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2024 DIGILAW 1263 (AP)

Korrapati Venkata Poornachandra Rao v. K. Midhun

2024-09-05

V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

body2024
JUDGMENT : V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. 1. This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short 'the C.P.C.'], is filed by the Appellant/plaintiff challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 18.04.1996, in O.S. No.4 of 1995 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Avanigadda [for short 'the trial Court']. The Respondents herein are the defendants in the said Suit. 2. The appellant/plaintiff filed a Suit for partition of plaint schedule property into 3 equal shares and to allot one share each to the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.4 of 1995, are as under: The plaintiff and the mother of the first defendant Dr.Ramadevi fell in love while they were studying medicine, their marriage was performed in March, 1976 and they started living in Hyderabad. Dr.Ramadevi continued her studies to obtain the degree in medicine even subsequent to the marriage. The first defendant 'Midhun' is the offspring of their wedlock and he born on 02.06.1977. There were some misunderstandings between the couple and a petition was filed for divorce in city Civil Court, Hyderabad by the plaintiff. On 11.11.1983 the said petition O.P.No.34 of 1983 was allowed on recording compromise. After the dissolution of the marriage, the plaintiff filed the suit for partition against first defendant on 27.01.1984 i.e., within 3 months from the date of dissolution of the marriage. 5. The first defendant filed his written statement, through his mother, denying the contents of the plaint and further contended as under: The plaintiff suppressed more properties viz. Ac.18.44 cents of land and a house and the first defendant urged that those properties are also liable for partition. 6. When the suit was part heard, the second defendant filed a petition vide I.A.No.800 of 1991 on 29.08.1991 to implead him as second defendant alleging that he is born to the plaintiff through his second wife Santhisri on 20.07.1984 and he is also having one third share in the properties. The said petition was allowed in the High Court, thereafter, the plaint was suitably amended. Later the second defendant filed written statement contending that he is also entitled to 1/3rd share in the plaint schedule properties. 7. The said petition was allowed in the High Court, thereafter, the plaint was suitably amended. Later the second defendant filed written statement contending that he is also entitled to 1/3rd share in the plaint schedule properties. 7. In the meanwhile, the first defendant became major and he has filed a separate written statement in addition to the written statement already filed by his mother. In the additional written statement, the first defendant contended that the second defendant is not the son of the plaintiff and he is introduced by the plaintiff only to reduce the legitimate share to be given to the first defendant. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of the plaint schedule properties into 2 equal shares and for separate possession of one such share? (ii) What are the properties that are liable for partition? (iii) To what relief? ADDITIONAL ISSUES: (iv) Whether the 2nd defendant is also entitled for an equal share with the plaintiff and first defendant? (v) Whether 2nd defendant is the son of the legally wedded wife of the plaintiff as alleged by first defendant? (vi) Whether 2nd defendant is entitled to any or 1/3rd share in the family properties of the plaintiff as contended by first defendant? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A11 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants DW1 and DW2 were examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B10 were marked. 10. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit vide its judgment, dated 18.04.1996, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/plaintiff in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 11. The application in A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008 is filed by the petitioner/appellant with a prayer to receive certain documents as additional evidence in A.S.No.2073 of 1996. 12. Heard Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Senior counsel for appellant and Sri S.Srinivasa Reddy, learned senior counsel for the second respondent. None for first respondent. 13. 11. The application in A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008 is filed by the petitioner/appellant with a prayer to receive certain documents as additional evidence in A.S.No.2073 of 1996. 12. Heard Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Senior counsel for appellant and Sri S.Srinivasa Reddy, learned senior counsel for the second respondent. None for first respondent. 13. The appellant would contend that the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge insofar against the appellant is contrary to law and the trial Court ought to have seen that the properties covered under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 have been sold for legal necessities. The appellant further contend that the trial Court ought to have come to conclusion that there is an allegation in the written statement that the appellant as a manager of the joint family sold the property for legal necessities and that the Court below ought to have held that the transaction covered under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 are binding on the defendants. The appellant further contend that the property covered under Ex.A8 was purchased by his mother out of her own funds and that it is not a joint family property. The appellant further contend that the properties covered under Ex.A9 are purchased from his own income and the conclusion of the trial Court that the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A8 and Ex.A9 of the schedule properties is not at all correct. The appellant further contend that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the findings given by the learned trial Court insofar as decreeing the suit in respect of properties covered under Ex.A6 to Ex.A9 which are equivalent to item Nos.1, 6 and 7 of written statement schedule properties. 14. The present appeal is filed against the decree and judgment passed by the Sub Ordinate Judge, Avanigadda in O.S.No.4 of 1995 dated 18.04.1996 insofar decreeing the suit in respect of properties covered under Ex.A6 to Ex.A9. 15. Now, in deciding the present appeal, the points that arise for determination are as follows: a. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of properties covered under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7? b. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A8? c. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A9? 16. b. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A8? c. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A9? 16. Point (a) : Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of properties covered under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7? The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that his marriage is performed with one Dr.Ramadevi and she gave a birth to the first defendant through the appellant and due to family disputes the plaintiff and Ramadevi obtained divorce by way of compromise through Court of law and the appellant married one Santhisri and she gave birth to second defendant through the appellant. The relationship of the parties in the suit is not at all in dispute, though the legality of marriage of appellant with DW2 is disputed before the trail Court, it was not disputed by the parties in the appeal proceedings. The leaned counsel for appellant would contend that the plaintiff has sold Ac.1.00 cents of land in survey No.31/1 under Ex.A6 and the plaintiff also sold Ac.2.00 cents of land in the same survey number under Ex.A7 and the sale consideration was used for payment of maintenance amount to the mother of the first defendant for legal necessities and that the first defendant is not entitled any share in the said property of Ac.3.00 cents, as stated supra. Since the appellant pleaded from out of sale consideration received under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 he paid the maintenance amount to the mother of the defendant No.1, therefore, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the sale consideration received under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 was utilized for the purpose of payment of the amount towards maintenance to the mother of the first defendant. As per the evidence of DW1, first defendant/minor is her son and he is under her care and protection and plaintiff never tried to partition the family lands in between himself and the first defendant. She further deposed that there was a compromise decree in O.P.No.34 of 1983, dated 11.11.1983 on the file of City Civil Court, Hyderabad and Ex.A1 is the certified copy of the order passed in O.P.No.34 of 1983. She further deposed that there was a compromise decree in O.P.No.34 of 1983, dated 11.11.1983 on the file of City Civil Court, Hyderabad and Ex.A1 is the certified copy of the order passed in O.P.No.34 of 1983. She further deposed that the plaintiff agreed to deposit Rs.4,000/- before the end of January 1984 and also before the end of every succeeding month for a period 6 years and to be revived thereafter. She further deposed that as agreed, the plaintiff did not deposit the amount in the bank and the plaintiff filed the suit showing only Ac.5.50 cents to be the joint family property and that is liable for partition in between the plaintiff and defendant without including the other properties. The plaintiff also admits in the cross examination itself that he did not comply the clause 3 of the terms of compromise of Ex.A1 that he should pay an amount of Rs.4,000/- to the minor son first defendant herein commencing from the month of January 1984 for a period of 5 years from and out of his agricultural income towards his educational expenses which was yearly. The statement of the plaintiff made in his evidence also supports the case of DW1 that the plaintiff did not comply the terms of the compromise with regard to the payment of maintenance to the first defendant, who is a minor in the care and custody of his mother, commencing from the month of January, 1984 for a period of 6 years. 17. As seen from Ex.A6, Ex.A6 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff and also on behalf of the first defendant minor, being represented by father i.e., plaintiff, Ex.A6 is dated 21.12.1983, it has to be seen that the decree of divorce of compromise was passed by the competent Court on 11.11.1983 much prior to Ex.A6 sale deed. As stated supra, the first defendant was shown in Ex.A6 as minor being represented by his father guardian i.e., plaintiff herein, Ex.A7 is also dated 21.12.1983 alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff and the first defendant, who is being minor represented by the father guardian and mother of the plaintiff. The recitals in both Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 goes to show that the plaintiff is in need of money for payment of maintenance of R.55,000/- to the mother of first defendant i.e., DW1 under compromise decree. The recitals in both Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 goes to show that the plaintiff is in need of money for payment of maintenance of R.55,000/- to the mother of first defendant i.e., DW1 under compromise decree. As per the own admissions of the plaintiff i.e., PW1, the maintenance amount was paid to Ramadevi i.e., mother of the first defendant on 11.11.1983 in the open Court while compromising the divorce petition. As noticed supra, both the sale deeds under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 under which the plaintiff received sale consideration are dated 21.12.1983. It shows that the plaintiff paid maintenance amount to DW1 much prior to the alleged Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds. It is the specific case of the plaintiff, both Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 were preceded by an agreement of sale dated 09.11.1983 but the alleged agreement of sales did not come into light, no evidence is produced by the plaintiff to show that he received sale consideration on 09.11.1983 i.e., on the date of alleged agreement of sale. Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 are the registered sale deeds dated 21.12.1983. Admittedly, the plaintiff failed to prove that he received sale consideration on the date of alleged unregistered agreement of sale on 09.11.1983 and the same was utilized for payment of money towards maintenance amount to Dr.Ramadevi on 11.11.1983. 18. As stated supra, the first defendant was not in the custody of the plaintiff by the date of Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds, but as seen from Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds, the plaintiff executed Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds by showing the minor as a second vendor in the said Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds represented by father guardian. As per the own case of the plaintiff, custody of minor first defendant was given to Ramadevi i.e., mother of the first defendant on 11.11.1983 before the Court. Therefore, the plaintiff is not at all competent to execute Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds on 21.12.1983 much subsequent to the handing over the custody of first defendant minor to the mother, and he is not competent to execute sale deeds to represent the minor first defendant because the first defendant minor is under the custody of Ramadevi. Therefore, the plaintiff is not at all competent to execute Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds on 21.12.1983 much subsequent to the handing over the custody of first defendant minor to the mother, and he is not competent to execute sale deeds to represent the minor first defendant because the first defendant minor is under the custody of Ramadevi. It is also relevant to say that the present suit proceedings were instituted originally in the year 1984 before the Sub Ordinate Judge, Machilipatnam and later the present suit was transferred to Subordinate Judge, Avanigadda in the year 1995 and numbered as O.S.No.4 of 1995. Therefore, the plaintiff is not a legal guardian to the first defendant minor because he is not the custodian of the first defendant minor by the date of alleged sale deeds Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 dated 21.12.1983. Furthermore, the plaintiff voluntarily admitted in his evidence in cross examination itself that immediately after 3 months of passing of divorce by the competent Court, he filed the present suit against the first defendant herein to take away his share in the property and that he did not pay any amount. 19. The learned counsel for appellant relied on Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy vs. V. Manjunath and another, (2021) 19 SCC 263 , in that decision the Apex Court held as follows: Right of the Karta to execute agreement to sell or sale deed of a joint Hindu family property is settled and is beyond cavil vide several judgments of this Court including Sri Narayan Bal and Others v. Sridhar Sutar and Others, (1996) 8 SCC 54 wherein it has been held that a joint Hindu family is capable of acting through its Karta or adult member of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. A coparcener who has right to claim a share in the joint Hindu family estate cannot seek injunction against the Karta restraining him from dealing with or entering into a transaction from sale of the joint Hindu family property, albeit post alienation has a right to challenge the alienation if the same is not for legal necessity or for betterment of the estate. Where a Karta has alienated a joint Hindu family property for value either for legal necessity or benefit of the estate it would bind the interest of all undivided members of the family even when they are minors or widows. Where a Karta has alienated a joint Hindu family property for value either for legal necessity or benefit of the estate it would bind the interest of all undivided members of the family even when they are minors or widows. The following have been held to be family necessities within the meaning of Article 240: (a) payment of government revenue and of debts which are payable out of the family property; (b) maintenance of coparceners and of the members of their families; (c) marriage expenses of male coparceners, and of the daughters of coparceners; (d) performance of the necessary funeral or family ceremonies; (e) costs of necessary litigation in recovering or preserving the estate; (f) costs of defending the head of the joint family or any other member against a serious criminal charge; (g) payment of debts incurred for family business or other necessary purpose. In the case of a manager other than a father, it is not enough to show merely that the debt is a pre- existing debt; 20. The learned counsel for appellant further placed a reliance in M.R.Vinoda vs. M.S.Susheelamma (Dead) By L.Rs., (2021) 20 SCC 180 of Apex Court, in that decision, the Apex Court held as follows: "A Karta of a joint Hindu family can dispose of joint family property involving the undivided interest of the minor of the family therein. Therefore the proposition of the Plaintiff No. 3/ the Appellant on the limitation of the power of the Karta to manage and sell the joint Hindu family property on behalf of the joint family comprising of a minor is misplaced, as a coparcener has no right to interfere in the act of management of the joint family affairs. [Sunil Kumar and Another v. Ram Parkash and Others, (1988) 2 SCC 77 .] This being the position, a coparcener cannot seek an injunction restraining the Karta from alienating joint Hindu family property, but has a right to challenge alienation, as the alienation is not beyond the scope of challenge by other members of the joint family, and thereby scrutiny of the court. Latter right entails the right to claim a share in the joint family estate free from unnecessary and unwanted encumbrances, whereas the former embraces the right to interfere with the act of management of the joint family affairs. We shall subsequently examine the grounds and circumstances in which alienation can be challenged". Latter right entails the right to claim a share in the joint family estate free from unnecessary and unwanted encumbrances, whereas the former embraces the right to interfere with the act of management of the joint family affairs. We shall subsequently examine the grounds and circumstances in which alienation can be challenged". The principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family governed by the mitakshara law. The legal position may be stated thus: Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and cannot be created by agreement of parties except in the case of reunion. It is a corporate body or a family unit. The law also recognizes a branch of the family as a subordinate corporate body. The said family unit, whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can acquire, hold and dispose of family property subject to the limitations laid down by law. Ordinarily, the manager, or by consent, express or implied, of the members of the family, any other member or members can carry on business or acquire property, subject to the limitations laid down by the said law, for or on behalf of the family. Such business or property would be the business or property of the family." 21. The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance in Narayan Lal and others vs. Sridhar Sutar and others (1996) 8 SCC 54 , in that decision, the Apex Court held as follows: The Joint Hindu Family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in management of the Joint Hindu Family property. Thus Section 8 in view of the express terms of Section 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a Joint Hindu Family property is sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the said Joint Hindu Family property. The question posed at the outset therefore is so answered. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. The facts in the present case not fall within the conspectus of the aforesaid ratio. The question posed at the outset therefore is so answered. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. The facts in the present case not fall within the conspectus of the aforesaid ratio. As stated supra, the recitals in ExA6 and Ex.A7 dated 21.12.1983 goes to show that the plaintiff in his personal capacity and also the first defendant being a minor represented by guardian father executed the sale deeds dated 21.12.1983 under original of Ex.A6 and Ex.A7. As noticed supra, on 11.11.1983 on the date of granting divorce to the first wife Ramadevi by the plaintiff, the custody of the minor child first defendant was handed over to Ramadevi on 11.11.1983 by which date the decree of divorce of compromise was passed. Furthermore, the own admissions of plaintiff also clearly shows that after 3 months of passing of decree, he filed a suit against the first defendant for partition of the plaint schedule property and that he did not pay any amount. Therefore, the plaintiff is not a legal custodian of the first defendant by the date of Ex.A6 and Ex.A7. 22. It is well settled that ordinarily the law does not envisage a natural guardian of the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in the joint family property. The natural guardian of the property of a Hindu minor, other than undivided interest in joint family property, he is alone contemplated under Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, where under his powers and duties are defined. Section 12 carves out an exception to the rule that should there be no adult member of the joint family in management of the joint family property, in which the minor had an undivided interest, a guardian may be appointed; but ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for such undivided interest of the minor. The adult member of the family in the management of the joint Hindu family property may be a male or female, not necessarily the kartha. Under Section 8 a natural guardian of the property of Hindu minor before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the Court. The adult member of the family in the management of the joint Hindu family property may be a male or female, not necessarily the kartha. Under Section 8 a natural guardian of the property of Hindu minor before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the Court. As stated supra, the first defendant minor is in the custody of his mother Ramadevi by the date of alleged Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 sale deeds under which the plaintiff alleged to have received sale consideration. Therefore, the plaintiff is not competent to execute a sale deed by showing the first defendant minor as one of the vendor under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 represented the plaintiff as a guardian because the plaintiff is not a guardian and he is not a custodian of minor defendant No.1 by the date of Ex.A6 and Ex.A7. The own admissions of the plaintiff also supports the aforesaid case. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the sale of the property under Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 comprised in survey No.31/1 is not binding on the first defendant in respect of his undivided share and the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A6 and Ex.A7 property. 23. Point (b) : Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A8? It was pleaded by the appellant that the house property under Ex.A8 was purchased on 07.03.1962 under the registered sale deed in the name of the plaintiff minor by the mother of the plaintiff and it has to be treated as self acquired property. As per the own case of the appellant he was a minor as on the date of 07.03.1962 and as per the own case of the plaintiff, he completed his graduation by the end of 1976, therefore, it seems that he was aged about less than 10 years by the date of alleged Ex.A8 sale deed and he is depending upon his parents. It was contended by the appellant that the property under Ex.A8 was purchased by his mother in his name and because of that reason, the house property was not included in the partition effected between the plaintiff and the father of the plaintiff by means of a registered partition dated 13.10.1971. It was contended by the appellant that the property under Ex.A8 was purchased by his mother in his name and because of that reason, the house property was not included in the partition effected between the plaintiff and the father of the plaintiff by means of a registered partition dated 13.10.1971. But in the case on hand, to prove the said contention of the appellant no cogent evidence is placed by the appellant that the first defendant is not entitled any share in Ex.A8 property. Admittedly by the date of Ex.A8 the plaintiff is a minor and he is in tender age and he is less than 10 years and he is depending upon his parents. Absolutely, there is no evidence to show that Ex.A8 is the self acquired property of the appellant. 24. The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance in D.S.Lakshmaiah and another vs. L.Balasubramanyam and another, AIR 2003 (sc) 3800 , in that decision, the Apex Court held as follows: In view of the aforesaid discussion, the respondents having failed to discharge the initial burden of establishing that there was any nucleus in the form of any income whatsoever from Item No.2 property and no other nucleus was claimed, the burden remained on the respondents to establish that Item No.1 property was joint family property. In this view, the fact that the first appellant has not led any evidence to establish his separate income is of no consequence insofar as the claim of the respondents is concerned. Under these circumstances, for failure to lead evidence, the respondents claim of Item No.1 to be joint family property would fail as rightly held by the first appellate court, The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available. The ratio laid in the aforesaid case law is not applicable to the present case on hand because on the face of the document Ex.A8 itself it is clear that the plaintiff is a minor and his mother purchased the property in the name of minor by showing the mother as a guardian. Admittedly by the date of Ex.A8, the plaintiff and his father constitute a members of Hindu joint family and partition was taken place in the year 1971 under Ex.B1 registered partition deed. It is not the case of the plaintiff that his mother executed a will in the name of the plaintiff by bequeathing Ex.A8 property. The plaintiff admits in his evidence in cross examination that at that time when his paternal grand father executed a sale deed Ex.A8 he was aged about 10 years and his mother was shown as a guardian in it. Therefore, Ex.A8 property is not self acquired property of the plaintiff and it was purchased from out of ancestral nucleus in the name of the plaintiff by showing the minor plaintiff represented guardian mother of the plaintiff. Therefore, the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A8 property. 25. Point (c) : Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition in respect of property covered under Ex.A9? The contention of the appellant is that he purchased Ac.3.00 cents of land under Ex.A9, by that date he is a medical practitioner and he is having good practice at Hyderabad and from out of his self earnings he purchased Ex.A9 property and it is his self acquired property. Ex.A9 goes to show that he purchased the Ex.A9 property from his father but not from third parties on 13.02.1980, the consideration mentioned in Ex.A9 is Rs.30,000/-. Ex.A2 goes to show that an amount of Rs.33,500/- was received by the plaintiff towards sale consideration on 11.02.1980, Ex.A3 and Ex.A4 sale deeds are dated 15.02.1980 under which the plaintiff received sale consideration of Rs.30,000/-, Rs.5,000/- respectively. Ex.A2 goes to show that an amount of Rs.33,500/- was received by the plaintiff towards sale consideration on 11.02.1980, Ex.A3 and Ex.A4 sale deeds are dated 15.02.1980 under which the plaintiff received sale consideration of Rs.30,000/-, Rs.5,000/- respectively. Ex.A2 to Ex.A4 clearly goes to show that the plaintiff is having necessity of alienating the properties on 11.02.1980, 15.02.1980, therefore, by the date of alleged Ex.A9 on 13.02.1980 the plaintiff is not having sufficient own funds to purchase the property under Ex.A9 on 13.02.1980, as per the own admissions of the plaintiff, he passed his graduation by the end of 1979, as per the petition filed by the plaintiff vide A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008, the plaintiff opened the clinic in the month of May, 1980. Therefore, by the date of alleged sale deed Ex.A9 dated 13.02.1980, he is not doing medical practice at Hyderabad, therefore, the contention of the plaintiff that by the date of purchase of the property covered under Ex.A9 he is having sufficient medical practice at Hyderabad and he purchased the Ex.A9 property from out of his own funds is unbelievable. Therefore, I do not find any force in the contention of the appellant that Ex.A9 property was purchased from out of his income by way of medical practice as a doctor at Hyderabad. As stated supra, the Ex.A9 property was purchased by the plaintiff from his father but not from third parties. The consideration mentioned in Ex.A9 is an amount of Rs.30,000/-. In those days of 1980, the said amount of Rs.30,000/- is a huge amount, therefore, it is also quite absurd to believe the contention of the appellant that by doing milk business, he used to earn money in those days. He has to prove by adducing cogent evidence to show that from out of milk business, he purchased Ex.A9 property. Furthermore as per the own case of the plaintiff, he is prosecuting M.B.B.S. degree in the year 1979. Furthermore, as per the own admissions of PW1, he has not paid maintenance amount of Rs.4,000/- per month from January 1984 onwards for a period of 6 years as per the agreed terms of compromise under Ex.A1. Furthermore as per the own case of the plaintiff, he is prosecuting M.B.B.S. degree in the year 1979. Furthermore, as per the own admissions of PW1, he has not paid maintenance amount of Rs.4,000/- per month from January 1984 onwards for a period of 6 years as per the agreed terms of compromise under Ex.A1. Therefore, on considering the aforesaid circumstances and on considering the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that Ex.A9 property is not a self- acquired property of the plaintiff and it was purchased from out of ancestral nucleus, therefore, the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A9 property. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A6 to Ex.A9 property and that the finding of the trial Court in its decree and judgment that the first defendant is entitled share in Ex.A6 to Ex.A9 property sustainable under law and there is no need to interfere with the said finding given by the trial Court. Therefore, there are no merits in the appeal filed by the plaintiff. A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008 27. The application under A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008 is filed by the petitioner/appellant in the year 2008 along with the main appeal. It is a fact that the suit is instituted before the Subordinate Judge Court, Machilipatnam in the year 1984 and subsequently it was transferred to Subordinate Judge Court, Avanigadda in the year 1995 and numbered as O.S.No.4 of 1995. The appeal is filed in the year 1996, the documents sought to be received as additional evidence are filed in the year 2008, therefore, it is for the petitioner to explain the delay of 24 years in filing the documents to be received as additional evidence which is sought by the petitioner in A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008. Order XLI Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. Order XLI Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if- (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to the produced, by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reason for its admission. The general principle is that the appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the trial Court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception under Order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code, enable the appellate Court to take evidence in exceptional circumstances only. The proviso under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. permits the party to produce additional evidence before the appellate Court provided it has to be come under the ambit of order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. 28. The documents to be received as additional evidence are No.1 and 4 are Xerox copies and those are inadmissible in evidence. The second document to be received as additional evidence is acknowledgment dated 12.01.1983 for assessment year 1981-1982. It shows that no income tax is paid by the appellant in the assessment year 1981-1982. The other documents, document Nos.5 to 10 to be received as additional evidence are relates to the financial year 1981-1982 subsequent to the sale deeds of 1980. Therefore, those documents are no way helpful to decide the issue in the appeal proceedings. It shows that no income tax is paid by the appellant in the assessment year 1981-1982. The other documents, document Nos.5 to 10 to be received as additional evidence are relates to the financial year 1981-1982 subsequent to the sale deeds of 1980. Therefore, those documents are no way helpful to decide the issue in the appeal proceedings. The other documents to be received as additional evidence are relates to the years 1982 and 1983, those are subsequent to the alleged sale transaction and those are no way helpful to decide the subject matter of the appeal. 29. As stated supra, the suit is originally instituted in the year 1984 before the Subordinate Judge Court, Machilipatnam and subsequently it was transferred and numbered as O.S.No.4 of 1995 before Subordinate Judge, Avanigadda, therefore, it is the primary duty of the petitioner/appellant to explain the said delay of 24 years, but the petitioner failed to explain the said inordinate delay of 24 years in filing the present application to receive the documents as additional evidence. Another important point is that any evidence which is received as additional evidence in the appellate stage cannot be looked into without any pleading in that record. It is also well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered, it is also equally well settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all necessary and material facts shall be pleaded by a party in support of the case set up by it. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any ground to allow the present application, hence, the present application is also dismissed. 30. In the result, A.S.M.P.No.1179 of 2008 in A.S.No.2073 of 1996 and A.S.No.2073 of 1996 are dismissed, confirming the decree and Judgment dated 18.04.1996, in O.S.No.4 of 1995 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Avanigadda. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.