JUDGMENT : (Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.) : Heard Sri Lakshmikanth Reddy, learned counsel for the claimants and Sri Naresh Byrapaneni, learned counsel for the United Insurance Company Limited represented by its Divisional Manager, Kurnool in both the appeals. 2. No representation for the owner, one of the respondents in the appeals. 3. The M.A.C.M.A.No.793 of 2017 has been filed by the claimants for enhancement of the compensation amount as awarded. 4. M.A.C.M.A.No.1184 of 2017 has been filed by the United India Insurance Company Limited challenging the same award dated 07.09.2016 passed in M.V.O.P.No.478 of 2014 by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VI Additional District Judge, Kurnool (in short, ‘the Tribunal’). The appeals are filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1994 (in short, ‘the M.V. Act’). 5. The claimants filed the claim petition under Section 166of the M.V. Act claiming compensation of Rs.1,25,00,000/- for the death of Mr.M.Ravi Kumar in a motor accident dated 06.05.2014 at Obulapuram Mitta in Dhone Mandal. The claimant no.1 is a widow, claimant nos.2 and 3 are the children and claimant nos.4 and 5 are the parents of the deceased. 6. The claim petition was filed with pleading that when the deceased was riding safely on motor cycle bearing no.AP21-AA-6859, it was hit by one car bearing no.AP03-AA-0409 driven by its driver rashly and negligently at high speed coming from the opposite direction. The deceased was aged about 34 years. He was doing business of purchase & sale of granite and his earning was Rs.4,00,000/- per annum from the granite business of his own factory in the name and style of ‘Chaithanya Granites’. Besides, he was also earning Rs.50,000/- per annum by supervising the agriculture. 7. The owner of the car Mr.K.Srinivasulu, the 1st respondent in M.V.O.P.No.478 of 2014, filed counter, denying the averments of the petition. He submitted that the driver of the car was holding a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident. The vehicle was insured with the United India Insurance Company and the policy was in force. He was not liable to pay any compensation and if at all, the Insurance Company had to pay. 8. The Insurance Company also filed counter submitting inter alia that the claimants be put to strict proof of their case. The vehicle was insured with the United India Insurance Company and the policy was in force. He was not liable to pay any compensation and if at all, the Insurance Company had to pay. 8. The Insurance Company also filed counter submitting inter alia that the claimants be put to strict proof of their case. The owner of the car was not having valid and effective driving licence, but was having only Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR) valid from 03.04.2014 to 02.10.2014 to drive non-transport LMV, MCWG. He was driving the car without any observer and violated the terms and conditions of the policy. The Insurance Company was not liable to pay any compensation. The compensation claimed under various heads was said to be excessive. 9. The Tribunal framed the following issues: “1. Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the car bearing No.AP03-AA-04097? 2. Whether the deceased, Ravi Kumar died in the road accident? 3. Whether petitioners are entitled to compensation? If so what amount and against whom? 4. To what relief?” 10. The claimants examined PWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A1 to A27 and Ex.X1. The Insurance Company examined RWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.B1 to B4. 11. The Tribunal after considering the evidence on record arrived at finding that the accident occurred only due to rash and negligent driving of the car. RW1 was holding Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR). But, RW2 was holding effective driving licence to drive. At the time of accident RW2/P.Thimmappa was by the side of RW1. There was no violation of either the policy or Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR). 12. On the point of compensation, the Tribunal considered the age of the deceased as 35 years based on his date of birth as 06.05.1979 recorded in Ex.A7, the original S.S.C. mark sheet. The annual income of the deceased was taken as Rs.3,00,000/-after deductions of tax. The Income Tax Returns (ITR) filed for the assessment year 2010-2011 to 2013 to 2014 were marked as EXs.A9 to A12. Ex.A14, the ITR for the assessment year 2014 to 2015 was not considered, which was filed after the death of M. Ravi Kumar, the deceased. To the said income, 50% was added towards future prospect. Towards agricultural income, for loss of the managerial capacity Rs.50,000/- was awarded. The Tribunal deducted 1/4th towards personal expenses of the deceased. Ex.A14, the ITR for the assessment year 2014 to 2015 was not considered, which was filed after the death of M. Ravi Kumar, the deceased. To the said income, 50% was added towards future prospect. Towards agricultural income, for loss of the managerial capacity Rs.50,000/- was awarded. The Tribunal deducted 1/4th towards personal expenses of the deceased. It applied multiplier of ‘16’. It added Rs.1,00,000/- to the widow, for loss of consortium; Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of estate; Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of parental affection to claimant nos.2 and 3 and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses. In total, it awarded compensation of Rs.63,25,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till the deposit to be payable by the owner and the Insurance Company jointly and severally. 13. Learned counsel for the claimants did not dispute the age and income of the deceased as determined by the Tribunal. The multiplier of ‘16’ and the deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses were also not disputed. On the point of compensation, however, he submitted that the future prospects should have been allowed on the total income, including the agricultural income/managerial charges i.e., (Rs.3,00,000/- + Rs.50,000/- = Rs.3,50,000/-), whereas the future prospect was added only on Rs.3,00,000/-. 14. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that there was no evidence of agricultural income. The same was also not shown in I.T.R. Consequently, such income managerial charges should not be added for determining the future prospects thereon for the compensation amount. In any case, he submitted that the future prospects could not be more than 40%. 15. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company further submitted that there was violation of the condition of the policy and the Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR). RW2 was not in a position to instruct RW 1 (driving the offending vehicle) and to stop the vehicle. In any case, he submitted that the future prospects could not be more than 40%. 15. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company further submitted that there was violation of the condition of the policy and the Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR). RW2 was not in a position to instruct RW 1 (driving the offending vehicle) and to stop the vehicle. He submitted that in view of Section 3 of the M.V. Act, no person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him authorizing him to drive the vehicle, and as per the Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (in short, “the Rules”), sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the M.V.Act shall not apply to a person while receiving instructions or gaining experience in driving with the object of presenting himself for a test of competence to drive, emphasizing on clause (b) that, such person was accompanied by an instructor holding an effective driving license to drive the vehicle and such instructor was sitting in such a position to control or stop the vehicle. He submitted that in the present case, RW2, though had a valid driving licence, but could not be said to be sitting in a position to stop the vehicle. In his submission the offending vehicle was not meant for driving for learners as there was no separate operative system from which RW2 could stop the vehicle, like the car training schools motor vehicles. 16. Consequently, he submitted that the insurance company could not be held liable for payment of the compensation amount. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company placed reliance in New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Mandar Madhav Tambe and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 328 in support of his aforesaid submission. 17. Learned counsel for the claimants in reply, submitted that it was not the case pleaded by the insurance company that the offending vehicle did not have separate operative system and it was also not pleaded that the instructor was not in a position to stop the vehicle. The pleading was that there was no instructor with the person driving the vehicle with Learner’s Licence Registration (in short ‘LLR’). He submitted that Mandar Madhav Tambe case (supra) has no application in the present case. The pleading was that there was no instructor with the person driving the vehicle with Learner’s Licence Registration (in short ‘LLR’). He submitted that Mandar Madhav Tambe case (supra) has no application in the present case. He placed reliance in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Swaran Singh and others, (2004) 3 SCC 297 to contend that in the case of LLR also the liability for payment of compensation would be of the insurance company. 18. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 19. In view of the submissions advanced, the following points arise for our consideration: 1) Whether the finding of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-VI Additional District Judge, Kurnool that there was no violation of the terms of the policy or the Learner’s Licence Registration (LLR) is legally correct? 2) Whether the Insurance Company has rightly been held jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation? 3) Whether the claimants have been awarded the just and fair compensation, in the light of the submissions advanced? Point Nos.1 & 2: 20. We proceed to consider Point Nos.1 & 2. Both are connected to each other. 21. Section 3 of the M.V. Act, 1988 reads as under:- “3. Necessity for driving licence. – (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him authorising him to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a transport vehicle [other than a motorcab or motor cycle] hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made under sub-section (2) of section 75 unless his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do. (2) The conditions subject to which sub-section (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 22. Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 provides as under: “3. (2) The conditions subject to which sub-section (1) shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 22. Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 provides as under: “3. General.—The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3 shall not apply to a person while receiving instructions or gaining experience in driving with the object of presenting himself for a test of competence to drive, so long as- (a) such person is the holder of an effective learner's licence issued to him in Form 3 to drive the vehicle; (b) such person is accompanied by an instructor holding an effective driving License to drive the vehicle and such instructor is sitting in such a position to control or stop the vehicle; (c) there is painted, in the front and the rear of the vehicle or on a plate or card affixed to the front and the rear, the letter "L" in red on a white background as under: Note.- The painting on the vehicle or on ht place or card shall not be less than 18 centimetres squares and the letter "L" shall not be less than 10 centimetres high, 2 centimetres thick and 9 centimetres wide at the bottom.” 23. In Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) upon which the learned counsel for the Insurance Company placed reliance, the accident took place on 04.07.1979. The learner’s licence was obtained by the rider on 22.07.1977 which expired on 21.11.1977. So, on the date of the accident, he was neither holding a driving licence as contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, nor was he holding a learner’s licence. Soon after the accident, he obtained fresh learner’s licence on 07.07.1979 and thereafter on 09.07.1979 he obtained a driving licence. The main contention as raised on behalf of the insurance company was that the rider therein was not duly licensed to drive a scooter. There was also one specific clause in the insurance policy, which absolved the insurance company of all its liabilities. The exclusion clause in the policy relied upon by the insurance company was that “Provided that the person driving holds a valid driving licence at the time of the accident or had held a permanent driving licence (other than a learner’s licence) and is not disqualified from holding such a licence.” 24. The exclusion clause in the policy relied upon by the insurance company was that “Provided that the person driving holds a valid driving licence at the time of the accident or had held a permanent driving licence (other than a learner’s licence) and is not disqualified from holding such a licence.” 24. There, the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, Rule 16 made a provision for “learner’s driving licence”. Section 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which inter alia provided for the defence that could be taken by the insurance company in a claim for compensation in motor accident, used expression ‘duly licensed’. The questions which arose for consideration in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) were, firstly, whether the insurance company was entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act, and secondly, whether the exclusion clause in the insurance policy absolved the insurance company of any liability in that case. Considering Section 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court, referring to the definition ‘driving licence’ in Section 2(5-A) of the Act and Section 3 of the said Act observed and held that a valid driving licence as contemplated under the Act would be one which was issued in accordance with the provisions under Chapter II of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, after a driving test had been held. A person who holds only a learner’s licence was one who had not taken driving test successfully. Chapter II of the Act did not make any mention of a learner’s licence, except in Section 21 (2) (c) which enabled the State Government to frame rules inter alia, for the issue of temporary licences to persons receiving instruction in driving. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that in the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, there was provision under Rule 16 relating to ‘driving licence’. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the rider had no licence within the meaning of Section 2(5-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It held that ‘driving licence’ as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 was different from ‘learner’s licence’ as defined under Rule 16 of Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the rider had no licence within the meaning of Section 2(5-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It held that ‘driving licence’ as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 was different from ‘learner’s licence’ as defined under Rule 16 of Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules. In other words, a person would be regarded as being duly licensed only if he had obtained a licence under Chapter II of the Motor Vehicles Act and a person who had obtained a temporary licence which enabled him to learn driving could not be regarded as having been duly licensed. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that a learner having such a licence would not be regarded as duly licensed under Section 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, and consequently, in view of the clause in the insurance policy, as referred to above, the insurance company was not liable to make the payment awarded to the victim of the accident. 25. In Swaran Singh (supra) which is on Motor Vehicles Act 1988, the interpretation of Section 149 (2) (a) (ii) vis-à-vis the proviso appended to subsection (4) and sub-section (5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was involved. The defences which were raised by the insurance company in the claim petitions were in terms of Section 149 (2) (a) (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and those inter alia, were “(e) the vehicle in question was driven by a person having a learner’s licence”. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Swaran Singh (supra) held as under in para-110, the summary of findings. “Summary of findings 110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions is as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with the proviso thereunder and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” 27. For the present purpose, we would emphasise on two findings as recorded in Swaran Singh (supra). One is in finding No.(viii). The Hon’ble Apex Court clearly laid down that if a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner’s licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. 28. With respect to ‘effective licence’ in Section 3 and ‘duly licensed’ in Section 149 (2), as also the defence which could be taken by the Insurance Company under Section 149 (2) (a) or (b), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held in paragraphs – 42 to 47 and 50 of Swaran Singh (supra) as under: “42. We may also take note of the fact that whereas in Section 3 the words used are “effective licence”, it has been differently worded in Section 149(2) i.e. “duly licensed”. If a person does not hold an effective licence as on the date of the accident, he may be liable for prosecution in terms of Section 141 of the Act but Section 149 pertains to insurance as regards third-party risks. 43. If a person does not hold an effective licence as on the date of the accident, he may be liable for prosecution in terms of Section 141 of the Act but Section 149 pertains to insurance as regards third-party risks. 43. A provision of a statute which is penal in nature vis-à-vis a provision which is beneficent to a third party must be interpreted differently. It is also well known that the provisions contained in different expressions are ordinarily construed differently. 44. The words “effective licence” used in Section 3, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be imported for sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We must also notice that the words “duly licensed” used in subsection (2) of Section 149 are used in the past tense. 45. Thus, a person whose licence is ordinarily renewed in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder, despite the fact that during the interregnum period, namely, when the accident took place and the date of expiry of the licence, he did not have a valid licence, he could during the prescribed period apply for renewal thereof and could obtain the same automatically without undergoing any further test or without having been declared unqualified therefor. Proviso appended to Section 14 in unequivocal terms states that the licence remains valid for a period of thirty days from the day of its expiry. 46. Section 15 of the Act does not empower the authorities to reject an application for renewal only on the ground that there is a break in validity or tenure of the driving licence has lapsed, as in the meantime the provisions for disqualification of the driver contained in Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 will not be attracted, would indisputably confer a right upon the person to get his driving licence renewed. In that view of the matter, he cannot be said to be delicensed and the same shall remain valid for a period of thirty days after its expiry. 47. If a person has been given a licence for a particular type of vehicle as specified therein, he cannot be said to have no licence for driving another type of vehicle which is of the same category but of different type. 47. If a person has been given a licence for a particular type of vehicle as specified therein, he cannot be said to have no licence for driving another type of vehicle which is of the same category but of different type. As for example, when a person is granted a licence for driving a light motor vehicle, he can drive either a car or a jeep and it is not necessary that he must have driving licence both for car and jeep separately. 50. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, holding of a valid driving licence is one of the conditions of contract of insurance. Driving of a vehicle without a valid licence is an offence. However, the question herein is whether a third party involved in an accident is entitled to the amount of compensation granted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal although the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time might not have a valid driving licence but would be entitled to recover the same from the owner or driver thereof. 29. On the point of learner’s licence, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Swaran Singh (supra) also considered Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) and held that the question which arose for consideration in Swaran Singh (supra) did not arise in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra). The Hob’ble Apex Court observed that the case in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) had no application to the facts of that case nor created any binding precedent. The said decision was rendered in the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein. 30. The relevant paragraphs with respect to the learner’s licence, i.e., paragraphs-93 to 96 of Swaran Singh (supra) are reproduced as under: “Learner's licence 93. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of learner's licence. [See Section 4(3), Section 7(2), Section 10(3) and Section 14.] A learner's licence is, thus, also a licence within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that when a vehicle is being driven by a learner subject to the conditions mentioned in the licence, he would not be a person who is not “duly licensed” resulting in conferring a right on the insurer to avoid the claim of the third party. It cannot be said that a person holding a learner's licence is not entitled to drive the vehicle. It cannot be said that a person holding a learner's licence is not entitled to drive the vehicle. Even if there exists a condition in the contract of insurance that the vehicle cannot be driven by a person holding a learner's licence, the same would run counter to the provisions of Section 149(2) of the said Act. 94. The provisions contained in the said Act provide also for grant of driving licence which is otherwise a learner's licence. Sections 3(2) and 6 of the Act provide for restriction in the matter of grant of driving licence, Section 7 deals with such restrictions on granting of learner's licence. Sections 8 and 9 provide for the manner and conditions for grant of driving licence. Section 15 provides for renewal of driving licence. Learner's licences are granted under the Rules framed by the Central Government or the State Governments in exercise of their rule-making power. Conditions are attached to the learner's licences granted in terms of the statute. A person holding learner's licence would, thus, also come within the purview of “duly licensed” as such a licence is also granted in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It is now a well-settled principle of law that rules validly framed become part of the statute. Such rules are, therefore, required to be read as a part of the main enactment. It is also a well-settled principle of law that for the interpretation of statute an attempt must be made to give effect to all provisions under the rule. No provision should be considered as surplusage. 95. Mandar Madhav Tambe case [ (1996) 2 SCC 328 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 307] , whereupon the learned counsel placed reliance, has no application to the fact of the matter. There existed an exclusion clause in the insurance policy wherein it was made clear that the insurance company, in the event of an accident, would be liable only if the vehicle was being driven by a person holding a valid driving licence or a permanent driving licence “other than a learner's licence”. The question as to whether such a clause would be valid or not did not arise for consideration before the Bench in the said case. The said decision was rendered in the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein. The question as to whether such a clause would be valid or not did not arise for consideration before the Bench in the said case. The said decision was rendered in the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein. Therein it was stated that “a driving licence” as defined in the Act is different from a learner's licence issued under Rule 16 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1939 having regard to the factual matrix involved therein. 96. The question which arises for consideration in these petitions did not arise there. Neither was the same argued at the Bar nor were the binding precedents considered. Mandar Madhav Tambe case [ (1996) 2 SCC 328 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 307] therefore, has no application to the facts of these cases nor creates any binding precedent. The view we have taken is in tune with the judgments rendered by different High Courts consistently. (See for example New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Latha Jayaraj [ 1991 ACJ 298 (Ker)] .)” 31. In the present case, it is not in dispute that RW 1, the driver of the offending car, had a valid learner’s licence. The same was effective on the date of the accident. In Swaran Singh (supra) though the learner’s licence had expired before the date of accident, but the accident was within the period during which learner’s licence could be got renewed. In Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) such was not a case. So, we find applicability of Swaran Singh (supra) case to the facts of the present case. There is provision in the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 for issuance of learner’s licence in Chapter II itself which was not there in the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, which was for consideration in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) as has also been observed in the said case. 32. There is provision in the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 for issuance of learner’s licence in Chapter II itself which was not there in the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, which was for consideration in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) as has also been observed in the said case. 32. The other finding in Swaran Singh (supra) on which we lay emphasis is summary of finding Nos.(iii), that mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third party; (iv), that the insurance companies with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the proceedings, but must also establish ‘breach’ on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof where for would be on them, and in finding No.(v), that the Court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Swaran Singh (supra) thus clearly held that the insurance company must prove the willful violation of the law where the insurers relying upon the provisions of violation of law by the assured, take an exception to pay the assured or a third party. It was further observed that in some cases violation of criminal law, violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, may result in absolving the insurers, but the same may not necessarily hold good in the case of a third party. In any event, the exception applies only to acts done intentionally or so recklessly as to denote that the assured did not care what the consequences of his act might be. 34. With respect to the burden of proof, the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to its earlier pronouncement in Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins, (1985) 2 SCC 574 observed that if a breach of a term of contract permits a party to the contract, to not to perform the contract, the burden is squarely on that party which complains of breach to prove that the breach has been committed by the other party to the contract. The test in such a situation would be who would fail if no evidence is led. 35. The test in such a situation would be who would fail if no evidence is led. 35. Paras-51 & 52 of Swaran Singh (supra) read as under: 51. It is trite that where the insurers, relying upon the provisions of violation of law by the assured, take an exception to pay the assured or a third party, they must prove a wilful violation of the law by the assured. In some cases violation of criminal law, particularly, violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act may result in absolving the insurers but, the same may not necessarily hold good in the case of a third party. In any event, the exception applies only to acts done intentionally or “so recklessly as to denote that the assured did not care what the consequences of his act might be. “52. In Narcinva case [ (1985) 2 SCC 574 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 274] a Division Bench of this Court observed: (SCC p. 578, para 12) “The insurance company complains of breach of a term of contract which would permit it to disown its liability under the contract of insurance. If a breach of a term of contract permits a party to the contract to not to perform the contract, the burden is squarely on that party which complains of breach to prove that the breach has been committed by the other party to the contract. The test in such a situation would be who would fail if no evidence is led.” 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed in paragraphs – 66, 69 & 70 of Swaran Singh (supra) as under: “66. A bare perusal of the provisions of Section 149 of the Act leads to only one conclusion that the usual rule is that once the assured proves that the accident is covered by the compulsory insurance clause, it is for the insurer to prove that it comes within an exception. 69. The proposition of law is no longer res integra that the person who alleges breach must prove the same. The insurance company is, thus, required to establish the said breach by cogent evidence. In the event the insurance company fails to prove that there has been breach of conditions of policy on the part of the insured, the insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. The insurance company is, thus, required to establish the said breach by cogent evidence. In the event the insurance company fails to prove that there has been breach of conditions of policy on the part of the insured, the insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. (See Sohan Lal Passi [ (1996) 5 SCC 21 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 871] .) 70. Apart from the above, we do not intend to lay down anything further i.e. degree of proof which would satisfy the aforementioned requirement inasmuch as the same would indisputably depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It will also depend upon the terms of contract of insurance. Each case may pose a different problem which must be resolved having regard to a large number of factors governing the case including conduct of parties as regards duty to inform, correct disclosure, suppression, fraud on the insurer etc. It will also depend upon the fact as to who is the owner of the vehicle and the circumstances in which the vehicle was being driven by a person having no valid and effective licence. No hard-and-fast rule can, therefor, be laid down. If in a given case there exists sufficient material to draw an adverse inference against either the insurer or the insured, the Tribunal may do so. The parties alleging breach must be held to have succeeded in establishing the breach of conditions of the contract of insurance, on the part of the insurer by discharging its burden of proof. The Tribunal, there cannot be any doubt, must arrive at a finding on the basis of the materials available on records.” 37. From the aforesaid, it is well settled in law that a person who alleges breach must prove the same. Once it is proved that the accident was covered by the compulsory insurance clause, it is for the insurer to prove that it comes within an exception. It is for the insurance company to prove that there has been breach of conditions of policy on the part of the insured. In Swaran Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a beneficent statute, like Motor Vehicles Act, must receive a liberal interpretation. The liability of the insurer is a statutory one. The liability of the insurer to satisfy the decree passed in favour of a third party is also statutory. 38. In Swaran Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that a beneficent statute, like Motor Vehicles Act, must receive a liberal interpretation. The liability of the insurer is a statutory one. The liability of the insurer to satisfy the decree passed in favour of a third party is also statutory. 38. The submission of the learned counsel for the insurance company is that there was violation of insurance policy, in the light of the Rule 3 (b) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules and consequently, the insurance company would not be liable, as RW 1 was having only a learner’s licence and RW 2 was not sitting in a situation to stop the vehicle. We are of the considered view that the said submission deserves rejection, on the ground, inter alia, firstly, that any such plea that RW 2 the person who accompanied RW 1 in the car and was having a valid driving licence, was not in a position to stop the vehicle, as was being contended before us, was not raised before the Tribunal. The insurance company had not taken any such objection in the counter/reply to the claim petition. Learned counsel for the insurance company, however, referred to the following para from the counter in claim petition: “….The second respondent submitted that the first respondent who was driving the motor cycle at the time of accident was not having valid and effective driving licence, but he was having only Learner’s Licence bearing No.LLRAP00230552014 valid from 3-4-2014 to 2-10-2014 to drive non-transport LMV, MCWG. The petitioners, in collusion with the police, have created that at the time of accident the first respondent was driving the car and one Mr.Thimmappa was acting as observer to the driving of first respondent; that the said Mr. Thimmappa has nothing to do with the first respondent and he is planted witness. The first respondent was driving the car without any observer and violated the terms and conditions of the policy, hence, the second respondent is not liable to pay any compensation……” 39. A perusal of the above defence taken by the insurance company shows that there was general averment of violation of policy. The above defence was that RW 1 was having a learner’s licence and he was not accompanied by any person authorized and having a valid driving licence. A perusal of the above defence taken by the insurance company shows that there was general averment of violation of policy. The above defence was that RW 1 was having a learner’s licence and he was not accompanied by any person authorized and having a valid driving licence. So, the defence was that RW 1, driver of the offending vehicle was not accompanied by any other driver having valid driving licence. It was not the defence that he was accompanied by the person having valid driving licence, but that person was not in a position to instruct the learner or / and, was not sitting in a situation to stop the vehicle. Defence was of complete denial of the driver RW.1 being accompanied by a person having valid driving licence. Therefore, once it was proved before the Tribunal that the driver of the offending vehicle who was having a learner’s licence was accompanied by RW 2, the person having valid driving licence and was sitting besides the driver, also giving instructions, as per the evidence on record, the defence of the insurance company failed. They cannot change their stand as taken before the Tribunal, from one, i.e., no presence of an instructor having valid driving licence to another i.e., instructor not sitting in a position to stop the vehicle, at the stage of appeal. 40. Additionally, even if it be taken that this defence/plea as raised before us, was included in the general defence of violation of Rule 3, as submitted by the learned counsel for insurance company that the person sitting was not in a position to stop the vehicle, the burden was on the insurance company who alleged violation of the terms of the policy, but it did not lead any evidence. In the absence of any evidence to show that RW 2 was not in a position to stop the offending vehicle, it shall be taken that the insurance company has failed to discharge its burden of proof. It failed not only to establish by leading evidence with respect to violation of the terms of the policy, but also that the alleged violation was willful. The owner/driver RW.1 could not be proved to be guilty of negligence or failed to exercise reasonable care. It failed not only to establish by leading evidence with respect to violation of the terms of the policy, but also that the alleged violation was willful. The owner/driver RW.1 could not be proved to be guilty of negligence or failed to exercise reasonable care. The insurance company failed to prove that such act was intentional or so recklessly as the assured did not care what the consequence of his act might be. 41. We find that so far as the condition subject to which the person driving the motor vehicle in public place with learner’s driving licence that besides the driver in the vehicle there should be as instructor a person duly licensed to drive the vehicle and sitting in such a position as to be able readily to stop the vehicle, as was in Rule 16 of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, and is also under the present Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mandar Madhav Tambe (supra) did not enter into that aspect of the matter, may be for the reasons that the said question did not arise, as the learner’s licence was not ‘duly licenced’ within the meaning of Sections 96 (2) (b) (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and there was a clause in the policy that the insurance company would be liable if the person driving had a valid driving licence (other than a learner’s licence), and as the learner’s licence, in the said case, had also expired much prior to the accident. 42. The insurance company having failed to discharge the burden, we do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal in imposing liability for payment of compensation on the insurer as well. Merely because the car was not a school training vehicle, that does not necessarily make that RW 2 was not in a position to instruct or to stop the vehicle. Merely because the car was not a school training vehicle, that does not necessarily make that RW 2 was not in a position to instruct or to stop the vehicle. If the submission as advanced by the learned counsel for insurance company to the above effect, that it is only the car training school vehicle that can be driven by person with learner’s licence, and not the other vehicle, is accepted, then the learner’s licence would not be taken as due licence to drive the vehicle as provided under Section 149 (2) (a) (ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, which shall be contrary to the law laid down in Swaran Singh (supra) that “ it cannot be said that a person holding a learner’s licence is not entitled to drive the vehicle” . 43. Thus, considered. We hold on point Nos.1 & 2 that the finding of the Tribunal that there was no violation of policy or the learner’s licence is legally correct and it has rightly made liable, for payment of compensation, to the insurance company. Point No.3: 44. On the point of future prospect in view of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 case, we are of the view that addition of 40 percent instead of 50 percent of the annual income should have been made. 45. On the point of managerial charges, the Tribunal found that the deceased had agricultural income as well and contrary thereto, there was no evidence. It awarded the managerial charges of Rs.50,000/- @10%. We are of the view that the managerial charges @ 10% are on the lower side. In K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1338 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the managerial charges should lie between @10% to 15% but the acceptable range can be increased in the light of specific circumstances. It has been so held in paras-21 & 22 as under: “21. Now, the sole issue which remains before this court is whether the entire amount under ‘Income from House Property and Agricultural Land’ should be deducted or not. In this respect, we are guided by the observations of this court in State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, wherein it was noted that – 8. x-x-x-x The land possessed by the deceased still remains with his legal heirs. In this respect, we are guided by the observations of this court in State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, wherein it was noted that – 8. x-x-x-x The land possessed by the deceased still remains with his legal heirs. There is however a possibility that the claimants may be required to engage persons to look after agriculture. Therefore, the normal rule about the deprivation of income is not strictly applicable to cases where agricultural income is the source. Attendant circumstances have to be considered. (Emphasis Applied) 22. In our opinion, the abovementioned observations, though made in the context of agricultural land, would also be applicable to rent received from leased out properties as the loss of dependency arises mainly out of loss of management capacity or efficiency. As a rule of prudence, computation of any individual's managerial skills should lie between 10 to 15 per cent of the total rental income but the acceptable range can be increased in light of specific circumstances. The appropriate approach, therefore, is to determine the value of managerial skills along with any other factual considerations.” Consequently, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case the managerial charges are increased to 15%, i.e., Rs.75,000/-. 46. We are also of the view that the future prospects deserve to be granted at the rate of 40 percent on the total amount of income i.e., Rs.3,00,000/- plus Rs.50,000/- = Rs.3,50,000/-. We are further of the view that under the conventional heads (non-pecuniary) the claimants are entitled for the following amount for loss of consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/- for each of the claimants, five in numbers, i.e. equal to Rs.2,00,000/-, plus Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, plus Rs.15,000/- for funeral expenses, to a total of Rs.2,30,000/- with an enhancement of 20% as on today, i.e., 2,76,000/- against the award of Rs.3,75,000/- as given by the Tribunal under these heads. The interest @9% p.a. as awarded is maintained, in view of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rahul Sharma v. National Insurance Company Limited, (2021) 6 SCC 188 and Kirthi v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2021) 2 SCC 166 . 47. Thus, the claimants are entitled for compensation in total as under: 1. Net annual income Rs.3,00,000-00 2. Supervisory charges on agricultural income (15% of Rs.5,00,000/-) Rs. 75,000-00 2. Future prospects @ 40% thereon Rs.3,75,000/- x 40/100 = Rs.1,50,000/- Rs. 1,50,000-00 Total: Rs.5,25,000-00 3. 47. Thus, the claimants are entitled for compensation in total as under: 1. Net annual income Rs.3,00,000-00 2. Supervisory charges on agricultural income (15% of Rs.5,00,000/-) Rs. 75,000-00 2. Future prospects @ 40% thereon Rs.3,75,000/- x 40/100 = Rs.1,50,000/- Rs. 1,50,000-00 Total: Rs.5,25,000-00 3. Deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses Rs.5,25,000-00 – (1/4th ) 1,31,250-00= Rs.3,93,750-00 4. Applying multiplier ‘16’ (Rs.3,93,750.00 x 16) Rs.63,00,000-00 5. Conventional Head: Non-pecuniary: 1) Loss of Consortium Rs.40,000/- x 5 = Rs.2,00,000-00 ii) Loss of Estate = Rs. 15,000-00 iii)Funeral expenses= Rs. 15,000-00 with an enhancement @20% = Rs. 46,000-00 = Rs. 2,76,000-00 Total: (Rupees sixty five lakh seventy six thousand only) Rs.65,76,000-00 48. Result: (i) The Appeal of the claimants i.e., MACMA No.793 of 2017 is allowed with costs throughout in their favour; (ii) The Appeal of the Insurance Company, i.e., MACMA No.1184 of 2017 is dismissed with costs to the claimants. (iii) The claimants are entitled for the amount as per this judgment and we grant the same with interest therein @ 9% per annum to the claimants; (iv) The Insurance Company shall deposit the amount as aforesaid in para-47, after adjusting the amount already deposited / paid, if any, before the Tribunal, failing which, the amount shall be recovered, as per law; (v) On such deposit being made, the claimants shall be entitled to withdraw the same, proportionately, as per the award of the Tribunal; Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.