JUDGMENT : (Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.) Heard Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned Senior counsel assisted by Sri Anup Koushik, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Jayanthi, S.C. Sekhar, learned counsels for the respondents in all the writ appeals. 2. Writ Appeal Nos.310, 311, 312 and 313 of 2024 have been filed challenging the common judgment dated 31.01.2024, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No.15794 of 2010, W.P.No.32917 of 2010, W.P.No.15272 of 2010, W.P.No.33147 of 2010 respectively. 3. The challenge is on the same ground and same arguments have been advanced by both the sides as such all these writ appeals are being decided by this common judgment. I. Facts Writ Petitioners’ case: W.A.No.310 of 2024: 4. The case of the writ petitioners of this writ appeal briefly stated was as under:- 4.1. The 1st writ petitioner P. Nagendra was engaged as driver in the respondents Industry in the month of February, 1991 and since then he has been continuously, un-interruptedly without any break, working in the respondents industry. From 26.02.1991 to 1996 he was directly engaged without any middle man. For about three years the petitioner No.1 has been treated as contract worker. For every year the so-called contractors have been changing but the writ petitioner No.1 P. Nagendra was continued in his job without any break as he was. The 1st petitioner possessed the driving license for heavy goods vehicle and his education qualification is 10th class and passing I.T.I Electricals. He was available for 24 hours without any break in a week. 4.2. The 2nd petitioner M. Nagarjuna was engaged as driver in the year 1986 in the office of the S.E/T.L.C/A.P Transco, Kadapa. From 1986 to 1999 the 2nd petitioner M. Nagarjuna was directly engaged by the respondents Industry without any middle man. Then, since 1999 the 2nd petitioner has been treated as contract worker. He is in possession of Light Motor Vehicle Driving License and his qualification is 9th pass. The 2nd petitioner was available for 24 hours without any break in a week. 4.3. The 3rd petitioner M. Krishnaih was engaged by the respondent industry in the year 1985. From 1.1.1985 to 31.03.1999 he was directly engaged and worked under the supervision and control of the officers of respondent industry. Since 1.4.1999 he has been treated as contract worker. The 2nd petitioner was available for 24 hours without any break in a week. 4.3. The 3rd petitioner M. Krishnaih was engaged by the respondent industry in the year 1985. From 1.1.1985 to 31.03.1999 he was directly engaged and worked under the supervision and control of the officers of respondent industry. Since 1.4.1999 he has been treated as contract worker. His qualification is 9th class and he is in possession of heavy goods vehicle driving licence. 4.4. The 4th petitioner K. Nagabhushanam was engaged as a driver by the respondents industry on 01.08.1991 and from 1.8.1991 to 31.3.1999 he directly worked under the supervision and control of officers of respondents industry without any middle man. From 1999 he has been treated as contract worker. His qualification is 9th class and he is in possession of heavy goods vehicle driving license. 4.5. The 5th petitioner L. Seenaiah was engaged by the respondent industry as driver in the year 1992 and from 1992 to 31.3.1999 he worked in the respondent industry without any middle man. From 1.4.1999 he has been treated as contract worker. His qualification is passing 10th class and he is in possession of heavy goods vehicle driving license. 4.6. The 6th petitioner B. David Sudhama Rao was engaged by the respondents industry as driver on 27.10.1989. From 27.10.1989 to 31.03.1999 he worked in the respondent industry without any middle man. From 1.4.1999 he was treated as contract worker. His qualification is intermediate pass and he is in possession of driving license of light motor vehicle. W.A.No.311 OF 2024: 5. The case of the writ petitioners of this writ appeal, briefly stated was as under:- 5.1. The 1st petitioner- P. Vijay Vardhan Reddy was engaged as Lower Division Clerk (L.D.C) in the month of June, 2005 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry without any break. His qualification is B.A BEd., passing type writing lower grade, post graduate diploma in computer application and I.T.I Electricals. 5.2. The 2nd petitioner V. Yella Samulu was engaged as L.D.C on 01.02.2003 and since then he has been working in the respondent industry. His qualification is passing B.Com, passed type writing lower grade. He also possessed Post Graduate Diploma in computer application and Diploma in computer application. 5.3. The 3rd petitioner C. Surya Narayana Reddy was engaged as L.D.C on 01.07.2001. His qualification is passing B.Com, passed type writing lower grade. He also possessed Post Graduate Diploma in computer application and Diploma in computer application. 5.3. The 3rd petitioner C. Surya Narayana Reddy was engaged as L.D.C on 01.07.2001. Since then he has been working in the respondents industry. His qualification is B.A BEd, I.T.I Computer and Post Graduate Diploma in computer application. 5.4. The 4th petitioner K. Siva Prasad Rao was engaged as L.D.C in August, 2002 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. His qualification is passing B.A., L.LB, English type writing higher, post graduate diploma in computer science. 5.5. The 5th petitioner V. Thimma Reddy was engaged as typist/data entry operator on 02.12.2009 and since then he has been working in the respondent industry. His qualification is B.A and possessing type writing English lower grade and Diploma in computer application. 5.6. The 6th petitioner P. Thippanna was engaged as typist cum data entry operator on 01.02.2008 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. His qualification is possessing B.Com and PGDCA, DTP. 5.7. The 7th petitioner G. Jyothi was engaged as typist cum data entry operator in the month of July, 2005 and since then she has been working in the respondents industry. Her qualification is passing B.Sc., and type writing English lower grade, PGDCA. 5.8. The 8th petitioner Avula Ramesh was engaged as typist cum data entry operator on 1.4.1997 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. His qualification is passing B.A Bed., type writing English higher grade, TTC Diploma in communication Polytechnic Scheme, Computer M.S office. 5.9. The 9th petitioner P. Vijaya Raghava Reddy was engaged as typist on1.3.1995 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry as typist cum L.D.C. His qualification is passing B.A type writing English and Telugu Higher, Diploma in computer application. 5.10. The 10th petitioner K. Jyothi was engaged as typist from 2.4.1996 and since then she has been working in the respondents industry. Her qualification is passing B.Com, type writing English higher grade, PGDCA. 5.11. The 11th petitioner K. Suresh Babu was engaged as typist on 1.12.2005 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry as typist cum data entry operator. His qualification is passing M.A, DTP, PGDCA, PGDWM. W.A.No.312 OF 2024: 6. Her qualification is passing B.Com, type writing English higher grade, PGDCA. 5.11. The 11th petitioner K. Suresh Babu was engaged as typist on 1.12.2005 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry as typist cum data entry operator. His qualification is passing M.A, DTP, PGDCA, PGDWM. W.A.No.312 OF 2024: 6. The case of the writ petitioners of this writ appeal briefly stated was as under:- 6.1. The 1st petitioner Syed Noor Basha was engaged as Watchman-cum- Security Guard in the TLC stores in A.P. Transco on 22.02.1993 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. From 11.02.1993 to February, 2004 there was no middle man. From 1.3.2004 the 1st petitioner has been treated as contract worker. 6.2. The 2nd petitioner P. Nagaraju Babu was engaged as Watchman-cum-security Guard in the office of the S.E/TLC Circle A.P. Transco, Kadapa on 1.5.1992 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. From 1.5.1992 to February, 2004 there was no middle man. From 1.3.2004 the 2nd petitioner has been treated as contract worker. 6.3. The 3rd petitioner A. Murali was engaged as Watchman-cum-Security Guard in the office of 220 KV/33 KV Kodur, T.L. & S.S. Circle A.P. Transco, Kodur on 1.7.1996 and since then he has been working in the respondents industry. From 1.7.1996 to February, 2004 there was no middle man. From 1.3.2004 the 3rd petitioner has been treated as contract worker. W.A.No.313 OF 2024: 7. The case of the writ petitioner of this writ appeal briefly stated was as under:- 7.1. The 1st petitioner R. Seshanna was engaged as daily wage labourer in the office of the Assistant Divisional Engineer, TRE Section, Kurnool and worked there till 1998. There was no middleman. In the year 1999 he was engaged as Driver at Kunrool and worked for about one year. From 2002 to 31.07.2003 he worked as Driver at 400 KV Sub Station at Nannur. From 2003 he worked for one year as Van Driver and from 2004 to 30.09.2010 the 1st petitioner worked as Jeep Driver and from 1.10.2010 he has been working as Omni bus Driver at Kurnool. His qualification is 9th pass and he is in possession of Heavy Motor Vehicle Driving License. 7.2. The 2nd petitioner Pedda Maddaiah was engaged as a Driver in the year 1996 in the office A.D.E, MRT Section, Kurnool. His qualification is 9th pass and he is in possession of Heavy Motor Vehicle Driving License. 7.2. The 2nd petitioner Pedda Maddaiah was engaged as a Driver in the year 1996 in the office A.D.E, MRT Section, Kurnool. Since then he has been working in the respondents industry till now. The qualification of the 2nd petitioner is 9th pass and he possessed heavy motor vehicle driving license. 7.3. The 3rd petitioner Jaffar Hussain was engaged as a Driver in the month of July, 2000 in the office of E.E, TLC, Kurnool. Since then he has been working in the respondents industry till now. The qualification of the 3rd petitioner is 9th pass and he possessed heavy motor vehicle driving license. 7.4. The 4th petitioner B. Narsimlu was engaged as a Light Motor Vehicle Driver in the office of E.E, TLC, Kurnool in the month of July, 2000. Since then he has been working in the respondents industry till now. His qualification is 10th pass and he possessed light motor vehicle driving license. 7.5. The 5th petitioner R. Nehamaiah was engaged as a Light Motor Vehicle Driver in the office of A.E.E, Civil, T.L.C Sub Division, Kurnool in the month of October, 2006. Since then he has been working in the respondents industry till now. His qualification is intermediate passed and he possessed light motor vehicle driving license. 8. The writ petitioners of all the writ petitions filed the writ petitions mainly for the relief of regularisation of their services, as Drivers/Lower Division Clerks/Typist/Computer Operators/Watch & Ward Personal/Security Guards, i.e in which capacity they were working, or on any other suitable post(s), in existing clear vacancies. 9. The writ petitioner’s further common case in writ petitions was as under:- 9.1. The writ petitioners were working under the direct control and supervision of the officers of the respondent Industry. They have been using the vehicles owned by the respondent industry. They were doing essential perennial, necessary duties of the said industry. It was stated that the writ petitioners should be available for 24 hours and they should work for 30 to 31 days in a month without any break. The so-called contractor had no role at all in their employment. Only with an intention to defeat the legal right of the writ petitioners, the respondents introduced the contract system. The contract system itself was not genuine. The so-called contractor had no role at all in their employment. Only with an intention to defeat the legal right of the writ petitioners, the respondents introduced the contract system. The contract system itself was not genuine. It was further their case that the category of drivers and the perennial nature of work was abolished by the State Government under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. 9.2. Some of the drivers working at NPDCL, Warangal filed W.P.No.22170 of 1997 which was allowed by the learned single Judge, vide order dated 08.11.2000 directing the respondents therein to consider the appointment of those petitioners as drivers in the vacancies existing or future as they were working since long. The said order was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.181 of 2001 vide judgment dated 22.06.2004. 9.3. In the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (A.P.S.E.B) and in the present Andhra Pradesh Eastern Power Distribution Corporation Limited (APEPDCL) at district stores, Guntakal, Ananthapur District out of 13 workers, working as watchman since long, 6 workers filed writ petition seeking regularization of their services and against the order in writ petition, they filed W.A.No.1478 of 1999 which was allowed on 15.10.1999, directing the respondents therein to consider their cases for absorption and regularization as Watch and Ward of Security Guards. The S.L.P.No.2392 of 2000 filed against the said order was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19.12.2003. Thereafter, C.C.No.594 of 2004 was filed, in which the compliance with the writ court’s order was ensured to regularize the services as and when vacancies arose. But, again S.L.P.No.74 of 2005 was filed, in which the direction was given to implement the order of the writ court. Following that direction, the services of the six appellants in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 were regularized as watchman by issuing memo dated 08.02.2010. 9.4. The writ petitioners were working against sanctioned vacant posts. The contractor had no role in the services of the petitioners and the contract system itself came to an end. They were working under the immediate supervision and control of the Officers of the industry within the premises of the industry and were doing perennial essential and necessary work of the industry. The respondent industry put a middleman calling him contractor for name sake, and treated the petitioners as contract labour. 10. They were working under the immediate supervision and control of the Officers of the industry within the premises of the industry and were doing perennial essential and necessary work of the industry. The respondent industry put a middleman calling him contractor for name sake, and treated the petitioners as contract labour. 10. In the writ petitions, the 3rd respondent in the writ petitions, the present appellant No.3, filed counter affidavits to the same effect. Their case was that the works of driving departmental vehicles along with several other works were being executed on contract basis, for which tenders were being floated periodically and the works were being executed through the successful tenderer. The contractor was engaging his own suitable persons with required qualifications for execution of the work. They submitted that the writ petitioners were engaged by the contractor. The case of the writ petitioners that they were working directly in the respondent industry was denied. They submitted that there was no relationship of employer and employee between them. The contractors were at liberty to engage the required labour for execution of work as per the conditions laid in the agreement for contract. The contractors preferred to continue the writ petitioners, but for such continuation, the AP TRANSCO had nothing to do. They were working in total 5 to 6 hours a day. The petitioners did not come under the purview of the B.P.Ms.No.36, dated 18.05.1997 which related to a different category of employees and was also dispensed (scraped). It was denied that the writ petitioners were working against the sanctioned posts. With respect to Writ Appeal No.1478 of 1999 and SLP No.2392 of 2000, their case was that those matters belonged to APCPDCL which were not binding on AP TRANSCO. It was their further case that as per the agreement between AP TRANSCO and representatives of AP Electricity Employees Union, Regd.No.1104, dated 29.10.2008, a letter dated 15.12.2008 was addressed to Special Chief Secretary, Energy Department with a request to accord necessary permission for filing of 32 vacant posts of drivers in AP TRANSCO, but the approval by the Government had to be received. The policy in vogue was only to continue or recruit fresh employees on outsourcing or on contract basis especially employees like watchmen, drivers, attenders and data entry operators which fall under Class-IV employees. The policy in vogue was only to continue or recruit fresh employees on outsourcing or on contract basis especially employees like watchmen, drivers, attenders and data entry operators which fall under Class-IV employees. The writ petitioners were working under the contractors and consequently, the question for regularizing them did not arise. II. COMMON JUDGMENT DATED 30.01.2024: 11. W.P.No.15794 of 2010 and batch have been allowed by the learned single judge by common judgment dated 30.01.2024, directing the respondents therein (the present appellants) to consider the cases of the writ petitioners for absorption and regularization for the posts they be found suitable, expeditiously and preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment. 12. The learned single Judge observed that the writ petitioners were engaged on contract posts as Watch and Ward Staff and drivers. Some of the writ petitioners were engaged as typists. It was not in dispute that their services were required continuously for the Corporation/Organization. The duties and responsibilities entrusted to them were of perennial nature and it could not be said that their services were no longer required and as such there was no requirement of continuing them either on contract, casual or daily basis. The only premise on which the petitioners’ claim was opposed was that the writ petitioners were engaged through contractor, but this aspect was considered extensively in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 and following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary, H.S.E.B vs. Suresh, 1999 (3) SCC 601 , the Division Bench of the composite High Court had observed that the statutory body should not be permitted to violate the statute with impurity as the same would amount to unfair labour practice. The Corporation could not be permitted to employ the contract labour against regular posts, especially when the work was of perennial nature. The judgment in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 attained finality as the S.L.P. against the said judgment was dismissed. The same view, as in W.A No.1478 of 1999, was taken in W.P.No.21947 of 1999 which was also affirmed by the Division Bench in writ appeal and the S.L.P against that judgment was also dismissed. In the said case also the direction was given to consider the regularization of all similarly situated employees. The writ petitioners had worked for last more than 20 years and there was no adverse remarks against them on record. In the said case also the direction was given to consider the regularization of all similarly situated employees. The writ petitioners had worked for last more than 20 years and there was no adverse remarks against them on record. The services rendered by them were perennial in nature and it could be safely concluded that they had rendered satisfactory service all alone. Consequently, the writ petitions were allowed with direction to the respondents to consider the writ petitioners’ absorption and regularization for the posts they were found suitable expeditiously within specific time. III. SUBMISSION OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE WRIT APPELLANTS: 13. Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the claim of the writ petitioners was denied. It was the writ appellants’ categorical stand that the writ petitioners were working for a total period of 5 to 6 hours a day. In order to execute the work tenders were called periodically and the tenders were being awarded to the workers who were working on contract posts. The contractor was engaging his own men at his own choice. The writ petitioners were engaged by the contractor. The question of continuing them did not arise. There was no employee and employer relationship between the writ petitioners and the writ appellants-A.P. Transco. The writ petitioners were working under the control and supervision of the contractor and their salaries were being paid by the contractor. Therefore, regularization of services or its consideration could not be directed to the writ appellants. The petitioners’ employment was governed by a private contractual agreement and the contractor. They were not contractually engaged by the A.P. TRANSCO. The claim for regularization was untenable and impermissible in law. 14. Learned senior advocate further submitted that when there was no existence of employee and employer relationship between the outsourcing workers and the corporation, the writ petitions were also not maintainable. He placed reliance in Ekambaram Muralidhar v. the State of A.P., WP Nos.12035 of 2021 & batch Decided on 5.8.2021 (APHC) to contend that in that case it was held that opening of escrow account was for specific purpose and there from it could not be said that there was employer and employee relationship between the workmen and the official respondent. There was no privity of contract between the petitioners and the official respondents on that count. There was no privity of contract between the petitioners and the official respondents on that count. The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable. He also placed reliance in Tavva Subba Reddy v. the State of A.P., WA No.467 of 2023, Decided on 14.7.2023 (APHC) to contend that in the absence of relationship of employer and employee, the writ petition was not maintainable. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted, placing reliance in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, 2006) 4 SCC 1 that the conditions laid down in the said case for regularization, that the initial appointment must be done by the competent authority and they must be working against a sanctioned post were also missing. He submitted that the Contract Labour (Regularization and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short, the Act, 1970) had no application for ordering regularization. 16. Placing reliance in the case of Ganesh Digambar Jambhrunkar and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others, S.L.P.(c) No.2543 of 2023, learned senior counsel further submitted that the working for a long period on contractual basis does not create a vested right for regularization. IV. SUBMSSION OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE WRIT PETITIOENRS: (RESPONDENTS IN W.A.(s) 17. Sri Jayanthi S.C. Sekhar, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petitioners were working since long with the Corporation. The work is of perennial nature and essential for the Corporation. The writ petitioners were working under the supervision and control of the Corporation. They were paid meager amount as wages and not receiving other service benefits whereas the regular employees doing the similar nature of work were receiving more wages and all the service benefits. The writ petitioners were initially appointed directly but later on the corporation put a mediator naming him as a contractor and started treating the writ petitioners as contract workers, though the contractors had no role at all in the working of the writ petitioners. 18. Learned counsel for respondents further submitted that the Corporation did not file any document in the writ petition to establish that there was an agreement between the contractor and the corporation for supply of the works or to show that the corporation was an Industry under Section 7 of the Act, 1970. 18. Learned counsel for respondents further submitted that the Corporation did not file any document in the writ petition to establish that there was an agreement between the contractor and the corporation for supply of the works or to show that the corporation was an Industry under Section 7 of the Act, 1970. They also did not file any document to show that the so-called contractor was the licensing contractor under Section 12 of the Act, 1970. It was only with the intent to defeat the legal rights of the writ petitioners that the Corporation adopted the plea of contract labour. They were working for long time on meager wages with hope that by passage of time their services would be regularized. The writ petitioners were working against sanctioned posts. There was an agreement on 29.10.2008 between A.P. TRANSCO and A.P. Electricity Employees Union under the Industrial Disputes Act in which the Corporation agreed to absorb the number of category employees. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that similarly situated workers i.e the watchman working in erstwhile APSEB (APEPDCL) at District Stores, Ananthapur District filed writ petition seeking regularization of their services which was dismissed but the W.A.No.1478 of 1999 was allowed on 15.10.1999 directing to consider for absorption and regularization as Watch and Ward Personnel and against the said judgment, the corporation filed S.L.P.No.7219 of 2000 which was dismissed on 19.12.2003 and finally the order of the W.A.No.1478 of 1999 was complied with by the Corporation vide proceedings dated 08.12.2010 after the contempt proceedings. Following the judgment in W.A No.1478 of 1999, another W.P.No.21947 of 1999 was allowed on 11.08.2010 directing the A.P. Transco to regularize the services of those petitioners as Watch and Ward in regular posts. The said judgment was also challenged in W.A No.615 of 2013 which was dismissed on 25.07.2013 and the S.L.P.No.11910 of 2014 was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 28.04.2014. He further submitted that one more W.P.No.26770 of 2010 was allowed by this Court on 08.06.2017 directing the AP Transco to regularize the services of the workers treating them as contract workers. To the same effect an order was passed in one more W.P.No.19853 of 2003. The W.A.No.4170 of 2018 and W.A.No.1267 of 2017 were filed which were dismissed on 14.02.2020. To the same effect an order was passed in one more W.P.No.19853 of 2003. The W.A.No.4170 of 2018 and W.A.No.1267 of 2017 were filed which were dismissed on 14.02.2020. Challenging the judgment in W.A.No.1267 of 2017, A.P.E.P.D.C.L filed S.L.P.No.9367 of 2020 which were also dismissed by common order on 15.03.2024. Challenging the judgment in W.P.No.4170 of 2018, A.P.E.P.D.C.L filed S.L.P.No.13801 of 2020 and the same was also dismissed on 15.03.2024. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the aforesaid judgments in the writ petition(s) as also in the writ appeal(s), the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh (supra) was relied upon and the judgments of the writ appeal(s) were affirmed by dismissal of S.L.P(s). by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Consequently, the judgment under challenge is perfectly justified and calls for no interference. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners placed reliance in i) R.K. Panda vs. Steel Authority of India, 1994 (5) SCC 304 , to contend that therein the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed for regularization of contract workers, ii) Rourkela Mazdoor Sabha vs Union Of India (UOI) And Ors, (1994) 5 SCC 313 to contend that the same direction was issued following the previous judgments. iii) Vineet Kumar Mathur vs Union Of India and others, (1996) 7 SCC 381 , to contend that the persons similarly situated if taken into service the only persons left were also entitled for the same relief, iv) In Umadevi (supra) to contend that irregular appointments, not illegal appointments, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts, who have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals as on the date of judgment in Umadevi (supra), their regularization had to be considered and the Corporation must have ensured the same by setting the process in motion within the specified time. v) Prem Ram vs. Managing Director, Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam Dehradun, (2015) 11 SCC 255 , to contend that the petitioners who were working for the last more than 10 years as daily wage workers, and out of them 5 junior employees were regularized, direction was given to regularize the services of the rest and from the date of regularization of the juniors, vi) State of Karnataka vs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 to contend that one time measure as in Umadevi was to be understood in its proper perspective i.e., even if that one time measure was not completed within the period of six months and the matter remained pending, the employer should consider the cases of those employees also as a continuation of onetime exercise which shall be concluded only when all the employees are to be considered in terms of para-53 of Umadevi (supra) were so considered, and in (vii) Narendra Kumar Tiwari vs. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 to contend that the purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi was twofold, firstly, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been irregularly appointed in the past. 22. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. V. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 23. The following points arise for our consideration and determination: A. Whether there is relationship of employer and employee between the writ petitioners and the writ appellants, and whether their non-regularization by the writ appellants is unfair labour practice? B. Whether the common judgment dated 30.01.2024 in W.P.Nos.15272, 15282, 32917, 33147, 15794 of 2010 and 9778 of 2014 is legal and justified or it calls for interference? VI. Analysis: Point-A: 24. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the writ appellants and the writ petitioners. In his submission, the writ petitioners were engaged by the contractor. It was governed by private contracting agreement with the contractor. They were also not engaged against sanctioned posts. Consequently, the judgment in Umadevi (supra) would be of no help to the writ petitioners. 25. In his submission, the writ petitioners were engaged by the contractor. It was governed by private contracting agreement with the contractor. They were also not engaged against sanctioned posts. Consequently, the judgment in Umadevi (supra) would be of no help to the writ petitioners. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents in the writ appeals (writ petitioners) submitted that there was relationship of employer and employee in view of the facts that all the petitioners were initially directly appointed/engaged by the Corporation itself and it was at some later point of time that it was mentioned that the petitioners’ contractor was one Sri B. Gangadhar and other contractor. He submitted that there was no role of the contractor. The entire supervision and control was of the Corporation. The petitioners discharged the work of the Corporation which was of perennial in nature. The petitioners were working continuously for so many years. He submitted that it is not the case of the writ appellants that the petitioners’ engagement was illegal. He submitted that even the case of contractor as middleman between the Corporation and the writ petitioners is not made out. The contract employment was abolished inasmuch as the Corporation did not file any document to establish that there was an agreement between so called contractors and the Corporation for supply of the petitioners/workers. Even no documents were filed to establish that the industry was registered under Section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and that the so called contractors were the licenced contractors under Section 12 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. The petitioners were continued without any order of the Courts, posts were sanctioned posts and the petitioners had completed more than ten years of service, continuously, on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (supra). 26. Before proceeding further, we would first consider the following judgments, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsels. 26.1. The petitioners were continued without any order of the Courts, posts were sanctioned posts and the petitioners had completed more than ten years of service, continuously, on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (supra). 26. Before proceeding further, we would first consider the following judgments, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsels. 26.1. In Umadevi (supra) on the point of regularization, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that there may be cases where irregular appointments, not illegal appointments, as explained in State of Mysore v. S. V. Narayanappa : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 23, R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah : (1972) 1 SCC 409 and B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka : (1979) 4 SCC 507 of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the Courts or of Tribunals, the question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled. In that context, it was directed that the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments were undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that required to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers were being employed. The process was directed to be set in motion within six months from the date of the judgment. It was clarified that regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on the judgment in Umadevi (supra), but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. In Umadevi (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in Umadevi (supra), or in which directions running counter to what was held in Umadevi (supra), would stand denuded of their status as precedents. 26.2. Paragraph-53 of Umadevi (supra) is as follows: “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. In Umadevi (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in Umadevi (supra), or in which directions running counter to what was held in Umadevi (supra), would stand denuded of their status as precedents. 26.2. Paragraph-53 of Umadevi (supra) is as follows: “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [ (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 ] , R.N. Nanjundappa [ (1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799 ] and B.N. Nagarajan [ (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937 ] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 26.3. In State of Karnataka v. M. L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 referring to paragraph- 53 of Umadevi (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, that was an exception to the general principles against ‘regularization’ enunciated in Umadevi (supra), if the conditions thereunder were fulfilled. Paragraph-7 reads as follows: “7. In State of Karnataka v. M. L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 referring to paragraph- 53 of Umadevi (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, that was an exception to the general principles against ‘regularization’ enunciated in Umadevi (supra), if the conditions thereunder were fulfilled. Paragraph-7 reads as follows: “7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against “regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] , if the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years. (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular.” 26.4. In M. L. Kesari (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court explained the term “one time measure”, observing that the term one time measure had to be understood in its proper perspective. That would normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi (supra), each department or each instrumentality should undertake a onetime exercise and prepare a list of all casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees who had been working for more than ten years without the intervention of Courts and Tribunals and subject them to a process of verification as to whether they were working against vacant posts and possessed the requisite qualification for the post and if so, to regularize their services. 26.5. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed in M.L. Kesari (supra) that true effect of the direction was that all persons who had worked for more than ten years as on 10.04.2006, the date of decision in Umadevi (supra) without the protection of any interim order of any Court or Tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, were entitled to be considered for regularization. The fact that the employer had not undertaken such exercise of regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi (supra) or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, would not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularization in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (supra) as a onetime measure. 26.6. Para 11 of M. L. Kesari (supra) is as follows: “11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] was rendered, are considered for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] ] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision in Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] as a one-time measure.” 26.7. In Prem Ram v. Managing Director, Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam Dehradun, (2015) 11 SCC 255 the appellants were appointed in the year 1980 and till the decision was pronounced in Umadevi (supra) they had completed more than ten years of service. Neither the State Government nor the respondent therein i.e., Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam framed a scheme for regularization of daily wagers. Neither the State Government nor the respondent therein i.e., Uttarakhand Pey Jal and Nirman Nigam framed a scheme for regularization of daily wagers. By the time, the Government of Uttarakhand had framed Regularization Rules 2011 for regularization of daily wagers and temporary employees who had been appointed on or before 01.11.2011 and had completed ten years of continuous service, by that time, the appellant therein had already attained the age of superannuation. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that, that did not make any difference. What was important was that, the appellant had been appointed as early as in the year 1988 and had, by the time the decision of the Court in Umadevi (supra) was pronounced, already completed more than 10 years' service. There was no impediment in directing regularization of the services of the appellant on the analogy of his juniors with effect from the date his juniors were regularized. 26.8. In Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 the appellants therein were irregularly appointed as employees of the State Government. They sought regularization of their status on the ground that they had put in more than 10 years of service and were therefore entitled to be regularized. The High Court took the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (supra) did not permit their regularization since they had not worked for 10 years on the cutoff date of 10.04.2006, i.e., the date of decision in Umadevi (supra). The appellants had filed writ petitions relating to the regularization of daily wage or contract workers on different posts. They were denied the benefit of regularization in view of the provisions of the Jharkhand Sarkar ke Adhinasth Aniyamit Rup se Niyukt Ewam Karyarat Karmiyo ki Sewa Niyamitikaran Niyamawali, 2015 (in short “the Regularization Rules”). The appellants therein had not put in 10 years of service in terms of the Regularization Rules and consequently, they could not be regularized, was the view taken by the High Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that if a strict and literal interpretation, forgetting the spirit of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra), was to be taken into consideration then no irregularly appointed employee of the State of Jharkhand could ever be regularized since that State came into existence only on 15.11.2000 and the cut-off date was fixed as 10.04.2006. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand ought to have considered the entire issue in a contextual perspective and not only from the point of view of the interests of the State, financial or otherwise. The interest of the employees was also required to be kept in mind. The direction was issued that the Regularization Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and if the appellants therein had completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularization Rules, they should be regularized unless there was some valid objection to their regularization like misconduct, etc. 27. It is thus well settled, from the aforesaid judgments that, the irregular appointments of the employees, not illegal appointments, made or continued against sanctioned posts, possessing prescribed minimum qualification, and who have worked for 10 years or more, without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any Court or Tribunal, on the date of judgment in Umadevi (supra) i.e., 10.04.2006, are to be considered for regularization, as a one time measure. ‘One time measure’ has to be understood, in proper perspective. If the employer had not undertaken such exercise within 6 months of the decision in Umadevi (supra) or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, that will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularization in terms of directions in Umadevi (supra) as a one time measure (M. L. Kesari (supra)). Further, if 10 years on the decision of Umadevi (supra) had been completed, but the regularization scheme came at a later point of time, and by that time the employer allowed the age of superannuation, that was no impediment in directing regularization of such superannuated employee with effect from the date of regularization of juniors { Prem Ram (supra)}, { Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra)} is under special circumstances of State of Jharkand which came into existence only on 15.11.2000, so 10 years was considered on the date of Regularization Rules. 28. We now proceed to consider the judgments in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 and in similar other W.A(s), based upon which the judgment under the present appeal, has been passed. 28.1. 28. We now proceed to consider the judgments in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 and in similar other W.A(s), based upon which the judgment under the present appeal, has been passed. 28.1. In P. Narayana v. Member Secretary, AP Transco, WA.No.1478/1999 erstwhile APHC, Decided on 15.10.1999 the appellants therein were working as watchmen against the regular and sanctioned posts from the year 1989. Ten years had been completed. The question was of regularization of their services. The A.P.Transco took an objection that they were workers working as contract labour, their claims were rejected, the writ petition was also dismissed. In the aforesaid writ appeal, the coordinate Bench of this Court followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, H.S.E.B v. Suresh, (1999) 3 SCC 601 observing that the statutory bodies could not be permitted to violate the statute with impunity. That was an unfair labour practice when the appellants were working against the sanctioned posts which were regular posts of watchmen in order to evade the statutory liabilities under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Corporation had raised the plea that all appellants being employed under contract labour which could not hold good when the contract labour system had been abolished against the Corporation. The writ appeal was allowed directing the Corporation to consider the cases for absorption and regularization of the appellants therein, as Watch and Ward/Security Guards within the specified period. Considering the fact, especially that they had become over age after serving the Corporation for about 11 long years. The SLP (c) No.7219 of 2000 against the said judgment was dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 19.12.2003. 28.2. In D. Madhusudana v. A.P. Transco Ltd., W.P.No.21947/1999 erstwhile APHC, Decided on 11.08.2010, (W.P.No.21947 of 1999) which was also filed for regularization of services and the case of the writ petitioners therein was that instead of filling up the sanctioned posts of watchmen on regular basis, the services of eligible persons were being engaged through the agency of the contractor. The petitioners therein were working for more than 10 years and periodically the respondents therein had been regularizing the services against the various varieties of posts, but they were continuing the writ petitioners without regularization. The petitioners therein were working for more than 10 years and periodically the respondents therein had been regularizing the services against the various varieties of posts, but they were continuing the writ petitioners without regularization. The direction was given to consider the case of the writ petitioners as also the other similarly placed employees for regularization against the vacant posts of watchmen/security guard at Electrical Revenue Offices. W.A.No.615 of 2013 filed against the said judgment by the A.P.Transco was dismissed on 25.07.2013. The A.P.Transco filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)…../2014 (CC.737/2014) which was also dismissed. The Hon’ble Apex Court however observed that as under: “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Delay condoned. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, specially the fact, that the respondents have since rendered more than 20 years of service, we find no justification to interfere with the impugned order. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. The question of law is however left open, to be decided in an appropriate case.” 28.3. In G. Sankaraiah v. CMD, AP Transco, WP No.26770/2010 erstwhile APHC, Decided on 08.06.2017, (W.P.No.26770 of 2010) also the question was of regularization of services of watchmen-cum-security guard engaged for various posts in A.P.Transco. The claim of the petitioners therein was opposed by the respondents-AP Transco on the ground that the petitioners were not engaged by the Corporation. The contract was entered into with a contractor for watch and ward of the company officers and the contractor engaged the petitioners. The claim for regularization could not be granted against the company. It was found by the learned single Judge that the petitioners were engaged on contract basis as watch and ward staff. The services of the watch and ward staff were required continuously for the organization. Thus, the duties and responsibilities entrusted to the petitioners therein were of perennial in nature. The only premise on which the claim of the petitioners was opposed was that they were engaged through contractor. The learned single Judge observed that the very issue was considered by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 and following the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Suresh (supra) the writ appeal was allowed, also observing that similar view was taken by another learned single Judge in W.P.No.21947 of 1999, which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court by dismissing the SLP. The writ petition was allowed with direction to the Corporation to consider the cases of the petitioners therein for absorption and regularization as watch and ward/security guards. It was observed that the principle laid down by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 had attained finality and the same principle to be applied to the petitioners as well. It was further observed that the respondent company, being a company involved in public service and a wing of the State, should stand as a model employer which could not be permitted to resort to such kind of tactics and force individual employees to litigate on the issue which had become final. 28.4. W.P.No.19853 of 2003 was also disposed of by the learned single Judge on 20.12.2017 in terms of the orders of this Court in W.P.No.26770 of 2010, dated 08.06.2017. 28.5. Challenging the aforesaid orders in W.P.No.26770 of 2010 and W.P.No.19853 of 2003, the APSPDCL preferred two writ appeals, viz., W.A.No.1267 of 2017 and W.A.No.410 of 2018 respectively. Both the writ appeals were dismissed by common judgment dated 14.02.2020. Two SLPs being SLP (c) Nos.9376/2020 and 9825/2020 filed by the APSPDL respectively were also dismissed vide orders dated 15.03.2024. 29. We find that in all the aforesaid judgments as in paras-28.1 to 28.5 (supra) of the learned single Judge or by the Division Bench in writ appeals, reliance was placed in Suresh (supra) and those judgments have been affirmed by dismissal of the SLPs by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 30. The judgment in Suresh (supra) is prior to the judgment in the case of Umadevi (supra). The judgments passed by the learned single Judge in writ petitions, by the Division Bench in writ appeals, were rendered, post Umadevi (supra), placing reliance, in Suresh (supra) but without referring to Umadevi (supra), and those judgments have been affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court by dismissal of the SLPs filed by the Corporation. However, we further find that in D. Madhusudana (supra), while dismissing the SLP of the A.P.Transco on 28.04.2014, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “The question of law is however left open, to be decided in an appropriate case.” 31. It is settled in law that dismissal of SLP without recording reasons is no affirmation of the grounds or reasons recorded by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court in such circumstances is binding only between the parties. It is settled in law that dismissal of SLP without recording reasons is no affirmation of the grounds or reasons recorded by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court in such circumstances is binding only between the parties. The reasons are not binding as precedent in subsequent matters. 32. In Experion Developers Private Limited v. Himanshu Dewan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1029 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held as under in paras-27, 28 & 37: “27. The aforesaid decision no doubt draws the distinction between a simple non-speaking order passed by this Court rejecting the special leave to appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in which case the doctrine of merger has no application, and cases where this Court exercises its appellate power in terms of the statute or the Constitution. In the former set of cases, the grant of special leave to appeal is discretionary. The effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal of the special leave petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons for dismissal by a necessary implication cannot be taken as acceptance of the reasons or the ratio of the judgment under challenge. It is not correct to assume that the Court has implicitly decided all the questions. There could be multiple reasons why in a particular case a special leave to appeal can be refused. It would be incorrect to attempt to embark on such reasons when they have not been so stated. Such reasons can be varied and different, and may not completely and directly relate to the merits of the case as to be construed as an imprimatur of this Court on the correctness of the decision appealed against. A case may not raise a question of general principle but turn on its own facts. Facts of the particular case may not be suitable as a foundation for determining some question of a general principle. Due to heavy backlog of work, this Court has to restrict the intake of fresh cases. Thus, there can be a variety of reasons why the court dismisses a special leave petition, and that too by a non-speaking order. 28. Approving this aforesaid ratio, in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (supra) it is observed: “20. Due to heavy backlog of work, this Court has to restrict the intake of fresh cases. Thus, there can be a variety of reasons why the court dismisses a special leave petition, and that too by a non-speaking order. 28. Approving this aforesaid ratio, in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (supra) it is observed: “20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where orders of different nature were passed and dealt with these judgments by classifying them in the following categories: (i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition — without reasons — no res judicata, no merger. (ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking or reasoned order — no merger, but rule of discipline and Article 141 attracted. (iii) Leave granted — dismissal without reasons — merger results.” 37. Thus, we are clearly of the view that the order of this Court dismissing the appeal in the case of Pawan Gupta (supra) cannot be read as a precedent and applied to the cases in hand. In fact, precedents cannot decide questions of fact. The decision in the case of Pawan Gupta (supra) was based on evidence adduced by the appellant/builder/developer, which in the said case was not found to be sufficient and cogent to justify and substantiate the demand raised in view of the increased sale area. No doubt, the architect's certificate and report dated 23.09.2020 was filed before this Court as additional documents, but a non-reasoned order passed by this Court dismissing the case cannot be read as accepting and considering the additional evidence, or as rejecting justification and reasons given therein for claiming additional/increased sale area. Any additional evidence sought to be produced at the appellate stage can only be introduced when an appropriate application under Rule 27 to Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is moved and an order is passed taking them on record. Therefore, the order passed by this Court dismissing the appeal in the case of Pawan Gupta (supra) is confined to the facts of the said case, including the evidence led by the parties before the National Commission. The National Commission was therefore required to consider and examine the contentions of the appellant and not overrule the same on the grounds of the principle of res judicata and on the rule of binding precedent, which do not apply. The National Commission was therefore required to consider and examine the contentions of the appellant and not overrule the same on the grounds of the principle of res judicata and on the rule of binding precedent, which do not apply. An order of remand on the question of merits as to the stipulation and increase in the sale area is therefore required.” 33. In Umadevi (supra), the conflict was as in para-7 as under: “7. ……….. The conflict relates to the right, if any, of employees appointed by the State or by its instrumentalities on a temporary basis or on daily wages or casually, to approach the High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing that they be made permanent in appropriate posts, the work of which they were otherwise doing. The claim is essentially based on the fact that they having continued in employment or engaged in the work for a significant length of time, they are entitled to be absorbed in the posts in which they had worked in the department concerned or the authority concerned. There are also more ambitious claims that even if they were not working against a sanctioned post, even if they do not possess the requisite qualification, even if they were not appointed in terms of the procedure prescribed for appointment, and had only recently been engaged, they are entitled to continue and should be directed to be absorbed.” 34. In Suresh (supra), the H.S.E.B awarded contracts to contractors who undertook the work of keeping clean and hygienic the power plants and stations and performed that work through the Safai Karamcharis and they raised a dispute as regards their entitlement to be absorbed permanently on completion of 240 days in the year with the Board. 35. In Umadevi (supra), Suresh (supra), does not find mention. However, paragraph – 54 of Umadevi (supra), clarifies as under: “54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.” 36. At this stage, we may refer the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishan Gopal and others, (2021) 18 SCC 707 . 37. At this stage, we may refer the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishan Gopal and others, (2021) 18 SCC 707 . 37. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court on analysis of the decision on the point of applicability of decision in Umadevi (supra), in the context of industrial adjudication, considered Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd v Engg. Mazdoor Sangh : (2007) 1 SCC 250 , Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana : (2009) 8 SCC 556 and Hari Nandan Prasad v Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India : (2014) 7 SCC 190 , and observed the propositions which would emerge, in para 28, which we would shortly reproduce. 38. Before that, it is considered appropriate to refer paras - 20 to 26 of Krishna Gopal (supra) as follows: “20. The second aspect on which we are of the view that the present appeals would require to be placed before a larger Bench for consideration is in regard to the applicability of the principles set out and formulated by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] in the context of industrial adjudication. In Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , the Constitution Bench made a distinction between appointments or selections which are merely irregular and those which are illegal. The Court observed : (SCC pp. 24-25, para 16) “16. … We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised and that it alone can be regularised and granting permanence of employment is a totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularisation.” 21. In this context, the Court held : [Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , SCC p. 36, para 43] “43. In this context, the Court held : [Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , SCC p. 36, para 43] “43. … It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme.” 22. In para 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , the Court made a one-time exception, for the regularisation of the irregularly appointed persons, who had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts : [Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , SCC p. 42, para 53] “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 23 : (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 ] , R.N. Nanjundappa [R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409 ] and B.N. Nagarajan v. State ofKarnataka [B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed.” (emphasis in original) 23. The applicability of the decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] in the context of labour adjudication was considered in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh [U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh, (2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 258] (Bijli Mazdoor Sangh). This Court held that the law propounded in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was applicable also to Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts. The Court held : (Bijli Mazdoor Sangh case [U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh, (2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 258] , SCC p. 758, paras 6-7) “6. It is true as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the question as regards the effect of the industrial adjudicators' powers was not directly in issue in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . But the foundational logic in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of the contract of the employment, it cannot do something which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is covered by the concept of regularisation, the same cannot be viewed differently. 7. Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of the contract of the employment, it cannot do something which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is covered by the concept of regularisation, the same cannot be viewed differently. 7. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that at the time the High Court decided [U.P. SEB v. Industrial Tribunal, 2003 SCC OnLine All 481 : (2003) 4 AWC 2661 ] the matter, decision in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was not rendered is really of no consequence. There cannot be a case for regularisation without there being employee-employer relationship. As noted above the concept of regularisation is clearly linked with Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if in a case the fact situation is covered by what is stated in para 45 of Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] the industrial adjudicator can modify the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] about the regularisation.” 24. Subsequently, in Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] (Maharashtra SRTC), it was held that the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30(1)(b) of the MRTU and PULP Act have wide powers to direct the employer to take affirmative action in a case of unfair labour practice including the power to order regularisation or permanency. The decision in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was held to limit the scope of the powers under Articles 32 and 226 to issue directions for regularisation in a matter of public employment. However, the power to take affirmative action under Section 30(1)(b) was held to be intact even after the judgment of the Constitution Bench. This Court held : (Maharashtra SRTC case [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513], SCC p. 574, paras 35-36) “35. However, the power to take affirmative action under Section 30(1)(b) was held to be intact even after the judgment of the Constitution Bench. This Court held : (Maharashtra SRTC case [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513], SCC p. 574, paras 35-36) “35. Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that the Supreme Court (Article 32) and the High Courts (Article 226) should not issue directions of absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of the constitutional scheme. 36. Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist. Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established.” 25. The Court however clarified in Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] that there is no doubt that the creation of posts does not lie within the domain of judicial functions “which obviously pertains to the executive” and the status of permanency cannot be granted by the Court where no posts exist. In Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] , the two-Judge Bench was construing the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. In Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] , the two-Judge Bench was construing the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. In holding that the creation of posts could not be directed by courts, the judgment in Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] relied upon the decisions in Mahatma Phule Agricultural University [Mahatma Phule Agricultural University v. Nasik Zilla Shet Kamgar Union, 1997 SCC OnLine Bom 791 : 1997 LLR 1136] and State of Maharashtra v. R.S. Bhonde [State of Maharashtra v. R.S. Bhonde, (2005) 6 SCC 751 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 907]. 26. The divergence between the decisions in Bijli Mazdoor Sangh [U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh, (2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 258] and Maharashtra SRTC [Maharashtra SRTC v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] was sought to be reconciled in a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corpn. of India [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corpn. of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] (FCI). A.K. Sikri, J. speaking for the two-Judge Bench held : (FCI case [Hari Nandan Prasad v. Food Corpn. of India, (2014) 7 SCC 190 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 408] , SCC pp. 213-14, para 39) “39. On a harmonious reading of the two judgments discussed in detail above, we are of the opinion that when there are posts available, in the absence of any unfair labour practice the Labour Court would not give direction for regularisation only because a worker has continued as daily-wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number of years. Further, if there are no posts available, such a direction for regularisation would be impermissible. In the aforesaid circumstances giving of direction to regularise such a person, only on the basis of number of years put in by such a worker as daily-wager, etc. may amount to back door entry into the service which is an anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, such a direction would not be given when the worker concerned does not meet the eligibility requirement of the post in question as per the recruitment rules. may amount to back door entry into the service which is an anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, such a direction would not be given when the worker concerned does not meet the eligibility requirement of the post in question as per the recruitment rules. However, wherever it is found that similarly situated workmen are regularised by the employer itself under some scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have approached the Industrial/Labour Court are on a par with them, direction of regularisation in such cases may be legally justified, otherwise, non-regularisation of the leftover workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua them in such cases and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the industrial adjudicator would be achieving the equality by upholding Article 14, rather than violating this constitutional provision.” 39. In Krishan Gopal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed the following propositions to emerge from the aforesaid discussions as in para 28, which is reproduced as under: “28 The following propositions would emerge upon analyzing the above decisions: 28.1. Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution; 28.2. The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages; 28.3. The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service; 28.4. Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of Article 14; and 28.5. In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years, with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen.” 40. In Krishna Gopal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court referred the decision in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union and others, (2015) 6 SCC 494 to the larger Bench, which reference is pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 41. As is evident from the aforesaid judgments, as on today, the position in law is as in para 28 of Krishna Gopal (supra). 42. We now consider the judgment in Suresh (supra). 42.1. Coming to the judgment in Suresh (supra) the Haryana State Electricity Board (in short ‘the Board’) was a statutory board with one of its primary functions being the supply of power to urban and rural areas in the State of Haryana through its various plants and stations. In order to keep the said plants and stations clean and hygienic, the Board, upon tenders being floated, awarded contracts to contractors who undertook the work of keeping the same clean and hygienic. One such contract was awarded to one Kashmir Singh, for “proper, complete and hygienic cleaning, sweeping and removal of garbage from the Main Plant Building” with a stipulation to engage minimum 42 Safai Karamcharis with effect from 15.05.1987 for one year and in terms therewith the contractor took over the work and performed the said work through the said Safai Karamcharis. Subsequently, in view of the dispute raised by the Safai Karamcharis, as regards their entitlement to be absorbed permanently on completion of 240 days in the year with the Board, the matters were referred to the Conciliation Officer, culminating however in an order of reference by the State Government to the Labour Court, which passed the award in favour of the workmen that they were entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service along with back wages. Against the Order of the Labour Court, writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which were disposed of by a common judgment recording, inter alia, that there existed a relationship of employer and workmen between the Board and those Safai Karamcharis and by reason wherefore, the High Court directed reinstatement of the respondents with continuity of service, however, without back wages. The High Court placed reliance on the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, (1978) 4 SCC 257 in which it was held that the true test to determine who was employee in the labour law, was; Where a worker or group of workers labours to produce goods or services were these goods or services are for the business of another, that other was, in fact, the employer. He had economic control over the workers' subsistence, skill, and continued employment. It was also observed that the presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers had immediate or direct relationship was of no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, the truth was that the real employer was the management and not the immediate contractor. 42.2. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid case of Suresh (supra) observed that the Labour Court while adjudicating the issue, as to the justification of the termination of services of the workmen in terms of the order of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, came to a definite conclusion on the basis of evidence tendered that the workforce did in fact work for more than 240 days in the year and as a matter of fact, there was no dispute raised on that score by the Board and it was on this factual score that the Labour Court did record that the presence of an intermediary would not alter the situation, as regards the existence of the relationship of workman and employer and thus, between the Board and the claimants and as such, answered the reference in the affirmative, resulting in a finding that the workmen were entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service along with 10% back wages. This finding of the Labour Court was accepted by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the award of the Labour Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the High Court did in fact note with care and caution the doctrine of “lifting of the veil” in industrial jurisprudence and recorded that in the contextual facts and upon lifting of the veil, question of having any contra opinion as regards the exact relationship between the contesting parties would not arise and as such directed reinstatement though, however, without any back wages. 42.3. Para-9 of Suresh (supra) is as under: “9. The High Court did in fact note with care and caution the doctrine of “lifting of the veil” in industrial jurisprudence and recorded that in the contextual facts and upon lifting of the veil, question of having any contra opinion as regards the exact relationship between the contesting parties would not arise and as such directed reinstatement though, however, without any back wages. While it is true that the doctrine enunciated in Saloman v. Saloman & Co. Ltd. [1897 AC 22, HL] came to be recognised in the corporate jurisprudence but its applicability in the present context cannot be doubted, since the law court invariably has to rise up to the occasion to do justice between the parties in a manner as it deems fit. Roscoe Pound stated that the greatest virtue of the law court is flexibility and as and when the situation so demands, the law court ought to administer justice in accordance therewith and as per the need of the situation.” 42.4. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Suresh (supra) also considered the Act of 1970 and observed that the same was enacted to regulate contract labour and to provide for its abolition in certain circumstances, since prior to such, the factum of engagement of contract labour stood beset with exploiting tendencies and resulted in unwholesome labour practice. The object of the Legislation was observed as followed, inter alia, in paras-11 to 13 as under: “11. The object of the Legislation was observed as followed, inter alia, in paras-11 to 13 as under: “11. Incidentally, however, be it noted that the legislature did not feel it expedient to do away with the contract labour altogether, since there are several fields of employment where it is not otherwise possible to have continuous employment and as such, regard being had to the necessities of the situation, the Act of 1970 provides for continuation of contract labour. As a matter of fact the legislature in the enactment has itself provided various provisions pertaining to the working conditions of contract labour, provided however engagement of contract labour becomes invariable or necessary in the interest of the industry concerned. 12. The legislation therefore subserves a twin purpose, to wit: (i) to abolish the contract labour; and (ii) to regulate the working conditions of contract labour wherever such employment is required in the interest of the industry. 13. There is, however, a total unanimity of judicial pronouncements to the effect that in the event the contract labour is employed in an establishment for seasonal workings, question of abolition would not arise but in the event of the same being perennial in nature, that is to say, in the event of the engagement of labour force through an intermediary which is otherwise in the ordinary course of events and involves continuity in the work, the legislature is candid enough to record its abolition since involvement of the contractor may have its social evil of labour exploitation and thus the contractor ought to go out of the scene bringing together the principal employer and the contract labourers rendering the employment as direct, and resultantly a direct employee. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with great lucidity, by one of us (Majmudar, J.) in Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United Labour Union [ (1997) 9 SCC 377 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344 : JT (1996) 11 SC 109, 170].” 42.5. In Suresh (supra) with respect to the Haryana State Electricity Board, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, it, in the usual course of business, had to maintain the plant and stations as a licensee within the meaning of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. In Suresh (supra) with respect to the Haryana State Electricity Board, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, it, in the usual course of business, had to maintain the plant and stations as a licensee within the meaning of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. The number of employees required for such purpose had been specified in the contract itself and as a matter of fact supervision of the Board as regards the attendance had also not been disputed before the Labour Court. Maintenance of records pertaining to other statutory duties and liabilities had also not been disputed before the Labour Court, which depicted the overall control of the working of the contract labour including administrative control being with the Board. The same was also dealt by the Labour Court which could not be doubted in any way and either the High Court or the Supreme Court would not enter into the arena of appraisal of evidence. It was observed that in view thereof, the High Court also thought it fit to rely on the judgment of the Labour Court and record its affirmation to what had been passed by the Labour Court, since no reasonable person could come to a conclusion different, upon lifting the veil. 42.6. In Suresh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in para-20 as under: “20. It has to be kept in view that this is not a case in which it is found that there was any genuine contract labour system prevailing with the Board. If it was a genuine contract system, then obviously it had to be abolished as per Section 10 of the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act after following the procedure laid down therein. However, on the facts of the present case, it was found by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the High Court that the socalled contractor Kashmir Singh was a mere name lender and had procured labour for the Board from the open market. He was almost a broker or an agent of the Board for that purpose. The Labour Court also noted that the management witness Shri A.K. Chaudhary also could not tell whether Shri Kashmir Singh was a licensed contractor or not. That workman had made a statement that Shri Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor. He was almost a broker or an agent of the Board for that purpose. The Labour Court also noted that the management witness Shri A.K. Chaudhary also could not tell whether Shri Kashmir Singh was a licensed contractor or not. That workman had made a statement that Shri Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor. Under these circumstances, it has to be held that factually there was no genuine contract system prevailing at the relevant time wherein the Board could have acted as only the principal employer and Kashmir Singh as a licensed contractor employing labour on his own account. It is also pertinent to note that nothing was brought on record to indicate that even the Board at the relevant time was registered as the principal employer under the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act. Once the Board was not a principal employer and the so-called contractor Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor under the Act, the inevitable conclusion that had to be reached was to the effect that the so-called contract system was a mere camouflage, smoke and a screen and disguised in almost a transparent veil which could easily be pierced and the real contractual relationship between the Board, on the one hand, and the employees, on the other, could be clearly visualised.” 43. In our view, in Suresh (supra), the matter came up from the Labour Court which had recorded a specific finding on fact on the point of relationship between the Board and the respondents in the said case. On lifting the veil, it was found that there was relationship of employer and employee. The so called contractor therein Kashmir Singh was a mere name lender and had procured labour for the Board from the open market. He was almost a broker or an agent of the Board for that purpose. Before the Labour Court it could also not be pointed out by the management that the said Kashmir Singh was a licensed contractor or not. The workman had made a statement that Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor. Under those circumstances, it was observed that there was no genuine contract system prevailing at the relevant time wherein the Board could have acted as only the principal employer and Kashmir Singh as a licensed contractor employing labour on his own account. The workman had made a statement that Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor. Under those circumstances, it was observed that there was no genuine contract system prevailing at the relevant time wherein the Board could have acted as only the principal employer and Kashmir Singh as a licensed contractor employing labour on his own account. There was nothing brought on record to indicate that even the Board at the relevant time was registered as the principal employer under the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that once the Board was not a principal employer and the so called contractor Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor under the Act, the inevitable conclusion that had to be reached was to the effect that the so called contract system was a mere camouflage, smoke and a screen and disguised in almost a transparent veil which could easily be pierced and the real contractual relationship between the Board, on the one hand, and the employees, on the other, could be clearly visualised. 44. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers : (2001) 7 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with Issue No.B to the effect that, whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal employer) and the contract labour, emerges, observed and held that the word “workman” is defined in Contract Labour Abolition and Regulation Act, 1970 in wide terms. It is a generic term of which contract labour is a species. It is true that a combined reading of the terms “establishment” and “workman” shows that a workman engaged in an establishment would have direct relationship with the principal employer as a servant of master. But what is true of a workman could not be correct of contract labour. The Hon’ble Apex Court did not find any substance in the submission advanced that a combined reading of the definition of the terms “contract labour”, “establishment” and “workman” would show that a legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about such relationship. 45. Paras-117 and 118 of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) read as under: “117. 45. Paras-117 and 118 of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) read as under: “117. We find no substance in the next submission of Mr Shanti Bhushan that a combined reading of the definition of the terms “contract labour”, “establishment” and “workman” would show that a legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about such relationship. 118. We have quoted the definitions of these terms above and elucidated their import. The word “workman” is defined in wide terms. It is a generic term of which contract labour is a species. It is true that a combined reading of the terms “establishment” and “workman” shows that a workman engaged in an establishment would have direct relationship with the principal employer as a servant of master. But what is true of a workman could not be correct of contract labour. The circumstances under which contract labour could be treated as direct workman of the principal employer have already been pointed out above. 46. Here, we would refer to R. K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India, 1994 (5) SCC 304 in which the writ petitioners were employed by the Steel Authority of India through various contractors at its Rourkela plant, but they were doing jobs which were perennial in nature and identical to the jobs being done by the regular employees of the Steel Authority of India. It was submitted that in order to deny the benefits at par with the regular employees they were designated as contract labourers. They had been working for more than 10 to 20 years under different contractors. The contractors used to be changed, but while awarding the contract, one of the terms incorporated in the agreement used to be, “the incoming contractors shall employ the workers of the respective outgoing contractors subject to the requirement of the job”. The Agreement, inter alia also provided that the parties shall be governed by the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in view of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, it was apparent that the framers of the Act had allowed and recognized contract labour and they had never purported to abolish it in its entirety. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in view of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, it was apparent that the framers of the Act had allowed and recognized contract labour and they had never purported to abolish it in its entirety. The primary object appeared to be that there should not be any exploitation of the contract labourers by the contractor or the establishment. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after referring to its previous pronouncements on the abolition of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 observed that with the passage of time and purely with a view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal employers while renewing the contracts had been insisting that the contractor or the new contractor retain the old employees. In fact such a condition was incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract could not by itself give rise to a right to regularization in the employment of the principal employer. It was further observed that whether the contract labourers had become the employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor was a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, was a question of fact and had to be established by the contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It was not possible for the High Court or for the Apex Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. It was further observed that in all such cases, the labourers were initially employed and engaged by the contractors. As such, at what point of time a direct link was established between the contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene, was a matter which had to be established on material produced before the Court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act were the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them. 47. In R. K. Panda (supra) in para-7, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held as under: “7. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act were the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them. 47. In R. K. Panda (supra) in para-7, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held as under: “7. It is true that with the passage of time and purely with a view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal employers while renewing the contracts have been insisting that the contractor or the new contractor retains the old employees. In fact such a condition is incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularisation in the employment of the principal employer. Whether the contract labourers have become the employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, as has been urged in this case, is a question of fact and has to be established by the contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High Court or this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. It need not be pointed out that in all such cases, the labourers are initially employed and engaged by the contractors. As such at what point of time a direct link is established between the contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene, is a matter which has to be established on material produced before the court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them.” 48. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them.” 48. In R. K. Panda (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed further that it was faced with different orders passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court since 1986 when the writ petitions were entertained, as the services of a number of labourers were to be terminated with effect from 01.01.1987 and because the contract of the contractor concerned was to expire on 31.12.1986, interim orders were granted to continue labourers. It also came to the notice of the Hon’ble Apex Court that several contract labourers had taken voluntary retirement. But majority of them were continuing and a scheme of modernization was in process of implementation, which might have resulted in the reduction of the labour force and many of the workmen might had to be retrenched as a consequence, hence taking all facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, the Hon’ble Apex Court issued directions, as contained in para-9 of the judgment, which is reproduced as under: “9. We are informed that pursuant to the aforesaid order, several contract labourers have taken voluntary retirement. But majority of them are continuing. On behalf of the respondent, it was brought to our notice that a scheme of modernisation is in process of implementation, which may result in the reduction of the labour force and many of the workmen may have to be retrenched as a consequence. Hence taking all facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, we direct that: (i) All labourers, who had been initially engaged through contractors but have been continuously working with the respondent for the last 10 years on different jobs assigned to them in spite of the replacement and change of the contractors, shall be absorbed by the respondent, as their regular employees subject to being found medically fit and if they are below 58 years of age, which is the age of superannuation under the respondent. (ii) While absorbing them as regular employees their inter se seniority shall be determined department/job-wise on the basis of their continuous employment. (iii) They will not be entitled to the difference in their contractual and regular wages till the date of their absorption. After absorption as regular employees, they shall be paid wages, allowances etc. (ii) While absorbing them as regular employees their inter se seniority shall be determined department/job-wise on the basis of their continuous employment. (iii) They will not be entitled to the difference in their contractual and regular wages till the date of their absorption. After absorption as regular employees, they shall be paid wages, allowances etc. on a par with their counterparts, working as regular employees with the respondent. If in respect of any group of contract labourers, no rate of wages or emoluments have been fixed by the respondent because those jobs had not been performed by the regular employees of the respondent in the past, the contract labourers so absorbed for performing the said jobs, shall be paid at the minimum rate payable to the unskilled workmen, doing other similar jobs. (iv) After absorption, the contract labourers will be governed exclusively by the terms and conditions prescribed by the respondent for its own employees irrespective of any existing contract or agreement between the respondent and the contractors. No claim shall be made by the contractors against the respondent for premature termination of their contracts in respect of the contract labourers. (v) The benefit of absorption shall not be extended to contract labourers who in terms of this Court's order referred to above have taken voluntary retirement on payment of the retrenchment compensation. (vi) The respondent shall be at liberty to retrench workmen so absorbed, in accordance with law. This order shall not be pleaded as a bar to such retrenchment. (vii) If there is any dispute in respect of the identification of the contract labourers to be absorbed as directed above, such dispute shall be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), on material, produced before him by the parties concerned. (viii) This direction shall be operative only in respect of 142 jobs out of 246 jobs, in view of the fact that contract labour has already been abolished in 104 jobs. (ix) This order does not relate to the persons who have already been absorbed. (x) The persons, who had been retrenched, but in terms of the directions of this Court, have been taken back, shall also be entitled to the benefit of this order. If there is any dispute in respect of the identity of such persons, that shall also be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). (x) The persons, who had been retrenched, but in terms of the directions of this Court, have been taken back, shall also be entitled to the benefit of this order. If there is any dispute in respect of the identity of such persons, that shall also be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). (xi) For the purpose of calculating the payment of retrenchment benefit, in the event of their retrenchment, hereafter, the 10 years' period aforesaid shall be counted, in respect such retrenched persons, although they are absorbed after the passing of this order. (xii) This order shall be complied with by the respondent within four months from today.” 49. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that in R. K. Panda (supra) direction was given for regularization, but, we are of the view that the aforesaid directions were in the facts and circumstances of that case. The law, as laid down therein, in our view, is as in para-7 of R. K. Panda (supra) which we have reproduced above, i.e., whether the contract labourers have become the employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, is a question of fact and has to be established by the contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. At what point of time a direct link is established between the contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene, is a matter which has to be established on material produced before the court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before it. Common judgment under Appeals: 50. A reading of the judgment of the learned single Judge shows that, the writ petition was allowed observing that though the petitioners were engaged on contract basis, their services were required continuously for the organization. The duties and responsibilities entrusted to petitioners were of perennial nature. Common judgment under Appeals: 50. A reading of the judgment of the learned single Judge shows that, the writ petition was allowed observing that though the petitioners were engaged on contract basis, their services were required continuously for the organization. The duties and responsibilities entrusted to petitioners were of perennial nature. It could not be stated that the services of the petitioners were no longer required and as such there was no requirement of continuing the petitioners either on contract, casual, or daily basis. The writ petitioners claim was opposed by the company on the ground that they were engaged through contractor which aspect was extensively considered in W.A.No. 1478 of 1999 in which, following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suresh (supra), it was observed that the statutory body should not be permitted to violate the statute with impunity and the same would amount to unfair labour practice. Thus, the emphasis laid was on the judgment in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 which had attained finality as also on the fact that the writ petitioners were working for last twenty years and there was no adverse remarks against them from which it was drawn that they had rendered satisfactory service. 51. A reading of the judgment of the learned single Judge, however, does not show, any finding recorded on the aspect of the relationship of the employer and employee between the writ appellant and the writ petitioners. 52. As per both the judgments, Suresh (supra) or/and Umadevi (supra) there must be relationship of employer and employee. In Uma Devi (supra), the appointment was by the employer, might have been irregular, for whom fulfilling the conditions, regularisation was directed as one time measure. In Suresh (supra) there was finding by the Industrial Tribunal that there was relationship of employer and employee between the workman and based on such finding the writ petition was decided by the High Court. There was specific finding on these material facts, from which the real contracting relationship between the Board and the employees could clearly be visualised. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that such a finding of fact, arrived at by the Labour Court could not be interfered while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in Suresh (supra) the Court had proceeded on the findings recorded by the Labour Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that such a finding of fact, arrived at by the Labour Court could not be interfered while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in Suresh (supra) the Court had proceeded on the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Any such finding by Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is lacking in the present case. 53. In our view, the question whether there is relationship of employer and employee between the writ appellant and the writ petitioners is a question of fact and for applying the judgment in the case of Suresh (supra), there should be a specific finding of said fact, may be after lifting of veil or piercing the veil. To record the finding, the material would be required, the evidence would be required and it will also have to be seen, whether the writ appellant was a licenced principal employer under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, and the contractor(s), as named in the writ petitions, was a licenced contractor, as also whether there was any genuine contract system prevailing at the relevant point of time or not. Whether the contract labourers became employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment through contractor was a mere camouflage and required to be established on the basis of requisite material. 54. In our view, Suresh (supra) cannot be placed reliance upon for direction for regularization in the absence of finding on the point of relationship of employer and employee. Finding on such an aspect for the first time cannot be recorded in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of R.K. Panda (supra). 55. There is also nothing to show that in spite of there being sanctioned posts, the services of the writ petitioners were not being regularized or that the writ petitioners were engaged against the sanctioned posts though it was the writ petitioners’ case that they were engaged against sanctioned posts, but the same was denied by the writ appellant. So, if there were no sanctioned posts for regularization, non-regularization would not amount to unfair trade practice. 56. So, if there were no sanctioned posts for regularization, non-regularization would not amount to unfair trade practice. 56. The writ appellants, though regularized the services of some persons, may be similarly situated, but that was under the directions in writ petitions/writ appeals, affirmed by dismissal of the S.L.P. There is no finding in the writ court’s judgment that the writ appellants regularized the services of similarly situated persons of their own, under some scheme or otherwise, of their own, and discriminated the writ petitioners, in the matter of regularization, violating their constitutional rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 57. In Ganesh Digamber Jambhrunkar v. The State of Maharashtra, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 801 the petitioners therein were appointed in Shri Guru Govind Singh Institute of Engineering and Technology on contractual basis. Their appointments were made sometime in the year 2011. The issue which involved was as to whether by working for a long period of time on contractual basis, the petitioners had acquired any vested legal right to be appointed in the respective posts on regular basis. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that continuous working of the petitioners therein had not created any legal right in their favour to be absorbed. The view taken by the learned single Judge, granting regularization, because the petitioners were working for last twenty years on contractual basis, in our view, is legally unsustainable. 58. So far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned when the determination of the lis, is dependent on question of facts, being involved, as in the present case, whether there was relationship of employer and employee between the writ petitioners and the writ appellants, on which there was no finding by Industrial Court or Labour Court as was the case of Suresh (supra) which had arisen from adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal, in our view, the writ petition would not be the appropriate remedy to be approached directly and particularly when the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider and grant such relief, on determination of relevant factual aspects based on material/evidence before those Courts/Tribunals. Conclusions: 59. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are: (i) As per both the judgments in Suresh (supra) or/and Umadevi (supra), there must be relationship of employer and employee. Conclusions: 59. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusions are: (i) As per both the judgments in Suresh (supra) or/and Umadevi (supra), there must be relationship of employer and employee. In Umadevi (supra), the appointment was by employer, might have been irregular and in Suresh (supra) there was a finding by the Industrial Tribunal that there was relationship of employer and employee between the workmen and based on such finding the High Court had decided the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, any such finding by the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal is lacking. (ii) In the absence of any finding on the aspect of the relationship of the employer and employee between the writ appellants and the writ petitioners, the direction for regularization is unsustainable. (iii) The question whether there is relationship of employer and employee between the writ appellants and the writ petitioners is a question of fact. To record the finding, the material would be required. The evidence would be required. It will also have to be seen whether the writ appellant is a licenced principal employer and the contractor, as named in the writ petitions, was a licenced contractor. It will also have to be seen whether there was any genuine contract system prevailing at the relevant point of time or not, and whether the contract labourers became employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment through contractor was a mere camouflage. All this is required to be established on the basis of requisite material, may be after lifting of veil or piercing the veil. (iv) Finding on the aforesaid factual aspects, for the first time, cannot be recorded in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of R. K. Panda (supra). (v) There is also no finding if there was sanctioned posts on which the writ petitioners could be regularized. So, if there were no sanctioned posts for regularization, it cannot be said that the non-regularization would not amount to unfair trade practice. (vi) The writ petitioners might have worked for 20 years on contractual basis, but by working for a long time on contractual basis, the writ petitioners would not acquire any vested legal right to be regularized, in view of Ganesh Digamber Jambhrunkar (supra). (vi) The writ petitioners might have worked for 20 years on contractual basis, but by working for a long time on contractual basis, the writ petitioners would not acquire any vested legal right to be regularized, in view of Ganesh Digamber Jambhrunkar (supra). (vii) The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the appropriate remedy to be approached directly in such matters seeking regularization, and particularly, when the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal have got the jurisdiction to consider such aspect and on the determination of the relevant factual aspects based on material they have jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for regularization. (viii) The view taken by the learned single Judge, that the order in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 attained finality on dismissal of SLP by the Hon’ble Apex Court, may be correct but to this extent only that the judgment in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 became final between the parties thereto. We are of the view that as the dismissal of SLP was by a non-speaking order and as in one of the matters (W.P.No.21947 of 1999), where the order was passed based in W.A.No.1478 of 1999, and the SLP against that order was also dismissed, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that “the question of law is however left open to be decided in an appropriate case”. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid, as also the law as laid down in Himanshu Dewan (supra) that in a non-speaking order of dismissal of SLP, the doctrine of merger does not apply, and further that the effect a non-speaking order of dismissal of SLP without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons for dismissal, by a necessary implication cannot be taken as acceptance of the reasons or the ratio of the judgment under challenge, the order in W.A.No.1478 of 1999 is not to be considered as final and binding as precedent and particularly in the absence of finding on material aspects, as discussed above, in the facts of the present cases. Result: 60. Our conclusions on Point-A are as in Para-59 (supra). 61. In view of our conclusions on Point-A, we are of the view on Point-B, that the common judgment dated 31.01.2024 under challenge, cannot be legally sustained and deserves interference. 62. In the result, Writ Appeal Nos.310, 311, 312 & 313 of 2024 are allowed. Result: 60. Our conclusions on Point-A are as in Para-59 (supra). 61. In view of our conclusions on Point-A, we are of the view on Point-B, that the common judgment dated 31.01.2024 under challenge, cannot be legally sustained and deserves interference. 62. In the result, Writ Appeal Nos.310, 311, 312 & 313 of 2024 are allowed. The common judgment dated 31.01.2024, passed in W.P.Nos.15794, 32917, 15272 and 33147 of 2010 is set aside. Consequently, all the aforesaid writ petitions are dismissed. The writ petitioners, if so advised, may have their remedies before appropriate forum. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.