ORDER : 1. By way of the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has challenged the order dated 04.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Magistrate (City), Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial court’), whereby the complaint under Section 145 Cr.P.C. filed by the Station House Officer, Naya Shahar, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as ‘SHO’) has been allowed and SHO has been appointed as Receiver and the property in question – Godown has been given in possession to him. 2. Mr. Jain, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the petitioner is having peaceful possession of the godown, which he purchased at the strength of an agreement to sell dated 24.07.2012. He submitted that it appears that the respondent no.2 thereafter got a sale-deed executed in his favour on 12.03.2013 by mostly the same persons (some of the legal heirs of Bhanwar Khan) and have claimed their title and ownership over the property. 3. Learned counsel submitted that the possession of the godown in question was handed over by the original owner to the petitioner in the year 2012 and though the sale-deed has been executed in favour of the respondent no.2, but since the possession was lying with the present petitioner, de-facto possession was not transferred. 4. Learned Senior Counsel argued that the order impugned passed by the trial court on 04.05.2023, for appointing the SHO as Receiver is illegal and contrary to the mandate of Section 146(1) Cr.P.C. He submitted that the proceedings in question have been wrongly initiated by the SHO, maybe under the influence of the respondent no.2 and the same is deceitful attempt on his part, to take forceful possession from the petitioner. 5. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the trigger point or the reason for which the proceedings have been taken is, the First Information Report No. 139/2023 dated 14.03.2023, which the respondent no.2 had lodged in the office of SHO - the Police Station Naya Shahar, District Bikaner wherein an assertion was made that the possession of the godown in question has been wrongly taken by the petitioner party. It was stated that when the respondent no.2 went at the godown for installation of electricity meter, the petitioner and his relatives resisted the same. 6. It was stated that when the respondent no.2 went at the godown for installation of electricity meter, the petitioner and his relatives resisted the same. 6. Learned Senior Counsel read the First Information Report and submitted that the contents of the FIR do not show any force or aggression much less an aggression to such an extent which was likely to disturb the public peace and tranquility. It was argued that the FIR in question came to be registered on 14.03.2023 in relation to an incident which took place on 13.03.2023, whereas as per the complaint under Section 145 Cr.P.C. filed by the SHO concerned, he had already bound down both the parties under Sections 107 and 116 of Cr.P.C. on 07.04.2023. Learned Counsel added that as the parties had been bound down on 07.04.2023 and no incident after 13.03.2023 (major or minor) has taken place, the trial court had no justifiable reason to conclude that the situation is likely to disturb the public order or that there is likelihood of breach of public peace. 7. Mr. Verma, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submitted that the interim order passed by this Court be vacated and the Receiver be allowed to take possession of the godown in question. He submitted that the petitioner and his relatives have forcibly taken the possession of the godown and have created ruckus, when the respondent no.2 went to the godown to get the electricity meter installed. He further submitted that in furtherance of the FIR, which the respondent no.2 had lodged, the investigating officer has found a prima-facie case for the offences under Sections 323 and 447 of IPC to be made out against the petitioner and his relatives. Therefore, the trial court has committed no error of law in exercising its power under Section 146 Cr.P.C. by attaching the property and appointing the Receiver. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The fact that on 13.03.2023, the petitioner was in possession of the godown in question is not in dispute. An incident seems to have happened when the respondent no.2 tried to get the electricity connection in his name installed at the godown, and such attempt was resisted by the petitioner and his family members. 10. 9. The fact that on 13.03.2023, the petitioner was in possession of the godown in question is not in dispute. An incident seems to have happened when the respondent no.2 tried to get the electricity connection in his name installed at the godown, and such attempt was resisted by the petitioner and his family members. 10. A perusal of the contents of the First Information Report does not evince any serious scuffle or entanglement, which could be treated as breach of the peace. That apart, even though the incident had happened on 13.03.2023 and subsequent thereto the parties have been bound down by the SHO under Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. on 07.04.2023. 11. There was no reason for the SHO to apprehend that some altercation would take place resulting in public disorder. While instituting the impugned complaint, the SHO has not even stated what the incident was, which impelled him to bound down both the parties on 07.04.2023. As a matter of fact, the contents of the complaint show that he had taken bonds of both the parties on the basis of First Information Report, which the respondent no.2 had lodged on 14.03.2023 and there was no fresh incident of quarrel/fight between the rival groups. 12. In the opinion of this Court, even if the incident as alleged in the First Information Report No. 139/2023 is presumed to have taken place, firstly the same does not seem to be of that serious nature for which, property could be attached and a Receiver could be appointed. Had the incident been so serious, then naturally, the SHO concerned ought to have moved an application to the Additional District Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. immediately, whereas, the application in question came to be filed on 01.05.2023, at least 45 days after the date when the minor tussle (that too without any weapon) took place. 13. In an application filed so belatedly, the trial court has proceeded mechanically and without recording any finding about the apprehension of disturbance of public peace and tranquility, he has attached the godown and has appointed SHO concerned as a Receiver. 14. A gainful reference of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. 14. A gainful reference of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 366 , can be made here, wherein it has been held that the scope of enquiry under Sections 145 and 146 of Cr.P.C. is only in respect of actual possession and the Magistrate concerned need not enter into detailed enquiry on merits. Para No. 12 and 13 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinafter: “12. The above order would indicate that the SDM has, in our view, wrongly invoked the powers under Section 146(1), Cr.P.C. Under Section 146(1), a Magistrate can pass an order of attachment of the subject of dispute if it be a case of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was in such possession, or he cannot decide as to which of them was in possession. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and Section 146 cannot be separated from Section 145, Cr.P.C. It can only be read in the context of Section 145, Cr.P.C. If after the enquiry under Section 145 of the Code, the Magistrate is of the opinion that none of the parties was in actual possession of the subject of dispute at the time of the order passed under Section 145(1) or is unable to decide which of the parties was in such possession, he may attach the subject of dispute, until a competent court has determined the right of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to possession thereof. 13. The ingredients necessary for passing an order under Section 145 (1) of the Code would not automatically attract for the attachment of the property. Under Section 146, a Magistrate has to satisfy himself as to whether emergency exists before he passes an order of attachment. A case of emergency, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Code, has to be distinguished from a mere case of apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate, before passing an order under Section 146, must explain the circumstances why he thinks it to be a case of emergency. A case of emergency, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Code, has to be distinguished from a mere case of apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate, before passing an order under Section 146, must explain the circumstances why he thinks it to be a case of emergency. In other words, to infer a situation of emergency, there must be a material on record before Magistrate when the submission of the parties filed, documents produced or evidence adduced.” 15. The power to attach the property and appointing a Receiver has to be exercised in a case of emergency, where there is real threat perception to the property and life of people and not in a casual manner as has been done in the case in hands. 16. The fact that the Receiver has been appointed after about 45 days of a rather minor incident (which took place on 13.03.2023), is indicative of improper exercise of powers having least regard to the factual matrix and material available on record. 17. The impugned order dated 04.05.2023 passed by the trial court is, therefore, quashed and set aside. 18. It will be required of the trial court to conclude the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. on or before 30.06.2024. 19. Needless to state that any observation made hereinabove be treated to be incidental and be treated relevant for the purpose of deciding the correctness, legality and propriety of the order dated 04.05.2023 and the same may not be construed to be any finding about the rightfulness of the possession of ownership of either of the parties in any manner. 20. The trial court shall be free to take an independent view of the matter on the basis of oral and ocular evidence before it while concluding the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. 21. The present petition stands allowed, as indicated above. 22. Stay application also stands disposed of, accordingly.