JUDGMENT : Per Goutam Bhaduri, J. Heard. 1. The instant appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 24/07/2017 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.182 A/2008 whereby the appellant has been non-suited by invoking the provisions under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 2. (A) The brief facts of this case are that a declaratory suit for declaration and injunction was filed by Shrinivasacharyaji and Badrinarayan Tripathi. The pleading of the plaintiff shows that in the year 1935 Late Swami Ram Prappannacharya, who was devotee of Lord Vishnu, purchased a land at Juni Line, Bilaspur. Subsequently, a temple was constructed in the year 1941 and Idol of Lord Vyankatesh was religiously installed on 10th May, 1945. Late Swami Ramprapannacharya Ji had two followers devotee namely Late Shri Radhakrishna Gadodiya and Late Shri Laxminarayan Agrawal. Shrinathmal Gadodiya who was the adopted son of his brother Shri Sitaram Gadodiya and second son was Madhav Hari. Radhakrishna Gadodiya and Nathmal Gadodiya purchased the adjacent land in the year 1945-46 to the southern part of the temple. Late Ramprapannacharya had one son namely Nrasinghacharya who left four sons out of which two are the plaintiffs. (B) On 22/09/1951 gift deed was executed by Late Shri Ramprapannacharya Ji, Shri Radhakrishna Gadodiya, Late Shrinathmal Gadodiya and Late Shri Laxminarayan Agrawal and dedicated the properties which are in dispute to Idol of Lord Vyankatesh. As per the gift deed 9 member committee was constituted and Swami Sudarshanacharya was decided to be the Head (Pradhan Mantri) of the Committee and their successor will continue to hold the said post according to their Guru Parampara. Due to this arrangement one member will always be there from Ayodhya Math; Swami Ramprapannacharya was described as Sevayat of the trust and his successors will continue to hold the said post; and family of Radhakrishna Gadodiya was declared as Sarvarakar. The dispute started when few of the Manager Sarvarakar proceeded to declare the trust as a public trust. The plaintiff participated in the proceeding before the public trust, however, by an order dated 28/01/2008, the Registrar, Public Trust under Sections 4 & 5 of Public Trust Act, 1951 declared the subject suit property to be a public trust property. Both the plaintiffs, who are son of Nrasinghacharya, who was son of Swami Shriramprapannacharya, challenged the finding of the Registrar, Public Trust. Both the plaintiffs, who are son of Nrasinghacharya, who was son of Swami Shriramprapannacharya, challenged the finding of the Registrar, Public Trust. During the pendency of the same an application was filed initially under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC by the defendant the other trustee but the same was dismissed by order dated 06/12/2008. Subsequently, the plaintiff also filed an application under Section 92 of the CPC seeking leave of the Court to carry on the proceeding. The said application was dismissed on 13/01/2017. Subsequently, a preliminary issue was framed by the Court and again on 24/07/2017 the application under Section 92 read with Section 151 CPC and the preliminary issue which was framed as Issue No. 6A, was adjudicated, which resulted into dismissal of the suit. Hence this appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court completely misjudged the provisions of Section 92 of the CPC. He would further submit that Section 8 of the Act, 1951 the civil suit are required to be filed against the finding of the Registrar. He would further submit that the very declaration of the fact that the nature of the trust is a public trust which was directed by an order dated 28/01/2008 was under challenge and the plaintiff claimed that it was a private trust, therefore, the provisions of Section 92 CPC was misapplied. He would further submit that on the earlier occasion on 13/01/2017 when an application was dismissed under Section 92 of the CPC it could not have been adjudicated again by the Court while passing the order of dismissal. He went through the pleading and the prayer to submit that if the finding of the Registrar is set aside by allowing the civil suit, the entire other relief will succumb to it. He placed his reliance in the matter of Abdul Karim Khan and others Vs. Municipal Committee, Raipur { AIR 1965 SC 1744 } and Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and Another Vs. Ramji Tripathi and another { AIR 1974 SC 2141 } and would submit that when the case is at the stage of defendant witness, there was no provision to invoke Section 92 of the CPC to cause a dismissal. Consequently, the order is liable to be set aside and the case be remanded back to learned trial Court for adjudication afresh. 4. Consequently, the order is liable to be set aside and the case be remanded back to learned trial Court for adjudication afresh. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondents No.2, 3 & 4 would submit that the relief is claimed in two parts and the minute reading of the relief would show that the leave of the Court should have been obtained by the plaintiff to prosecute as the suit property was already declared as a public trust property. She would submit that under the circumstances, the Court has no option and the provisions of Section 92 CPC are very clear which having not been followed, the nature of the suit itself was not tenable. 5. Learned State counsel would submit that the relief was in two parts, therefore, the second part of the relief which is claimed it certainly take into sweep the provisions of Section 92 of the Act, therefore, the order is well merited which do not call for any interference. 6. We went through the order and the pleading which is before the Court. 7. The proceeding would show that the Court proceeded to adjudicate a civil suit which was predominantly under Section 8 of the C.G. Public Trust Act, 1951. For the sake of brevity Section 8 of the Act, 1951 is reproduced hereinbelow:- 8. Civil Suit against the finding of the Registrar.- (1) Any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property, aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under Section 6 may, within six months from the date of the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 7, institute a suit in a Civil Court to have such finding set aside or modified. (2) In every such suit, the Civil Court shall give notice to the State Government through the Registrar, and the State Government, if it so desires, shall be made a party to the suit. (3) On the final decision of the suit, the Registrar shall, if necessary, correct the entries made in the register in accordance with such decision. The pleading shows that it potentially demonstrates the lenient succession how the trust was created to project that it is a private trust. The dispute arose for the reason that few of the trustees/manager when proceeded to declare the same as a public trust. The pleading shows that it potentially demonstrates the lenient succession how the trust was created to project that it is a private trust. The dispute arose for the reason that few of the trustees/manager when proceeded to declare the same as a public trust. Section 8 of the Act, 1951 certainly gives right to any person or trustee having an interest in public trust to file a suit when he is aggrieved by finding of the Registrar. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and Another Vs. Ramji Tripathi and another { AIR 1974 SC 2141 } has held that application of Section 92 CPC is a special nature which presupposes the existence of public trust of a religious and charitable character. The principle which is laid down that if the plaintiffs when do not sue to vindicate the right of public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights then in such case there will be no application of Section 92 of CPC. At para 10 of the judgment the Court held as under:- 10. A suit under Section 92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. It is, therefore, clear that if the allegation of breach of trust is not substantiated or that the plaintiff had not made out a case for any direction by the Court for proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under the section would fail; and, even if all the other ingredients of a suit under Section 92 are made out, if it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights or the individual or personal rights of any other person or persons in whom they are interested, then the suit would be outside the scope of Section 92, (see Shanmukhan v. Govinda, AIR 1938 Mad 92 ; Tirumalai Devesthanams v. Krishnayya, AIR 1943 Mad 466 (FB); Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia, (1969) 3 SCR 83 = ( AIR 1969 SC 884 ) and Mulla; Civil Procedure Code, (13th ed.) Vol. I, p. 400). A suit whose primary object or purpose is to remedy the infringement of an individual right or to vindicate a private right does not fall under the section. It is not every suit claiming the reliefs specified in the section that can be brought under the section but only the suits which, besides claiming any of the reliefs, are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights, and in deciding whether a suit falls within section 92 the court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit was brought. This is the reason why trustees of public trust of a religions nature are precluded from suing under the section to vindicate their individual or personal rights. It is quite immaterial whether the, trustees pray for declaration of their personal rights or deny the personal rights of one or more defendants. This is the reason why trustees of public trust of a religions nature are precluded from suing under the section to vindicate their individual or personal rights. It is quite immaterial whether the, trustees pray for declaration of their personal rights or deny the personal rights of one or more defendants. When the right to the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside S. 92. 9. Further the law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Abdul Karim Khan and others Vs. Municipal Committee, Raipur { AIR 1965 SC 1744 } that the right to file a suit refers to a given person who is aggrieved by finding of the Registrar. Admittedly, the entire nucleus of the dispute arose when the suit property was declared as a public trust. The plaintiffs are falling back on the gift deed which created the trust to claim their right which is against the finding of the Registrar, Public Trust wherein it was declared to be a public trust. At para 13 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has laid down the principle which reads as under:- 13. Then again the right to file a suit to which S. 8 (1) refers is given to persons who are aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar. Having regard to the fact that the proceedings before the Registrar are in the nature of proceedings before a civil court, it would be illogical to hold that the respondent who was not a party to the proceedings can be said to be aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar. The normal judicial concept of a person aggrieved by any order necessarily postulates that the said person must be a party to the proceedings in which the order was passed and by which he feels aggrieved. It is unnecessary to emphasise that it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that though a person is not a party to the proceedings and cannot participate in them by way of filing objections, he would still be bound to file a suit within the period prescribed by Section 8 (1) if the property in which he claims an exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a public trust. 10. 10. The reading of Section 92 of the CPC by which the plaintiffs were non- suited would show that it is a special nature for protection of public right in a public trust and charity. It do not extend when there are rival claims as against that it is a private trust not a public trust. Therefore, the concept of Section 92 is fundamentally on behalf of the entire body of persons who are interested in trust not private and it is for vindication of the public rights. The beneficiary, therefore, necessarily would be public at large wherein the Section contemplates that two or more persons amongst themselves who are interested to protect the public right may seek a leave of the Court to institute the suit. Therefore, the persons whose names are in the plaint or suit are not the only parties to the suit. The plaintiffs named therein in a Section 92 CPC application would be the representative of the people whereas in the instant case when the plaintiffs claimed to be the private trustee and the very nature of the public trust is in question the dispute is no longer on the boil that private rights were being exerted in the suit to claim that the property to be a private trust. 11. The purpose of Section 92 CPC is to give protection to public trust of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suit filed against them when the very nucleus of the issue is under question that the declaration by the Registrar Public Trust as against the demand of the plaintiff that it is a private trust the applicability of Section 92 CPC to non-suit the plaintiff in our considered opinion is defective and cannot be sustained. We are also unable to appreciate the fact that once the application under Section 92 CPC was dismissed by the Court by order dated 13/01/2017 how the same application can be again revived to non-suit the plaintiff. 12. The suit proceeding was at the evidence stage. The order literally, therefore, pull back the plaintiff from brink which resulted into dismissal which cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 24/07/2017 and remand the case for adjudication on merits before the Court below. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 14th of March, 2024. 13. The order literally, therefore, pull back the plaintiff from brink which resulted into dismissal which cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 24/07/2017 and remand the case for adjudication on merits before the Court below. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 14th of March, 2024. 13. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above.