JUDGMENT : MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY 1. Heard the parties. 2. This Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the prayer for issue of appropriate writ (s), order (s), direction for setting aside the award dated 30.01.2020 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 30 of 2015 whereby and where under, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 has answered the reference in favour of the workman and directed the petitioner-company to give promotion to the concerned workman as per promotion given to Binod Kumar Rajak with all financial and consequential benefits to him. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the following reference was made by the appropriate government under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act 1940:- “Whether the action of the management of South Tisra Colliery of M/s BCCL is not giving proper promotion after implementation of award of Ref. No. 201 of 2001 to Shri Khagan Rajwar, Pers. No.00833690, EP Fitter of South Tisra Colliery of M/s BCCL is fair and justified? To what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?” and consequent upon the same, Reference No. 30 of 2015 was registered by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad and award was made in respect of the reference on 30.01.2020 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad. 4. It is the case of the respondent-workman through its union that the workman Khagan Rajwar entered in excavation cadre on 22.07.1986 as Greaser Helper and Binod Prasad Rajak entered in the same cadre on 06.12.1986. Thus, the workman Khagan Rajwar was senior to Binod Prasad Rajak in service as well as in Excavation Cadre but Khagan Rajwar was superseded in promotion by Binod Prasad Rajak who was junior to him in all respects. Later on Binod Prasad Rajak was promoted to Grade “D” Excavation vide office order dated 27.04.1993 but made effective from 15.01.1993. The concerned workman Khagan Rajwar was granted E.P. Fitter-Grade “D” Excavation w.e.f. 15.01.1993 in pursuance of the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.II, Dhanbad in Reference No. 201 of 2001 and the same was implemented by the BCCL management in May, 2014. Thereafter, Binod Prasad Rajak was promoted in Fitter E.P. in Excavation ‘A’ whereas Khagan Rajwar was given Grade “B” Excavation by the same office order dated 01.11.2013. Thereafter, Binod Prasad Rajak was promoted in Fitter E.P. in Excavation ‘A’ whereas Khagan Rajwar was given Grade “B” Excavation by the same office order dated 01.11.2013. So, it is the case of supersession in promotion by junior and as such the senior should also be given promotion from the date in which the junior was promoted. 5. The case of the writ petitioner-Management before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad was that Khagar Rajwar entered in employment in Category I as Greaser Helper (T) on 04.09.1986 and was allowed Category II w.e.f. 23.09.1987. He was also given Grade “E” w.e.f. 21.11.1990. So the claim of the workman is not correct. 6. In support of its case, the sponsoring union has examined one witness being Khagan Rajwar himself as WW-1 besides proving the documents which has been marked Ext. W-1 to W-7. From the side of the Management, one witness was examined being MW-1- Chandra Prakash besides proving the documents which has been marked Ext. M-1 to M-6. 7. The Tribunal considered the deposition of WW-1-Khagan Rajwar that Binod Prasad Rajak was junior to him but still has been given promotion to Grade “A” whereas Khagan Rajwar was promoted to Grade “B” by the same office order dated 01.11.2013 so Khagan Rajwar was superseded in promotion. The Tribunal also considered the testimony of MW-1 and in his cross-examination, within the MW-1 admitted that as per the reference, Binod Prasad Rajak was junior to Khagan Rajwar. The Tribunal also considered that the Management has not brought anything on record showing any adverse remarks/comment against the concerned workman Khagan Rajwar for which he was superseded by his junior Binod Prasad Rajak and by considering materials in the record, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that South Tisra Colliery of BCCL has not given proper promotion to the concerned workman namely Khagan Rajwar hence, the action of the Management of South Tisri Colliery of BCCL Management in not giving proper promotion after implementation of award of Reference No.201 of 2001 to Khagan Rajwar is not fair and justified hence, he is entitled to the relief and directed the Management to give promotion to Khagan Rajwar as per the promotion given to Binod Prasad Rajak with all financial and consequential benefits to him. 8. 8. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned award dated 13.10.2020 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad is bad in law. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has made wrong averments in paragraph no.15 of the writ petition but in fact, it is Khagan Rajwar was given promotion in compliance of the direction passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.2, Dhanbad in Reference No.201 of 2001 but it has wrongly been mentioned in paragraph no.15 that Binod Kumar Rajak was given promotion in compliance of the direction passed in the said Reference No.201 of 2001. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the promotion cannot be claimed as the matter of right hence, the Tribunal was not justified in directing the Management to give all financial benefits by giving retrospective promotion to the respondent-workman without considering the fact that the workman admittedly did not work on higher post during the intervening period. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. vs. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 766 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the facts of that case held that incorrect promotion given erroneously by the Department by misreading the Service Rules or such promotion given pursuant to judicial orders contrary to the Service Rules cannot be a ground to claim erroneous promotion by perpetrating infringement of statutory service rules. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India vs. Chaman Rana reported in (2018) 5 SCC 798 , wherein, in the facts of that case, where the respondents of the writ petition were subsequently promoted and after promotion they submitted several representation for promotion from the date of supersession. The orders rejecting the representation along with the reasons were duly communicated to them more than once but after the pronouncement of the judgment in Sukhdev Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2013) 9 SCC 566 affirming Dev Dutt vs. Union of India reported in (2008) 8 SCC 725 , separate writ petitions were filed by them on the ground that the entry “good” in their annual confidential reports for the relevant years was an adverse remark in view of the benchmark of “very good” and since the adverse entry had not been communicated to them, it could not be taken into consideration, requiring reconsideration for promotion from the date of supersession and the claim of the respondents were highly belated and stale and it was contended that mere filing of representation or a subsequent judgment could not be sufficient justification to entertain such belated claims dehors the facts of the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed that a subsequent pronouncement by the High Court could not enthuse a fresh lease or life, or furnish a fresh cause of action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim and set aside the order of the High Court by which the prayer of the writ petition was allowed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 , wherein in the facts of that case, the appointment orders were issued in the year 1987 but was cancelled vide order dated 22.06.1987, the respondents before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India did not challenge the cancellation orders till the year 1996 and thus, they have accepted the cancellation of their appointment and they woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed and as by the date of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, 27 years had passed after the issuance of cancellation orders, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after a period of nine years; so it would be totally unjust to direct the appellants to give them appointment; as of today i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years or above. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer as made in this writ petition be allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand opposes the prayer for setting aside the award dated 30.01.2020 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 30 of 2015. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that no illegality has been committed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in making the award. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that it is not the case of the writ petitioner that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad did not admit any evidence which was admissible or admitted any evidence which was not admissible nor it is the case of the petitioner that the award of the learned Tribunal is based on no evidence. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that no perversity or violation of law has specifically been pleaded by the petitioner and in the absence of that, there is no justifiable reason for this Court to interfere with the award impugned in this writ petition. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that so far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. vs. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that so far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. vs. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. (supra) is concerned, the fact of the said case is entirely different from the facts of this case as in this case, it is not the case of the Management- writ petitioner that Binod Prasad Rajak was given incorrect promotion or erroneously he has been given promotion nor it is the case of the Management that Binod Prasad Rajak was given promotion contrary to the service rules and hence, the ratio of the judgment of Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. vs. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. 12. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Union of India vs. Chaman Rana (supra) is concerned, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the facts of that case is also entirely different from the facts of this case in the sense that firstly, this is a case of reference unlike a writ petition filed directly with the prayer secondly, there is absolutely no delay on the part of the respondent in raising the industrial dispute and it is a settled principle of law that delay cannot be a ground for denying the relief to a deserving workman in a reference made under Section 10 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Hence, the ratio of the judgment of Union of India vs. Chaman Rana (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. 13. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. (supra) is concerned, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the facts of that case is again different from the facts of this case; as firstly there is no delay on the part of the respondent in raising an industrial dispute and secondly the respondent never really waited for any judicial pronouncement to be passed in any case; to stake his claim by raising any industrial dispute. 14. 14. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that thus, there is no merit in this writ petition. Accordingly, the same being without any merit be dismissed. 15. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 , paragraph no.7 of which reads as under:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [ (1955) 1 SCR 1104 ] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [ AIR 1960 SC 1168 ]” (emphasis supplied) that a writ of certiorari can be issued in regard to finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal if it is shown that in recording of the said finding, the Tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding or if a finding of fact is based on no evidence or there is no perversity or error in law apparent on the face of record committed by the Tribunal. 16. Now coming to the facts of the case, this Court after going through the materials in the record did not find any perversity having been committed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in passing the award dated 30.01.2020 in Reference No. 30 of 2015. There is no error apparent on the face of record nor it has refused to admit admissible evidence nor has it admitted inadmissible evidence. 17. There is no error apparent on the face of record nor it has refused to admit admissible evidence nor has it admitted inadmissible evidence. 17. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is not the case of the petitioner that Binod Prasad Rajak was given promotion incorrectly or wrongly, contrary to service rules and the ratio of Indian Council of Agricultural Research & Anr. vs. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. (supra) is certainly of no relevance to the facts of this case. 18. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors. (supra) and Union of India vs. Chaman Rana (supra) is concerned, again the fact of those cases were entirely different from the facts of this case; as firstly they were not the cases involving reference made by any appropriate government nor it is the contention of the Management any time before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad that there is any delay on the part of the respondent in raising the industrial dispute and it is also a settled principle of law that the delay in a reference made under Section 10 (1) is not a ground to deny the relief to which the workman is otherwise entitled. 19. Because of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in this writ petition filed by the petitioner. Accordingly, this writ petition being without any merit is dismissed. 20. In view of the dismissal of this writ petition, I.A. No. 7104 of 2021 is dismissed being infructuous.