ORDER : The present second appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 18.03.2019 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Jaitaran, District Pali, in Civil Appeal Decree No. 07/2010 affirming the judgment and decree dated 02.02.2010 passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division Bar, District Pali, Civil Original Case No. 61/1997 whereby, the suit filed by respondent plaintiffs for possession and permanent injunction has been decreed. 2. The present appeal has been listed in ‘Defect’ category as the same is barred by delay of 1899 days. The appellants had filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 3. Counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment was passed by the court below on 18.03.2019 but the appellants had no knowledge about the said judgment. It is argued that most of the appellants resided out of Rajasthan in Tamil Nadu for many years and due to medical condition also, so they could not remain in touch with his counsel. The appellants had faith and trust in their counsel but were never informed about the judgment. It is further argued that the impugned judgment and decree was passed in 2010, but respondent-plaintiff did not take any action regarding its execution until 10.07.2023. Upon receiving the notices of execution proceedings, the appellants were shocked to learn that their appeal had been dismissed in 2019. Thereafter, they immediately applied for certified copy of the judgment and finally the second appeal was filed before this court on 27.08.2024 without causing further delay. In this regard, he also made a complaint before the Bar Council against the counsel. Therefore, it is prayed that the delay in filing the second appeal may be condoned and the appeal may be heard on merits. In support of his submission he has placed reliance of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Apangshu Mohan Lodh and others vs. State of Tripura and Others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 119 and decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Dodram vs. The Collector Pilibhit & Ors. Reported in 2014 (4) CCC 644 (Allahabad). 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and carefully gone through the record. 5. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is reproduced hereinunder for our reference: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. Reported in 2014 (4) CCC 644 (Allahabad). 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and carefully gone through the record. 5. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is reproduced hereinunder for our reference: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation. —The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.” 6. The intention in accepting the concept of limitation is that “controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time, lest they should become immortal while men are mortal.” The notion is that every legal proceeding should be kept alive for a term fixed by the Legislature. The courts are simultaneously bestowed with the power/discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause is proved for not availing the remedy within the time fixed under the given law. Although, there is no straight-jacket formula for dealing with the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the term “sufficient cause” used under the abovementioned Section is to be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice in cases where the appellant cannot be held accountable for any negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides. In the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy Reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that:- “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.” 7. In another decision passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, Pundlik Jalan Patil (D) by Lrs. vs. Exe. Jalgaon Medium Project and another reported in 2008 (17) SCC 448 it was observed as under: “The law will presume that it knew of its right to file appeal against the award. Everybody is presumed to know law. It was its duty to prefer appeals before the court for consideration which it did not. There is no explanation forthcoming in this regard. The evidence on record suggest neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 has observed as under: “16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 9. In the case of Prachin Choudhary vs State of Rajasthan and Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12729/2020) decided on 23.07.2024 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court: “8. In the case in hand, the petitioner apart from making a bald statement that petitioner was mentally upset and not aware of the proceedings, no evidence was produced. The delay cannot be condoned mechanically in absence of sufficient cause. Considering that there is an inordinate delay of more than three years and there is no explanation worth acceptance for condoning the delay, no interference is called for in impugned orders.” 10. In the case of Harish & Anr. Vs Rajasthan Board of Muslim waqf decided on 09.03.2017 by the co-ordinate bench of this Court, it has been observed that: “7. It is to be noticed that while levelling an allegation against the counsel in not informing the petitioner regarding the order passed by the Estate Officer, there is no explanation set out as to why the petitioners did not contact the counsel for the period of 5½ years. A litigant should be vigilant enough and should keep himself informed about the pending proceedings and therefore, the bald assertions on the part of the petitioner that the counsel did not inform about the disposal of the matter, cannot be considered to be a plausible explanation for condonation of inordinate delay in filing the petition.” 11. The relevant para from the case of Hussain Vs. The relevant para from the case of Hussain Vs. Om Prakash (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 75/2014) decided on 08.07.2015 is reproduced as under: “9. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for laying an appeal gives rise a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between parties. In other words, on expiry of prescribed period of limitation the decree holder acquires a benefit under law of limitation to construe the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration, which is to be kept in mind by the Court is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown by the party, Court in its discretion may condone the delay. It is needless to emphasize here that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party, it is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the application under Section 5 of the Act deserves rejection.” 12. In the case of Gauri Shankar vs. Ram Sahay reported in 2013(1) WLN 559 (Raj.), the Court has held that: “8. …….Therefore, if the appellant has chosen not to approach the counsel for inquiry about the progress of the case, it is his own sweet will and he cannot now turn around and rely on the said so called default on part of the Advocate for seeking condonation of delay.” 13. Admittedly, the impugned judgment dated 18.03.2019 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Jaitaran, District Pali, in Civil Appeal Decree No. 07/2010, whereby learned Civil Judge, Junior Division Bar, District Pali has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 02.02.2010 in Civil Original Case No. 61/1997, whereas the present appeal was filed on 27.08.2024, thus barred by 1899 days. The law states that if a case is presented beyond limitation, the applicant must explain the “sufficient cause” for the delay. It is against the legislative intent and the specific language of the Act to excuse tardiness. The law states that if a case is presented beyond limitation, the applicant must explain the “sufficient cause” for the delay. It is against the legislative intent and the specific language of the Act to excuse tardiness. In the present case, the appellants have not shown any documentation to support their claim that they acted against their counsel or that they complained to the Bar Council about their attorney’s purported inactions. Moreover, it is not appropriate to excuse the delay only on the ground that the appellants did not have due knowledge of the decision passed by the court below as most of the appellants resided out of Rajasthan but LRs to appellant no. 1/2- Panna Ram @ Surendra, appellant no. 1/3- Smt. Manju Devi and appellant no. 1/4- Deva Ram were residing in District Pali, Rajasthan. Hence, the mere claim of the appellants that their counsel failed to intimate them about the decision passed by the learned court below is not reason enough to allow the delayed filing of this appeal. In the absence of the facts for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases by the appellants counsel, vis-a-vis, the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, the court does not find it a fit case to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. 14. Therefore, I do not deem it proper to condone the delay in filing the present appeal. 15. The present Civil Second Appeal stands dismissed being barred by limitation. 16. Stay petition also stands dismissed.