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2024 DIGILAW 1239 (ALL)

Jamia Urdu Aligarh Regd v. Jamia Urdu Sanstha

2024-05-08

SARAL SRIVASTAVA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Saral Srivastava, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff/appellant challenging the judgement and decree dated 05.03.2024 passed by the First Appellate Court i.e. Additional District Judge, Court No.14, Aligarh in Civil Appeal No.34 of 2017 as well as judgement and order dated 13.01.2017 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.2, Aligarh in Original Suit No.914 of 2010. 3. The case of the plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'plaintiff') is that the plaintiff is a registered educational institution having Registration No.625/1983-84 (Renewal No.551/1995) under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and Smt. Saba Khan is the Registrar of the said institution who is competent to verify and sign the plaint. As per the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff purchased a piece of land measuring 1250.07 square yards out of Khasara No.539 situated at Dhorra Muafi, Pargana & Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh as detailed in Schedule-A at serial no.1 by registered sale deed dated 31.03.1997 executed in pursuance of registered agreement to sale dated 06.03.1997 for a sale consideration of Rs.10,62,500/-. 4. The plaintiff purchased another piece of land measuring 1250.07 square yards abutting the said land towards the southern side of the above land as detailed in Schedule-A at serial No.2 out of Khara No.539 situated at Dhorra Muafi, Pargana & Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh by another sale deed dated 31.03.1997 executed in pursuance to agreement to sell dated 06.03.1997. It is further stated that on 01.06.2010, respondent nos.1 & 2 (defendant first set) and respondent no.3 (defendant second set) (hereinafter referred to as defendant first set and defendant second set) came on the spot and tried to take forcible possession over 111 square yards land out of total land purchased by the plaintiff by the two sale deeds detailed above to raise illegal construction. 5. The further case of the plaintiff is that after getting the knowledge of the sale deed dated 27.12.2001, the plaintiff applied for the certified copy of the said sale deed on 02.06.2010 which was made available to the plaintiff on 05.06.2010. The plaintiff came to know for the first time about the contents of the sale deed and also the fraud and misrepresentation played by the defendant's first set and the defendant's second set in collusion with each other in getting the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 executed. 6. The plaintiff came to know for the first time about the contents of the sale deed and also the fraud and misrepresentation played by the defendant's first set and the defendant's second set in collusion with each other in getting the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 executed. 6. It is further stated that the defendant first set in collusion with the defendant second set created a fake institution in the name of 'Jamia Urdu Sanstha' which is akin to the name of the plaintiff's institution to usurp the property detailed in Schedule-A and to use the registration number of the plaintiff i.e. Jamia Urdu Aligarh. It is further stated that a fraudulent power of attorney was executed on 28.09.2001 in respect of the property of Schedule-A in favour of defendant no.2 (Imran Sabir) who as attorney holder of Jamia Urdu Sanstha, transferred the plot measuring 111 square yards out of Khasra No.539 to the defendant second set detailed at the foot of the plaint as Schedule-B by sale deed dated 27.12.2001. 7. The plaintiff has prayed for the following relief in the aforesaid backdrop:- “(A). That a decree for declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. It be declared that the alleged sale deed dated 27.12.2001 alleged to be executed by defendant No.1 through defendant No.2 as attorney holder in favour of defendant IInd Set with regard to the property in question as detailed at the foot of the plaint in Schedule 'B' registered in Bahi No.1 Zild No.3236 on pages 505 to 512 at No.221 registered on 10.1.2002 in the office of the sub- Registrar, Koil, Aligarh and the information to this effect be sent to the office of the sub-Registrar, Koil, Aligarh. (B). That a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, the defendants their agents, servants, subordinates, relatives and associates be restrained from taking forcible possession and raising illegal construction over the property in question and also restrain from transferring, alienating and disposing off the property in question as detailed at the foot of the plaint in Schedule 'B' or otherwise in any manner whatsoever. (C). Cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants. (D). (C). Cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants. (D). Any other relief or reliefs which may be just and proper be also granted to the plaintiff and against the defendants which may be beneficial to the plaintiff in the circumscribes of the case as also in the opinion of the Hon'ble Court.” 8. It appears that the defendant did not appear to contest the suit and the Trial Court proceeded ex-parte. The Trial Court framed the following issues:- 9. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff despite having been granted several times did not produce evidence to establish its title over the suit property. The Trial Court further recorded a finding that the plaintiff had filed the true copy of the sale deeds dated 31.03.1997 and 04.06.1997 which had been executed by Nahida Nijami and Jamal Nijami in favour of Jamia Urdu Shiksha Sanstha. The Trial Court while considering the issue whether the scheduled property described in Schedule-B in the plaint is also a part of the property of Schedule-A held that since it is admitted that after the purchase of the land, no construction had been raised, therefore perusal of the boundaries in respect of plot described in Schedule-A and Schedule-B discloses that boundaries of the plot of Schedule-A are not the same which have been shown as boundaries of Schedule-B. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the total area of Khasra No.539 was 2500.14 square yards. Accordingly, it concluded that the property described in Schedule B is not part of the property of Schedule A. 10. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that defendant no.1-Jamia Urdu Sanstha and plaintiff-Jamia Urdu Aligarh (Registered) are two different societies and Saba Khan was the Registrar of the society of Jamia Urdu Aligarh. The said finding has been returned by the Trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to establish that the plaintiff and defendant no.1-Jamia Urdu Sanstha are two different societies and Saba Khan was the Registrar of the plaintiff's society. Consequently, the Trial Court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove its case and accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 11. Consequently, the Trial Court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove its case and accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 11. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court preferred a civil appeal which was also dismissed by the First Appellate Court by recording a finding that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence regarding registration of the society of the plaintiff nor did it produce the constitution of the society. The First Appellate Court further noted that it is evident from the sale deed dated 04.06.1997 that the name of Jamia Urdu Shiksha Sanstha is recorded in the sale deed dated 04.06.1997 whereas the plaintiff in the suit has named itself as 'Jamia Urdu (Registered)'. 12. The First Appellate Court further noted that the plaintiff did not adduce any documentary evidence to establish under what name the plaintiff's society has been registered. Accordingly, it concluded that the name of the plaintiff-Jamia Urdu (Registered) is different from the name mentioned in the sale deed dated 04.06.1997 paper no.32Ga/10 namely Jamia Urdu Shiksha Sanstha. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court concluded that since there was difference in the name of the society, therefore the plaintiff ought to have filed the necessary evidence to establish that the society of the plaintiff is the valid society. The First Appellate Court also found that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to prove its title, therefore, the Trial Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing the suit. 13. Challenging the above two orders, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the finding of the Trial Court, as well as the First Appellate Court, is perverse inasmuch as the plaintiff has filed the certified copy of the sale deed which is secondary evidence and being a public document was liable to be read in evidence, therefore, the Trial Court, as well as First Appellate Court, has erred in law in concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish its title over the suit property. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Appaiya Vs. Andimuthu @ Thangapandi & Others 2024 (1) JCLR 99 (SC). 14. I have considered the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 15. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Appaiya Vs. Andimuthu @ Thangapandi & Others 2024 (1) JCLR 99 (SC). 14. I have considered the submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record. 15. The suit has been filed by Jamia Urdu Aligarh (Registered) through its Registrar Smt. Saba Khan. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff's society is the registered society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is running an educational institution. The plaintiff for playground, purchased the suit property by two sale deeds dated 31.03.1997 out of Khasara No.539 situated at Dhorra Muafi, Pargana & Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh. 16. According to the plaintiff, the defendant first set- Jamia Urdu Sanstha is a fake society, and it has no authority to grant power of attorney to the defendant's second set-Imran Sabir, therefore, the sale deed executed by the defendant's first set in favour of defendant second set in respect to 111 square yard was illegal. The plaintiff in the aforesaid backdrop had prayed for the relief, extracted above. 17. It is admitted on record that original sale deeds were not filed on record and only the certified copy of the sale dee dated 31.03.1997 has been filed on record which is secondary evidence. 18. Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1872') provides that the contents of a document may be proved either by primary evidence or secondary evidence. 19. Section 62 of the Act, 1872 deals with primary evidence and Section 63 of the said Act defines secondary evidence. 20. Section 64 of the Act, 1872 provides that a document must be proved by primary evidence except in cases hereinafter mentioned i.e. the circumstances mentioned in Section 65 of the Act, 1872. Section 65 of the Act, 1872 is reproduced herein below:- “Section 65. 20. Section 64 of the Act, 1872 provides that a document must be proved by primary evidence except in cases hereinafter mentioned i.e. the circumstances mentioned in Section 65 of the Act, 1872. Section 65 of the Act, 1872 is reproduced herein below:- “Section 65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.- Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases:- (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest; (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; (d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable; (e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74; (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in [India] to be given in evidence; (g) when the originals consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.” 21. In the instant case admittedly, primary evidence i.e. original sale deed was not produced before the court below. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.” 21. In the instant case admittedly, primary evidence i.e. original sale deed was not produced before the court below. As per Section 64 of the Act, 1872, a document must be proved by primary evidence except in cases which have been enumerated in Section 65 of the Act, 1872. 22. In the present case, no factual foundation has been laid by the plaintiff in the plaint or by filing any application seeking leave of the Court to prove the sale deed by secondary evidence on the ground that they do not have the primary evidence i.e. original sale deed. The law is settled that to take the benefit of Section 65 of the Act, 1872, the party has to establish that for bona fide reasons, it could not produce the primary evidence. In the present case, the plaintiff did not lay any factual foundation giving reasons for not producing the primary evidence, therefore, the certified copy of the sale deed being secondary evidence could not be read in evidence. 23. In this respect, it would be beneficial to have a glance at a few judgements of the Apex Court where the Apex Court has elaborated the preconditions for proving a fact by secondary evidence. 24. The Apex Court in the case of H.Siddiqui (Dead) by LRS. Vs. A. Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240 in paragraph 12 has held as under:- “12. The provisions of Section 65 of the 1872 Act provide for permitting the parties to adduce secondary evidence. However, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where original documents are not produced at any time, nor has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non- production of the original is accounted for, to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is a true copy of the original. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non- production of the original is accounted for, to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved by law. The court has an obligation to decide the question of the admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. (Vide Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1457 ; State of Rajasthan v. Khemraj (2000) 9 SCC 241 , LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010) 4 SCC 491 and M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu (2010) 9 SCC 712 ).” 25. In the case of Rakesh Mohindra Vs. Anita Beri and Others (2016) 16 SCC 483 , the Apex Court again reiterated that if a party desires to give secondary evidence, it has to lay down the factual foundation that despite best effort, it is not able to produce primary evidence for the reason beyond its control. Paragraphs nos. 15 & 20 of the said judgement are reproduced herein below:- “15. The preconditions for leading secondary evidence are that such original documents could not be produced by the party that relied upon such documents in spite of best efforts, unable to produce the same which is beyond their control. The party sought to produce secondary evidence must establish for the non-production of primary evidence. Unless, it is established that the original document is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence in respect of that document cannot accepted.” 20. It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence. At the same time, the party has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. At the same time, the party has to lay down the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where the original document cannot be produced. It is equally well settled that neither mere admission of a document in evidence amounts to its proof nor mere making of an exhibit of a document dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law.” 26. In this respect, it would be apt to reproduce paragraphs nos.11, 13, 14 & 17 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jagmail Singh and Another Vs. Karamjit Singh and Others (2020) 5 SCC 178 :- “11. A perusal of Section 65 makes it clear that secondary evidence may be given with regard to existence, condition or the contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in possession or power against whom the document is sought to be produced, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after notice mentioned in Section 66 such person does not produce it. It is a settled position of law that for secondary evidence to be admitted foundational evidence has to be given being the reasons as to why the original evidence has not been furnished. 13. In the matter of Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri (2016) 16 SCC 483 this Court has observed as under:- “15. The preconditions for leading secondary evidence are that such original documents could not be produced by the party relying upon such documents in spite of best efforts, unable to produce the same which is beyond their control. The party sought to produce secondary evidence must establish for the non- production of primary evidence. Unless, it is established that the original document is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence in respect of that document cannot be accepted.” 14. It is trite that under the Evidence Act, 1872 facts have to be established by primary evidence and secondary evidence is only an exception to the rule for which foundational facts have to be established to account for the existence of the primary evidence. It is trite that under the Evidence Act, 1872 facts have to be established by primary evidence and secondary evidence is only an exception to the rule for which foundational facts have to be established to account for the existence of the primary evidence. In the case of H. Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 420, this Court reiterated that where original documents are not produced without a plausible reason and factual foundation for laying secondary evidence not established it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. 17. Needless to observe that merely the admission in evidence and making exhibit of a document does not prove it automatically unless the same has been proved in accordance with the law.” 27. In the case of Appaiya (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Apex Court after considering the various provisions of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 namely, Sections 61 to 65, Section 74, Section 77, Section 79 and Section 57 (5) of the Registration Act held that the High Court has erred in holding that Exhibit A-1 sale deed dated 27.08.1928 could not be admitted in evidence. The case of Appaiya (supra) is distinguishable and the law postulated in the said case is not applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the case of Appaiya (supra), the issue before the Apex Court was not that the precondition to prove a document by secondary evidence has been complied with or not whereas in the present case, it is evident from the record that the precondition to prove the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 by secondary evidence has not been complied with inasmuch as plaintiff did not lay any factual foundation establishing that despite its best effort, it could not give primary evidence. 28. Further, this Court may note that the First Appeal Court has recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff has failed to establish its title by producing cogent evidence. The First Appellate Court also recorded a finding of fact that no evidence had been adduced by the plaintiff to establish that Smt. Saba Khan was the Registrar of the plaintiff's society. Further, this Court may note that the First Appeal Court has recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff has failed to establish its title by producing cogent evidence. The First Appellate Court also recorded a finding of fact that no evidence had been adduced by the plaintiff to establish that Smt. Saba Khan was the Registrar of the plaintiff's society. The First Appellate Court further held that the sale deed dated 31.03.1997 registered on 04.06.1997 reveals that the sale deed was executed by one 'Jamia Urdu Shiksha Sanstha' whereas the plaintiff is Jamia Urdu (Registered) and it failed to establish that they are the same and there is no difference between plaintiff and Jamia Urdu Shiksha Sanstha. The aforesaid finding returned by the First Appellate Court is a finding of fact, and learned counsel for the appellant did not assail the said finding. 29. It is further pertinent to note that the suit has been filed on the ground that the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 executed by the defendant's first set in favour of the defendant's second set was without authority. 30. The suit was instituted in the year 2010 and there is no pleading in the plaint as to the date on which the plaintiff acquired the knowledge about the execution of the sale deed dated 27.12.2001. Paragraphs No.5 & 6 of the plaint are reproduced hereinbelow:- “5. That on 1.6.10 the defendants in collusion with each other came on spot and tried to take forcible possession with a view to raise illegal construction over 111 square yards land out of total land 2500.14 square yards aforesaid but they could not get success in their illegal design due to the resistance made by the plaintiff and its employees. However the defendants and their associates clearly alarmed and threatened that they will take forcible possession over 111 square yard land as detailed at the foot of the plaint in Schedule 'B' which is the subject matter in the instant suit and will raise illegal construction and further threatened to transfer, alienate and dispose off the same at any opportune moment. 6. 6. That after getting the knowledge of the said sale deed dated 27.12.2001 the plaintiff applied for obtaining the certified copy of the same on 2.6.2010 which could be available to the plaintiff on 5.6.2010 then the plaintiff for the first time came to know about the contents of the same and also about the fraud, cheating, and misrepresentation committed by the defendants in collusion with each other in obtaining the said sale deed dated 27.12.2001 which is absolutely fraudulent, fictitious, fabricated and forged document which deserves to be declared as null and void on following grounds:- (A). That the defendants in collusion with each other planned to usurp and swallow up the property of Schedule 'A' of the plaintiff, for that purposes the defendants in collusion with each other collusively, maliciously, fraudulently and fictitiously created a fake institution Jamia Urdu Sanstha and connected the registration No. of the plaintiff i.e. Jamia Urdu, Aligarh and its the then Registrar who is no more in the mortal world without any right and authority executed a General Power of Attorney dated 28.9.01 with regard to the property of Schedule 'A' in favour of defendant No.2 who as attorney holder of Jamia Urdu Sanstha transferred, alienated and disposed of a plot measuring 111 square yards out of Khasra No.539 (out of the land of the plaintiff of Schedule 'A') situated at Dhorra Maufi, Pargana & Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh as detailed at the foot of the plaint in Schedule 'B' by virtue of registered sale deed dated 27.12.2001 for a total sale consideration of Rs.80,000.00/-. The said plot has been transferred out of the land of the plaintiff of Schedule 'A' of which the defendants have no right and authority to do the same in any manner whatsoever. (B). That the then Registrar Anwar Syeed had no right and authority appointed the general power of attorney holder dated 28.09.01 in favour of defendant No.2 nor defendants Ist Set or the then Registrar of Jamia Urdu, Aligarh or Jamia Urdu Sanstha Aligarh had any right and authority to transfer, alienate or dispose off the land in question or its part to defendants Ist Set in any manner whatsoever more particularly when the institutional property (plaintiff's property) could/cannot be transferred, alienated or disposed off in any manner whatsoever. (C). (C). That defendant IInd Set never acquired any right, title or interest in the property of Schedule 'B' on the basis of fictitious and forged sale deed dated 27.12.2001. Furthermore, she never became the owner nor got possession over the same. (D). That the transaction of the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 is absolutely a fake and imposter transaction which does not carry any weight in the eye of law nor the same is recognized under any law. (E). That no amount of sale consideration ever passed under the said alleged sale deed nor any amount is deposited in the account of the plaintiff. (F). That the said alleged sale deed never acted upon either on spot or on record. (G). That the alleged sale deed dated 27.12.2001 is outcome of collusion and connivance of scribe, witnesses, employees of the office of Sub-Registrar, Koil, Aligarh and also of the defendants.” 31. The plaintiff to circumvent the question of limitation deliberately did not seek the cancellation of the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 inasmuch as the plaintiff to seek the cancellation of the sale deed had to establish that the suit had been filed within three years from the date it acquired knowledge of the execution of sale deed whereas in the present case, the plaintiff did not state the date of knowledge of the sale deed. 32. The plaintiff has not assailed the sale deed dated 27.12.2001 and surreptitiously, prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant second set from interfering with the possession of suit property. 33. This Court is conscious of the fact that this issue was not raised before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, therefore, this Court may not deal with the said issue in the second appeal, but the law is settled that the question of limitation is a pure question of law, and if it is manifest from the pleading that the suit is barred by limitation, and no question of fact is to be gone into to conclude that the suit is barred by limitation, the Court under Section 3 of the Limitation Act has jurisdiction to look into the question of limitation, even if no plea of limitation has been set up by the defendant or no issue is framed regarding limitation. In such an event, the suit deserves to be rejected since the question of limitation is a pure question of law. 34. In this respect, it would be apt to reproduce paragraph 5 of the judgement of Apex Court in the case of Narne Rama Murthy Vs. Ravula Somasundaram and Others (2005) 6 SCC 614 :- “5. We also see no substance in the contention that the suit was barred by limitation and that the courts below should have decided the question of limitation. When limitation is the pure question of law and from the pleadings itself it becomes apparent that a suit is barred by limitation, then, of course, it is the duty of the court to decide limitation at the outset even in the absence of a plea. However, in cases where the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the suit does not appear to be barred by limitation on the face of it, then the facts necessary to prove limitation must be pleaded, an issue raised and then proved. In this case the question of limitation is intricately linked with the question whether the agreement to sell was entered into on behalf of all and whether possession was on behalf of all. It is also linked with the plea of adverse possession. Once on facts it has been found that the purchase was on behalf of all and that the possession was on behalf of all, then, in the absence of any open, hostile and overt act, there can be no adverse possession and the suit would also not be barred by limitation. The only hostile act which could be shown was the advertisement issued in 1989. The suit filed almost immediately thereafter.” 35. In the present case, the plaintiff has not stated the date on which he acquired the knowledge of the execution of the sale deed dated 27.12.2001. The limitation for filing a suit for cancellation of the sale deed is three years. The suit was instituted in the year 2010 about 9 years after the date of execution of the sale deed. The limitation for filing a suit for cancellation of the sale deed is three years. The suit was instituted in the year 2010 about 9 years after the date of execution of the sale deed. The facts in the present case demonstrate that the plaintiff deliberately did not pray for the cancellation of the sale deed since the limitation for filing a suit for cancellation of the sale deed is three years whereas in the present case, the suit has been instituted after about 9 years from the date of execution of sale deed. From the pleading in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by limitation and the question of limitation in the instant case is a pure question of law and not a mixed question of fact and law. 36. Therefore, this Court for the aforesaid reason is also of the view that the suit of the plaintiff is nothing but an abuse of the process of law since the plaintiff knew that it could not succeed in the suit being barred by limitation if it prays for cancellation of sale deed. 37. In such view of the fact, this court is of the view that no substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal which needs to be answered by this Court. Consequently, the appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with a cost of Rs.25,000/-.