ORDER : (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIREN VAISHNAV) 1. The original plaintiff has filed this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order of the 13th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat, dated 15.01.2019. By the aforesaid order under Order VII Rule XI of the Civil Procedure Code, an application filed by the defendant nos.1 and 2 i.e. the present respondent nos.1 and 2 in this appeal was allowed. The appellant-original plaintiff filed a suit being Special Civil Suit No.207 of 2015 before the Civil Court. It was the case of the appellant-original plaintiff that in Surat, Sub District:Choryasi at Village:Viheel, land being survey no.29, block No.33, was an ancestral property of the grandfather of plaintiff-Kalidas Nathubhai amongst other lands. On the death of his grandfather, the lands including the one referred to herein above, came to the share of his father Ghelabhai Kalidas. 2. It was the case of the plaintiff that his father Ghelabhai Kalidas made a Will on 29.01.1985 bequeathing the lands separately to his six successors including the plaintiff. The plaintiff got a land being survey no.42/1. It was the case of the plaintiff that subsequently three separate sale deeds were executed on 05.11.2001 by the successors of the father Ghelabhai Kalidas declaring the earlier Will as cancelled. This was registered on 13.02.2002. Further it was the case of the plaintiff-appellant that the father died on 06.02.2003 and contrary to the settlement entered into by the sister Nirmalaben without the knowledge of the plaintiff, she made a Will on 01.02.2007 and the land which was otherwise bequeathed in favour of plaintiff at Village:Viheel was sold after the death of Nirmalaben on 20.06.2007. The land in question viz. Survey no.29/1 at Village:Viheel was sold vide registered sale deed of 19.06.2011 which according to the plaintiff-appellant was registered on 20.07.2012. The cause of action to file the suit occurred when the position of the appellant-plaintiff was sought to be interfered with in the year 2015. 3. The defendant nos.1 and 2 filed an application under Order VII Rule XI claiming that the suit was hopelessly time barred inasmuch as, the Will of the father of the year 1985 was sought to be challenged of which a revenue entry was already made in the year 2005. 3. The defendant nos.1 and 2 filed an application under Order VII Rule XI claiming that the suit was hopelessly time barred inasmuch as, the Will of the father of the year 1985 was sought to be challenged of which a revenue entry was already made in the year 2005. Even in an appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff, the order of the Revenue Court had come on 24.03.2008. The registered sale deed in favour of the defendant nos.3 and 4 was executed in 2011 and therefore the suit filed on 18.04.2015 was hopelessly time barred. 4. Mr.A.K.Dave learned counsel for the appellant would submit that admittedly the Will of the father-Ghelabhai Kalidas executed in the year 1985 was bad. Moreover, once the release deeds were signed in the year 2002, Nirmalaben in the year 2007 could not have bequeathed the land in question nor the defendant nos.1 and 2 to whom the land was bequeathed could have sold it to defendant nos.3 and 4 in 2011. 5. He would submit that the sale deed of 19.06.2011 was only registered in the year 2014 and since the possession of the appellant-plaintiff was sought to be interfered with on 05.02.2015 by the defendant nos.3 and 4, at that time the appellant came to know about these proceedings. He had therefore prayed for a declaration that the sale deed dated 19.06.2011 be set aside and the Will accordingly be declared as illegal. 6. In support of his submissions, Mr.Dave would rely on a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar rendered in Civil Appeal No.3500 of 2018. Relying on para 11 of the decision, he would submit that only from the date of knowledge would the execution of the registered sale deed a right accrued in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 7. Mr.Rakesh Patel learned counsel for the defendant nos.1 and 2-respondent nos.1 and 2 would support the order of the Trial Court. He would rely on the decision in case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited and Another v. Union of India and Another reported in (2011) 9 SCC 126 . 8. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the plaint and examined the same as a whole, certain dates need to be attended to in context of the prayers made in the suit. 8. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the plaint and examined the same as a whole, certain dates need to be attended to in context of the prayers made in the suit. Reading the prayers in the suit would indicate that primarily the foundation of the first relief in the suit for setting aside a sale deed dated 19.06.2011 was based on a Will of the father of the year 1985 being declared as bad. Post that development, even from the plaint when it is read in its entirety, it was the case of the plaintiff that the Will of his sister Nirmalaben of the year 2007 should also be declared in light of the sale deeds signed in the year 2002. 9. Perusal of the memo of the application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule XI (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure would indicate that essentially the Wills of the year 1985 and 2007 were under challenge to contend at the hands of the appellant that the Will executed in the year 1985 was not valid in the eye of law and a consequential sale of the year 2011 appears to be a case of being hopelessly time barred, it cannot be said that a question of limitation in such facts would be a mixed question of fact and law and can only be adjudicated after recording the evidence. Certain other dates in the interregnum from the date of the Will of father - Ghelabhai Kalidas dated 29.01.1985 till the registration of the sale deed of the year 2011 need a special mention. Post the Will what is evident from the documents mark 3/5 to 3/7 that the sale deeds were of the year 2002. The Will of Nirmalaben was also of the year 2007. Entries pursuant to the Will of late Ghelabhai Kalidas which according to the plaintiff was cancelled, were mutated as per the Will vide mutation entry no.358 dated 24.02.2004. These were challenged in RTS Case No.50 of 2004 which the Revenue Court rejected in the year 2005 and appeal also failed inasmuch as the same was rejected on 24.03.2008. No further proceedings were carried against this order. These were challenged in RTS Case No.50 of 2004 which the Revenue Court rejected in the year 2005 and appeal also failed inasmuch as the same was rejected on 24.03.2008. No further proceedings were carried against this order. Evidently therefore, it cannot be believed that the appellant-plaintiff was unaware of the Will, firstly that of Ghelabhai Kalidas and the registered will of Nirmalaben dated 01.02.2007 when in the interregnum he had perused review cases till the year 2008 and failed. 10. It is on record that the sale deed subsequent to the Will of Nirmalaben by which the properties bequeathed to defendant nos.1 and 2 was sold to defendant nos.3 and 4 were of the year 2011. The Trial Court on perusal of documents mark 3/2 found that the possession was also handed over to the defendant nos.3 and 4 in the year 2014. 11. Evidently therefore it cannot be said that the Court below had committed any error in entertaining and passing orders allowing an application below Order VII Rule XI. As observed in case of Khatri Hotels Private Limited (supra), successive violation of rights could not give a fresh cause of action. Paragraph nos.23 to 30 of the decision read as under: “23. We shall first consider the question whether the suit filed by the appellants on 14.2.2000 was within limitation and the contrary concurrent finding recorded by the trial Court and the High Court is legally unsustainable. 24. The Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, `the 1963 Act') prescribes time limit for all conceivable suits, appeals etc. Section 2(j) of that Act defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted, appeal preferred or application made after the prescribed period shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. In other words, the residuary article is applicable to every kind of suit not otherwise provided for in the Schedule. 25. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. In other words, the residuary article is applicable to every kind of suit not otherwise provided for in the Schedule. 25. Article 58 of the 1963 Act, which has bearing on the decision of this appeal, reads as under: "THE SCHEDULE PERIODS OF LIMITATION [See sections 2(j) and 3] FIRST DIVISION – SUITS Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begin storun PART III- Suits Relating To Declarations 58. To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 26. Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (for short, `the 1908 Act') which was interpreted in the judgment relied upon by Shri Rohtagi reads as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begin storun PART III- Suits Relating To Declarations 120. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule Six years When the right to to sue first accrues 27. The differences which are discernible from the language of the above reproduced two articles are: (i) The period of limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the 1908 Act was six years whereas the period of limitation prescribed under the 1963 Act is three years and, (ii) Under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, the period of limitation commenced when the right to sue accrues. As against this, the period prescribed under Article 58 begins to run when the right to sue first accrues. 28. Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the Judicial Committee in Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan AIR 1930 PC 270 and it was held: "There can be no `right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least, a clear or unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted." The same view was reiterated in Annamalai Chettiar v. A.M.K.C.T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar (1930) I.L.R. 8 Rang. 645 and Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh 29. In Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan (supra), the three-Judge Bench noticed the earlier judgments and summed up the legal position in the following words: "33. 645 and Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh 29. In Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan (supra), the three-Judge Bench noticed the earlier judgments and summed up the legal position in the following words: "33. The right to sue under Article 120 of the 1908 Act accrues when the defendant has clearly or unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective or innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right." 30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word `first' has been used between the words `sue' and `accrued'. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.” 12. In light of the above, we find no reason to entertain the First Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.