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2024 DIGILAW 1239 (GUJ)

Rajesh Keshavji Khakharia v. State of Gujarat

2024-06-13

D.A.JOSHI

body2024
JUDGMENT : D.A. Joshi, J. 1. Rule. Learned APP Ms. Monali Bhatt for the respondent no.2 - State of Gujarat waives service of notice. 2. By way of present application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ("CrPC" for short), the applicant has prayed for quashment of the impugned First Information Report being C.R. No.II-178/2019 registered with Kamalabaug Police Station, Porbandar for the offences under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short) and under Sections 3(1)(R)(S) of the Prevention of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes ("Atrocity Act" for short). 3. The allegations leveled in the FIR in nutshell are as under, The land bearing Survey No.2885/2 situated in the sim of Village : Chhaya owned by the respondent no.2 herein was sold by him to one Rambhai Mokariya and the applicant herein for sale consideration of Rs.2,00,00,000/-, for which, registered sale deed has been executed by him and at the time of execution of the registered sale deed, the accused have paid an amount of Rs.1,92,00,000/- and it was decided to pay remaining amount of Rs.8,00,000/- as when the construction of commercial shops and residential apartment is over. It is alleged that thereafter the respondent no.2 started demanding the remaining amount and at that point of time, an amount of Rs.50,000/- was given and, thereafter, the respondent no.2 used to demand remaining about but the accused did not give it. It is alleged that on 12.03.2019 at about 8 O'clock, the respondent no.2 had gone to the office of the applicant, where two persons were sitting, however, those two persons were asked to go out from the office and, thereafter, when the respondent no.2 had demanded the remaining amount, the applicant started abusing him. It is alleged that thereafter on 25.03.2019, the respondent no.2 submitted an application to the concerned Superintendent of Police narrating the aforesaid incident and, thereafter, the talks of settlement were going on but not a single penny has been given by the applicant to the respondent no.2. Therefore, the impugned FIR has been lodged. 4. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Rahul Dholakia for the applicant and learned APP Ms. Monali Bhatt. Though served, none appears for the respondent no.2. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. Therefore, the impugned FIR has been lodged. 4. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Rahul Dholakia for the applicant and learned APP Ms. Monali Bhatt. Though served, none appears for the respondent no.2. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. Dholakia submitted that as per the case of the prosecution, so-called incident occurred on 12.03.2019, for which, FIR has been lodged on 20.07.2019 and thus, there is gross delay of four months in registration of the FIR, which suggests that the applicant is falsely implicated in the aforesaid FIR. Learned advocate submitted that as per the case of the prosecution, the complainant had sold his land to the applicant and one Rambhai Mokariya by executing registered sale deed before seven years from the date of incident and the accused had already given Rs.1,92,00,000/- to the complainant at the time of execution of the registered sale deed and as per the oral assurance given by the accused, remaining amount of Rs.8,00,000/- would be paid within no time and on the strength of the assurance given by the accused persons, the complainant had entered into an agreement and sale deed was executed before the competent authority and for the purpose of getting remaining amount of Rs.8,00,000/-, on number of occasions, the complainant had gone to the office of the accused persons as the accused had started construction over the said land, however in the meantime, the said Rambhai Mokariya had already relieved from the said business, therefore, the complainant used to go to the office of the applicant for the purpose of getting outstanding amount and the accused had paid Rs.50,000/- to the complainant but remaining amount of Rs.7,50,000/- was not paid. Learned advocate submitted that it is the specific case of the prosecution that on 12.03.2023 at around 8 O'clock, the complainant had gone to the office of the applicant, at the relevant point of time, two persons were sitting in the chamber of the applicant, who were asked to go outside the chamber and, thereafter, when the talks were going on between the applicant and the complainant, the applicant abused the complainant and also administered threats, therefore, the complainant left the office and, thereafter on 25.03.2019, the complainant has given an application in the form of complaint to the concerned Superintendent of Police to initiate action against the accused person but no FIR has been registered against the applicant and, thereafter, the complainant had also made efforts to get back his amount but his all efforts were gone into vein and, therefore having no other option, the complainant has lodged impugned FIR against the applicant. 6. Learned advocate submitted that if the Hon'ble Court would make cursorily glance upon the allegations leveled against the applicant, in that event, it would be found out that after the commission of crime, on number of occasions, the complainant had paid visit at the office of the applicant and not only that, in the operative part of the FIR, the complainant himself has stated that if the rest of the outstanding amount would be paid by the applicant, in that event, he does not want to pursue further with the FIR, which clearly goes on to show that with sole intent to get amount from the applicant, FIR has been registered. Learned advocate submitted that copy of private complaint filed by the complainant is produced on record at Annexure-C of the petition and if the Hon'ble Court would make a cursorily glance upon the contents of the allegations in the said application, it would be found out that it is the modus operandi of the complainant that first he is filing complaints against other persons and under the pretext of settlement, he is extracting money from them. Learned advocate submitted that in fact, after purchasing the said land from the complainant, the applicant has entered into an agreement in the form of release-deed with his partner on 16.04.2014 and since then, the applicant is not at all directly or indirectly connected with the said property, copy of released deed is produced on record at Annexure-D and the recital of the said document clearly goes on to show that the present applicant is nowhere connected and/or concerned with the said property since execution of the released deed and, hence, he need not have to execute any further transactions so far as the said property is concerned. 7. Learned advocate submitted that at the time of registration of the FIR, the complainant has come with specific case that for the purpose of receiving the money, he had gone to the office of the applicant, at that point of time, nobody had accompanied him and sub-clauses (1) to (xv) of Section 3(1) of the Atrocity Act enumerated various kinds of atrocities that might be perpetrated against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which constitute an offence. However, sub- clause (x) is the only clause where even offending utterances have been made punishable. Learned advocate submitted that the Legislature required intention as an essential ingredient for the offence of insult, intimidation and humiliation of a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in any place within public view and the offences under the Atrocity Act are quite grave and provide stringent punishments. Learned advocate submitted that graver is the offence, stronger should be the proof. Learned advocate submitted that the interpretation which surpasses or evades the mischief and advances the object of the Atrocity Act has to be adopted. He further submits that the 'public view' in Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties. Learned advocate submitted that in other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant, would necessarily get excluded. Learned advocate submitted that in other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant, would necessarily get excluded. Learned advocate submitted that admittedly in the facts of the present case and as per the case of the prosecution also, at the time when the applicant abused the complainant, nobody was present and the said fact has also been admitted by the complainant himself stating that when he entered into the chamber of the applicant, two persons sitting in the chamber were asked to go outside and, thereafter, the applicant had abused him. It is, therefore, submitted that the provision of the Atrocity Act is not at all attracted and just to make the offence grave, such type of allegations are leveled. 8. Learned APP Ms. Bhatt appearing for the respondent- State of Gujarat has opposed the present application with a vehemence and submitted that the complainant is belonging to scheduled caste and he had sold his property to the applicant and his partner by executing registered sale deed and at that time, out of sale consideration, Rs.1,92,00,000/- was paid to the complainant and it was assured to pay remaining amount of Rs.8,00,000/- to the complainant within short time but despite certain period of time, the said amount had not been paid and, therefore, the complainant started demanding the said amount and at that time, Rs.50,000/- was given but remaining outstanding amount of Rs.7,50,000/- had not been given, therefore to get the said amount, at regular interval, the complainant used to pay visit to the office of the applicant but for one reason or other, the applicant was delaying the payment and ultimately on the day of incident, when the complainant had gone to the office of the applicant and demanded amount, the applicant abused him by making casteist slur upon him and also administered threats to him, therefore, the applicant has committed alleged offence. 9. 9. Learned APP has fairly conceded that it is apparent on record that there was delay of more than four months in registration of the FIR but in fact, immediately after the incident, within one week, the complainant submitted an application in the form of complaint to the concerned Superintendent of Police but for the reason best known, the office of the concerned Superintendent of Police did not register FIR for about four months, as a result of which, delay has occurred but there was no intention on the part of the complainant. 10. Learned APP submitted that the applicant has approached this Court and at the time of issuance of notice, he was protected by this Court with a direction that no coercive steps shall be taken against the applicant but investigation may go on and in pursuance to the said order, the concerned IO has recorded the statements of the witnesses and after referring to the said statements, learned APP submitted that on the fateful day of incident, one witness viz., Tarun Mansukhbhai Magadiya accompanied the complainant and he had gone along with the complainant at the office of the applicant and he has also supported the version of the complainant. It is, therefore, urged that from the evidence collected so far, direct involvement of the applicant - accused in the commission of crime is clearly spelt out from the documents and material collected by the IO and, hence, discretion may not be exercised in favour of the applicant. 11. It is, therefore, urged that from the evidence collected so far, direct involvement of the applicant - accused in the commission of crime is clearly spelt out from the documents and material collected by the IO and, hence, discretion may not be exercised in favour of the applicant. 11. In view of the rival submissions canvassed by learned advocates for the parties and having considered the documents produced on record, it is found out that the impugned First Information Report being C.R. No.II-178/2019 came to be registered with Kamalabaug Police Station, Porbandar for the offences under Section 504 of the IPC and under Sections 3(1)(R)(S) of the Atrocity Act alleging inter alia that the complainant sold his land to the applicant and his partner for sale consideration of Rs.2,00,00,000/- but at the time of execution of the registered sale deed, Rs.1,92,00,000/- was given and it was assured by the applicant and his partner that remaining amount of Rs.8,00,000/- will be given within short time but despite passing of time, no payment was made and, hence, when the complainant started demanding the amount, Rs.50,000/- was given and, thereafter, no payment was given despite making several requests and, hence, the impugned FIR has been lodged by the complainant. 12. It is found out from the record that there is a civil dispute between the parties with regard to the sale of land by the complainant to the applicant and his partner and towards the sale consideration, Rs.1,92,00,000/- were already paid by the applicant to the complainant. As per the case of the prosecution, as and when the demand was made by the complainant to clear the outstanding dues of Rs.8,00,000/-, for one reason or other, the applicant used to evade the payment of the said amount and when the efforts were being made to collect it, the complainant was abused by the complainant and threats were administered and as the complainant belongs to scheduled caste, the provision of the Atrocity Act were invoked along with the provision of the IPC. It is, however, required to be noted that the so-called incident has taken place in four corners of wall i.e. in the chamber of the applicant and as per the case of the prosecution, except the applicant and the complainant, none was present there. It is, however, required to be noted that the so-called incident has taken place in four corners of wall i.e. in the chamber of the applicant and as per the case of the prosecution, except the applicant and the complainant, none was present there. I have gone through and also considered the statement of the friend of the complainant viz., Tarun Mansukhbhai Magadiya and from the statement of said witness, it is found out that on the fateful day of incident, the said witness had gone along with the complainant at the office of the applicant, where the complainant asked him to sit outside the office of the applicant and, hence, he was sitting outside on Scooter when the complainant had gone inside the office of the applicant and thus, he had not gone in the chamber of the applicant along with the complainant and seen the incident. However having considered the contents of the FIR, it is found out that the complainant himself has stated in the impugned FIR that he was alone in the chamber of the applicant, where he was abused and threatened. Thus the statement given by the friend of the complainant was contradictory statement, which clearly goes on to show that just to help the complainant, such type of statement was given by him. It is an admitted position of fact that the entire incident in question took place in the chamber of the applicant and as per the settled proposition of law, to constitute an offence under the provisions of the Atrocity Act, the abusive utterance must be at a 'public place' and that too witnessed by some independent persons. Here in the case on hand, there is no independent witness cited by the complainant in the entire body of the complaint in support of his claim. Further, as per the case put up by the learned APP, statement of friend of the complainant has been recorded, however, from the facts narrated hereinabove, it is found out that it is contradictory statement given by him. It is a trite law and has been reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court as well as various High Courts that the basic ingredient to make out a case under the provisions of the Atrocity Act is the utterance, if any, made by the applicant "in any place within public view", which is missing the present case. It is a trite law and has been reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court as well as various High Courts that the basic ingredient to make out a case under the provisions of the Atrocity Act is the utterance, if any, made by the applicant "in any place within public view", which is missing the present case. 13. In the aforesaid context, I may quote, with profit, the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported 2023 Live Law (SC) 469, which are as follows; "14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment and order of the High Court together with the materials on record. 15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment notified vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18th January, 2016, read as follows: "3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. - (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, - *** (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; ***** 16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at the house of the appellant. 17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not "in any place within public view", the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present. 18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court's jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. 19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra) cited by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we have taken above. 20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC. ****** 22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 , this Court had the occasion to hold that: "13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC." 23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abused the complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any other offence. 24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing to appreciate the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the charge-sheet in the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure of justice in rejecting such challenge. 25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016. 26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs" 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016. 26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs" 14. At this stage, I would also like to refer to and rely upon the very recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ali vs. State of U.P. & Ors., wherein speaking for the Bench, His Lordship (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court held:- "10. We are of the view that even if the entire case of the prosecution is believed or accepted to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence as alleged are disclosed. It is pertinent to note that the FIR in question came to be lodged after a period of 14 years from the alleged illegal acts of the appellants. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR no specific date or time of the alleged offences has been disclosed. 11. The entire case put up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . The parameters are:- "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." We are of the view that the case of the present appellants falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra)." 12. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 13. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:- "5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6) (I) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death….. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death….. (Emphasis supplied)" 15. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the opinion that the impugned FIR does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the applicant either under the provisions of the Atrocity Act or the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, now no fruitful purpose would be served keeping the proceeding alive and the applicant and to ask the applicant-accused to face the trial. 16. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned First Information Report being C.R. No.II-178/2019 registered with Kamalabaug Police Station, Porbandar is hereby ordered to be quashed. All consequential proceedings arising from the same also stands terminated. 17. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.