JUDGMENT : Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 1. Since the aforesaid three criminal appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2023 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa, in Sessions Case No.85/2021, they were clubbed & heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Appellants-Karan Suryavanshi, Rakesh Rohidas and Raja Yadav @ Rajveer have preferred these three criminal appeals under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment dated 12.01.2023 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa, in Sessions Case No.85/2021, by which they have been convicted for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for six months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 7.6.2021 at 8.50 A.M. Chaitram Suryavanshi (PW-2) informed the Police Station Sargaon that his cousin Akash Ratnakar had left the house since 6.6.2021 at 11.30 P.M. whose dead body is lying in the field beside Mahant Math on 7.6.2021 at 7.30 A.M. A light blue colour cloth was tied on neck of deceased Akash Ratnakar. On the basis of information of Chaitram Suryavanshi (PW-2), merg was recorded vide Ex.P-2 and thereafter, on the basis of merg (Ex.P- 2), the FIR was registered against unknown person vide Ex.P-1. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-16. Memorandum statements of the appellants were recorded vide Exs.P-6, P-7 to P-8 and on the basis of their memorandum statements, clothes of the appellants stains with blood on producing the same by them were recovered vide recovery panchnama Exs.P-9, P-10 and P-11. Seizure memos were also prepared vide Exs.P-12, P-13 and P-14. Bloodstained and plain soil were recovered from the spot vide Ex.P-15. Patwari also prepared spot map vide Ex.P-5. Inquest was conducted over dead body of the deceased vide Ex.P-18. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to Primary Health Center, Saragaon, where Dr.Amit Agrawal (PW-5) conducted postmortem vide Ex.P- 4 and found following injuries:- “Rigor mortis moderate over upper & lower limb. Blacken mark over back 2x1cm, 3x1cm, 2x1cm, 1x1cm, 1½x1cm, ligature encircled entire neck protrude, a ligature mark (5cm) over front right side of neck & back of neck, knot is fixed. Blacken mark over back 2x1cm, 3x1cm, 2x1cm, 1x1cm, 1½x1cm, ligature encircled entire neck protrude, a ligature mark (5cm) over front right side of neck & back of neck, knot is fixed. Laceration wound over left side of head 4x2cm, 3x2cm Laceration wound over vertex of head 5x2cm, 4x2cm, 2x1cm. Tongue protrude between teeth. The doctor has opined that cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and death was homicidal in nature. One mobile of accused Rakesh Rohidas bearing No.9755609894 was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P-28. The appellants were arrested vide arrest memos Exs.P-30 to P-32. Seized towel, iron rod, bloodstained soil, plain soul and clothes seized from the appellants were sent to FSL for chemical examination vide Ex.P-33 and in FSL report, human blood was found on the clothes seized from appellant-Karan Suryavanshi. 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC and after due investigation, the appellants were charge- sheeted before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Janjgir-Champa, from where the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir received the case on transfer for trial. The accused/appellants abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 35 documents Exs.P-1 to P-35. Statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which they denied guilt. However, they examined none in their defence, however, exhibited the statement of Smt.Poonam Ratnakar as Ex.D-1. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 12.01.2023, convicted the appellants for offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced them for the period as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, these appeals have been preferred. 7. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 12.01.2023, convicted the appellants for offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced them for the period as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, these appeals have been preferred. 7. Mr.Ajay Kumar Chandra, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that even though death of the deceased is said to be homicidal in nature there is no evidence to hold that the appellants have committed the offence in question as there is no eyewitness in the present case and conviction is only based on the memorandum statements of the appellants followed by recovery of clothes, which is inadmissible in evidence in view of the provisions contained in Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act and there is no other evidence to connect the appellants in crime in question. In that view of the matter, the criminal appeals deserve to be allowed and the judgment impugned passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr.R.S.Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondent/State, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and as such, the criminal appeals deserve to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Akash Ratnakar was homicidal in nature ? 11. The trial Court has answered this issue in affirmative. After going through the medical evidence of Dr.Amit Agrawal (PW-5) and postmortem report (Ex.P-4) and considering the nature of injuries, the trial Court has rightly held that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which has not been seriously disputed by learned counsel for the appellants. As such, the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 12. In the present case, there is no direct evidence/eyewitness available on record. As such, the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 12. In the present case, there is no direct evidence/eyewitness available on record. The trial Court has convicted the appellants only on the basis of their memorandum statements followed by recovery of clothes of the appellants, which have been proved in accordance with law. In para 41, the trial Court has recorded the following finding:- ^^41- ;gk ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd lk{kh d`".kdqekj ¼v-lk-&8½ us v[kafMr :i ls foospuk vf/kdkjh lqjs'k/kqzo ¼v-lk-&11½ dh lk{; dk leFkZu fd;k gS vkSj vkjksihx.k ds }kjk blds iqfyl dks laiw.kZ ?kVuk ds RkF;ksa dks izdV fd;k gS rFkk vkjksihx.k ds }kjk ?kVuk ds le; igus gq, diMksa dks fNikdj j[k fn;k x;k Fkk] mls cjken dj tCrh i= iz-ih- 12] 13 rFkk iz-ih- 14 dh dk;Zokgh blds le{k gksuk izekf.kr fd;k gSA lk{kh d`".kdqekj ¼v-lk-&8½ us fdlh nqHkkZouk vFkok jaft'ko'k vkjksihx.k ds fo:} lk{; fn;k gksA lk{kh lqjs'k/kqzo ¼v-lk-&11½ ds izfrijh{k.k ds nkSjku vkjksihx.k dh vksj ls ;g lq>ko fn;k x;k gS fd vkjksihx.k dks izdj.k es >wBk Qalk;k x;k gS] ijarq vkjksihx.k dks >wBk Qalk;s tkus dk dksbZ rF; vFkok vk/kkj vfHkys[k ij miYkC/k ugha gSA^^ 13. Memorandum statements (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9) of the appellants have been proved by the investigating officer Suresh Dhruv (PW- 11) and on that basis, the appellants have been convicted. 14. A careful perusal of memorandum statements of the appellants (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9) would show that it has been recorded by investigating officer Suresh Dhruv (PW-11) at Police Station Saragaon in presence of two panch witnesses in which the appellants are said to have stated that on account of abusing and molesting niece (bhanji) of accused Rakesh Kumar Rohidas they removed the towel worn by Akash Ratnakar, tied it around his neck and pressed it, after that accused Rakesh Rohihas hit Akash on the head with a rod, due to which blood started oozing from Akash's head and thereafter accused Raja @ Rajveer snatched that rod and put it in the mouth of Akash Ratnakar and kicked the rod with his foot, due to which the rod went inside Akash’s mouth. 15. 15. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 16. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P., AIR 2018 SC 5264 with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 observed as under: - “13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 1 SCC 253 , in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: “23. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 1 SCC 253 , in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: “23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 18. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra), only discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and knowledge of the accused as to this extent would be admissible and incriminating part of the accused statement that they have inflicted injuries to deceased Akash Ratnakar would not be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, no incriminating article has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statements of the appellants (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9). As such, that part of evidence would not be admissible. 19. In the present case, no incriminating article has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statements of the appellants (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9). As such, that part of evidence would not be admissible. 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 has clearly held that confession to police whether in course of investigation or otherwise and confession made while in police custody would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and observed as under:- “9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions". Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides : "No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence." The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.” Their Lordships further held as under:- “18. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.” Their Lordships further held as under:- “18. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S.27” 20. In the case in hand, confessional statements (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P- 9) made by the appellants before the police officer is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. As such, we are of the considered opinion that alleged memorandum statements of the appellants (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9) are hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in view of decisions rendered by Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) followed by the Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra). Even otherwise, no other incriminating piece of evidence is available on record to convict the appellants for offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC. 21. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid legal analysis, the criminal appeals filed on behalf of appellants-Karan Suryavanshi, Rakesh Rohidas and Raja Yadav @ Rajveer are allowed. Impugned judgment dated 12.01.2023 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir in Sessions Case No.85/2021 convicting and sentencing the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 is hereby set aside. The accused/appellants are acquitted of the said charge levelled against them. They are in jail. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if no longer required in any other criminal case. 22. The appellants are directed to file personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court concerned in compliance with Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 23. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.