JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 31.10.2012, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court Hamirpur, H.P., vide which the appeal filed by the revisionists/petitioners (accused before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner in which they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 427, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. It was asserted that the informant Balbir Singh (PW-1), his wife (PW-6) and his children were sleeping in their house on 03.09.2009, at about 11 p.m., when they heard the noise of stone pelting on their roof and the door. The informant and his family members woke up. The informant opened the door and found that Deshraj, Bimla Devi, Asha Devi and Kamal Dev were pelting stones at his house. Deshraj abused the informant and asked him why, he(the informant) and his mother had gone to the police station to lodge the report. He would finish the whole family. He started throwing the pieces of bricks towards the informant. The informant shouted for help. His family members and the children started crying and weeping. The informant called the Panchayat Pradhan and Pradhan of Mahila Mandal. The villagers came to the spot. The accused ran away from the spot after seeing the villagers. Leela Devi (PW-3), Suresh Kumar (PW-5), Swaran Singh (PW-4), Gian Chand, Ganga Ram and Rajinder Singh (not examined), saw the accused running away from the spot. The accused had removed the Chajja from the roof. They had also damaged the Palli of Partap Singh. The Panchayat Pradhan stated that Panchyat would visit the spot in the morning. Panchayat visited the spot on 4.09.2009 and advised the informant to report the matter to the police. The informant was going to the Police Station when it was found that a villager had died in her matrimonial home and the whole village went to the village to perform her last rites. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW-1/A) and conducted the investigation. HC Purshotam Dass went to the sport and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/A). The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW-1/A) and conducted the investigation. HC Purshotam Dass went to the sport and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/A). Balbir produced three stones (Ext.P-1 to P-3), which were seized vide seizure memo (Ext. PW1/B). These were put in a parcel and the parcel was sealed withfive impressions of seal “N”. The Seal was taken on a piece of a separate cloth. Ramesh Chand (PW-2), took the photographs (Ext. P-1 to P-6). H.C Purshotam Dass recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and it was presented before the Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to frame charges for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 427, 504, and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Balbir Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Ramesh Chand (PW-2), took the photographs. Leela Devi (PW-3), Sarwan Singh (PW-4), and Suresh Kumar (PW-5) are the eyewitnesses. Banita Devi (PW-6), is the wife of the informant. HC Purshotam Chand (PW-7), is the investigation officer. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution’s case in its entirely. They stated that they were innocent and there was a dispute over the passage. Initially, they stated that they wanted to lead evidence in defence but no evidence was led in defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There were no major contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses. The informant and his wife specifically stated that the accused were angry as a report was made to the police. The delay in reporting the matter to the police was sufficiently explained. It was duly proved that the informant and his wife had immediately informed Panchayat Pradhan of the incident, who had reached the spot; therefore, the delay would not be fatal. The report of the Probationa Officer was called and as per the report, the accused were habitual troublemakers, who kept on engaging in fights with their neighbours. They were not amenable to the social discipline. Hence, the prayer to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was declined. The report of the Probationa Officer was called and as per the report, the accused were habitual troublemakers, who kept on engaging in fights with their neighbours. They were not amenable to the social discipline. Hence, the prayer to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was declined. Learned Trial Court imposed the following sentences:- Section Sentence 336 read with Section 34 of IP Two months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 427 read with Section 34 of IPC. Six months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 506 read with Section 34 of IPC Six months rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court concurred with the findings of the learned Trial Court and held that the testimonies of witnesses corroborated each other. These were also corroborated by the recovery of stones from the scene of the crime. The delay in reporting of the matter was not fatal and it was sufficiently explained by the informant. There are no major contradictions in the testimonies of eyewitnesses. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, a revision petition has been filed asserting that the learned Courts below mis-appreciated the evidence on record. The offence punishable under Section 336 of IPC was not proved as the negligence was not established. There was a delay of two days in reporting the matter to the police, which was fatal. PW-6 Banita, is the wife of the informant, Sheela Devi, Pradhan was inimical to the accused. The learned Courts below had failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision petition be allowed and the judgments passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Neeraj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. R.P.Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. The learned Courts below had failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision petition be allowed and the judgments passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Neeraj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. R.P.Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr. Neeraj Sharma, learned counsel or the petitioners submitted that the learned Courts below did not properly appreciate the evidence on record. The prosecution has relied upon the statements of the interested witnesses and there was no corroboration to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The learned Courts below erred in declining the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr R.P.Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted that the witnesses had consistently stated about the incident and there were no contradictions in their testimonies. The delay was properly explained and the prosecution case could not be discarded due to the delay alone. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present revision has been filed against the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an Appellate Court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - 10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 11. This Court in [Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1015], while dealing with the scope of reappreciation of evidence by higher Court in criminal revision, observed in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment as under : (SCC pp. 333-34) “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married to Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. All three courts below have given concurrent findings regarding the factum of marriage and its validity. It has been held to be a valid marriage. It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of reappreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by reappreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by reappreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. … The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from [the] facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by a violation of any rule of law or procedure.’ (Vide [Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136], SCC p. 139, para 9) *** 11. Thus, it is evident from the above that this Court being the fourth court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the courts below as the said courts have exercised their discretion in good faith giving due weight to relevant material and without being swayed by any irrelevant material. Even if two views are possible on the question of fact, we, being the fourth court, should not interfere even though we may exercise discretion differently had the case come before us initially. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count is required to be interfered with.” 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The incident had taken place 03.09.2009 at around 11:00 p.m. and the matter was reported to the police on 05.09.2009 at 12:40 p.m. It was submitted that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which was fatal to the prosecution and the learned Courts below erred in accepting the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518 , that there is no hard and fast rule that delay in lodging the F.I.R. would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. Where the delay was properly explained, the same is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was held:- 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518 , that there is no hard and fast rule that delay in lodging the F.I.R. would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. Where the delay was properly explained, the same is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was held:- 10. The High Court has gone to the extent of observing that the delay of 26 hours in sending the special report by itself was enough to allow the appeal and to set aside the conviction of the accused. In our opinion, the period which elapsed in lodging the FIR of the incident has been fully explained from the evidence on record and no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution merely on the ground that the FIR was lodged at 9.20 p.m. on the next day. There is no hard-and-fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether there has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case and for this, a host of circumstances like the condition of the first informant, the nature of injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to provide medical aid to them, the distance of the hospital and the police station etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either way merely on account of the delay in lodging the FIR. In this connection, it will be useful to take note of the following observation made by this Court in Tara Singh v. State of Punjab [1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710: AIR 1991 SC 63 ] : (SCC p. 541, para 4) The delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, one cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all promptitude in giving the report to the police. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are, one cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all, it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report. Of course, in cases arising out of acute factions, there is a tendency to implicate persons belonging to the opposite faction falsely. In order to avert the danger of convicting such innocent persons the courts should be cautious to scrutinise the evidence of such interested witnesses with greater care and caution and separate grain from the chaff after subjecting the evidence to closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the FIR also will have to be scrutinised carefully. However, unless there are indications of fabrication, the court cannot reject the prosecution version as given in the FIR and later substantiated by the evidence merely on the grounds of delay. These are all matters for appreciation and much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. In Zahoor v. State of U.P. [1991 Supp (1) SCC 372: 1991 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1991 SC 40 ] it was held that mere delay by itself is not enough to reject the prosecution case unless there are clear indications of fabrication. This was reiterated in Jamna v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 185, 188 (para 4): 1994 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1994 SC 79 ] (AIR para 4) that delay by itself is not a circumstance to doubt the prosecution case. This was reiterated in Jamna v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 185, 188 (para 4): 1994 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1994 SC 79 ] (AIR para 4) that delay by itself is not a circumstance to doubt the prosecution case. In the present case, the High Court did not at all take into consideration the fact that the first informant Amar Singh and his three sons besides two others had received injuries and they had first gone to Sangrur from their village on a tractor-trolley and from there to CMC, Ludhiana which is about 60 kilometres on taxis and further, that all the six injured had been admitted in the hospital where one of them died next morning and another, namely, PW 7 Bhan Singh had sustained serious injuries which were dangerous to life and he had to be operated upon and in such circumstances he could not have left the hospital for going to PS Sangrur for lodging the FIR. The High Court also failed to take into consideration the fact that the FIR was lodged after PW 14 Sardara Singh, SI of Police Station Sangrur had come to the hospital and had recorded the statement of Amar Singh after seeking the opinion of the doctor in writing and thereafter, the said statement was sent through Constable Joga Singh to Police Station Sangrur. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no delay in either lodging the FIR or in sending the special report to the CJM and the view to the contrary taken by the High Court is absolutely incorrect. 16. This position as reiterated in Hariprasad @ Kishan Sahu vs. State of Chattisgarh, 2023 INSC 986 , wherein it was observed:- 9. It cannot be gainsaid that the First Information Report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced during the course of the trial. 16. This position as reiterated in Hariprasad @ Kishan Sahu vs. State of Chattisgarh, 2023 INSC 986 , wherein it was observed:- 9. It cannot be gainsaid that the First Information Report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced during the course of the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence [Thulia Kali vs. The State of Tamil Nadu; 1972 (3) SCC 393 ]. It is also an equally settled legal position that the receipt and recording of information reports by the police is not a condition precedent to set into motion a criminal investigation[The King Emperor vs. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad; AIR 1945 PC 18 ]. The First Information Report under Section 154 of Cr.PC, as such could not be treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant’s evidence in the Court. As held by the three-judge Bench of this Court[Apren Joseph alias current Kunjukunju&Ors. Vs. State of Kerela; 1973 (3) SCC 114 ], FIR is very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish, or before the informant’s memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, may give rise to suspicion which puts the Court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. 10. Of course, the delay in lodging an FIR by itself cannot be regarded as a sufficient ground to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution case, nor could it be treated as fatal to the case of the prosecution. The Court has to ascertain the causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. If the causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay by itself would not be fatal to the case of prosecution. 11. In Ravinder Kumar and Another Vs. The Court has to ascertain the causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. If the causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay by itself would not be fatal to the case of prosecution. 11. In Ravinder Kumar and Another Vs. State of Punjab[ 2001 (7) SCC 690 ] , it has been held that: - “13. The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most of criminal cases that there would be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that the law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Of course, a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords the commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false version. Barring these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuineness of the version incorporated therein. 14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to the lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, that the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident. 15. We are not providing an exhaustive catalogue of instances which could cause a delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is a delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. (Vide Zahoor v. State of U.P. [1991 Supp (1) SCC 372: 1991 SCC (Cri) 678], Tara Singh v. State of Punjab [1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710] and Jamna v. State of U.P. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 185: 1994 SCC (Cri) 348] ) In Tara Singh [1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710] the Court made the following observations: (SCC p. 541, para 4) “4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all, it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report.” 17. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all, it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report.” 17. In the present case, it was specifically stated in the F.I.R. that the Pradhan stated that Panchayat would visit the spot in the morning and advised the complainant to file F.I.R. in the morning. Somebody died in the village and the villagers went to perform her last rites. This fact was also stated on oath by Baldev Singh. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the delay was properly explained and there was no reason to doubt the prosecution case due to the delay. 18. The informant Balbir Singh stated that he, his wife and children were sleeping in their home on 03.09.2009. At about 11:00p.m. he heard the noise of the pelting of stones on his roof. He woke his wife and switched on the light. He saw that the family of Deshraj, his wife and daughter Asha and son Kamal Dev were pelting the stones. They said that the informant had gone to the police station. He called Pradhan of Mahila Mandal and Pradhan of the village. Leela Devi and Suresh Kumar came to the spot and saw the accused running from the spot. They went to the police station on 05.09.2009 because somebody died on 04.09.2009 and everybody went to perform her last rites. He duly identified the stones, which were recovered by the police. He stated in his cross-examination that Leela Devi was his sister-in-law, and Sarwan Singh and Gian Chand were his uncles. Suresh and Yashpal are his brothers. Banita is his wife. His house is located in a lonely place. There is a public path adjacent to his house. There is Palli of Partap Chand on the upper side of his house. He had affixed a light in his Veranda. He was sleeping in the first room, adjacent to the passage. He admitted that there was no window towards the passage. His statement was recorded on 5.09.2009. Gian Chand, Yashpal etc. were with him. The accused pelted 10-12 stones and 10-12 bricks, which were shown by him to the police. The accused were pelting the stone due to a dispute over the Janjghar. He admitted that there was no window towards the passage. His statement was recorded on 5.09.2009. Gian Chand, Yashpal etc. were with him. The accused pelted 10-12 stones and 10-12 bricks, which were shown by him to the police. The accused were pelting the stone due to a dispute over the Janjghar. He admitted that he and the accused had pending litigation regarding Janjghar for the last 2-3 years. He admitted that there is a passage adjacent to the Janjghar. He admitted that the Janjghar was constructed and the passage was given to the accused. He admitted that the accused demanded passage from the Beed and he does not want to give them passage over the Beed. He admitted that Deshraj resides in Delhi. He admitted that Asha and Kamal Dev reside with their maternal uncle. He volunteered to say that earlier they were residing in the village. He had called the Pardhan of Mahila Mandal, who arrived within 5 minutes with her husband. 10-15 people gathered on the spot. The Police Station is located at a distance of 7 KM. He denied that the accused did not pelt any stone. 19. Leela Devi (PW-3) stated that she was at home on 03.09.2009. The neighbour’s dog started barking loudly at about 11:00 p.m. She woke, switched on the light and came out. She heard some noise, coming from the house of Balbir and woke her husband. Banita called her. She was crying and was asking for help. She (Banita) said that the whole family of Deshraj had reached her house to kill her. They were pelting stones. She advised Banita to go inside the house. She told Banita that she (Leela Devi) would collect the villagers and reach the spot. She went towards the house of the informant. Her husband went to wake up the villagers. She woke Rajo Devi and when they reached the house of Balbir, they saw Deshraj, his wife Bimla Devi, daughter Asha and son Kamal Dev pelting the stones and bricks. They damaged the palli of Partap Chand. They removed the bricks and threw them in the courtyard of the informant. They also damaged the Chajja of Balbir Singh. The accused said that the informant party was saved on the date of the incident but, the accused would not leave the informant party. The accused ran away from the spot. They damaged the palli of Partap Chand. They removed the bricks and threw them in the courtyard of the informant. They also damaged the Chajja of Balbir Singh. The accused said that the informant party was saved on the date of the incident but, the accused would not leave the informant party. The accused ran away from the spot. The other villagers also gathered on the spot. She asked them to apprehend the accused. She also identified the stones and bricks. She stated in her cross-examination that her house is located at a distance of half a kilometre from the house of Balbir. The house of Purshotam and Joginder is located adjacent to her house. She started from the house at about 10:45-11:00 p.m. Then corrected to say that she had not seen the exact time. She reached the house of the informant at 11-11:15 p.m. She admitted that the house of Balbir is not visible from her house. She and Rajo went together. Her husband reached after 2-3 minutes. Sarwan, Yashpal, Joginder and other villagers also gathered on the spot. The house of the Deshraj is at a distance of ½ K.M from the house of Balbir. She admitted that the accused and Balbir had a dispute over the Janjghar for 2-3 years. Balbir is his cousin. She denied that she was making a false statement due to the relationship. 20. Sarwan Singh (PW-4) stated that he heard the noise of Suresh Kumar, crying at about 11:00 p.m. He went towards the house of Suresh and Balbir. He met Deshraj, who was running. He was saying something but he could not hear it. The lights of the house of Balbir were switched on. The people were crying. The wife of Baldev was weeping. Stones and bricks were lying in the house of the informant. The Palli of Partap Singh was damaged. He stated in his cross-examination that he had made a similar statement to the police as was made by him in the Court. He knew Beli Ram. Wattan Singh and Deshraj are his sons. He admitted that Wattan Singh had filed a case regarding the passage, which is pending before the Court. He volunteered to say that the Janjghar belongs to the whole village. The land on which Janjghar was constructed, is jointly owned by the villagers. The passage has been given towards one side of the Janjghar. He admitted that Wattan Singh had filed a case regarding the passage, which is pending before the Court. He volunteered to say that the Janjghar belongs to the whole village. The land on which Janjghar was constructed, is jointly owned by the villagers. The passage has been given towards one side of the Janjghar. His house is at a distance of 500 meters from the house of Balbir and the house of Suresh is located at a distance of 400 meters. Balbir is not related to him. The dispute with Wattan Singh over the Janjghar has been pending for the last three years. 21. Suresh Kumar (PW-5) stated that he was awakened by his wife on 03.09.2009 at 11:00 p.m. She said that some noise was coming from the house of Balbir. Banita Devi called and said that Deshraj and his family members were pelting stones. They were threatening to kill her. He and his wife went towards the house of Balbir. He departed on the way and called the villagers. He saw Deshraj, Bimla, Asha and Kamal Dev running. They were threatening to kill the informant. Banita was crying. Stones and bricks were lying on the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that Balbir was a brother by relationship of the village because all the villagers are brothers. He had not seen Deshraj and his family members pelting the stone. His statement was recorded only once. He admitted that the villagers had a dispute with the brother of Deshraj over the Janjghar. 22. Banita Devi (PW-6) stated that all the family members were sleeping. Deshraj his wife Bimla, daughter Asha Devi and son Kamal Dev started pelting the stones. Balbir Singh woke up and switched on the light. She and Balbir saw that the accused were pelting the stone at her house. They were also abusing the informant party and they were asking why the matter was reported to the police. The accused would kill all the family members of the informant. The informant and his family members started crying. She called Smt. Leela Devi, Pardhan Mahila Mandal, who reached the spot within five minutes. The villagers also arrived thereafter. The accused ran away from the spot by saying that the informant party was saved but they would not be spared in future. She stated in her cross-examination that Palli of Partap Singh was also damaged in the incident. She called Smt. Leela Devi, Pardhan Mahila Mandal, who reached the spot within five minutes. The villagers also arrived thereafter. The accused ran away from the spot by saying that the informant party was saved but they would not be spared in future. She stated in her cross-examination that Palli of Partap Singh was also damaged in the incident. She could not tell the exact distance between her house and the Palli of Partap Singh. Although they were located adjacent to each other. Partap Singh is her brother-in-law. She was not aware that Partap Singh had filed a case against the accused. She was not aware when the work of Janjghar was commenced. She did not state to the police that Janjghar was being repaired and Mahila Mandal was involved in the repair. Her house is located in a lonely place. Leela Devi is her sister-in-law. Sarwan and Gian Chand are her uncles-in-law. Suresh and Yashpal are her brothers-in-law. She and her husband were present when the torch was switched on. She could not tell the time during which time the accused remained on the spot. She volunteered to say that the accused remained on the spot for 5 to 7 minutes. The telephonic call was made at 11:00 p.m. Leela Devi came to the spot first. Her husband came after about 2 minutes and other villagers came afterwards. The accused had run away from the spot by the time Sarwan Singh etc. reached the spot. Many stones and bricks were pelted but she could not tell their number. She was not aware that the passage leads to the house of Dev Raj, adjacent to Janjghar. She was not aware that the villagers wanted to close that passage. 23. These are the testimonies of the eyewitnesses. 24. It was submitted that the prosecution has relied upon related witnesses. The eyewitnesses admitted in their cross-examination that they were related to the informant in some way or the other. Hence, their testimonies should have been rejected as they are interested witnesses. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that there is a distinction between an interested witness and related witness. The interested witness is the one who derives some benefits from the litigation. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that there is a distinction between an interested witness and related witness. The interested witness is the one who derives some benefits from the litigation. It was observed: 12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593]; [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] and [Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] ). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi case [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.…” 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.…” 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in [Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465], wherein this Court observed : (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in [Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966] : (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 25. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 25. In the present case, nothing was shown in the statements of witnesses that they were interested in the success of the case and the submissions that the testimonies of the witnesses are to be rejected because they are interested witnesses cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the ground of a relationship. It was observed: 31. In this context, we may refer with profit the decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364 , wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows:- “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = ( AIR 1952 SC 54 at page 59).” 32. In the said case, it was further observed that: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true that when feelings run high and there is a personal cause for enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202 , it has been ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would not be considered to be interested witnesses who would also mention the names of the other persons as responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. 34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 82 , a three-judge Bench has held that evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. 35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614 , it has been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the other, convicted for some animus or some other reason. 36. 36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010 , while dealing with the liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two-judge Bench observed that: “it is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or close relative to the deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible.” The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the innocent is wrongly convicted. If on such careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 26. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav vs. State of Bihar 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986 (SC) as under: 28. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and withstands the rigour of cross-examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness, only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. 29. When the court is convinced with the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to make reliance upon it in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591 : “32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the appreciation of evidence of a related witness. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465, Vivian Bose, J. for the Bench observed the law as under (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true when feelings run high and there is a personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133 : AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], a five-judge Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under (AIR pp. 209-210, para 14) “14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, criminal courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” 34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1964) 3 SCR 397 : AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court held that evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinised but no corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [ (2005) 9 SCC 195 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213: 2005 Cri LJ 2199], this Court observed that: (SCC p. 227, para 6) “6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.” 35. The last case we need to concern ourselves with is Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 14 SCC 150 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773], wherein this Court after observing previous precedents has summarised the law in the following manner: : (SCC p. 164, para 38) “38. … it is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. … it is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. If on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, a conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of such witness. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or the victim is no grounds to reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.” 36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a strong interest in the result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule which remains the bulwark of this system, and which determines the value of evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desire to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner, when it involves his interest. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour. These are most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony, and should never be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under the facts and circumstances of each case.” 30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution, the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid aspect as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 27. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 27. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791 wherein it was observed: 10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses being relatives of the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 & PW6 and even PW7. 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that merely because the witnesses are related to each other is no reason to discard their testimonies. The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and caution. It was observed: 55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examined the credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court in a number of cases has had the opportunity to consider the said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded, however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded, however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 , this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 , this Court observed: “29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [ AIR 1953 SC 364 ] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 ] in the following words : (Sarwan Singh case [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 , p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549 , this Court held that in several cases when only family members are present at the time of the incident and the case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence, Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the evidence in the process of trial. 29. Thus the testimonies of the witnesses were required to be seen with care and caution. 30. 29. Thus the testimonies of the witnesses were required to be seen with care and caution. 30. In the present case, the informant and his wife are the occupants of the house and they are the natural witnesses, whose presence on the spot cannot be doubted. 31. The witnesses consistently stated that Leela Devi was called to the spot and she reached the spot with her husband, therefore, their presence is also established on the spot. Nothing was shown in their cross-examination that they had any interest in deposing falsely against the accused. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly accepted their testimonies. 32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan And Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104 , that while assessing the evidence of an eye witness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eye witness to be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed:- “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses the Court must adhere to two principles, namely whether in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court in our opinion has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and in fact, had misappreciated the evidence which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence taken insofar as the context of the case and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation.” 33. There is nothing inherently improbable in their testimonies and therefore, their testimonies cannot be discarded. 34. There is nothing inherently improbable in their testimonies and therefore, their testimonies cannot be discarded. 34. It was submitted that there was a dispute regarding Janjghar and litigation was pending before the Civil Court. This shows the enmity between the informant and the accused party. In this regard, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that enmity is a double-edged weapon while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime, therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the pending litigation. 35. The informant and his wife specifically stated that the accused Deshraj was aggrieved by the fact that the informant had lodged an F.I.R. against them at the Police Station. This shows that the incident started because of the report made by the informant to the police. This would furnish an adequate motive for the accused to attack the informant and his family members; hence there is nothing inherently suspect in the genesis of the incident. 36. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses making them unreliable. The incident took place on 03.09.2009. The witnesses were deposing in the year 2011 after a lapse of two years. Human memories fail with time and do not behave like a video recorder. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and another Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2023 SC 1736 , that witnesses do not have photographic memory and the contradictions are bound to come with time. It was observed as under:- “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which did not have this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )] 37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253, that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed:- 38.... This Court in [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. Referring to [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In [Kuriya v.State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held : (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even in law render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case, that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case, that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]] . 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to taking steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to [Ashok Kumarv. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777] .” 41. In [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held : (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 38. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh Vs State of Bihar, AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed:- “[17] It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed with guns and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 . However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 . This Court while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony, while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 39. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. The Court has to see whether the discrepancies affect the prosecution case adversely or not and whether they are related to the core of the prosecution case or the details. The contradictions were bound to come with time and minor contradictions are insufficient to discard the prosecution case. 40. In the present case, the discrepancy regarding the arrival of Pradhan on the spot can be due to the lapse of time and the same cannot be used for the discarding the prosecution case. 41. HC Purshotam Dass (PW-7) went to the spot and found stones and bricks lying on the spot. He has shown them in the site plan (Ex.PW-7/A) at point “F”. 41. HC Purshotam Dass (PW-7) went to the spot and found stones and bricks lying on the spot. He has shown them in the site plan (Ex.PW-7/A) at point “F”. He had also shown a Palli of Partap Singh at point “B”. He had shown the broken slates. The Photographs (Ext.P1 to P6), also show stones and bricks and broken slates, damaged Chajja and Palli. These circumstances corroborate the version of the informant. It is trite to say the man may lie but the circumstances do not. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the testimonies of the eyewitnesses as corroborated by the circumstances on record. 42. The accused had pelted the stones negligently on the house of the informant, which would have endangered human life. The accused damaged the Palli of Partap Singh. They also threatened the informant and his family members; therefore, they were rightly held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 427, and 506 of IPC. 43. It was submitted that the learned Courts below erred in declining the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This submission cannot be accepted. The report of the Probation Officer was called. He recorded the statements of witnesses and reported that offenders often pick up quarrels with the neighbours as was reported by Pradhan, Ward Member Mahila Mandal and other people of the society. Thus, antecedents of the accused were not found to be such as the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could be granted to them. 44. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commandant 20 Bn ITB Police vs Sanjay Binjola 2001 (5) SCC 317 , that nobody can claim the benefit of Section 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and the Court has to pass the orders having regards nature of the offence, general effect on the society and character of the offender. It was observed:- 9. It is not disputed that for an offence punishable under Section 10 of the Act, the sentence provided is one year with a fine entitling the respondent to claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It was observed:- 9. It is not disputed that for an offence punishable under Section 10 of the Act, the sentence provided is one year with a fine entitling the respondent to claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It transpires that both the appellate as well as the High Court, after passing the order of conviction and sentence and having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and character of the offender, thought it expedient to take a lenient view and instead of sending him to jail opted to pass a sentence till the rising of the court. On the point of sentence, the appellate court observed: “I think it justified to consider leniently because the accused Sanjay Binjola is a young boy and he just took excessive liquor on the alleged liquor day. It is also to be kept in mind that in the paramilitary forces liquor is provided comparatively cheaper to the paramilitary personnel, hence I find that the punishment given to the accused of a sentence of 3 months is severe, consequently, I reach at the conclusion that the sentence awarded by the lower court is modified accordingly.” and in this context directed that the order of conviction and sentence would not adversely affect the service career of the accused. It is true that nobody can claim the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act as a matter of right and the court has to pass appropriate orders in the facts and circumstances of each case having regard to the nature of the offence, its general effect on the society and the character of the offender, etc. There are laws which specifically direct that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act shall not apply to the persons convicted for those offences and there may be cases under other laws as well which may not justify the exercise of the powers of the Probation of Offenders Act. Even apart from such exclusions, the courts should be wary of extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to offences relating to corruption, narcotic drugs, etc. Even apart from such exclusions, the courts should be wary of extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to offences relating to corruption, narcotic drugs, etc. This Court has indicated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not normally be afforded in respect of the offences under Section 304-A IPC when it involves rash or negligent driving. Those are instances of showing how the nature of the offence could dissuade the court from giving the benefit. However, in an offence of a trivial nature, as the respondent is stated to have committed and keeping in view its peculiar circumstances, we find it to be a fit case where powers under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act can be exercised.” (Emphasis supplied) 45. In the present case, the report clearly shows that the antecedents of the accused were not such that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could be granted to them and the learned Trial Court rightly declined this benefit. 46. It was submitted that the report of the Probation Officer is required while passing an order Under Section 4 and not under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. This submission cannot be accepted. In the present case, first of all, the accused had threatened the informant to kill him and his family members. Hence, the offence was punishable under Section 506 Part-II, which is punishable with life imprisonment and the benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act was not available. Further Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act also provides that the character of the Offenders has to be considered while granting the benefit and when the report of the Probation Officer showed that the conduct of the offender was not such that the benefit could be granted, the learned Trial Court could not have ignored the report. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order declining the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. The accused were sentenced as under:- Section Sentence 336 read with Section 34 of IP Two months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 427 read with Section 34 of IPC. The accused were sentenced as under:- Section Sentence 336 read with Section 34 of IP Two months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 427 read with Section 34 of IPC. Six months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 506 read with Section 34 of IPC Six months rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 47. The accused were aggrieved by the fact that the informant and his mother had reported the matter to the police. Reporting the matter to the police is a valuable right of a citizen and in case he is intimidated for doing so, it will be the end of the rule of the law as the people will not be able to complain to the police even after the commission of offence. Therefore, the circumstances, in which the offence was committed was such as would not justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. 48. Keeping in view the nature of the offence and circumstances in which it was committed, the punishment of two months and six months cannot be said to be excessive and no interference is required with the same. 49. No other point was urged. 50. In view of the above, the present revision fails and the same is dismissed.