JUDGMENT : (Munnuri Laxman, J.) : 1) The present criminal appeal assails the judgment of conviction dated 23.06.2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.2, Abu Road, Distt. Sirohi on the file of Sessions Case No.25/2015 (19/2013), whereby the appellant-accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.10,000/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. 2) The sum and substance of the prosecution case is that Deva Ram (PW-2), the elder brother of the deceased-Samartha Ram lodged a report under Exhibit-P/1 stating that Samartha Ram and his wife Baby Devi had three sons i.e. Dalpat Ram, Prema Shankar and Raju. All the sons reside in Mumbai. The younger son Raju came to the parents 20-25 days prior to the incident and ever since, he had been staying with them. On 07.02.2013 at about 10:00 p.m. on receipt of information about murder of his brother Samartha Ram and sister-in-law Baby, he went to the house of the deceased and found that they were lying dead in the pool of blood and the wounds were fresh. The blood was still oozing out from the injuries and Raju was sitting near the deceased persons. On enquiry with the appellant-accused Raju, initially he claimed that he went to Ajari village and subsequently, he claimed that he went to Markundeshwar Ji. Such incident was informed to other sons of the deceased. 3) On the basis of the above, the police issued the FIR No.49/2013 at Police Station Pindwara. The FIR was issued expressing suspicion over the present appellant and the investigation was proceeded on the basis of the said FIR. The final result of the Investigation reveals that the appellant accused had some domestic disputes with the parents. He blamed the deceased parents responsible for desertion of his wife and the appellant-accused killed both the parents by hitting with stone and by placing rope around the neck of Samartha Ram (appellant’s father) in their residential house. 4) The charge was framed for the offence under Section 302 of IPC against the appellant-accused. The accused denied the charge and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in support of its case examined in all 18 witnesses and relied upon the documents under Exhibits-P/1 to P/40. 4) The charge was framed for the offence under Section 302 of IPC against the appellant-accused. The accused denied the charge and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in support of its case examined in all 18 witnesses and relied upon the documents under Exhibits-P/1 to P/40. Accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he denied the incriminating evidence. He did not produce any witness in defence, however, he exhibited documents under Exhibit-D/1 to D/4. 5) The learned trial court on appreciation of evidence on record found the accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of IPC and he was sentenced to the terms indicated herein-before. Hence, the present appeal at the instance of the appellant-convict. 6) The learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has submitted that there is no direct eyewitness to the incident. The entire case of the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence like presence of the accused at the time of the incident and recovery of blood stained clothes of the accused. The blood group thereon was tallied with the blood group of the deceased. The other part of the evidence is the recovery of the stone on the information of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act based on his confessional statement. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial court was not correct in invoking Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act in the absence of discharge of initial onus, which always lies with the prosecution. The foundational requirement for shifting the burden and for invoking the presumption under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act was placed on record by the prosecution. Without discharge of initial burden, the presumption under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, in the absence of proper explanation with regard to how the death occurred, cannot be invoked. 7) The further submission of learned Amicus Curiae is that the recovery of stone which the prosecution claimed to have recovered based on disclosure statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act from the scene of offence has been made basis for conviction of the accused. This approach of the trial court is incorrect and against the foundational principle for recovery based on the disclosure statement. This approach of the trial court is incorrect and against the foundational principle for recovery based on the disclosure statement. According to him, the stone was recovered from the scene of the offence itself and such a recovery was not from any hidden place. It was openly seen even during the site inspection by the Investigating Officer. When the stone was lying on the scene of offence and could be seen from naked eye, the recovery based upon the alleged confession is incorrect. Therefore any incriminating evidence found on the stone disclosing the presence of blood group, which tallied with the blood group of the deceased, such evidence do not help the prosecution. Thus, the entire approach of the trial court in convicting the appellant-accused based on the wrong premise without there being any foundational evidence to establish the presence of the accused with the deceased shortly before the incident is bad in the eyes of law. The presumption under Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act could not be invoked. Therefore, he prays to allow the appeal. 8) Learned Amicus Curiae has relied upon the judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605 and the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan [D.B.Criminal Appeal No.845/2005], decided on 03.02.2015 as well as the judgment of Allahabd High Court rendered in the case of Dr. (Smt.) Nupur Talwar Vs. State of U.P., reported in 2017 SCC Online All 2222. 9) The learned Government Advocate-cum-AAG appearing for the State has contended that there is ample evidence on record to show that the accused was staying with the deceased parents and no other sons were staying with them. The incident had occurred in the early night hours and the presence of the accused with the deceased can be inferred from the words uttered by him before PW-1 Mahadev Prasad (neighbour of the deceased) immediately after the incident. According to him, the accused immediately after the incident approached PW-1. He was crying and shouting that thieves have intruded into their house and in response to such utterances, PW-1 went inside the house and found the deceased were lying in the pool of blood with fresh injuries. The blood was still oozing from the injuries. According to him, the accused immediately after the incident approached PW-1. He was crying and shouting that thieves have intruded into their house and in response to such utterances, PW-1 went inside the house and found the deceased were lying in the pool of blood with fresh injuries. The blood was still oozing from the injuries. He did not see anyone running there. However, in the defence, accused claimed that he was not present at the time of incident, which is falsified by his own initial claim before PW-1. The initial utterances, which is admitted under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act can be a guiding principle to establish that the appellant-convict was with the parents when the alleged incident occurred. It is for him to explain how the incident occurred. Contrary to such initial claim, he has set up a plea of alibi which is unproven. 10) Further, there is evidence on record that when PW-2, the Informant reached the house of the deceased, the accused was also with them. The evidence of PW-1, who is neighbour, clearly demonstrates that the appellant-accused joined with the parents 20-25 days prior to the incident. Such evidence clearly establishes that the accused were with the deceased shortly prior to the incident and it was also natural that accused was staying with the parents since he has no other accommodation in the village and plea of alibi was also unproven. 11) The learned Government Advocate also contended that the clothes of the appellant was stained with the blood and the FSL report clearly demonstrates that the blood group present on the clothes of the appellant-accused was found to be the same blood group of the deceased (appellants’ father). The injury certificate of the appellant shows that he had multiple simple injuries on his body apart from the blood stained clothes. He has not explained how such injuries have been received by him. All the above circumstances clearly go to prove that the accused was present with the deceased parents shortly before the incident. This means the accused-appellant alone had special knowledge about how the deceased have been murdered and the silence of the appellant-accused with regard to how the incident occurred has laid to invocation of presumption under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which the trial court was rightly invoked while convicting the appellant-accused. Therefore, the conviction was legally sustainable. This means the accused-appellant alone had special knowledge about how the deceased have been murdered and the silence of the appellant-accused with regard to how the incident occurred has laid to invocation of presumption under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which the trial court was rightly invoked while convicting the appellant-accused. Therefore, the conviction was legally sustainable. Since such a finding of conviction are based on the evidence on record, the same requires no interference by this Court. 12) We have heard the learned Amicus Curiae as well as learned Government-cum-AAG and carefully perused the record of the case. 13) The postmortem reports of both the deceased indicate that, father-deceased was tied around the neck with the rope and there were ligature mark all around the neck. There are multiple head injuries. Even, the mother of the appellant also sustained multiple head injuries and the stone which is recovered from the scene of offence is weapon, which has been used for causing such injuries. From such a medical evidence, it is clear that the death of the deceased were homicidal. 14) The evidence of PW-2 (the First Informant) shows that he had no knowledge that the deceased came to stay with the parents 20-25 days prior to the incidence. He came to know about the said fact after the incident. This is clear from the cross-examination. Such information he got from other sons, as such any evidence of this witness to the effect that the appellant started living with the parents (deceased) for the last 20-25 days prior to the incident, has no relevance and inadmissible since it is hearsay evidence. 15) Further, PW-2 states that there were five minutes walking distance from his house to the deceased’s house and he reached the scene on knowing the incident at about 10 p.m. and he found the appellant-accused with the deceased nearby and his evidence also shows that on enquiry, the appellant was claiming that he went to Ajari village at the initial stage and on further enquiry, he claimed that he went to Markundeshwar Ji. This means he has set up plea of alibi before him claiming initially he went to Ajari village and later Markundewhar Ji. 16) The evidence of PW-1 Mahadev Prasad is very crucial. This means he has set up plea of alibi before him claiming initially he went to Ajari village and later Markundewhar Ji. 16) The evidence of PW-1 Mahadev Prasad is very crucial. He is neighbour and his evidence shows that he had seen the appellant-accused was staying with the parents for the last 20-25 days. PW-1 is natural witness and his evidence shows that on the date of incident at around 10 o’clock in the night, the appellant allegedly approached him with the cries and shouting, claiming that thieves have intruded in their house. Upon such claim, PW-1 went to the house of appellant. He found that the door was open and the deceased were lying in a pool of blood with multiple injuries. The deceased and appellant lives in the house where the incident occurred. The statement of this witness that immediately after the incident, the appellant approached PW-1 and informed that thieves have intruded in their house. Though this is hearsay evidence, which is admissible under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. If this statement is taken on record, this means the accused was with the parents when the alleged incident occurred. This claim of the appellant was not found to be correct from the investigation and in fact, this claim is also not part of the defence, which has been taken by the appellant before the trial court during the course of trial. Although his contention was that when the incident occurred he was not present with the deceased. This means the appellant-convict set up plea of alibi. 17) From the evidence of PW-2 (First Informant), it is clear that appellant also took up a defence that he went to Ajari village at the initial stage and later he changed his version and stated that he went to Markundeshwar Ji. As seen from the first information report and in the evidence, it is stated that accused claimed that he was not present when the incident occurred. This claim is going contrary to initial claim made by the appellant-accused before PW-1. The initial claim made by the appellant, if taken into consideration, it clearly establishes that the appellant-accused was present with the deceased parents either immediately before or at the time of incidence. This claim is going contrary to initial claim made by the appellant-accused before PW-1. The initial claim made by the appellant, if taken into consideration, it clearly establishes that the appellant-accused was present with the deceased parents either immediately before or at the time of incidence. One of the foundational fact which the prosecution was required to prove for invoking the benefit of provision of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, is established. 18) Apart from the above evidence, the bloodstained clothes of the accused contained ‘B’ positive blood group which tallied that of the blood group found on the blood wetted kameej of the deceased. He did not explain how such blood stain was found on his clothes. Apart from that the accused was found with multiple injuries on his body, which were simple in nature and no explanation was given by him as to how the injuries were sustained by him. All these circumstances clearly go to show that he was with the deceased person and it was for the accused who had to explain how the incident had occurred. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Thakur Singh, reported in (2014) 12 Supreme Court Cases 211, wherein the Apex Court while considering the initial burden of the prosecution and the stage at which the benefit of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act can be taken advantage by the prosecution, has held as follows:- “22. The law, therefore, is quite well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused is on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts pertaining to a crime that can be known only to the accused, or are virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove. These facts need to be explained by the accused and if he does not do so, then it is a strong circumstance pointing to his guilt based on those facts. 23. Applying this principle to the facts of the case, since Dhapu Kunwar died an unnatural death in the room occupied by her and Thakur Singh, the cause of the unnatural death was known to Thakur Singh. There is no evidence that anybody else had entered their room or could have entered their room. 23. Applying this principle to the facts of the case, since Dhapu Kunwar died an unnatural death in the room occupied by her and Thakur Singh, the cause of the unnatural death was known to Thakur Singh. There is no evidence that anybody else had entered their room or could have entered their room. Thakur Singh did not set up any case that he was not in their room or not in the vicinity of their room while the incident occurred nor did he set up any case that some other person entered the room and caused the unnatural death of his wife. The facts relevant to the cause of Dhapu Kunwar's death being known only to Thakur Singh, yet he chose not to disclose them or to explain them. The principle laid down in Section 106 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to the facts of the case and there is, therefore, a very strong presumption that Dhapu Kunwar was murdered by Thakur Singh.” 19) In the case of Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757, Apex Court while discussing the principles of law governing the applicability of of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, held as follows:- “34. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. i. Principles of law governing the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act 35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience”. 37. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , this Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: “11. … The word “especially” stresses that it means facts that are pre- eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v.R. [1936] 3 All ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).” 38. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 , wherein this Court observed as under: “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 39. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 10 SCC 373 , this Court observed as under: “23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v.Mir Mohammad Omar [ (2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] : (SCC p. 393, para 38) “38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: 11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’”” (Emphasis supplied) 40. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’”” (Emphasis supplied) 40. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations made therein are considered relevant in the facts of the present case: “14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [[1944] A.C. 315: [1944] 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v.Karnail Singh [ (2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135]. )The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. xxx xxx xxx 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. …” (Emphasis supplied) 41. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused, was examined by this Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8 SCC 382 . In this case, the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused, and took him away at about 2 : 30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. In this case, the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused, and took him away at about 2 : 30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 364, read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced them to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the charge of murder. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to the deceased after he was abducted by them. The Sessions Judge, after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence, had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons, and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital, and concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down the following principles in paras 31 to 34: “31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a recognized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” 20) A reading of the above principles, it is clear that as per Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, in criminal cases initially burden is always on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act is the exception to the above rule. In certain special circumstances where certain facts pertaining to crime can be known only from the accused or virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove, then the benefit of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act can be invoked. The facts, which are required to be explained by the accused, if he does not do so then it is a strong circumstance pointing towards his guilt based on those facts. The facts, which are required to be explained by the accused, if he does not do so then it is a strong circumstance pointing towards his guilt based on those facts. 21) The evidence of PW-1 clearly shows that res gestae statement appellant-accused immediately after the incident, presence of injuries, tallying of blood stains found on the clothes of the accused with the deceased blood stains are the circumstances which clearly establish that shortly before the incident or at the time of the incident, the appellant-accused was with the deceased parents. In fact, he had been staying with them for the last 20-25 days prior to the incident. This evidence clearly proves the initial burden which was required to be proved by the prosecution, has been discharged. As per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, when certain facts are impossible for the prosecution to prove the author of the crime, it is for the accused who was with them, had to explain how such an incident has occurred. He has claimed the plea of alibi instead explaining how the incident had occurred and he retracted from the initial res gestae statement made before PW-1 and set up a plea of alibi, which is unproved. The facts relating to how the injuries had been sustained by the appellant are within the special knowledge of the accused. The accused could only explain such incident and it is impossible for the prosecution to prove how the deceased sustained injuries. Since the incident occurred within the four-walls of deceased house where the appellant was staying with deceased. The statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is silent with regards to how the deceased had sustained injuries and how he received the blood stains which are similar to his father. Therefore, failure to explain the above circumstance is a very strong presumption that it is the appellant-accused who has murdered his parents. The trial court has rightly invoked the benefit of provision of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act and rightly convicted the appellant. Such conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court requires no interference. Therefore, failure to explain the above circumstance is a very strong presumption that it is the appellant-accused who has murdered his parents. The trial court has rightly invoked the benefit of provision of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act and rightly convicted the appellant. Such conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court requires no interference. 22) The learned Amicus Curiae has relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal (cited supra) to contend that when the material recovered in pursuance of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act from the open place accessible to one and all, such evidence cannot be relied upon. Since this Court has already held that the recovery of stone from the scene of offence which was visible to the Investigating Officer when the search and seizure was conducted, recovery of such stone under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is incorrect. Therefore, further elaboration on this point in the light of the decision relied upon by the learned Amicus Curiae is unwarranted. 23) The other judgment relied upon by learned Amicus Curiae in the case of Ashok Kumar (cited supra) stands on different facts. It was a case where the FSL report was only showing human semen on the vaginal swab slide without any genital matching with the alleged rapist. In these circumstances, it was held that such a FSL report was of no help to the prosecution. In the present case, the FSL report clearly demonstrates specific blood group on the clothes of the accused which tallied with the blood group of the deceased clothes. It is not a general finding. It is a specific finding. Therefore, such finding is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 24) So far as other judgment relied upon by learned Amicus Curiae in the case of Dr. (Smt.) Nupur Talwar (cited supra) is concerned, it is not clear on what grounds and what is the principle basing on which the judgment is relied upon. Therefore, this Court feels it is unnecessary to delve deep into the said judgment relied upon by the learned Amicus Curiae. 25) In the result, the criminal appeal is hereby dismissed. (Smt.) Nupur Talwar (cited supra) is concerned, it is not clear on what grounds and what is the principle basing on which the judgment is relied upon. Therefore, this Court feels it is unnecessary to delve deep into the said judgment relied upon by the learned Amicus Curiae. 25) In the result, the criminal appeal is hereby dismissed. The appellant-accused was on bail during the pendency of this criminal appeal, therefore, his bail bonds are forfeited and he is directed to surrender before the court where he was convicted, within a period of 15 days from the date of this judgment to serve remaining sentence. 26) This Court is thankful to Mr. Kaushal Sharma, who has rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused-appellant, in the present adjudication.