JUDGMENT : HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. N. PATHAK Heard the parties. 2. Common facts and identical issues are involved in all the writ petitions and as such they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. Petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer for recognition of their service from the initial date of their appointments or with effect from the date of selection of the Schools, whichever is later in view of rules, regulations, circulars, orders and report of the Screening Committee and further to give them seniority from the date of their initial appointment and to pay salary with effect from the date of selection of the School. 4. According to the petitioners, in view of policy decision of the State to establish four High Schools in each of the blocks of the erstwhile State of Bihar including one Girls’ High School for eradication of backwardness in the society, initiatives were taken to start the first School in Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana Division. The said policy decision was notified vide letter no. 1115, dated 27.05.1981. It was decided to complete the target within a period of four years in the Sixth Five Years’ Plan. The Schools which were being run by the public assistance or granted permission for establishment of proposed schools, were given priority. In view of aforesaid policy decision in financial years 1981 – 32, total 150 High Schools (boys and girls) were to be established in view of letter issued vide memo nos. 109 and 182 dated 15.03.1982 and 25.03.1982 respectively. After selection of aforesaid 150 High Schools, vide memo no. 405, dated 19.07.1986, payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the Project Schools selected in the years 1981 – 82 was granted. The basic pay scales of the teachers (trained or untrained) of Project Schools had been fixed as per their qualification. A Policy decision was taken to pay salary to all the trained or untrained teachers working in the said 150 selected Project Schools even appointed much after selection of the Schools till 13.02.1985 by the Managing Committee. The decision was taken in view of a wireless message issued on 14.04.1987. 5. A Policy decision was taken to pay salary to all the trained or untrained teachers working in the said 150 selected Project Schools even appointed much after selection of the Schools till 13.02.1985 by the Managing Committee. The decision was taken in view of a wireless message issued on 14.04.1987. 5. The petitioners in all the writ petitions are aggrieved by non-payment of salary from the date of initial appointment and recognition of their services not from the date of absorption but from the date of initial appointment. Several other issues were raised which were to be decided regarding their service conditions when the Schools were established/taken over and payments were made under different categories that of trained and un-trained teachers. 6. Admittedly petitioners in all these writ petition are trained and their services were recognized after taken over of the schools. In view of policy decision of the State, they were given recognition from the date of their absorption i.e. 01.01.1989 and not from the date of their initial appointment and salary also was fixed and paid from 01.01.1989 in view of clear decision and direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court and taking into consideration the Full Bench decision of the Hon’ble Patna High Court and thereafter report of the Alam Committee. The matter travelled up to the Hon’ble Apex Court and in view of direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the State has come up with a policy decision fixing cut-off date of absorption as 01.01.1989 and also payment and fixation of salary from 01.01.1989. Petitioners are aggrieved by the said policy decision of the State and hence they have knocked door of this Court. 7. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners strenuously urges that the policy decision of the State in not granting recognition to the petitioners from the date of their initial appointment and non-fixation of the salary, is totally illegal, arbitrary and against the mandates of law. The learned counsel further argues that in view of Judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh and others Vs. State and others reported in 2000(1) PLJR 287 and thereafter the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. State and others reported in 2000(1) PLJR 287 and thereafter the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh and others reported in (2006) 2 SCC 545 , petitioners are entitled for fixation of salary as well as date of recognition from the initial date of appointment and not from the date when School was taken over. Learned counsel further argues that in view of letter no. 705, dated 12.10.1982, the letter no. 202 and letter no. 212, the wireless message dated 14.04.1987, it was incumbent upon the respondents to recognize service of the petitioners from 01.01.1982 i.e. from the date of initial appointment. Learned counsel further argues that after taking into consideration the Full Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Patna High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the State Government to take an informed decision regarding recognition of service of teachers and fixation of pay scale. It has further been argued that though it was left open for the respondents – State to come out with a policy decision that does not mean that the policy decision should be arbitrary and not in consonance with the law and against the mandates of law which has been set at rest by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as that of Full Bench decision of the Hon’ble Patna High Court. Learned counsel further argues that if any policy decision is not in public interest, the same can be interfered by this Court and the Court has every powers to struck down the arbitrary policy decision of the State. Lastly it has been stated that the Notification in view of Alam Committee Report dated 09.02.2011 is fit to be quashed and set aside with a direction to the respondents to fix the cut-off date of recognition from the date of initial appointment and not from the date of taken over of the School and simultaneously the pay fixation be ordered to be done from the date of initial appointment. Learned counsel further argues that even accepting that the cut of date was fixed on policy decision of the State, law is well settled that the said policy decision could not be given effect to from retrospective date rather it is prospective in nature and in view of that it is not applicable in case of the petitioners. 8. Learned counsel further argues that even accepting that the cut of date was fixed on policy decision of the State, law is well settled that the said policy decision could not be given effect to from retrospective date rather it is prospective in nature and in view of that it is not applicable in case of the petitioners. 8. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance on the following Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court (i) AIR 172 SC 628 (ii) AIR 173 SC 303 (iii) (1997) 6 SCC 623 (iv) AIR 1998 SC 2682 9. Counter affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel representing State vehemently opposes contention of learned counsel for the petitioners and further argues that the writ petition is not tenable in the eyes of law in as much as it has already been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh. Learned counsel further argues that in view of directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the State has come out with a policy decision by constituting a Three Men Committee headed by Syed M. Alam and, thereafter, the said Enquiry Committee, after verifying each and every aspects of the matter, vide memo no. 424, dated 09.02.2011, fixed cut-off date regarding the date of recognition of service of the petitioners and also regarding pay fixation, which was 01.01.1989. Further, it has been argued that the cut-off date is not an ongoing date, it is a date as per the enquiry report and has been fixed as per the policy decision of the State. It has also been argued that the said policy decision has not ever been challenged by the petitioners. Without challenging the same, the writ petition is not tenable in the eyes of law as no relief has been sought for quashing of the said Annexure-6, dated 09.02.2011. It has also been argued that the said policy decision has not ever been challenged by the petitioners. Without challenging the same, the writ petition is not tenable in the eyes of law as no relief has been sought for quashing of the said Annexure-6, dated 09.02.2011. It has further been argued that it was the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to come up with the policy decision and it has also been held that it is within the domain of the State to fix cut-off date and come up with guidelines regarding recognition of the School and pay fixation as the schools were taken over at different point of time and the dates were different but the date of recognition had to be fixed which would be common for all the teachers and as such a policy decision was taken to fix the cut off date as 01.01.1989 (Annexure-6) which is fully justified. 10. Learned counsel justifying the letter dated 09.02.2011 (Annexure-6) submits that no interference is warranted in the writ petitions. It has also been argued that similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Division of this Court in L.P.A. No. 138 of 2019 and the same has been allowed setting aside contention of the writ petitioners as well as findings of the Single Judge. There is no merits in the writ petitions and the same are fit to be dismissed. 11. Having heard rival submission of the parties, this Court is of the view that there is no quarrel to the fact that petitioners are trained teachers and the schools in which they were working were taken over on different dates i.e. some in the year 1982, others in 1984, 85 and also on subsequent dates. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Patna High Court and thereafter in Full Bench, the contention of the petitioners were affirmed. However, the State preferred appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court and all contention of the petitioners as well as the State was duly considered and thereafter a direction was given to the State to come up with the policy decision. In the case of Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh and others, the Hon’ble Patna High Court observed in para-15 as under: “15. That apart, a question may also arise, whether provisions of circular no. In the case of Project Uchcha Vidyalaya Shikshak Sangh and others, the Hon’ble Patna High Court observed in para-15 as under: “15. That apart, a question may also arise, whether provisions of circular no. 142, dated 4th February, 1989, can be applied retrospectively in the facts and circumstances of the present cases where admittedly Project Schools of the second batch were selected during the financial year 1984 – 85 as also admitted by the Secretary, Department of Human Resources Development, in its second counter affidavit filed in CWJC No. 12326 of 1992. It would be useful to notice that previously also this Court while disposing of some of the cases like CWJC No. 1333 of 1993, CWJC No. 1882 of 1993, MJC No. 1232 of 1991, had held that the circular in question cannot be applied retrospectively as it is well settled that the Government cannot and should not alter or modify any circular retrospectively which may affect or prejudice the right of the Government servants. In this regard, reference can usefully be made to some of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Ex. Major M.C. Singhal V. Director General, Armed Forces Medical Services and another ( AIR 1972 SC 628 ), Union of India v. K.P. Joseph and others ( AIR 1973 SC 303 ), Chairman, Railway Board and others V. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and others [ (1997) 6 SCC 623 ] and Food corporation of India etc. v. Om Prakash Sharma and others ( AIR 1998 SC 2682 ). From a plain reading of the aforesaid decisions, it would appear that retrospective application of such classification generally violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the present cases, nothing has been brought before us on behalf of that State to show that circular no. 142, dated 4th February, 1989, was issued for a different class of persons or teachers and other employees of the schools of this batch requiring more skill or qualification from that of the first batch. Nor there appears any justification that for a particular block where schools of second batch are established requirement of only five teachers would suffice for effective and bona fide implementation of the scheme. Nor there appears any justification that for a particular block where schools of second batch are established requirement of only five teachers would suffice for effective and bona fide implementation of the scheme. Therefore, in my view, such a decision or policy of the State has to be declared arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, not with respect to the instant employees only but also with respect to local people where the present schools have been established.” 12. Thereafter, paragragraph-15 was interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh. Paragraphs-50, 56, 63, 76, 77 and 83 of the Judgment reads as under: “50. It is one thing to say that the Management of the school has been taken over together with the services of the teaching and non-teaching staff and it is another thing to say that the State has recognized the schools and is bound to pay the salary and such teaching and non-teaching staff on the same scale and pay as it has been paying to its own teachers. In case of nationalization of schools, furthermore, in terms of the provisions of the Statute itself, the educational or qualification as also other qualifications for taking over the services of the teachers would be laid down. In absence of any such legislation, it was expected of the State to lay down such criteria in clear terms by way of policy decision or guidelines not only for the purpose of letting the teachers know as to where they stand but also for the purpose of determining as to whether such teachers are available in the schools who are entitled to salaries and other emoluments payable to them by the State. If new schools were established, indisputably teaching and non-teaching staff thereof were required to be appointed through Vidyalaya Sewa Board in conformity with the existing rules as well as Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is, thus, not a case where the concept of regularization could have been invoked. … … … 56. We have noticed that there is no dispute that in the years 1982 – 83 and 1983 – 84, no school was recognized or established. It is, thus, not a case where the concept of regularization could have been invoked. … … … 56. We have noticed that there is no dispute that in the years 1982 – 83 and 1983 – 84, no school was recognized or established. We have also noticed hereinbefore that one of the conditions for recognition was that the teachers were required to be appointed by the Vidyala Sewa Board. In the aforementioned context, the letter dated 04.02.1989 is required to be considered for the purpose of this case. … … 63. We, however, fail to understand as to how by reason of the said circular letter, the policy decision adopted by the State could be deviated from, but having regard to the order proposed by us, it may not be necessary to say anything further at this stage. 76. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents that the principle of equitable estoppel would apply against the State of Bihar. It is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regard constitutional provision or a statute is raised. The right of the State to raise a question as regard its actions being invalid under the constitutional scheme of India is now well recognized. If by reason of a constitutional provision, its action cannot be supported or the State intends to withdraw or modify a policy decision, no exception thereto can be taken. It is, however, one thing to say that such an action is required to be judged having regard to the fundamental rights of a citizen but it is another thing to say that by applying the rule of estoppel, the State would not permitted to raise the said question at all. So far as the impugned circular dated 18.2.1989 is concerned, the State has, in our opinion, a right to support the validity thereof in terms of the constitutional framework. 77. Having said so, we must observe that the ultimate decision must be left at the hands of the State, in view of the Cabinet decision dated 25.1.2000, 300 schools are said to have been recognized. 77. Having said so, we must observe that the ultimate decision must be left at the hands of the State, in view of the Cabinet decision dated 25.1.2000, 300 schools are said to have been recognized. We have, however, our doubts as to whether all correct facts have been placed before the Cabinet or not particularly in view of the fact that many of the schools which were established in Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana are now in the State of Jharkhand. We have pondered over the matter but we are not very sure as to whether apart from the schools which had been identified by the three-men committee and admittedly recognized by the State, any final decision had been taken as regard recognition or otherwise of the remaining schools by the appropriate authority. … … … 83. the Committee shall also deal with all such individual cases of the Appellants, as has been directed in para-35 of the Judgment of the High Court.” 13. The issue also fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Patna High Court in L.P.A. No. 2029 of 2011 [The State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajendra Prasad Singh] and similar view has been reiterated. The relevant portion is quoted hereunder: “… … … If the date of taking over were treated as the relevant date, it would create anomaly to the extent that the different schools having been taken over on different dates, the teachers and non-teaching employees in such schools will be treated differently insofar as the conferment of status of a government servant is concerned. It is also not in dispute that such teachers and other employees including the writ petitioner have been given the pay scale prevalent in the State Government from 1st January, 1989 and not earlier.” 14. In view of specific directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the State came up with a policy decision which is Annexure-6 to the writ petition. A Three Men Committee headed by Shri S.M. Alam was constituted to inquire into each and every aspects of the matter regarding initial appointment, absorption and fixation of salary. Thereafter, it was found that above initial appointments were made on different dates i.e. right form the year 1981 to 1985. A Three Men Committee headed by Shri S.M. Alam was constituted to inquire into each and every aspects of the matter regarding initial appointment, absorption and fixation of salary. Thereafter, it was found that above initial appointments were made on different dates i.e. right form the year 1981 to 1985. The Committee came up with a finding that though the date of initial appointment are different but the recognition could not be granted on different dates as chaos would be created and there will be discrimination and class within the class will be formed. The classification will not be proper. Thereafter, it was decided to fix uniform date of recognition from 01.01.1989. In view of policy decision of the State Annexure-6, dated 09.02.2011, was issued, which was accepted by the petitioners and never challenged and the same has already attained finality. 15. From Annexure-C to the counter affidavit it also appears that the memo no. 424, dated 09.02.2011 has been affirmed and approved by His Excellency Governor of Bihar. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that Clause 4 of the letter no. 12/P 1-065/87-142, dated 04.02.1989 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) clarifies that by the State policy decision only, the pay fixation has been done from 01.01.1989 and not the recognition of service condition of teachers. Clause 4 reads as under: From perusal of Clause-4, it appears that contention of the petitioners is totally misconceived and wrongly interpreted as pay fixation can be done only after recognition of the service conditions, which has rightly been done from 01.01.1989. The law is also well settled that it is domain of the State to come up with the policy decision and the same cannot be interfered by the Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The policy decision of the State has already been accepted and has not been challenged, which requires no interference. 16. The law which has been set at rest and settled, cannot be unsettled after a lapse of more than a decade. None of the Judgments relied upon by the petitioners are applicable in the instant case. No interference is warranted in the instant writ petitions and as such the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. 17. No order as to costs. 18. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.