JUDGMENT : Nisha M. Thakore, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the original plaintiffs-appellants herein under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the Code”), being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 02.04.2024 passed by learned Chamber Judge & Additional City Civil Judge, Ahmedabad below Exh.1 under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the Code. By the said order, the learned Civil Judge has suo moto taken cognizance of the maintainability of the suit and after conducting preliminary hearing, has rejected the plaint. 2. The facts, in nutshell, are reproduced hereunder: 2.1 The original plaintiffs have approached the court of learned Additional City Civil Judge by seeking prayer for specific performance and Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter to be referred as “MoU”) dated 16.11.2019 executed between the parties in respect of land being sub-plot no.4 and 4(a) admeasuring 5296 sq. mtr. i.e. 6335 sq. yards of revenue survey no.142 of Mouje-Maninagar, Taluka-Rajpur Hirpur, District-Ahmedabad being part of final plot no.25 admeasuring 22762 sq. mtrs of T.P. Scheme No.9. 2.1(a) The original plaintiffs have sought for direction against the defendants for execution of registered sale deed in respect of aforesaid suit land by remarking the aforesaid part of land by obtaining title clearance certificate and by accepting the sale consideration as agreed between the original plaintiffs and defendants in terms of the MoU. 2.1(b) The original plaintiffs have also sought for further directions against the defendants in case, if the defendants failed to execute the sale deed, the Court Commissioner be appointed for execution of the registered sale deed in favour of the original plaintiffs. 2.1(c) Apart from the aforesaid directions, the original plaintiffs have also sought for permanent injunction against the defendants as well as against any person, servant, agent, power of attorney holder etc. by restraining them from executing any sale transaction or by way of transfer or assign in any manner the suit property as well as to restrain from entering into any type of agreements or documents or any type of transactions in respect of the suit property. 2.2 The aforesaid suit was presented before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad on 06.03.2024, which came to be registered as Civil Suit No.240 of 2024. 2.2 The aforesaid suit was presented before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad on 06.03.2024, which came to be registered as Civil Suit No.240 of 2024. Along with the plaint of the aforesaid suit, the original plaintiffs have also produced list of the documents; however, for the reasons best known, no application seeking interim injunction was presented along with the plaint. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, it would be appropriate to reproduce in nutshell the facts as pleaded by the original plaintiffs in the plaint. 3.1 The defendant no.1 is a registered company having its registered office at Ahmedabad. Defendant nos.2 and 3 are the Directors of the defendant no.1-company. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they had agreed to purchase the suit land for consideration of total amount of Rs.12,67,00,000/-. According to the plaintiffs, the parties have mutually agreed to fix the value of the suit property as Rs.20,000/- per sq. yard. An amount of Rs.21 Lakhs is claimed to have been paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants as token payment. Subsequently, the aforesaid agreement was reduced in form of MoU, which was executed between the parties on 16.11.2019. The said document was notarized, which was entered in the book of Notary-Girish S. Parmar vide entry no.74/2019. The said document was signed by the defendant nos.2 and 3 as the authorize signatory of defendant no.1-company. 3.2 According to the plaintiffs, the main conditions as mutually agreed between the parties, were reduced in writing in the form of MoU. 3.3 The public notice was immediately issued by the plaintiffs on 18.11.2019 inviting objections against the issuance of title clearance certificate. The plaintiffs had contended that expenses were incurred for not only publishing the aforesaid public notice but also for architect plan fees, liasoning fees, plot survey expense, plan passing expense, advocate fees, etc. As per the plaintiffs, expense of an amount of Rs.10 Lakhs was incurred towards such different fees. 3.4 Since objections were received against the issuance of title clearance certificate, the plaintiffs have approached the defendants to get clear title of the suit property as per the terms and conditions of the MoU. In the meanwhile, the payment though agreed as per the MoU which was to be paid, was deferred. 3.4 Since objections were received against the issuance of title clearance certificate, the plaintiffs have approached the defendants to get clear title of the suit property as per the terms and conditions of the MoU. In the meanwhile, the payment though agreed as per the MoU which was to be paid, was deferred. The plaintiffs have averred their readiness and willingness to perform their part of obligation; however, it is submitted that since the defendants started making excuses, the remaining payment of consideration could not be complied with. 3.5 In such circumstances, the plaintiffs have raised refund of the token amount of Rs.21 Lakhs as paid towards the consideration and Rs.10 Lakhs expense incurred from the defendants and had thereby offered to cancel the MoU. It is the case of the plaintiffs that part payment of the aforesaid refund amounts was received from the defendants. An amount of Rs.11 Lakhs was refunded by the defendants. Further the defendants have also issued cheque dated 20.12.2020 drawn from the Bank of Kotak Mahindra Branch for an amount of Rs.10 Lakhs. Apart from the aforesaid amounts, separate payment of an amount of Rs.10 Lakhs was also done by RTGS. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the cheque of amount of Rs.10 Lakhs was presented for realization on 18.01.2021, which was returned back unpaid on the ground of “exceed arrangement”. The plaintiffs were informed about dishonour of cheque, which in turn, was reported to the defendants; however, the defendants have not responded. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs were constrained to initiate the proceedings under the N.I. Act by issuing legal notice dated 09.02.2021. The plaintiffs have approached criminal court by lodging the complaint under the N.I. Act, which is registered as Criminal Misc. Application No.37753 of 2021, pending before the Metropolitan Court, Ahmedabad City. It is clarified by the plaintiffs that an application under Section 143A(2) of the said Act has been moved before the concerned court seeking deposit of the amount, which is allowed in favour of the plaintiffs. 3.6 By referring to the aforesaid facts, the plaintiffs have averred that on one hand, the defendants have failed to get title clearance of the suit property and on the other hand, the part payment as agreed to cancel the MoU, has not been complied with. The plaintiffs apprehended that the defendants are likely to transfer the suit land. 3.6 By referring to the aforesaid facts, the plaintiffs have averred that on one hand, the defendants have failed to get title clearance of the suit property and on the other hand, the part payment as agreed to cancel the MoU, has not been complied with. The plaintiffs apprehended that the defendants are likely to transfer the suit land. 3.7 Thus, the cause of action has arisen for the plaintiffs to approach City Civil & Sessions Court, Ahmedabad by filing civil suit seeking specific performance of the agreement in respect of the suit land and in the meanwhile seeking permanent injunction against the defendants from transferring the suit land in any manner. 4. Learned counsel Mr. J.R. Shah has appeared for the appellants. At the outset, learned counsel has invited our attention to the impugned order passed below Exh.1 by the court below. Learned counsel has submitted that the matter was kept for preliminary hearing by the learned Judge. He had not disputed the jurisdiction of the court to examine the cause of action as well as the issue of limitation at the threshold before proceeding with issuance of summons. 4.1 It was pointed out that essentially the learned Judge has proceeded to dismiss the suit at the threshold by resorting to the powers conferred upon Court under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the Code on the ground that there did not exist any agreement reduced in writing between the parties in respect of the suit properties of which, the specific performance was sought for. Secondly, on the ground that the MoU dated 16.11.2019 had stood cancelled, and therefore, there did not survive any cause of action for the plaintiffs to pursue the proceedings for specific performance of the alleged agreement. Thirdly, on the ground that the suit was barred by the provisions of law of limitation. The Court had relied upon Article 54 of the schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, which otherwise prescribes the period of three years for filing of suit seeking specific performance of an agreement, which was required to be filed by 20.12.2023, whereas the suit was filed on 06.03.2024. The Court, has therefore, not entertained the suit, in view of specific bar of Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code. The Court, has therefore, not entertained the suit, in view of specific bar of Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code. 4.2 Learned counsel by referring to the aforesaid background, has submitted that the learned Civil Judge committed serious error in arriving at factual finding that the MoU stood cancelled. Our attention was invited to the relevant observations of the learned Judge. As against the aforesaid observations, the learned counsel had referred to paras 8 and 15 of the plaint to submit that though the appellants at one stage, have mentioned about cancellation of MoU as reflected in 93 at page no.8 of the plaint, but it is clearly mentioned in para 15 that the said MoU has not been cancelled and the same is still alive. 4.3 It is further submitted that in absence of the repayment of the amount, there was no reason for the parties to seek cancellation of the MoU. It was never agreed to cancel the MoU. In fact, a request was made to the court about their intention by explaining that inadvertently the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs had not properly worded the pleadings but the learned trial Judge without affording proper opportunity, had proceeded to pass the impugned order of rejection of the plaint. As regards the observation of the learned Judge that there did not exist any agreement between the parties. 4.4 Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Eldeco Housing And Industries Limited vs Ashok Vidyarthi and Ors. reported in 2023 INSC 1043 (SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 19465 OF 2021). Learned counsel has submitted that in similar set of facts where the MoU was entered into between the appellants and the respondents therein in respect of sale of property, wherein specific recital was made about pending litigation between the family members of the respondent and the clarification about the execution of sale deed immediately after the litigation was to get over, the trial court had dismissed the suit, which was filed on an apprehension that the respondent was trying to sell the property to the third parties. The application was filed by the respondent under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code for rejection of plaint on the ground that in terms of Order II Rule 2 of the Code, the suit was barred by law. The application was filed by the respondent under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code for rejection of plaint on the ground that in terms of Order II Rule 2 of the Code, the suit was barred by law. Both the courts i.e. trial court as well as High Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was called upon to examine the issue as to whether the relief of specific performance as subsequent suit was available to the appellants when suit for injunction was filed by it and fresh suit was not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal in the facts of the case, noticed that the vendor was trying to create third party rights in the property while agreeing to sell the same to some other parties, and therefore, at that stage the cause to file the suit for specific performance had not arisen. In the process, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the submissions that the MoU does not take a form of an agreement, had in fact, entertained the suit for specific performance on the basis of such MoU. Learned counsel has, therefore, urged this Court to issue notice upon the respondents. 5. We have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the view that the learned Judge committed error to arrive at finding that the MoU does not take form of any agreement, in light of the relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Eldeco Housing And Industries Limited (supra). This brings us to the second submission of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to issue of cause of action for the plaintiffs to pursue the proceedings for specific performance of the aforesaid MoU. It is a settled legal position of law that foremost requirement for maintaining a specific suit for specific performance of an agreement, the plaintiff must satisfy the Court by making basic pleadings in the plaint that an enforceable contract exist. That the contract has been concluded between the plaintiffs and the defendants. That the plaintiff was always ready and willing at all material times to perform his part of contract. 6. That the contract has been concluded between the plaintiffs and the defendants. That the plaintiff was always ready and willing at all material times to perform his part of contract. 6. Looking to the averments made in the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiffs that by virtue of MoU dated 16.11.2019, the terms and conditions agreed between the parties were reduced in writing with regard to agreement to sell entered upon between them in respect of the suit land. Further reading of the averments made in the plaint, more particularly, in paragraph 8 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have clearly pleaded that they have approached the defendants to cancel the aforesaid agreement to sell and to refund the amount of consideration paid towards such agreement to sell of the suit land. Further averments made in the plaint with regard to acceptance of refund amount of Rs.31 Lakhs, out of which, Rs.21 Lakhs is stated to have been actually realized and the remaining Rs.10 Lakhs being subject matter of consideration in the proceedings under Section 143A(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the competent court, unequivocally speaks about the intention of the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants have raised serious objection with regard to the approach of the learned Judge for not taking into consideration the averments made in paragraph 15, which describes the “cause of action” of the plaintiffs to prefer the suit for specific performance. 8. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take into consideration the land mark decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs & Ors. reported in 2020 (7) SCC 366 . We would like to quote relevant observations of the said judgment, which read as under : “23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs & Ors. reported in 2020 (7) SCC 366 . We would like to quote relevant observations of the said judgment, which read as under : “23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:– (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied) 23.2 The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3 The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. 23.3 The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : “12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5 The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under : “Order 7 Rule 14: Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” 23.8 Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9 In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 23.11 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., which reads as : “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” 23.12 In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. 23.13 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 23.14 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra). 23.15 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24. Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24. Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 24.1 In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam this Court held : “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded” 24.2 In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words : - “5. …The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …” (emphasis supplied) 24.3 Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. 24.4 If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. 25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. 26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under : Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 58. To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues 59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected. 9. In view of the aforesaid legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the courts are conferred with independent powers in the form of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, to examine the plaint in its entirety to ascertain whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, even at the stage of presentation of plaint, prior to registration. In fact, the said provision has to be read as mandatory and permits the Court to reject the plaint at the threshold, where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or is miserably barred by any law. In such process, the Courts are under obligation to read the plaint in its entirety and cannot confined to only one paragraph to be read in isolation. The composite reading of the pleadings made in the plaint are required to be accepted as correct. 10. In such process, the Courts are under obligation to read the plaint in its entirety and cannot confined to only one paragraph to be read in isolation. The composite reading of the pleadings made in the plaint are required to be accepted as correct. 10. Applying the aforesaid principles in the facts of the case, we have attempted independently to examine the plaint in its entirety to ascertain whether the plaint discloses a cause of action. We do not agree with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Judge committed any error in not considering the clear averments made in Para 15 “that the MoU has not been cancelled by issuing any legal notice by the defendants and the same is still in force”. 11. In our opinion, the Court could not restrict itself to the distinctive averments made in para 15 to find out the cause of action. The composite reading of the pleadings made in the plaint in its entirety even accepted to be correct, what can be gathered, is that the original MoU dated 16.11.2019 stood cancelled as the parties not only agreed, but have acted upon by accepting refund of the paid consideration. Merely because the cheque amount of Rs.10 Lakhs got defaulted, it would not revive the original MoU dated 16.11.2019. In such circumstances, the Court has no alternative but to treat the original MoU to have cease to exist as doing so, would amount to creating a new agreement to sell. In other words, the overall reading of the averments made in the plaint in meaningful manner does not disclose any right to sue for relief of specific performance of the MoU dated 16.11.2019, which does not exist any more. The very fact that the plaintiffs have chosen to pursue the legal proceedings with regard to unpaid part of consideration, clearly disclose the intention of the parties having cancelled the MoU with regard to sell of suit lands. 12. As regards the suit being barred by provisions of law on the ground of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is concerned, it prescribes the period of three years for presenting a suit for specific performance in two eventualities. Firstly, three years from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiffs have noticed that the performance is refused. 13. Firstly, three years from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiffs have noticed that the performance is refused. 13. Even considering the case of the plaintiffs about the original MoU dated 16.11.2019 in force, in absence of any legal notice addressed by the defendants declaring their intention to treat such agreement as cancelled, the moment when the cheque got defaulted, the cause of action had arisen for the plaintiffs to approach the Court for appropriate relief. Upon overall reading of the averments made in the plaint, indisputably, the last part of refund of Rs.10 Lakhs through cheque was defaulted, in view of the return memo issued by the concerned Bank on 18.01.2021. Therefore, the last extension for period of three years from reading of the cause of action as pleaded by the plaintiffs in the plaint would get expired on completion of three years from 18.01.2021 i.e. 18.01.2024, whereas the suit has been filed on 07.03.2024, which is filed much beyond the period of three years. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the reading of the plaint in its entirety smack of vexatious and meritless case. By pleading in the plaint that the MoU dated 16.11.2019 is still in force as no legal notice is addressed by the defendants, is nothing but a part of clever drafting to create illusion about accrual of the right to sue for specific performance. We are of the firm opinion that though no right to sue accrues upon the plaintiffs for pursuing the relief of seeking specific performance of the MoU dated 16.11.2019 for sale of the suit land in their favour. Even otherwise, the suit is not maintainable as the period of limitation had already got expired. 15. Hence, we do not find any error being committed by the Court in invoking powers conferred under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) to arrive at a conclusion that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and was barred by law of limitation. Hence, the appeal preferred by the appellants-original plaintiffs would meet the fate of rejection and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.