ORDER : 1. Heard on application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2. Taking into consideration the short period of delay and cause shown in the application, despite objection, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Application for condonation of delay is allowed. 3. With the consent of the parties, this appeal is heard finally. 4. The only issue raised by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner is that once the learned Single Judge observed that the Rajasthan High Court, Bench at Jaipur had no territorial jurisdiction, it ought not to have decided the case on merits. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that as the appellant-petitioner himself had approached the Court, the learned Single Judge examined the merits of the case. 6. We have gone through the contents of the petition and the order which has been passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. Apparently, the appellant-petitioner was proceeded against and was terminated from service while he was posted at Nagaland. He preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority stationed at Patna, Bihar, who decided his appeal. Thereafter, revision petition against the order passed by the Appellate Authority was also filed stationed at Patna only. The revision petition was also dismissed. 8. A perusal of the pleadings made in the petition reflects that the appellant-petitioner was initially selected in the services of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 03.03.2003 and performed his basic training at Central Reserve Police Force Group Centre-II, Ajmer, Rajasthan whereafter, he was appointed as Constable (GD) CRPF. These facts, even if taken as correct, do not constitute the part of the cause of action. 9. This Court had an occasion to examine similar issue of territorial jurisdiction in the case of Unique Organics Limited Vs. Union of India and Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14226/2023) and has observed in Para 15 as under: “15. The aforesaid principle was lucidly reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent judicial pronouncement in the case of State of Goa Vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others (supra). On facts, that was a case where notifications issued under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were under challenge. The Factual background of that case was noted by the Hon’ble Supreme as below: “11. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited & Others (supra). On facts, that was a case where notifications issued under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were under challenge. The Factual background of that case was noted by the Hon’ble Supreme as below: “11. The High Court, while delivering the impugned judgment and order, proceeded to hold that the writ petitioners were aggrieved not only by the impugned notification issued by the appellant under the GGST Act but also by the act of the Central Government in issuing the impugned notifications under the CGST Act as well as the IGST Act seeking to levy tax (GST) on lotteries organised, promoted and conducted by the State of Sikkim. The High Court further noted that it was not the actual incidence of GST under the GGST Act which is impugned in the writ petitions but the provisions of law made by the Parliament as well as the respective State Governments including the State of Goa by which they sought to levy GST on lotteries. Considering the prayers made in the writ petition, the High Court was further of the view that, at least, a part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. The High Court was also of the view that since notice had been issued on WP (C) Nos. 36 and 38 of 2017 on 17-7-2017, much before Rule was issued by the High Court of Bombay at Goa on 20-9-2017 in Serenity Trades (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2017 SCC Online Bom 10242, no ground had been set up by the appellant for deletion; hence, the interim applications seeking deletion stood dismissed. 12. In support of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain and try the writ petition, this is what the petitioning company has stated: “29. That this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition as the cause of action arises in Sikkim only. Both the petitioner and the respondents are located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court.” Apart from these two sentences, nothing more has been averred in support of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. 13. That this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition as the cause of action arises in Sikkim only. Both the petitioner and the respondents are located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court.” Apart from these two sentences, nothing more has been averred in support of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. 13. From the above, it is clear that according to the petitioning company the cause of action has arisen in Sikkim only, meaning thereby the whole of the cause of action and not part of it; additionally, it is stated that all the respondents are located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court which is factually incorrect.” The cause of action in the aforesaid case was explained as below: “16. The expression “cause of action” has not been defined in the Constitution. However, the classic definition of “cause of action” given by Lord Brett in Cooke vs. Gill, (1873) LR 8 CP 107 that “cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court” has been accepted by this Court in a couple of decisions. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. However, in the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such “cause of action” is the material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain relief as claimed. 17. Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests.” Having thus explained the principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court at Sikkim had no territorial jurisdiction.” 10. Further in the case of Somya Saxena Vs. National Medical Commission and Others (D.B. Civil Special Appeal Writ No. 1312/2022), while dealing with the similar issue, has observed in Para 6.7 and 6.8 as below: “6.7 In the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Another (supra), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that nature of case which gives rise to part of cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court are only those having a nexus or relevance with the lis involved in the case and none else. On facts, that was a case where claim of the benefit of the Passbook Scheme contained in Import Export Policy in relation to certain credits to be given on export of shrimps was involved. The respondents therein claimed benefit on the basis of export of prawns and import of the inputs. It was an admitted fact that the benefits, which the respondents therein were seeking, were to be extended through the port situated at Chennai. As those benefits were not admitted for various reasons, the respondents therein filed special civil applications before the High Court at Ahmedabad. In support of the case that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Ahmedabad, the facts regarding the place where the parties were carrying on their business of export and import, places wherefrom order of export and import was placed, documents and payments for export and import sent/made, credit of duty claimed in respect of exports which were handled, payments received, non-grant and denial of utilisation of the credit affecting the business and execution of bank guarantee through their bankers at the place, were relied upon to contend that a part of cause of action had arisen at the place where the aforesaid facts and transactions had taken place. Having noted the factual premise of the case as stated and the contentions in support of the arguments that part of cause of action had arisen at Ahmedabad, their Lordships in the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as below: “14. Though it is also contended in Para 16 of the application that the appellants have their office at Ahmedabad, that contention has not been pressed since it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office at Ahmedabad. Dehors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts enumerated hereinabove in support of the cause of action pleaded by the respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way connected with the relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute the cause of action at Ahmedabad. 15. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court reads: “226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 16. It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 (SCC at p. 713) wherein it was held: “Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial.” 17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad. 18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The non-granting and denial of credit in the passbook having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants.” In the aforesaid case, it was held that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Gujarat High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the facts, which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do no give rise to a cause of action so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court concerned. 6.8 The nexus theory as propounded earlier was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. & Others Vs. Haribox Swalram & Others (supra). 6.8 The nexus theory as propounded earlier was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. & Others Vs. Haribox Swalram & Others (supra). That was a case where textile mills were situated in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. The money was to be paid to the mills at Bombay. Objection to territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court was sustained, but in intra-court appeal, it was held that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of contract at Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. Respondents No. 2 and 3 in that case had filed a petition before Calcutta High Court pleading inter alia that they had entered into contract and made advance payment. The mills concerned supplied and delivered the goods to them from time to time, but a substantial part of the contract remained unexecuted. The mills were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of goods. The mills intimated that delivery could not be effected as the banking transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured that arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible. However, as the goods were not supplied due to subsequent events wherein the management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government, Respondents No. 2 and 3 therein approached the authorities for release of goods. The goods were released only in part. Later on, in stead of meeting the demand regarding supply of balance quantity of goods, outstanding contracts were cancelled. In this back ground, writ petition was filed before Calcutta High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying upon earlier decisions in the cases of State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties (supra) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Others (supra), held thus: “12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in Para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in Para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under: “73. Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to hereinabove addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances, this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application.” 12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed........” 11. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed........” 11. In view of aforesaid law laid down by this Court, we have no doubt that this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to deal with the correctness and validity of the disciplinary proceedings and orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority, all situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court coupled with the fact that the appellant-petitioner also was posted and working at a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 12. Therefore, once it is held that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on merits, are also without jurisdiction and are, therefore, set aside insofar as the correctness and validity of the disciplinary proceedings and orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority are concerned. The finding to the extent that this Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction alone, is upheld. 13. Appeal is accordingly partly allowed in the manner and to the extent stated above. We leave the appellant-petitioner to avail the alternative remedy, as may be available under the law.