JUDGMENT : GOPINATH P., J. The short question and the only one that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the Government could exercise its jurisdiction under Section 191 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1994 Act’) against Ext.P11 decision of the committee of the Aryanad Grama Panchayat (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Panchayat’) in the light of the bar created by sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this writ petition are noticed below:- 2. The 9th respondent is a Company engaged in executing an infrastructure project commonly known as the ‘Vizhinjam Port’ at Vizhinjam in Thiruvananthapuram District. It had, in connection with the construction activities of the Port, intended to set up a stone (granite) quarry in certain Government land falling within the limits of the Panchayat. When its application for license from the Panchayat under Section 233 of the 1994 Act was not processed, it approached this Court by filing a writ petition (W.P(C)No.35965/2022), which was allowed by Ext.P8 judgment dated 23-12-2022, finding that by virtue of the operation of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 236 of the 1994 Act, the 9th respondent had a deemed licence. This Court therefore directed the Panchayat to issue a D&O/Trade licence in paper form to the 9th respondent. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Panchayat issued Ext.P9 licence on 05-01-2023. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Panchayat Committee under the provisions of Section 276 of the 1994 Act against the grant of the licence, and the Panchayat Committee by Ext.P11 decided to cancel the licence. The decision of the Panchayat Committee was communicated to the 9th respondent by Ext.P11(a) issued by the President of the Panchayat. On receipt of Ext.P11(a), the 9th respondent chose to file an application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act before the Government and the Government by Ext.P12 order, stayed the operation of the decision of the Panchayat Committee pending disposal of the matter by the Government. The petitioner is thus before this Court challenging Ext.P12 and taking the specific contention that in terms of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act, the 9th respondent could not have maintained any application before the Government. 3. The petitioner is thus before this Court challenging Ext.P12 and taking the specific contention that in terms of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act, the 9th respondent could not have maintained any application before the Government. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has referred to the provisions of Sections 191 & 276 of the 1994 Act and also to the fact that permission was earlier denied to a third party for carrying out quarrying operations at the same site, and without any just cause or reason the Government has interfered with the decision of the Panchayat Committee. The learned counsel has also placed for my consideration the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Haridas V. V. (Dr.) MD v. State of Kerala; 2022 (7) KHC 441 , and has submitted that the said decision is not authority for the proposition that an application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act could be maintained where a remedy under Section 276 of the 1994 Act was available to the 9th respondent. 4. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent Panchayat would also support the contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submit that the remedy of the 9th respondent against the decision taken by the Panchayat Committee was to file an appeal/revision before the Tribunal under Section 276 of the 1994 Act and the application before the Government under Section 191 of the 1994 Act was not maintainable in view of the specific bar in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent vehemently opposes the grant of any relief to the petitioner. It is submitted that there is absolutely no bonafidesin the contention now taken before this Court. It is submitted that the wordings of Section 191 of the 1994 Act clearly indicate that the Government exercises substantial authority to cancel or vary a resolution or decision of the Panchayat and Ext.P11 qualifies as a resolution or a decision of the Panchayat and therefore the Government has every authority to examine its validity under Section 191 of the 1994 Act. It is submitted that a remedy against Ext.P11 was not available to the 9th respondent under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. It is submitted that a remedy against Ext.P11 was not available to the 9th respondent under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. It is pointed out that under Section 276 of the 1994 Act, a further revision will lie only in respect of matters set out in Section 276(5)(a) and Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act. It is pointed out that Section 276(5)(a) of the 1994 Act deals with issues arising out of assessment, demand and collection of taxes or fees or cess, whereas Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act speaks about grant of permission and licences for trades, factories, markets and other establishments. It is submitted that Ext.P11 is not a resolution granting permission or licences for trades, factories, markets and other establishments and it is only a resolution cancelling an existing licence and therefore does not qualify as a decision under Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act against which a revision could be filed before the Tribunal under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. It is also submitted that the Government by proceedings dated 28-09-2024 has passed an order referring the matter for the consideration of the Tribunal as contemplated by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act, and therefore the grievance, if any, of the petitioner stands redressed. The decisions of this Court in Haridas V. V. (supra), Sumithran v. State of Kerala; 2020 (6) KLT 550 & Ahammed Kunju v. State of Kerala; 2010 (1) KLT 217 are referred to by the learned Counsel for the 9th respondent in support of his contentions. 6. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader also. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent Panchayat and the learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Section 191 of the 1994 Act reads thus: “191. Power of cancellation and suspension of resolutions etc. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent Panchayat and the learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Section 191 of the 1994 Act reads thus: “191. Power of cancellation and suspension of resolutions etc. – (1) Government may either suo motu or, on a reference by President, Secretary or a member, or on a petition received from a citizen, cancel or vary a resolution passed or decision taken by the Panchayat if in their opinion such decision or resolution- (a) is not legally passed or taken; or (b) is in excess of the powers conferred by this Act or any other law or its abuse; or (c) is likely to endanger human life, health, public safety, communal harmony or may lead to riot or quarrel; or (d) is in violation of the directions or provisions of grant issued by Government in the matter of implementing the plans, schemes or programmes. (2) Before cancelling or amending a resolution or decision as per sub-section (1), the Government may refer the matter for consideration either of the Ombudsman constituted under Section 271G or the Tribunal constituted under Section 271 and the Ombudsman or the Tribunal, as the case may be, after giving the Panchayat an opportunity of being heard, send a report to the Government with its conclusions and the Government may, on its basis cancel, amend or confirm the resolution or decision. (3) If another remedy is available to the petitioner through the Tribunal under Section 276, the Government shall not consider any petition for cancelling or amending any resolution or decision of the Panchayat. (4) If Government, consider that a resolution or decision of the Panchayat has to be cancelled or amended as per sub-section (1) it may suspend such resolution or decision temporarily and may direct the Panchayat to defer its implementation till the final disposal after the completion of the procedure under sub-section (2)”. A reading of Section 191 of the 1994 Act will indicate that an application under Section 191(1) of the 1994 Act cannot be entertained by the Government, if the applicant has any remedy under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. A reading of Section 191 of the 1994 Act will indicate that an application under Section 191(1) of the 1994 Act cannot be entertained by the Government, if the applicant has any remedy under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. Therefore, for the purposes of this case, the only question to be considered is whether the 9th respondent had a remedy against Ext.P11 under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. It is admitted before me that a decision of the Panchayat on a matter relating to the grant of licences for trades, factories, markets and other establishments falls within the provisions of Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act. Since Ext.P11 is a decision taken to cancel a licence granted for trades or factories or other establishments, I find it difficult to accept the contention that since Ext.P11 is a proceeding cancelling such permission, it falls outside the scope of Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act. It is settled law that the power to grant a licence includes the power to cancel, set aside or reject an application for licence. In State of U.P.v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 it was held:- “52. …….. In this case the grant of permission is part of or incidental to the statutory power to regulate orderly development of the “Development Area” under the Act under regulatory laws. The power to regulate with the obligations and functions that go with and are incidental to it, are not spent or exhausted with the grant of permission. The power of regulation which stretches beyond the mere grant of permission, takes within its sweep the power, in appropriate cases, to revoke or cancel the permission as incidental or supplemental to the power to grant. Otherwise the plenitude of the power to regulate would be whittled down or even frustrated.” Therefore, Ext.P11 can only be a decision relatable to the matters set out under Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act. In that view of the matter and in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act, it must be held that the 9th respondent could not have maintained any application against Ext.P11 before the Government. 8. In that view of the matter and in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act, it must be held that the 9th respondent could not have maintained any application against Ext.P11 before the Government. 8. The decision of this Court in Haridas V. V. (supra) on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the 9th respondent is not authority for the proposition that an application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act would lie even in respect of matters for which a remedy was provided under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. I say this because, the decision in Haridas V. V. (supra) did not turn on an interpretation of the provisions of Section 276 of the 1994 Act and the bar created by sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act. The facts of the cases before this Court in Haridas V. V. (supra) as recorded by the learned Judge indicate that the grievance of the petitioners in the writ petitions was against the resolution of the Panchayat to set up a waste treatment plant of the Municipality in the puramboke property vested in the Panchayat and lying adjacent to the premises of the petitioners in that case. That was obviously a matter clearly falling within Section 191 of the 1994 Act and for which there was no remedy under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the decision of this Court in Haridas V. V. (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. The judgment of this Court in Sumithran (supra) also does not come to the aid of the 9 th respondent, as I have already found that Ext.P11 qualifies as a matter set out in Section 276(5)(b) of the 1994 Act. The only other decision relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent is a decision of this Court in Ahammed Kunju (supra). The only other decision relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent is a decision of this Court in Ahammed Kunju (supra). On the facts of that case, it is clear that this Court was concerned with the provisions of the Panchayat Raj (Issue of Licence to Dangerous and Offensive Trades and Factories) Rules, 1996, and held that the remedy under Rule 12(4) of those Rules is an additional or alternate remedy, and it is not necessary that the person aggrieved must always resort to the remedy under Section 276 of the 1994 Act. That decision is not authority for the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent and did not consider a situation where a specific bar was created as in Section 191(3) of the 1994 Act. 9. In the light of the above findings, this writ petition is allowed. It is declared that the application filed by the 9 th respondent against Ext.P11 before the Government is not maintainable in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act. However, since the 9th respondent was already before the Government by filing an application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act immediately after Ext.P11 decision was taken by the Panchayat Committee, I deem it appropriate to direct that the period from the date of filing of the application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act before the Government till today (01-10-2024) shall be excluded for the purposes of determining any period of limitation within which the 9 th respondent had to approach the Tribunal by filing a revision petition under the provisions of Section 276 of the 1994 Act. I further deem it appropriate to direct that status quo as on today shall be maintained for a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment to enable the 9th respondent to avail the remedy of revision before the Tribunal under Section 276 of the 1994 Act against Ext.P11. If such a revision petition is filed by the 9th respondent before the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall take a decision thereon including on any application for interim relief after affording an opportunity of hearing to the 9 th respondent, the writ petitioner and the Panchayat. If such a revision petition is filed by the 9th respondent before the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall take a decision thereon including on any application for interim relief after affording an opportunity of hearing to the 9 th respondent, the writ petitioner and the Panchayat. In the light of the declaration that no application under Section 191 of the 1994 Act was maintainable against Ext.P11, I deem it appropriate to clarify that the reference made by the Government to the Tribunal in terms of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 191 of the 1994 Act was also without jurisdiction. I make it clear that I have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter and that the Tribunal shall take a decision on any interlocutory application or on the main application untrammelled by any observation in this Judgment and in any proceedings before the Government. Writ petition is ordered accordingly.