ORDER : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State laying challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 28.02.2001, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajgarh, Churu in Sessions Case No.23/1998, whereby the accused-respondent was acquitted of the offences under Sections 302, 120-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred on 04.02.1998 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2001. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that in the village Bhuwadi, there was a roadways bus which was coming every day took halt at night. The Driver of the bus namely Bhanwar Singh (respondent-accused), who is the resident of Bangdu stayed in the village at the residence of one Mangtu along with the conductor of the Bus. The complainant alleged that one month before the complaint on the day of Makar Sakranti, a dispute occurred between Santro Devi W/o Om Singh, resident of their village and his brother Jhabar Ram with the respondent-accused regarding fare for which respondent-accused was pressurizing them. Respondent-accused kept animosity with deceased Jhabar Ram for contesting the fare along with Santro Devi. At 9:00 p.m. on 04.02.1998, one Shri Ram Singh along with his brother Shri Pema Ram and his cousin brother Shri Bajrang Lal were sitting together, when they heard some noise coming from the house of Mangtu to which they rushed there and found that their brother Jhabar Ram (deceased) was crying and shouting for help. When they went near him, they saw that respondent-accused was hitting Jhabar Singh with lathi and consistently inflicting injuries upon him. All three of them got in between and released Jhabar Ram from the clutch of Bhanwar Singh, who subsequently ran away from the spot towards the house of Mangtu. They took the injured Jhabar Ram to the Rajgarh Hospital where at about 4:00 a.m. where he succumbed to the injuries. 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR (FIR No.38/1998) was lodged on an oral report given by complainant Ram Singh at 5.30 a.m. on 05.02.1998 before P.S. RAC, Rajgarh (the said complainant Ram Singh was later on examined as PW-4). 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR (FIR No.38/1998) was lodged on an oral report given by complainant Ram Singh at 5.30 a.m. on 05.02.1998 before P.S. RAC, Rajgarh (the said complainant Ram Singh was later on examined as PW-4). After completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 302, 120-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and the trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 15 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 22 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution and 3 documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondent; whereafter, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused-respondent pleaded innocence and his false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as after considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondent, vide the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2001, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General submits that allegations are well supported by three eye witnesses namely Pema Ram (PW-3), Ram Singh (PW-4) and Bajrang Lal (PW-5) and also by the FSL report and thus, it is a clear case where the learned trial Court has committed error in acquitting the respondent-accused. He further submits that as per the postmortem report four injuries sustained by the deceased were sufficient to cause death and the same are directly attributed to the respondent-accused. 7.1 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General also submits that the FSL report indicated that there were blood stains on the clothes of the respondent-accused and the same were matched with the blood stains of the deceased and thus, the circumstantial evidence were also against the respondent-accused. He further submits that the site plan (Ex.P/3) explains the happening of the incident and the eye witnesses, who were in close vicinity and upon hearing the noise, rushed to the spot (house of Mangtu) and have witnessed the respondent-accused causing injuries to the deceased - Jhabar Ram. He further submits that the site plan (Ex.P/3) explains the happening of the incident and the eye witnesses, who were in close vicinity and upon hearing the noise, rushed to the spot (house of Mangtu) and have witnessed the respondent-accused causing injuries to the deceased - Jhabar Ram. 7.2 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General also submits that the oral report had been lodged early in the morning at 5.30 a.m. on 05.02.1998, while the incident occurred in night, but it is natural, as the death has occurred only at 4:00 a.m. and the family members were busy in attending the injured who subsequently succumbed to the injuries and therefore, some delay has been caused in lodging the FIR which is considerable. 7.3 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General further submits that although the motive which has been given in the complaint and has been used by the prosecution to carry on the investigation, is that there was some altercation which took place between Santro Devi W/o Om Singh and the respondent-accused in which Jhabar Ram (deceased) intervened and ruffled Bhanwar Singh the Driver of the bus which led to an animosity, resulting into the incident in question. There was a motive which has completely failed in the investigation but at the same time even if the same has failed, the independent existence of the incident cannot be ruled out. The relevant exhibits are the Ex.P/3 Site Plan, Ex.P/14 - Memo of condition of dead body, Ex.P/20 FSL report, Ex.P/21 Injury report and the Ex.P/22 is the postmortem report. 7.4 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General also submits that the eye witnesses are credible and thus, the learned trial Court has wrongly arrived at a decision of acquittal. 8. On the other hand Mr. Suresh Kumbhat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the reason behind the crime as neither Santro Devi has been examined nor any reason has been furnished as to why she was not called in the witness box. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused further submits that PW-1 - Mangtu who was the owner of the house where the respondent-accused stayed for night did not depose in support of the prosecution story. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused further submits that PW-1 - Mangtu who was the owner of the house where the respondent-accused stayed for night did not depose in support of the prosecution story. 8.1 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused also submits that PW-3 - Pema Ram, PW-4 - Ram Singh and PW-5 - Bajrang Lal were examined as the eye witnesses to the incident but all three are the brothers of the deceased (PW-3 and PW-4 are the real brothers while PW-5 is the cousin brother) and hence they are interested witnesses. 8.2 Mr. Kumbhat has pointed out that the pre-animosity which has been proceeded against in the whole trial was never established and the dispute arising out of the fare having not been paid by Santro Devi, has completely collapsed as it could not be sustained by the prosecution and thus the very reasoning, why Jhabar Ram (deceased) could have been attacked by respondent-accused, has gone away. 8.3 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused further submits that the independent witnesses PW-1 - Mangtu and PW-2 - Krishna Kumar did not support the previous animosity theory of the prosecution. 8.4 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused also submits that the conversation between the Doctor at the Hospital, which is recorded in the shape of respective deposition, clearly indicates that three eye witnesses did not know the name of the respondent-accused and it was only that subsequently the story was planned and planted as a matter of allegations in the shape of an FIR in the morning, that too in the oral complaint. 8.5 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused further submits that a very strange incident occurred that the complainant - Ram Singh, who is the brother of the deceased, filed a private complaint, calling for arraying of Gajendra Singh, Tara Chand and Girwar Singh as co-accused in the matter. All these persons were alleged in the complaint to have prompted respondent-accused to kill deceased. The complainant during trial had also prayed for his safety from these three persons. The cognizance was taken in the complaint and however, the same was quashed by the Hon’ble High Court in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., same has also been recorded by the learned Trial Court. The complainant during trial had also prayed for his safety from these three persons. The cognizance was taken in the complaint and however, the same was quashed by the Hon’ble High Court in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., same has also been recorded by the learned Trial Court. 8.6 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused also submits that such a wide variation automatically demolishes the case of the prosecution as in the cross-examination of the prosecution eye witnesses, particularly Pema Ram (PW-3) he has admitted that they wanted to pressurize Gajendra Singh, Tara Chand and Girwar Singh to give evidence against respondent-accused but when they did not agree, they tried to array them as co-accused, which not only creates grave doubt in the minds of the Court, but also demolishes the story of the prosecution. 8.7 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused further submits that the variations and deviations that have been made in the prosecution story even at the instance of the complainant create a doubt that actually PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 were the eye witnesses or not and particularly they are very close relatives of the deceased, in fact, they are real brothers and cousin brothers and thus, it seems that they were not at the site in question. 8.8 Learned counsel for the respondent-accused also submits that in case they were sure about their being an eye witness, there was no requirement of further evidence and thus in the cross-examination they admitted that they wanted to include these persons namely Gajendra Singh, Tara Chand and Girwar Singh as witnesses which further shows their efforts to strengthen the prosecution case because they were not confident to support the same in the capacity of eye witnesses. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the material available on record. 10. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the material available on record. 10. This Court, after seeing the record of the case, particularly the exhibits pointed out by the eye witnesses and the story pointed out by the respondent-accused, finds that learned Trial Court has rightly disbelieved the story of the prosecution because the motive in the case completely collapses and that Santro Devi has not been examined whereas, the original reason given by the complainant was that a dispute arose because of Santro Devi not paying the fare to the bus driver Bhanwar Singh (respondent-accused) in which Jhabar Ram (deceased) intervened, then an animosity resulted into, the incident in question. 11. This Court finds that the learned trial Court has also taken into consideration the effort of the complainant to subsequently array three more co-accused namely Gajendra Singh, Tara Chand and Girwar Singh even when the original FIR was said to have been lodged by them in the capacity of eye witnesses and therefore, in case there was any involvement of those three persons they should have been brought in the original story. The kind of haphazard development that has been tried to be brought on record, by the complainant creates great doubt in the story of the prosecution. The learned Trial Court has in detail considered all these deviations and thus has disbelieved the testimony of the eye witnesses giving the benefit of doubt to the present respondent-accused. 12. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra) : “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra) : “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra) : “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. In view of the aforesaid precedent law, this Court finds that in the present case, the sole eyewitness i.e. Santro Devi to the incident in question was not produced during the trial; no evidence was placed on record before the learned Trial Court, which could, in any way, establish the prosecution case regarding prior enmity between the deceased and the accused-respondent and, therefore, it is not established that the respondent-accused was having any motive to commit the crime in question. 13.1 The other witnesses i.e. PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5, who are close relatives of the deceased, and that, the said witnesses were claimed to be the eye witnesses, whereas they were not present at the place of incident at the relevant time, which creates a shadow of doubt upon the prosecution story. 14. This Court has carefully gone through the judgment of the learned trial Court and find that the reason arrived at by the learned trial Court for the acquittal does not call for any interference from this Court as the flow of the judgment does not indicate any kind of deviation from the facts or the evidence which has been adduced. 15. This Court also notes that there is no incriminating evidence connecting the accused-respondent with the crime in question. 15. This Court also notes that there is no incriminating evidence connecting the accused-respondent with the crime in question. The mere presence of the accused at the site or the differences between the accused and the deceased unless acted upon would not bring him in the purview of conviction or absolute making out of the crime. 16. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondent for the offences under Sections 302, 120-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 20. 18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 20. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the respondent-accused is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the respondent-accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as he would be called upon to do so. 21. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.