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2024 DIGILAW 1240 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Udai Lal, son of Varda

2024-09-12

MUNNURI LAXMAN, PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

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JUDGMENT : 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (3) & (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State laid a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur in Sessions Case No. 130/1999 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Udai Lal & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the offences under Sections 148, 447 & 302 IPC and in alternative under Section 302/149 IPC. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1998 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1999. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that an incident was reported on 07.11.1998 at about 5:45 PM at Nimri whereby the complainant Parasram reported that his father Khem Raj alongwith two labourer was cultivating an agricultural field. At that time, four residents of village Akodiya namely Udai Lal, Madhu Lal, Badri Lal and Nand Lal arrived at the location and attempted to divert a water drain to the fields belonging to the complainant’s father. When Khemraj opposed this action, the accused persons allegedly assailed the father of the complainant using various agricultural instruments including spade, Khodi (small hand-held sickles), Daranti (sickle) and Lath (wooden stick). 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR No.189/1998 was registered and the investigation accordingly commenced. After completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the four accused persons named in the FIR and the fifth accused Dhanraj under Sections 147, 148, 447 & 302 IPC, and the trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 16 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 30 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution and 02 documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondents; whereafter, the accused- respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents namely Udai Lal, Nand Lal, Dhanraj, Badri Lal and Madhu Lal, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Yogendra Singh Charan, learned assisting counsel to Mr. Neeraj Kumar Gurjar, GA-cum-AAG for the appellant-State submits that the complainant’s wife alongwith two labourer namely Nathu Lal and Goda were present at the site and witnessed the incident in question. 7.1 Learned counsel further submits that 16 prosecution witnesses were examined during the trial. 7.2 Learned counsel also submits that there were five injuries caused to the deceased i.e. on the jaw, ear, elbow, ribs and knee and the cause of death was attributed to three ribs puncturing the lungs, resulting in excessive bleeding. 7.3 Learned counsel further submits that the complainant's wife PW-12 Smt. Champa, an eyewitness, has clearly deposed the entire incident providing a detailed account of the events in question. 7.4 Learned counsel drew the Court’s attention to the statement rendered by the PW-12 Smt. Champa, in which she deposed that she was working with Khemraj, her father-in-law (the deceased), in the fields when an altercation occurred due to the accused persons attempting to divert a water drain, when this was opposed, they allegedly attacked her father-in-law Khemraj, causing his death. 7.5 Learned counsel, however, fairly submits that the FIR, which contains the complainant's version (who is the son of the deceased), did not mention any role or presence of the wife Smt. Champa (PW-12). 7.6 Learned counsel further submits that the chain of evidence is complete and there is an eye-witness, therefore, the decision arrived at by the learned trial court has to be reversed. 7.7 Learned counsel also informed the Court that PW-9 Nathu Lal and PW-10 Goda, who were working as labourers with the deceased Khemraj, did not support the prosecution story. 8. On the other hand, Ms. Dolly Jaiswal, learned Amicus Curiae representing the accused respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the presence of PW-12 Smt. Champa, the sole eye-witness, is doubtful and her inclusion as an eye-witness appears to be a subsequent development. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that PW-12 Smt. Champa herself has admitted that for three days following the incident, she did not speak about it to anyone. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that PW-12 Smt. Champa herself has admitted that for three days following the incident, she did not speak about it to anyone. 8.1 Learned Amicus Curiae also submits that the statement rendered by the eye-witness contains discrepancies as PW-12 Smt. Champa has stated at one point that she arrived later when her father-in-law and two labourers were working, while at another point, she claimed to have rushed to the village from the field, which was about 3 kms. away and took about an hour to travel and inform about the incident in question. Learned Amicus Curiae argued that traveling 3 km in one hour without encountering anyone in a populated village seems implausible. 8.2 Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the contradictions in the testimonies of PW-9 Nathulal and PW-10 Goda, who were actually the labourer assisting the deceased, clearly reflect that the prosecution story does not have any strength. 8.3 Learned Amicus Curiae also drew this Court’s attention to the testimonies of PW-8 Ganga Ram, PW-11 Prakash @ Pappu and PW-14 Jagdish, who could have been credible witnesses if they were not held to be hostile by the learned Public Prosecutor due to their deposition. PW-13 Paras Ram, son of the deceased and the complainant, admittedly was not present at the site, and subsequently, upon receiving information, rushed to the deceased (Khemraj) and then first to the Police Station then to the hospital. 8.4 Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the incident is of the year 1998 and since then about 26 years have passed. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 10. This Court observes that the key witnesses, PW-9 Nathu Lal and PW-10 Goda, who were labourers working alongside the deceased Khemraj, have not supported the case of the prosecution. 11. Upon examination, this Court further finds that the testimony of PW-12 Smt. Champa, the daughter-in-law of the deceased Khemraj, in her version of travelling 3 kms in one hour as well as passing on the basic information as an eye-witness is doubtful because the version doesn’t gain strength from the FIR. PW-15 Goverdhan Singh, the investigating officer, also could not explain the same in his investigation as to in what circumstances PW-12 Smt. Champa has been treated as an eye-witness. 12. PW-15 Goverdhan Singh, the investigating officer, also could not explain the same in his investigation as to in what circumstances PW-12 Smt. Champa has been treated as an eye-witness. 12. This Court, upon conjoint consideration of the testimonies of PW-8 Gangaram, PW-9 Nathu Lal, PW-10 Goda, PW-11 Prakash @ Pappu and PW-14 Jagdish, finds that the prosecution case has almost collapsed, which has led to the conclusion of the learned trial court, leading to acquittal in the case. The statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the complainant marked as Ex.P.-19 contains contradictions that are inconsistent with the subsequent statements of the same witness, particularly, regarding the information allegedly provided by the father to the son before his death. The learned trial court has also noted that while the testimonies of PW-9 Nathu Lal and PW-10 Goda were initially recorded on 08.11.1998, the statement of PW-12 Smt. Champa, purportedly an eyewitness, was only taken three days later. This delay casts doubt on the credibility of PW-12, as it would be expected that an eyewitness who was also a family member would have given her deposition at the earliest opportunity. The improvement in such perspective is vital for the present case as the case if at all has to reach to a conclusion of conviction then it has to rest upon the statement of PW-12 Smt. Champa alone, as rest of the witnesses collapsed during trial. The incident happened on 07.11.1998 and the aforesaid observation of the learned trial court is significant. 13. This Court finding discrepancies in prosecution’s narrative, particularly the missing link of PW-12 Smt. Champa being on the place of incident and the manner in which the information given after one hour as claimed by her in the statement rendered before the learned trial court, but not supporting in the FIR, creates grave doubt in the story of the prosecution and the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused-respondents. Furthermore, the statement of PW-15, the investigating officer, that the soil at the spot was not stained with blood despite the reported injuries, raises additional questions about the thoroughness and accuracy of the investigation. 14. In overall factual matrix, the judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999 passed by the learned trial court cannot be said to be anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse the same. 15. 14. In overall factual matrix, the judgment of acquittal dated 08.06.1999 passed by the learned trial court cannot be said to be anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse the same. 15. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12. 02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 16. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 148, 447 & 302 IPC and in alternative under Section 302/149 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 20. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as she would be called upon to do so. 21. All pending applications stand disposed of. 21. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 22. This Court is thankful to Ms. Dolly Jaiswal, who has diligently rendered her assistance as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused-respondents by preparing a well-written note/brief as well as her assistance and exemplary efforts for the case, which has significantly contributed to the present adjudication.