and accordingly quashed and set aside the notice as well as consequential assessment order. 8. Learned advocate Ms.Maithili Mehta appearing for the appellant-revenue has submitted that the tribunal has committed an error by recording that the approval of assessee trust was withdrawn from 31.3.2014 which cannot have retrospective effect by misinterpreting the factual aspect mentioned in the order of CIT (Appeals) wherein, it is held that the part of the fund which was received from the employer in excess of the limit prescribed in clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed has not been approved and therefore any income which is earned on such excess fund is not exempt from tax. It was further submitted that the Assessing Officer and CIT(Appeals) did not pass the order for withdrawal granted earlier but part of the fund which is received from the employer in excess of the limit prescribed in clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed, was not considered and any income which is earned on such excess fund, is not exempt from taxation. 8.1 It was further submitted that the notice for reopening of assessment was not based on an incorrect factual assumption whereas in fact the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer no- where makes a reference to the order dated 31.3.2014. But, the same are based on the facts that the asseessee has exceeded the limit prescribed in Clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed and claimed it as exempt income based on approval granted by CIT, Jamnagar on 25.1.2005 whereas order dated 31.3.2014 was passed subsequent to to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act. 9. Mr. Manish Shah, learned advocate appearing for the respondent-assesseee on caveat has submitted that the tribunal has taken into consideration the order dated 31.3.2014 for withdrawal of approval to clarify that prior to 2013 there was no withdrawal of approval granted and therefore, the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment are based upon the incorrect facts that the assessee trust has deposited Rs.4.00 Lakhs as not prescribed in clause 6(a) of Trust Deed which was claimed as exempted income. Mr. Mr. Shah, learned advocate has pointed out that the reasons do not disclose as to how the exemption claimed by the assessee was in excess of the limits prescribed in clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed. 9.1. It was submitted that on perusal of Rule 2 of Part B of the Schedule IV of the Act provides that the Commissioner shall communicate in writing to the trustees of the fund for any withdrawal of approval with the reasons for such withdrawal and the date on which the withdrawal is to take effect. It was therefore submitted that in absence of such communication the approval granted by the Commissioner at the time of issuance of notice for reasssessment was not withdrawn. 10. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having considered the facts of the case, it is evident that the tribunal has considered Rule 2 of Part B of Schedule IV of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which reads as under:- Approval and withdrawal of approval (1) The Commissioner may accord approval to n perasanie find or any part of a superannuation fund which, onion, complies with the requirements of rule 3, and may at time withdraw such approval, if in his opinion, the circumstances the fund or part cease to warrant the continuance of the approval. (2) The Commissioner shall communicate in writing to the trustee the find the grant of approval with the date on which the approve to take effect, and, where the approval is granted subject conditions, those conditions. (3) The Commissioner shall communicate in writing to the tru of the fund any withdrawal of approval with the reasons for withdrawal and the date on which the withdrawal is to take effect (4) The Commissioner shall neither refuse nor withdraw appro any superannuation fund or any part of a superannuation fund he has given the trustees of that fund a reasonable opportur being heard in the matter." 11. Considering Rule 3 of Part B of Schedule IV of the Act, the Tribunal has taken note of order dated 31.3.2014 passed by the Commissioner for withdrawal of approval to hold that there was no question of any withdrawal of approval in absence of communication in writing by the Commissioner to the respondent- assessee. 12. Considering Rule 3 of Part B of Schedule IV of the Act, the Tribunal has taken note of order dated 31.3.2014 passed by the Commissioner for withdrawal of approval to hold that there was no question of any withdrawal of approval in absence of communication in writing by the Commissioner to the respondent- assessee. 12. The Tribunal has held that such withdrawal of approval shall take effect from the date on which such order has been passed. Therefore, presumption on which the notice was issued that the fund stands withdrawn is not tenable as the withdrawal of approval as per clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed from 10.4.2014 would not be applicable in the facts of this case. The tribunal has therefore, rightly held that on the date of notice dated 24.3.2014 for reopening of assessment, there was excess fund of Rs.4.12 crores and the approval was granted under Rule 2 of Part B of Schedule IV of the Act as per clause 6(a) of the Trust Deed was in operation. 13. In view of the foregoing reasons and in view of the finding arrived at by the Tribunal coupled with Sub Rule 3, Rule 2 Part B of Schedule IV of the Act and in absence of any communication of withdrawal of approval by the Commissioner at the time of issuance of notice dated 24.3.2014 for reopening under Section 148 of the Act, the Tribunal was justified to set aside the notice for reopening of assessment and consequently reassessment order was also rightly set aside. 14. We do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal giving rise to any question of law much less any substantial question of law. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed.