JUDGMENT : Bhargav D. Karia, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Dhinal Shah, learned advocate Ms. Vaibhavi K. Parikh, learned advocate Mr. Jimi Patel for learned advocate Mr. Darshan Gandhi for the petitioners and learned Senior Standing Counsels Mr. Varun K. Patel and Mr. Karan Sanghani for the respondents. 2. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocates for the respective parties waive service of notice of rule for the respective respondents. 3. Having regard to the controversy in narrow compass, with the consent of learned advocates for the respective parties, these petitions are taken up for hearing. 4. As the issue arising in these petitions is similar, the same were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 5. In all these petitions the petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) and the order under Section 245D(4) of the Act passed by the Interim Board of Settlement. 6. The brief facts of the each petitions are as under : SCA No. A.Y. Date of Notice u/s 148/153A Date of Order u/s 245D(4) Date of filing of application for settlement 21052/2023 2016-17 30.06.2021 02.08.2023 26.03.2021 20532/2023 2017-18 24.03.2021 02.08.2023 26.03.2021 991/2024 2019-20 to 2020-21 19.07.2021 20.12.2023 30.09.2021 1010/2024 2019-20 to 2020-21 19.07.2021 20.12.2023 30.09.2021 1181/2024 2019-20 to 2020-21 19.07.2021 20.12.2023 30.09.2021 1246/2024 2010-11 to 2013-14 06.02.2021 30.12.2023 19.03.2021 6134/2024 2013-14 to 2017-18 31.01.2021 29.12.2023 24.03.2021 7. In this group of petitions for the Assessment Years which are referred to in the above table, the Interim Board for Settlement has held that the applications filed by the petitioners for settlement for the said Assessment Years, the petitioners were not eligible to file application for settlement as the petitioners have not filed application for settlement on or before 31.01.2021 for the relevant Assessment Years in view of the amendment in Section 245C of the Act by Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 01.02.2021. 8. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners are liable to file application for settlement on or before 31.03.2021 as the Finance Act, 2021 received the assent of the President on 01.04.201 and therefore till 31.03.2021, the Settlement Commission continued to operate and it cannot be said that the Finance Act, 2021 would come into effect with effect from 01.02.2021. 9. 9. Learned advocates for the petitioners submitted that the issue with regard to the maintainability of the Settlement Applications filed prior to 31.03.2021 as well as notices issued prior to the said date under Section 148 or 153A of the Act would be maintainable before the Interim Board for Settlement, more particularly in view of the Circular No.299/22/2021-Dir (Inv.-III)/174 dated 28.09.2021 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (for short ‘CBDT’) in exercise of powers under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act which reads as under : “....3. In view of the above, the Board in exercise of its power under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), in order to avoid genuine hardship to assesses authorizes the Commissioner of Income-tax, posted as Secretary to the Settlement Commission prior to 01.02.2021, to admit an application for settlement on behalf of the Interim Board filed after 31.01.2021 which is the date mentioned in sub-section (5) of section 245C of the Act for filing such application, and before 30.09.2021 and treat such applications as valid and process them as "pending applications" as defined in clause (eb) of section 245A of the Act. 4. The above relaxation is available to the applications filed:- (i) by the assesses who were eligible to file application for settlement on 31.01.2021 for the assessment years for which the application is sought to be filed (relevant assessment years); and (ii) where the relevant assessment proceedings of the assessee are pending as on the date of filing the application for settlement...” 10. It was submitted that the respondents have misinterpreted above Notification to hold that the petitioner must be eligible to file application for settlement on 31.01.2021 for the relevant Assessment Years as per Section 245A(b) read with Section 245C(1) of the Act which reads as under : “Section 245A(b) of the Income Tax Act contains the definition of case to mean any proceedings for assessment under this Act, of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before the Assessing Officer on the date on which an application under section 245C (1) is made. Explanation (i) to section 245A (b) provides that a proceeding for assessment or reassessment or re-computation under section 147 shall be deemed to have commenced- (a) from the date on which a notice under section 148 is issued for any assessment year; (b) from the date of issuance of the notice referred to in sub-clause (a), for any other assessment year or assessment years for which a notice under section 148 has not been issued, but such notice could have been issued on such date, If the return of income for the other assessment year or assessment years has been furnished under section 139 or in response to a notice under section 142. Thus as per the provisions of this section the proceedings commence on the date of issue of notice under 148 or if it has not been issued but the mandate still exists for issue of such notice. Section 245C(1) lays down the other conditions essential while filing an application for settlement. 245C. Thus as per the provisions of this section the proceedings commence on the date of issue of notice under 148 or if it has not been issued but the mandate still exists for issue of such notice. Section 245C(1) lays down the other conditions essential while filing an application for settlement. 245C. ((1) An assessee may, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and containing a full and true disclosure of his Income which has not been disclosed before the [Assessing) Officer, the manner in which such income has been derived, the additional amount of income-tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and any such application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided: [Provided that no such application shall be made unless,- (i) in a case where proceedings for assessment or reassessment for any of the assessment years referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 1538 in case of a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C have been initiated, the additional amount of income-tax payable on the income disclosed in the application exceeds fifty lakh rupees, ((ia) in o case where- (A) the applicant is related to the person referred to in clause (1) who has filed an application (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as "specified person"); and (B) the proceedings for assessment or re-assessment for any of the assessment years referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 1538 in case of the applicant, being a person referred to in section 153A or section 153C, have been initiated, the additional amount of income-tax payable on the income disclosed in the application exceeds ten lakh rupees,] (ii) in any other case, the additional amount of income-tax payable on the income disclosed In the application exceeds ten lakh rupees, and such tax and the interest thereon, which would have been paid under the provisions of this Act had the income disclosed in the application been declared in the return of income before the Assessing Officer on the date of application, has been paid on or before the date of making the application and the proof of such payment is attached with the application." 11. Referring to the above provisions it was submitted that the respondent Board could not have passed the following order challenged in case of Special Civil Application No.21052 of 2023 and similar reasoning is adopted in all the matters : “Thus, it is apparent from the reading of the relevant sections as per the Income Tax Act, that for the applicant to be eligible to file an application for settlement as per the circular of the Board, the notice under section 148 should have been issued before 31.01.2021. However, in case of the applicant, it is evident that notices u/s 148 for the A.Y 2017-18 has been issued by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer after 31.01.2021 i.e. on 24.03.2021, as seen above at para 4-.1 supra which means that there is no eligibility in respect of application for this A.Y 2017-18 as on 31.01.2021. The notice under section 148, for A.Y. 2016-17 has been issued subsequently i.e. on 30-06-21 and thus it is also not a eligible case as on 31-01-2021 since assessment proceedings have not commenced on date. Therefore, the Board is of the view that in the case of the applicant the assessee is no eligible to file applications for AYs 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 as on 31-01-2021 and therefore the eligibility criterion for filling of Settlement Applicant, as laid down under the Act read with the Notification No. 299/22/2021-Dir (Inv. III)/174 dated 28.09.2021 is not fulfilled. As a result, these two assessment years cannot be considered for settlement before the Interim Board.” 12. It was submitted that the above reasoning on which the petitioners are held not eligible to file the application for settlement has been considered by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in case of Jain Metal Rolling Mills Vs. Union of India reported in (2023) 156 taxmann.com 513 (Madras) and in the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax And Ors. rendered on 02.04.2024 in Writ Petition No.5682 of 2021. Union of India reported in (2023) 156 taxmann.com 513 (Madras) and in the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax And Ors. rendered on 02.04.2024 in Writ Petition No.5682 of 2021. It was therefore submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court and the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, wherein the provisions of the statute have been read down in respect of the date to be read as 31.03.2021 instead of 01.02.2021 and all the applications in respect of the petitioners including in respect of the applications for settlement filed between date 01.02.2021 to 31.03.2021 is required to be deemed as pending applications for the purpose of consideration by the Interim Board and the orders passed by the Interim Board holding such applications as not pending were set aside and such applications were ordered to be pending applications for consideration by the Interim Board, if otherwise in order eligible to be dealt with and in accordance with law on merits and in accordance with the scheme that may be framed by the Central Government as in respect of other cases which arose prior to 31.01.2021. 13. On the other hand, learned advocates for the respondent submitted that the orders passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in case of Jain Metal Rolling Mills (Supra) is challenged by the respondents before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the matter is pending. 14. Learned advocates for the respondents referred to and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of EBR Enterprises and Another Vs. 14. Learned advocates for the respondents referred to and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of EBR Enterprises and Another Vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 107 taxmann.com 220 (Bombay) to submit that in the facts of the said case arising under Section 80-(IB)(10) of the Act, the legislature granted deduction in relation to income arising out of the development of housing projects to the assessee, fulfilling the conditions contained therein as inserted by Finance(No.2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2003, Section 80A of the Act which was also contained in Chapter VI A of the Act pertains to the deduction to be made in computing total income and Subsection 5 of Section 80A of the act was inserted by Finance(2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect on 01.04.2003, wherein it is provided as where the assessee fails to make claim in his return of income or any deduction under Section 10A, 10AA, 10B, 10 BA or any provision under Chapter VIA under the heading VIA, no deduction would be allowed under the said provisions. 15. It was submitted that the provisions contained in Subsection 5 of Section 80A of the Act was held to be statutory interdict which would prevent the Commissioner from granting any claim in exercise of its Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 264 and even the High Court in exercise of extra writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not issue directions contrary to the statutory provisions. It was therefore submitted that in the facts of the present case, when the Settlement Commission ceases to exist from 01.02.2021, any notice issued under Section 148 or under Section 153A or any further Assessment Proceeding whether initiated or not after 01.02.2021, would not give any eligibility to the assessee to file application for settlement upto 31.03.2021 considering the fact that the Finance Act, 2021 was given assent on 01.04.2021. 16. Learned advocates for the respondents also referred to and relied upon decision of this Court in case of Prashanti Medical Services and Research Foundation Vs. 16. Learned advocates for the respondents also referred to and relied upon decision of this Court in case of Prashanti Medical Services and Research Foundation Vs. Union of India reported in [2017] 399 ITR 450 (Gujarat) wherein it is held that Section 35AC of the Act, which was withdrawn with effect from 01.04.2017 and the exemption provided by the said section was denied from the A.Y. commencing on or after 01.04.2018, and this Court held that the deduction was not confined to the services which the petitioner is dispensing and would cover range of projects and schemes for promoting the Social and Economic welfare of the public as may be notified and once the legislature desired to withdraw such deduction, any expenditure after such date would no longer be an eligible deduction. It was further held that the provision applies prospectively, and the legislature was competent to introduce such amendment. It was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also confirmed decision of this Court. 17. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in case of S.P.A.M. Krishnan Chettiar & Sons Vs. Income Tax Settlement Commission reported in [1993] 202 ITR 81 (Madras), wherein it is held that amendment of Section 245C by the Amendment Act with effect from 01.10.1984 was purely procedural and would govern the application filed on 09.08.1989 and the application was rejected on the ground that it did not contain the particulars required by the Section 245C of the Act and was not entertained. It was therefore submitted that, if the application is filed without taking the procedural changes in the provisions of the Section 245C of the Act, which is held to be purely a machinery Section without providing certain particulars as prescribed in Form 34B, application was not entertained by the Settlement Commission. 18. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in case of Pitchai Rajagopal Shiva Kumar Vs. Union of India reported in [2022] 442 ITR 33 (Madras), wherein the petitioner gave up the challenge to the Constitutional validity in view of the directions to the respondents to send applications to the constitution consideration by the Interim Board, if submitted before 30.09.2021 and consideration of the application by the Interim Board would be taken up if the proceedings are pending as on 31.01.2021. It was therefore submitted that the petitioners in the said case have accepted that the Interim Board can take applications filed before 30.09.2021 in view of the notification issued by the CBDT, if the petitioners were eligible to file applications prior to 31.01.2021. It was therefore submitted that in the facts of the present case, the petitioners were not eligible to file applications for settlement as on 31.01.2021 and therefore, the petitioners cannot be said to be having any eligibility for the applications filed after 31.01.2021 in respect of notices issued under Section 148 or 153A of the Act after 31.01.2021. 19. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, the issue raised in these petitions with regard to the eligibility of the petitioners to file application for settlement prior to 31.03.2021 is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in case of Jain Metal Rolling Mills (Supra). The facts of each case are not narrated in detail as the issue of eligibility is already decided by the Hon’ble Madras High Court as well as the Hon’ble Bombay High Court wherein it is held that the eligibility condition in the notification issued under Section 1192(b) of the Act should be read as 31.03.2021 and not as 31.01.2021 as Finance Act, 2021 was notified with effect from 01.04.2021 and therefore the eligibility of the petitioners to file the application for the settlement had to be considered from immediately preceding date. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court the impugned notice/order passed by the respondent Board holding the applications filed by the petitioners as invalid and valid law is clearly not sustainable in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, reading down the eligibility conditions would applicable PAN India. 20. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court the impugned notice/order passed by the respondent Board holding the applications filed by the petitioners as invalid and valid law is clearly not sustainable in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, reading down the eligibility conditions would applicable PAN India. 20. Section 245C of the Act provides that an assessee may at any stage of the case relating to him, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed and containing full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing Officer, make an application before the Settlement Commission in the prescribed format disclosing the manner in which the income has been derived and the additional amount of income tax payable on such income for settlement of the case and such application to be disposed of by the Settlement Commission in accordance with provisions of the Act. 21. Section 245A(b) of the Act defines the word ‘case’ to mean any proceedings for the assessment under the Act of the any person in respect of any Assessment Year or Assessment Years, which may be pending before the Assessing Officer on the date on which application is made under Section 245C(1) of the Act. The proceedings of assessment or reassessment of any Assessment Year therefore would commence from the date of issuance of the notice initiating such proceedings and concluded on the date on which the assessment is made. Therefore in the facts of the petitioners, proceedings for relevant Assessment Years would fall within meaning of the ‘case’ when the notice under Section 148 or 153 is issued and as the petitioner has made an application as per Section 245C(1) of the Act on issuance of the notice, prior to 31.03.2021, there was no prohibition on the petitioner to make such application as the Finance Bill, 2021 did not have the force of law and was merely a bill which may or may not be enacted or which may be enacted in different form and till the Finance Bill becomes the Act, it did not become the law. It is not in dispute that the Finance Act 2021 was notified with effect from 01.04.2021 before which the petitioners have already filed applications for the Settlement. 22. It is not in dispute that the Finance Act 2021 was notified with effect from 01.04.2021 before which the petitioners have already filed applications for the Settlement. 22. Therefore, the amendment made by the Finance Act despite being retrospective in nature, with effect from 01.02.2021 would not affect the vested right of the petitioners to prefer application for settlement of their cases as per the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX-A of the Act. 23. It is pertinent to note that when the Finance Bill came into force and became the law with effect from 01.04.2021, provisions of Section 245C(5) of the Act, which provides that no application shall be made under this Section on or after 01.02.2021 cannot obliviate, the applications already filed by the petitioners as on the date of filing of the application for settlement, amendment of Section 245C(5) of the Act was not a statute and therefore by retrospective amendment the petitioners cannot be prohibited from making an application because if the legislature intended to make applications filed between 01.02.2021 and 01.04.201 as invalid and bad in law, it would have instead provided that such application would be treated as null and void. Therefore the provisions of Section 245C(5) of the Act cannot be placed into service to invalidate the applications filed between 01.02.2021 and 31.03.2021. 24. Reliance placed by the respondents on the decisions of this Court in case of EBR Enterprises (Supra) and Prashanti Medical Services and Research Foundation (Supra) therefore would not be applicable as the facts in the present case are totally different and the issue of coming into force of statute was not before the Court while deciding the retrospective effect of an amendment vis-a-vis the intention of the legislature. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in case of Jain Metal Rolling Mills (Supra) in the similar facts has held as under : “6. Be that as it may, considering the difficulty of the assessees, on account of the sudden and retrospective amendment, in exercise of its powers under Section 119(2) of the Act, a press release was issued on 07.09.2021 and thereafter an Order in the nature of a Trade Circular was issued on 28.09.2021 extending the time limit for filing applications before the Interim Board upto 30.09.2021. However, paragraph (4) of the said Order reads thus:- “4. However, paragraph (4) of the said Order reads thus:- “4. The above relaxation is available to the applications filed:- (i) by the assessees who were eligible to file application for settlement on 31.01.2021 for the assessment years for which the application is sought to be filed (relevant assessment years); and (ii) where the relevant assessment proceedings of the assessee are pending as on the date of filing of the application for settlement.” 7. As a matter of fact, immediately after the introduction of the Bill before the Parliament, fresh applications were not accepted before the ITSC as such, several petitioners had approached the Courts of law and upon directions of Court their applications were received and are pending. After the extension of time upto 30.09.2021, in some cases, the applications were rejected on the ground that the Orders/Notices of re-opening etc., were issued on or after 01.02.2021, by considering the eligibility clause as contained in the circular dated 28.09.2021. Hence, the aggrieved petitioners are before this Court, broadly with the above prayers challenging the Constitutional Validity of the provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, as also challenging the validity of the Circular dated 28.09.2021 and the consequential orders that are passed in their individual cases. 8. It is the case of the Writ Petitioners that their statutory remedy of approaching the ITSC, cannot be taken away retrospectively. Retrospective legislation cannot affect the vested rights. It also overrides the directions of Courts issued in the interregnum. As such, the provisions as aforementioned in the prayer are unconstitutional. Similarly, the Department is entitled to prescribe the last date even beyond the original cut-off date as prescribed by the legislation. Accordingly, when it has extended the last date from 01.02.2021 to 30.09.2021, it can only extend the deadline but cannot introduce a new concept of ‘eligibility as on 01.02.2021’ which is not there in the Act itself. To the said extent, the impugned circular is illegal. 34. We have considered the rival submissions made on either side and perused the material records of the cases. The following three questions arise for consideration in the present cases :- (i) Whether or not paragraph No.4(i) of the Circular, dated 28.09.2021 is bad in law inasmuch as it imposes a condition of eligibility to file application for settlement as on 31.01.2021 ? The following three questions arise for consideration in the present cases :- (i) Whether or not paragraph No.4(i) of the Circular, dated 28.09.2021 is bad in law inasmuch as it imposes a condition of eligibility to file application for settlement as on 31.01.2021 ? (ii) Whether or not the Finance Act, 2021 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it has given retrospective application with effect from 01.02.2021? (iii) To what reliefs, the petitioners are entitled ? 35. The impugned circular is issued in the exercise of power under Section 119(2) of the Act. The offending clause 4(i) is extracted supra in paragraph No.6 above. On a consideration of the decisions relied on by both sides and submissions made, to answer the question in the present context of the case, it is clear that a circular issued by the respondents under Section 119 of the Act: (i) would be binding on the departmental authorities; (ii) It is issued to ensure uniform and proper administration and the application of the Income Tax Act; (iii) It cannot add any new condition or anything contrary to the statute; (iv) But, in order to mitigate the rigor of the provisions for the benefit of the assessees in certain specified circumstances, it can even travel beyond so as to grant administrative relief to the taxpayer, but, it shall not impose any new burden on him. 36. In that conspectus, with the Finance Act, 2021, in the background as such, it can be seen that by virtue of proviso to Section 245B, the ITSC is made inoperative with effect from 01.02.2021. Similarly, the Section 245C(5) also plays an embargo that no application shall be made under the section on or after 01.02.2021. The proviso to Section 245D(2C) deems that if no order is passed as on 31.01.2021 under the section, the application is deemed to be valid. The powers of the ITSC under Sections 245DD, 245F, 245G, 245H are all specifically entrusted to be exercised by the Interim Board with effect from 01.02.2021. Further, Sections 245D(9), stipulates that from 01.02.2021, the provisions of Sub-Sections (1)(2)(2B), (2C), (3), (4), (4A), (5), (6) and (6B) shall apply to pending applications allotted to Interim Board with the modifications mentioned therein. In this background, the circular can only grant administrative relief to the assessees. Therefore, considering the fact that the Finance Act, 2021 was retrospective in nature. Further, Sections 245D(9), stipulates that from 01.02.2021, the provisions of Sub-Sections (1)(2)(2B), (2C), (3), (4), (4A), (5), (6) and (6B) shall apply to pending applications allotted to Interim Board with the modifications mentioned therein. In this background, the circular can only grant administrative relief to the assessees. Therefore, considering the fact that the Finance Act, 2021 was retrospective in nature. Those who have had a right to approach ITSC i.e., those who had a case pending against them would have missed the bus in not actually filing the application before the ITSC as the same was retrospectively made inoperative. Only for the said action of filing the application, the circular extend the date by 30.09.2021, even though as per the Act, it was only 01.02.2021. In that context, when paragraph No.4 categorically states that only those assessees who are eligible to file an application for settlement as on 31.01.2021, it cannot be said that it introduces an additional clause of eligibility which is not found in the statute. On the other hand, if only such clause 4(i) is not there, it would render violence to the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contentions on behalf of the writ petitioners that the circular imposes an additional condition of eligibility which is not there in the statute. Even though there is no specific provision regarding eligibility, the right to approach the ITSC can be exercised so long as the ITSC is operational in law. When ITSC itself has been made inoperative with effect from 01.02.2021, it cannot be said that clause 4(i) of the circular runs counter or imposes an additional condition to the statute. Accordingly, Question No.i is answered. Question No.ii : 37. The basic ground of attack on the constitutionality of the impugned enactment is that it is retrospective in nature and that it takes away the vested rights of the petitioners. The further submission is that the vested rights are taken away by fixing an artificial cut-off date. In this regard, the contention on behalf of the State is that the settlement itself is concession and therefore, the writ petitioners cannot claim any vested right. We are unable to countenance the said argument on behalf of the State. The further submission is that the vested rights are taken away by fixing an artificial cut-off date. In this regard, the contention on behalf of the State is that the settlement itself is concession and therefore, the writ petitioners cannot claim any vested right. We are unable to countenance the said argument on behalf of the State. It may be true that the orders passed by ITSC containing terms of settlement has the trappings of concession and benevolence showered by the State to a particular assessee. But, such benevolence, concession etc., are exercised by the State through a statutory regime. Under the statute, the assessees are entitled to approach the appropriate authority seeking such concession/benevolence. Therefore, the question with which we are concerned is the ‘right to approach’ the ITSC which is a statutory right conferred by Chapter XIX-A of the Act, more specifically, Section 245C of the Act by filing an application. Therefore, the assessees had a statutory right to approach the ITSC. Like any other appellate or revisional remedy which is a creature of statute, to right to seek resolution through ITSC was also conferred by the statute. Of course, it is well within the policy realm of the State to take away the remedy. It is not for this Court to substitute its opinion as to the abolition of the ITSC and taking away the procedure of resolution of the disputes through ITSC under Chapter XIX-A. The State had every right to abolish the ITSC. Therefore, the Parliament had every right to enact impugned enactment. While being so, in appropriate cases, the right to enact a law with retrospective operation is also well recognized. In the instant case, on a perusal of the impugned legislation, it was given retrospective effect with effect from 01.02.2021 on the premise that it is on the said date, that the Bill was introduced by the Parliament, by which, all the assessees and the general public concerned are made to know about the policy decision in the making by which the State proposed to make the ITSC inoperative. The period of retrospectivity is also only two months as it can be seen that the Act itself was notified on 01.04.2021. It is also not regarding any levy of tax to contend that the parties acted as per the law in force at the relevant time. The period of retrospectivity is also only two months as it can be seen that the Act itself was notified on 01.04.2021. It is also not regarding any levy of tax to contend that the parties acted as per the law in force at the relevant time. Therefore, the act of the State in abolishing the ITSC with effect from a cut-off date per se cannot be illegal or ultra vires the Constitution. 38. But, at the same time, the ITSC did exist legally and factually until 31.03.2021. Every eligible assessee had a right to approach the ITSC, if they had a ‘case’ pending against them. The definition of 'case' as per Section 245-A(eb) is also extracted above. Therefore, even if any proceeding for assessments/reopening is issued after 01.02.2021 upto 31.03.2021, the assessee had a ‘case’ to approach the Commission and if they had submitted an application and if no final order has been passed under Sub-Section 4 of 245(D) on or before 31.01.2021, then the said application is treated as a ‘pending application’. The very purpose of the legislation was to abolish the ITSC and to establish an Interim Board to deal with the pending applications. It can be seen that in respect of the case of the petitioners whose matters had arisen before the notification of the Act on 01.04.2021, but, after the cut-off date of 01.02.2021, were also very much eligible to approach the ITSC. The decisions relied upon by both sides in respect of retrospective legislation referred to supra, unequivocally hold that if the retrospective legislation takes away a vested right, it must do so by providing expressly or by necessary intendment. We step back and read the Amending Act namely, the Finance Act, 2021 carefully. While the ITSC is made inoperative with effect from 01.02.2021 and an Interim Board is set up, provisions are made to transfer pending applications, absolutely, the Amending Act or the entire Chapter XIX-A as it stands after the amendment, does not expressly deal with or provide anything by necessary intendment regarding those applications which are made or the eligible cases in the interregnum. This being so, the ratio of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. This being so, the ratio of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shah Sadiq & Sons (supra) would apply in all force that a right which had accrued to approach the ITSC till the notification of the Finance Act, 2021 on 01.04.2021 stood vested in the eligible assessees and the said rights continued to be capable of being enforced notwithstanding the amendment of the relevant provision. 39. As a matter of fact, the applications are either made by the petitioners or on direction by the orders of the Court as the ITSC was in the statute book in the interregnum period before the retrospective legislation came into force. Therefore, the retrospectivity also makes these directions of Court and the consequential applications being filed before the ITSC nugatory. Therefore, the ratio in Tushar Ranjan Mohanty quoted supra applies in all force. 40. At the material time, i.e., during the interregnum period of 01.02.2021 upto 31.03.2021, the petitioners had a “case” within the definition of Section 245A(b). Their applications were very much pending applications as per the definition of 245A(eb). As a matter of fact, their applications were dealt with as per Section 245D and on a perusal of Section 245M, it can be seen that these applications were also to be transferred to the Interim Board to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down to the board. But, however, without amending the definition of case pending applications etc., Section 245C(5) simply provides that no application shall be made under the Section on or after the first day of February, 2021. The right to file application before ITSC is very much existent and has been exercised till 31.03.2021. The retrospective legislation by way of legal fiction attempts to make it as if it is unavailable. In this regard, useful reference can be made to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. B.A. Jayaram, and the relevant portion of paragraph 17 reads as follows:- “17. Even if sub-section (8) of Section 57 can be viewed as creating a legal fiction, the question which would arise would be for what purpose such legal fiction was created. Vs. B.A. Jayaram, and the relevant portion of paragraph 17 reads as follows:- “17. Even if sub-section (8) of Section 57 can be viewed as creating a legal fiction, the question which would arise would be for what purpose such legal fiction was created. As was observed by Lord 1984 Supp SCC 244 James in Ex Parte Walton, In re Levy [(1881) 17 Ch D 746, 756 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548 : 45 LT 1 (CA)] : “When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.” This passage was quoted with approval by the House of Lords in Hill v. East & West India Dock Co.[(1884) 9 AC 448, 456 : 51 LT 163 : 32 WR 925 (HL)] This principle of statutory interpretation has been accepted by this Court. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar[ AIR 1955 SC 661 : (1955) 2 SCR 603 , 646 : 1955 SCJ 672 ] it was held that “a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field”. This was reiterated in CIT v. Amarchand N. Shroff [ AIR 1963 SC 1448 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 699, 709 : (1963) 1 SCJ 411], Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. M. Ramnarain (P) Ltd. [ AIR 1965 SC 1718 : (1965) 3 SCR 421 , 424 : (1965) 2 SCJ 853 ] and CIT v. Vadilal Lallubhai [ (1973) 3 SCC 17 , 22 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 1, 6 : AIR 1973 SC 1016 : (1973) 1 SCR 1058 , 1064]. Assuming, therefore, that an application for variation of the conditions of a permit referred to in sub-section (8) of Section 57 is to be deemed by a fiction of law to be an application for the grant of a new permit, the question to which we must address ourselves is for what purpose is such an application for variation deemed to be an application for grant of a new permit.” Therefore, when we consider the instant case, the purpose of the retrospective legislation is to make the ITSC inoperative right from the date of the introduction of the Bill and to send all the pending applications to the Interim Board. Therefore, fixing the last date for filing the applications alone travels beyond the purpose and results in more retrospectivity than which is needed and thus, runs counter to the other parts of the Act. As a matter of fact, as per the principle of lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back) it can be seen that the purport of the legislation is only to do away with the policy of resolution through ITSC. As a matter of fact, the Central Government has to make a Scheme for the purposes of Settlement in respect of pending applications by the Interim Board as per Section 245D(11) and such scheme had to be placed before the Parliament. Thus, neither there is any intent nor it is within the purpose to do away with the ‘pending applications’ in respect of matters in which the ‘cases’ arose from 01.02.2021 to 31.03.2021. Thus, we find that it is just and necessary to read down the last date mentioned for filing applications in Section 245C(5) as 31.03.2021 and consequently the last date mentioned in paragraph No.4(i) of the Circular should also read as 31.03.2021. The Question No.ii is answered accordingly. Question No.iii : 41. Thus, we find that it is just and necessary to read down the last date mentioned for filing applications in Section 245C(5) as 31.03.2021 and consequently the last date mentioned in paragraph No.4(i) of the Circular should also read as 31.03.2021. The Question No.ii is answered accordingly. Question No.iii : 41. As per our findings in respect of Questions No.i and ii, thereby reading down the statute in respect of the date as 31.03.2021, the petitioners: (i) all the applications in respect of the petitioners even in respect of the cases arising between 01.02.2021 to 31.03.2021 shall be deemed as pending applications for the purposes of consideration by the Interim Board; (ii) Wherever they are rejected on the ground that they did not have a case pending as on 31.01.2021, such orders shall stand set aside and the applications shall be deemed to be pending applications for the consideration by the Interim Board, if otherwise in order and eligible, and shall be dealt with in accordance with law on merits in accordance with the scheme that may be framed by the Central Government as in respect of the other cases which arose prior to 31.01.2021. The Result : 42. The Result : 42. In the result, these writ petitions are partly allowed and are disposed off on the following terms :- (i) Section 245C(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (as amended by the Finance Act, 2021) is read down by removing the retrospective last date of 1st date of February, 2021 as 31st day of March, 2021; (ii) Consequently the last date of eligibility mentioned paragraph 4(i) of the impugned circular dated 28.09.2021 shall also be read as 31.03.2021; (iii) all the applications in respect of the petitioners even in respect of the cases arising between 01.02.2021 to 31.03.2021 shall be deemed be pending applications and shall be deemed to be pending applications for the purposes of consideration by the Interim Board; (iv) Wherever they are rejected on the ground that they did not have a case pending as on 31.01.2021, such orders shall stand set aside and the applications shall be deemed to be pending applications for the consideration by the Interim Board, if otherwise in order and eligible, and shall be dealt with in accordance with law on merits in accordance with the scheme that may be framed by the Central Government as in respect of the other cases which arose prior to 31.01.2021; (v) No Costs. Consequently all miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.” 25. Therefore adopting the reasons given in the above decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court and more particularly when the petitioners have filed their applications before 31.03.12021, the date on which amendment Finance Act, 2021 did not come into effect and therefore the petitioners had vested right of preferring the application in absence of any statute prohibiting the same application. It is also pertinent to note that the CBDT has extended the last date from 01.02.2021 to 30.09.2021 for filing applications for settlement eligible on 31.01.2021 and the CBDT could not have prescribed the eligible date of filing of application up to 01.02.2021 for the assessee relying upon provisions of Section 245C(5) of the Act which was not in existence up to 31.03.2021 and therefore the application for settlement made by the petitioners are valid applications filed prior to 31.03.2021 in absence of provisions of Section 245C(5) of the Act. Therefore an application already filed after 01.02.2021 but before 31.03.2021 cannot be declared invalid and provision of section 245C(5) has rightly been read down that no application shall be made after 01.04.2021 once the provision of Section 245C(5) received the assent of the Hon’ble President of India on 01.04.2021, however before the assent being accorded to the Finance Act, 2021 the applications made by the petitioners cannot be held to be invalid by virtue of subsection 5 of Section 245C of the Act. 26. In view of the foregoing reasons the petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The applications filed by the petitioners in respect of the cases arising between 01.02.2021 to 31.03.2021 shall be deemed to be the pending applications and shall be applications for the purpose of consideration by the Interim Board considering the last date of eligibility mentioned in para no.4(1) of the Notification dated 28.09.2021 shall be read as 31.03.2021 by reading down the last date 01.02.2021 as 31.03.2021 in Section 245C(5) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2021. The impugned orders of the Interim Board are therefore set aside and the applications filed by the petitioners shall be deemed to be the pending applications for the consideration by the Interim Board, if otherwise, in order and eligible and shall be dealt with in accordance with law on merits and in accordance with the scheme that maybe framed by the Central Government as in respect of the other cases which were pending as on 31.01.2021. 27. Consequential actions to the impugned orders passed by the Interim Board if any taken by the respondent Assessing Officer shall also stand quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Interim Board for Settlement for deciding the applications filed by the petitioners on merits. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.