ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State and the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6. 3. First Information Report was registered at the instance of the second respondent for the various offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 468, 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”) against the appellant (accused No. 4) and three other accused. Ultimately, a charge-sheet has been filed only for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with 34 of the IPC. 4. There was a general power of attorney admittedly executed on 23rd March, 2005 by one Nagammal and Gengammal in respect of the subject property in favour of accused No. 2 (A. Jayaraman). There is no dispute about the genuineness of the power of attorney and the fact that the same was registered. Accused No. 2 along with accused Nos. 1 and 3 executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 5th September, 2005 in favour of a company, namely, M/s. Classic Farms Chennai Ltd. (for short “the Company”) of which the appellant was the Managing Director. The MOU records that the accused Nos. 1 to 3 have agreed to sell the property in question to the company. Then comes the sale deed dated 18th January, 2006 executed by several persons. Nagammal and Gangammal were also vendors who were represented by their power of attorney holder-accused No. 2. The sale deed was executed in favour of P. Babu (accused No. 3). Thereafter, accused No. 3 executed the sale deed dated 7th February, 2006 in favour of the company represented by the appellant as its Managing Director. The sale deed dated 7th February, 2006 has been admittedly registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Chengalpattu, Chennai. Thereafter, the company executed a sale deed dated 20th October, 2008 in favour of the another private limited company and the said private limited company executed a registered power of attorney in favour of one Chandru in the year 2011. These are the bare facts which can be gathered from the charge-sheet and the statements of the witnesses. 5. A complaint was filed by the second respondent on 27th May, 2014 on the basis of which FIR was registered. These are the bare facts which can be gathered from the charge-sheet and the statements of the witnesses. 5. A complaint was filed by the second respondent on 27th May, 2014 on the basis of which FIR was registered. Thus, the complaint was filed 8 years after the date of execution of the MOU and the first sale deed dated 18th January, 2006. As stated earlier, the second sale deed executed in favour of the company of which the appellant was the Managing Director is of 7th February, 2006. Thus, there is a gross delay of 8 years in lodging the First Information Report. There is nothing placed on record to show that the concerned respondents had made any grievance about the registration of the sale deeds in other manner till 2014. 6. There is no dispute that the power of attorney was executed by the aforesaid two persons in favour of accused No. 2. The power of attorney does not provide for payment of any consideration by accused No. 2. There is no allegation regarding forgery as far as the power of attorney is concerned. In short, the grievance of the second respondent appears to be that they did not receive the money as promised by accused Nos. 1 to 3. 7. According to us, the proceeding against the present appellant by lodging the First Information Report 8 years after the sale deed was executed in favour of the company of which he was the Managing Director is itself an abuse of process of law. Only on this ground, a case is made out for quashing the criminal proceedings as against the present appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 5th October, 2023 is set aside and the proceeding of CC No. 196 of 2015 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate-II, Chengalpattu are hereby quashed and set aside only as against the present appellant. 8. We make it clear that the observations made in the judgment are only for the purposes of considering the case of the appellant and shall not be construed as any findings on the issue of involvement of the co-accused. 9. The appeal is accordingly allowed.