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2024 DIGILAW 1257 (AP)

Moturi Durga Devi at Laliltha v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2024-09-02

VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA

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JUDGMENT : The instant petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C'), has been filed by the petitioner/accused No.6, seeking quashment of proceedings against her in CC No.66 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ramachandrapuram, registered for the offence punishable under Section 498-A read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC') and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short 'D.P. Act'). 2. The facts of the case, as per the charge-sheet, in brief, are as follows : (a) The marriage of LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari, who is the daughter of respondent No.2 herein with accused No.1 was performed on 03.05.2015 and at the time of marriage, as per the demand of the accused, the parents of LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari gave Ac.0.50 cents of land, Rs.1,50,000/- towards adapaduchu katnam, Rs.50,000/- towards marriage expenses, 5 sovereigns of gold and 8 tulas of silver anklets. (b) After two months of the marriage, accused No.1 at the instigation of accused Nos.2 to 6, who are the mother, father, elder sister, younger sister and friend respectively of accused No.1, started harassing LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari both physically and mentally demanding additional dowry. (c) During the wedlock, LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari gave birth to a male child and after delivery, she was not taken to the matrimonial home by accused No.1 by demanding additional dowry, inspite of the inability of the parents of Rajeswari to pay the same. (d) While so, at the request of accused Nos.4 to 6, LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari was sent to her matrimonial home on 11.06.2018 to celebrate the birthday function of the child. During the birthday function of the child on 14.06.2018 all the accused ill-treated LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari due to which, she consumed Hit Mosquito poison on 16.06.2018 at about 07.00 a.m., and became unconscious. Accused No.1 shifted her to Sri Bheemeswara Multi Specialty Hospital, Draksharama for treatment. (e) Having come to know about the said incident, respondent No.2, who is the mother of said Rajeswari presented a report to the Police against all the accused, which was registered as a case in Crime No.97 of 2018 on the file of Draksharama Police Station for the offence under Section 498-A read with 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of DP Act. Police, after completion of investigation, filed charge-sheet which was numbered as CC No.66 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Additional Judicial First Class, Magistrate, Ramachandrapuram for the said offence against accused Nos.1 to 6. Grounds Sought for quashment : 3. Aggrieved by the registration of the said case, the present petition is filed by petitioner/accused No.6 to quash the proceedings against her in the above CC on the following grounds : (i) There is no truth in the allegations made in the report and the Police without conducting investigation filed charge-sheet mechanically and the learned Magistrate had taken the same on file. The allegations made in the report are untrue and incorrect. (ii) The learned Magistrate has committed grave error in taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner though the ingredients are not satisfied. (iii) The petitioner is not a family member of accused No.1 and she will not fit into the said Sections of Law. The petitioner/accused No.6 has been residing alongwith her husband at Nellore and she is falsely implicated in the case. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 4. Heard Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. D. Prasanna Lakshmi learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for State/respondent No.1. Inspite of providing sufficient opportunity, learned Counsel for respondent No.2 did not turn upto submit arguments. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused No.6 would submit that there are no specific allegations leveled against the petitioner and she is the friend of accused No.1 but not a family member of the family of the accused. Learned Counsel would further submit that the petitioner has been residing with her husband in Nellore and she never resided alongwith the family of the accused. Therefore, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.6 is an abuse of process of law. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that there are specific allegations against the petitioner for the commission of the alleged offence. The veracity of the said allegations will be revealed during trial. There are no grounds to quash the proceedings against the petitioner. Hence, prayed to dismiss the petition. Point for Determination 7. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that there are specific allegations against the petitioner for the commission of the alleged offence. The veracity of the said allegations will be revealed during trial. There are no grounds to quash the proceedings against the petitioner. Hence, prayed to dismiss the petition. Point for Determination 7. Having heard the submissions of the learned Counsel representing both the parties, now the point that would emerge for determination is : Whether there are any justifiable grounds for quashment of proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.6 in CC No.66 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ramachandrapuram? Determination by the Court 8. A bare perusal of Section 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A Court while sitting in Section 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a Court of appeal or a Court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 9. The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Section 482. At Paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows: "102. 9. The decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Section 482. At Paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter-XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." (Emphasis supplied) 10. To decide further in this matter, it is relevant to extract Section 498-A of IPC. Section 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 11. 11. The essential ingredients under Section 498-A are as follows : * A woman must be married; * Such woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment and; * Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by the husband or the relative of husband. 12. For the purpose of constituting an offense under the section referred supra, the ingredients thereon must be existing. In the case on hand, in the charge-sheet, it is alleged that the petitioner/accused No.6, who is the friend of accused No.1 supported accused No.1 in harassing LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari, who is the wife of accused No.1 by demanding additional dowry. It is not case of the respondent No.2 that the petitioner is a family member of accused No.1. As contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, except stating that the petitioner supported accused No.1 in harassing LW1-Vattikuti Rajeswari, there are no specific allegations against the petitioner either in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, which would attract the alleged offences against the petitioner. Since the petitioner is the friend of accused No.1, invoking Section 498-A I.P.C., against the petitioner is unwarranted. 13. It is pertinent to state that, Section 498-A of I.P.C., is a powerful weapon engrafted by the law, to the rescue of a married woman, subjected to cruelty or harassment by husband or by the relative of husband. The Hon'ble Apex Court in U. Suvetha v. State, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri.) 36, interpreted the term "relative" as appearing in Section 498-A of I.P.C., in the following terms : "9. The word "cruelty" having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498-A of the Penal Code. An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons specified therein. They have to be the "husband" or his "relative". Either the husband of the woman or his relative must have subjected her to cruelty within the aforementioned provision. An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons specified therein. They have to be the "husband" or his "relative". Either the husband of the woman or his relative must have subjected her to cruelty within the aforementioned provision. If the appellant had not (sic) been instigating the husband of the first informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High Court, the husband would be committing some offence punishable under the other provisions of the Penal Code and the appellant may be held guilty for abetment of commission of such an offence but not an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. 10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term "relative" must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word "relative" would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption. ***** 13. Furthermore, Section 498-A is a penal one. It, thus, deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and except where a contextual meaning is required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed strictly. This Court in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT, (2007) 7 SCC 162 = (2007) 8 Scale 354 , held as under: (SCC P.168, Para 17) "17. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the more stringent is the law, more strict construction thereof would be necessary. Even when the burden is required to be discharged by an assessee, it would not be as heavy as on the prosecution. (See P.N. Krishna Lal v. Government of Kerala, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 187 = 1995 SCC (Cri.) 466].)" (Emphasis supplied) 14. Further, nowhere, either in the charge-sheet or in the FIR, it is mentioned about the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of D.P. Act. The allegations made in the charge-sheet do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioner/accused No.6 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of D.P. Act. 15. The allegations made in the charge-sheet do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioner/accused No.6 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of D.P. Act. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred to supra, this Court is of the view that continuation of proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.6 is an abuse of process of law and hence, the proceedings against her are liable to be quashed. 16. In result, the criminal petition is allowed. The proceedings against petitioner/accused No.6 in CC No.66 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ramachandrapuram, for the offence punishable under Section 498-A read with 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, are hereby quashed. 17. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.