ORDER : C. Jayachandran, J. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case is preferred by accused nos. 2 and 3 in C.C. No.270 of 2016 on the files of the Special Court, Muvattupuzha. The petitioners are aggrieved by Annexure-V order which allowed C.M.P. No.882 of 2018 preferred by the Public Prosecutor seeking alteration of charge under Section 216, Cr.P.C. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Special Public Prosecutor (Vigilance). Perused the records. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would first submit that no sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. has been obtained to alter the charge with respect to the offence under Sections 468 and 420 of the Penal Code. This submission was met by the learned Special Public Prosecutor (Vigilance) by pointing out that the petitioners are not persons removable from their office, except with the sanction of the Government. Petitioners 1 and 2 (accused nos.2 and 3) were Forest Range Officers, whose appointing authority is the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, wherefore, the sanction of the Government is not required for their removal from office. Learned Public Prosecutor would also point out that, in Annexure-R(a) sanction order, sanction in respect of offence under Section 420 has already been granted. Insofar as offence under Section 468, the sanctioning authority has taken stock of the act of petitioners in committing forgery with respect to convener bill No.108/03-04 and all what was missed is to mention the Section under which the offence of forgery is constituted, that is to say, Section 468. It is this omission, which is sought to be rectified by alteration of charge, insofar as offence under Section 468 is concerned. Once the sanctioning authority has taken note of the factum of commission of the offence of forgery, as disclosed from the records of the investigation, non mentioning of the Section which constitute the offence cannot be fatal, is the submission made. 4. This Court is in complete agreement with the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor in this regard. Therefore, the contention that the alteration of charge requires a fresh sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. will stand repelled. 5. Secondly, learned counsel would argue that the Prosecutor has no power as per the scheme of Section 216 Cr.P.C. to file an application seeking alteration of charge. Therefore, the contention that the alteration of charge requires a fresh sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. will stand repelled. 5. Secondly, learned counsel would argue that the Prosecutor has no power as per the scheme of Section 216 Cr.P.C. to file an application seeking alteration of charge. The power is within the exclusive domain of the Court, which is expected to be exercised suo motu; and not on the application of a Public Prosecutor. Learned counsel would rely on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kartikalakshmi P. v. Sri.Ganesh and Another [ 2017 (3) SCC 347 ]. Learned counsel would also canvass for the position that the law laid down to the contrary to Anant Prakash Sinha v. State of Haryana [ 2016 (6) SCC 105 ] is a judgment per incuriam, as held by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vijaya Kumar Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2020 KHC 4053]. On facts, learned counsel would submit that the alteration of charge as evidenced by Annexure-V has caused serious prejudice to the accused. Learned counsel would particularly emphasize on the alteration of charge, in the context of the offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code to the effect that the Government was cheated, instead of CW1 as canvassed in the original charge. With respect to the alteration incorporating offence under Section 468, the submission is that a new offence is sought to be incorporated, after adducing the entire prosecution evidence, after completion of the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also after examining as many as five witnesses on the defence side. Such an exercise will certainly prejudice the accused, is the sum and substance of the argument raised. 6. Opposing the above submission, learned Prosecutor would submit that the Public Prosecutor is entitled to bring the facts to the notice of the Court, so as to exercise the power under Section 216 Cr.P.C. It has been so held in Anant Prakash Sinha (supra). Learned Public Prosecutor also relied on the judgment by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Silvester @ Silver v. State of Kerala [ 2023 (4) KLT 402 ], whereby the contention to treat Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) as one rendered per incuriam was rejected, by disagreeing with the Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vijaya Kumar Jain (supra). As regards the incorporation of the offence under Section 468, learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that, all what is done is to specify the Section under which the offence is defined, whereas its ingredients already finds a place in the original charge. Such an exercise can never be treated as tabooed in law, is the submission. Insofar as the alteration pertaining to the offence of cheating, learned Special Public Prosecutor would submit that, it is the Government which delivered the property to the first accused, so that the offence of cheating should have been directed against the Government; and not against CW1, which is only a mistake. On such premise, learned Special Public Prosecutor (Vigilance) would seek the instant Crl.M.C. to be dismissed. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, this Court will address the contention that a Prosecutor is not empowered in law to file an application seeking alteration of charge. This Court will straight away refer to Kartikalakshmi P. (supra), wherein a two judges bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus in paragraph no.9: “Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we find force in the submission of learned senior counsel for respondent no.1. Section 216 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to alter or add any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is now well settled that the power vested in the Court is exclusive to the Court and there is no right in any party to seek for such addition or alteration by filing any application as a matter of right. It may be that if there was an omission in the framing of the charge and if it comes to the knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the power is always vested in the Court, as provided under Section 216 Cr.P.C. to either alter or add the charge and that such power is available with the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision for the Court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its notice. In such a situation if it comes to the knowledge of the Court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order need be passed for that purpose. In such a situation if it comes to the knowledge of the Court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order need be passed for that purpose. After such alteration or addition when the final decision is rendered, it will be open for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law.” (underlined by me, for emphasis) 8. In Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph no.20 that no fault can be found on the part of the learned Magistrate in entertaining an application from the Prosecutor seeking alteration of charge. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by such exercise, the defect in framing the charge was in fact brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate. 9. It is the latter judgment in Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) which is sought to be treated as per incuriam by the learned counsel, for which purpose, he would rely upon a Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vijaya Kumar Jain (supra). In paragraph no.5 of the judgment, the Division Bench noticed that the conflicting views were expressed in Kartikalakshmi P. (supra) and Anant Prakash Sinha (supra) by two benches of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of co-equal strength, wherefore the latter judgment is per incuriam. 10. This contention was rejected by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Silvester @ Silver (supra), with the following findings: “18. The learned counsel canvassed the decision in Vijay Kumar Jain, wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the law declared in Anant Prakash is hit by the principle of per incuriam. 19. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The principle declared in Kartikalakshmi is that Section 216 Cr.P.C is an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge and no party, the defacto complainant, the accused or the Public Prosecutor, has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge and also that the Court exercises the enabling provision to alter charge in a situation when it comes to the knowledge that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be altered or added and it may do so on its own. I am of the view that there is no conflict in Kartikalakshmi and Anant Prakash on the power and jurisdiction of the Court under Section 216 Cr.P.C. 20. I respectfully disagree with the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vijay Kumar Jain that Anant Prakash is hit by the principle of per incuriam.” 11. Another learned Single Judge in Aswathy v. State of Kerala, also held that the parties to the lis can file necessary application to alert the Court to exercise the power under Section 216 of the Code. 12. Having referred to the above judgments, this Court is only persuaded to endorse the views as propounded in Silvester @ Silver (supra). In arriving at that conclusion, this Court specifically notice that Kartikalakshmi P. (supra) does not hold that a party has no right to seek alteration of charge; instead what has been held is that a party has no right to seek addition or alteration of charge by filing an application ‘as a matter of right’. The same judgment recognises, and in fact contemplates a situation where an infirmity with respect to the charge framed is liable to be brought to the notice of the Court, simultaneous with the situation where it comes to the notice of the Court. Needless to say that, except in situation where it comes to the notice of the Court suo motu, the same is to be brought to the notice of the Court, which exercise can be done only by way of an oral submission or an application made by any of the parties to the lis. It is this precise aspect which has been highlighted in Anant Prakash Sinha (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has treated an application preferred by the Prosecutor, as an act which brings to the notice of the learned Magistrate about the defect in framing the charge (see in this regard paragraph no.20 of the judgment). The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that the Court could have done such alteration suo motu and ultimately held that, no fault can be found on the part of the learned Magistrate in entertaining an application by the Prosecutor. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that the Court could have done such alteration suo motu and ultimately held that, no fault can be found on the part of the learned Magistrate in entertaining an application by the Prosecutor. 13. Thus, reconciling Kartikalakshmi P. (supra) with Anant Prakash Sinha (supra), it can safely be concluded that while a party to the lis cannot file an application seeking alteration of charge as a matter of right, it is well within the contemplation of law to bring to the notice of the Court concerned about the infirmity with respect to the charge framed. An application filed in this regard only triggers the mind of the Court to exercise the power under Section 216 Cr.P.C. Upon considering the reasons brought to the notice of the Court by such application, it is only for the Court to decide whether the power under Section 216 is to be invoked or not. It is therefore axiomatic that the power is ultimately exercised by the Court only, as envisaged in Section 216 and the party who prefers application merely triggers the Court to exercise such power. 14. This Court may also make profitable reference to a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Soundararajan v. State Rep. By the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Dindigul [2023 SCC online SC 424], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the Courts to be very meticulous in framing charges and even exhorts a Public Prosecutor to be vigilant. The last sentence in paragraph no.16 is worth extracting, which is as follows: “xxxxx Apart from the duty of the Trial Court, even the public prosecutor has a duty to be vigilant, and if a proper charge is not framed, it is his duty to apply to the Court to frame an appropriate charge.” 15. Thus, a duty is cast on the Public Prosecutor to be vigilant in the matter of framing charges and it is his duty to ‘apply’ to the Court to frame an appropriate charge. If that be the legal position, this Court finds no reason as to why a Public Prosecutor should not be conferred the minimal liberty to make an application, so as to bring to the notice of the Court concerned, the infirmity with respect to the charge framed. If that be the legal position, this Court finds no reason as to why a Public Prosecutor should not be conferred the minimal liberty to make an application, so as to bring to the notice of the Court concerned, the infirmity with respect to the charge framed. It is also worth noticing that the power -in fact the duty -to frame the charge is on the Court. A fortiori, the power in the matter of alteration of charge, is also only on the Court, which legal position is indisputable. The second contention will therefore stand repelled. 16. As regards the contention with respect to incorporation of Section 468, this Court will straight away refer to the ingredients of the original charge, which is extracted in Annexure-II, the objection preferred by the accused against the subject application seeking alteration of charge. Under the head ‘firstly’, there is specific reference in the charge that accused nos.2 and 3 have conspired with the first accused and committed forgery and falsification of convener bill no.108/03-04, which was under the custody of the third accused. It is further alleged that the bill was obliterated with a dishonest intention and the name of the first accused was inserted, instead of CW1. A perusal of the above referred portion, as also, the rest of the contents of the charge under ‘firstly’ would make it clear that all ingredients with respect to the offence of forgery has been made in the charge, with the solitary omission to specify the Section, under which the offence is constituted. Obviously, the same is a mistake as found by the learned Special Judge. Therefore, no interference is warranted on that count as well. 17. It may incidentally be stated that, with respect to all other alteration of charge, except the one with respect to cheating (which will be dealt with here below), this Court is fully convinced of the reasons stated by the learned Special Judge and challenges in this regard will stand repelled. 18. 17. It may incidentally be stated that, with respect to all other alteration of charge, except the one with respect to cheating (which will be dealt with here below), this Court is fully convinced of the reasons stated by the learned Special Judge and challenges in this regard will stand repelled. 18. Coming to the alteration with respect to the offence of cheating, paragraph no.12 of Annexure-III application by the Prosecutor is relevant and extracted here below: “On going through the charge framed u/s 420 IPC (Thirdly), it is mentioned that the accused cheated CW1 dishonestly and by inserting the name of the 1st accused in bill No.108/03-04 in the place of the name of CW1 K.P.Ravi who had actually executed the said work and delivered an amount of Rs.24,012/-to the 1st accused and thereby committed offence punishable u/s 420 IPC.” The above charge is sought to be amended to the effect that, it was the DFO who delivered the property, wherefore, the accused persons have cheated the authority/Government by dishonestly inducing it to deliver the amount to A1. According to the Prosecution, the third charge needs correction to the effect that the Government was deceived/cheated, instead of CW1. In the impugned order, the same is seen addressed only on a legal premise. It is seen held that the authority cheated was the Government, since the delivery was made by the Government, wherefore allowing the alteration will not cause any prejudice to the accused. 19. This Court is afraid whether the course adopted by the Special Court in this regard is legally correct. It is relevant to refer to Annexure-R(b) Final Report, wherein there is no specific recital of the facts constituting the offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code, though the Section, as such, is seen incorporated. The allegations in the Final Report is to the effect that, the convener bill was obliterated with dishonest intention by inserting the name of Sri.M.S.Mohanan (first accused) after erasing the name of Sri.K.P.Ravi (CW1), who actually executed the work and delivered an amount of Rs.24,012/-to M.S.Mohanan, instead of K.P.Ravi and thereby the first accused (M.S.Mohanan) has obtained an undue pecuniary advantage and K.P.Ravi (CW1) sustained a corresponding loss. Now, coming to the Court Charge under ‘thirdly’, the charge is framed in such a fashion that the accused persons have cheated CW1 dishonestly and by inserting the name of the first accused in the bill. In both these places, the offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code are inserted. Now, to come with an amendment, after substantially progressing with the trial, to the effect that the person deceived is the authority/Government and not CW1, is completely contrary to the very prosecution case propounded in the Final Report and also in the Court Charge. It appears that the gist of the allegation in the Final Report is under Section 13(1)(d), where the first accused has obtained a pecuniary advantage by dishonest and illegal means. As already indicated, the ingredients of offence under Section 420 is not conspicuous in Annexure-R(b) Final Report, wherefore permitting an alteration as if the authority/Government is cheated, instead of CW1, at this stage does not appear to be in the interests of justice. Needless to say that, the same will cause serious prejudice and embarrassment to the petitioners/accused persons. Therefore, that part of the alteration sought for in the C.M.P., which stands allowed by the impugned order, cannot be countenanced. The impugned order will stand set aside only in that limited respect, which pertains to alteration to the offence under Section 420. In all other respects, the impugned order is sustained. The trial court will proceed with the matter expeditiously, especially in view of the fact that the C.C. concerned is of the year 2016. Needless to say that the petitioners/accused persons should be given adequate opportunity as enjoined by law consequent to the alteration of charges. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case is disposed of as above.