Orde r : ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, J. For convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the following parts: - INDE X (1) Details of Writ Petition (2) Factual Matrix and Submissions (3) Analysis (4) Judgments Referred (5) Observations (6) Conclusion (7) Additional Directions Details of the Writ Petition : 1. By way of filing of this writ petition, the challenge has been made to the impugned order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the Labour Court-I, Jaipur in LCC Case No.01/2000 by which the application filed by the respondent-workman under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleading the petitioner as party has been allowed. Factual Matrix and Submissions : 2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner-Company has no concern whatsoever with the M/s Autopal Industries Limited (for short “respondent-Company”). Counsel submits that an industrial dispute is lying pending between the said Company and the respondent-workman. Counsel submits that a piece of land was sold by respondent-Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited to the petitioner-Company vide registered sale deed dated 10.10.2019. Counsel submits that simply on the basis of the said sale deed, the petitioner-Company cannot be impleaded as party to the lis pending between the respondent-workman and respondent- Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited. Counsel submits that the petitioner has nothing to do with the rights and liabilities of M/s Autopal Industries Limited, as he has simply purchased a piece of land and on that basis no liability of M/s Autopal Industries Limited can be fastened upon the petitioner, hence, under these circumstances, the petitioner is neither necessary nor proper party to the matter pending before the Labour Court. Counsel submits that this objection was taken by the petitioner before the Labour Court, but the Labour Court by misinterpreting the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Arafat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/ s J.K. Staff Association, Kota and Anr. (SB Civil Wri t Petition No.12663/2018) dated 08.08.2019, wherein the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that the petitioner is a necessary party and accordingly the petitioner has been impleaded as party. (SB Civil Wri t Petition No.12663/2018) dated 08.08.2019, wherein the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that the petitioner is a necessary party and accordingly the petitioner has been impleaded as party. Counsel submits that the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Arafat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as in the aforesaid matter, there was a tripartite agreement between M/s Arafat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. and M/s J.K. Staff Association, but in the instant case, no such tripartie agreement has been executed between the respondents and the petitioner-Company is free from all kinds of liabilities and encumbrances against the respondent-workman and the respondent-Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted and the impugned order dated 29.05.2024 is liable to be quashed and set aside. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent- workman opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner-Company and submitted that the services of the respondent-workman were illegally terminated by the erstwhile respondent-Company i.e. M/s Autopal Industries Limited and more than 40 litigations of workmen are pending against the respondent-Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited before the Labour Court. Counsel submits that in order to escape from its liability, certain part of the property was sold by the respondent-Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited to the petitioner-Company, by executing a registered sale deed on 10.10.2019. Counsel submits that after receiving the consideration amount from the petitioner, the erstwhile employer i.e. M/s Autopal Industries Limited (respondent-Company) approached the National Company Law Tribunal (for short “NCLT”) for declaring it as “insolvent”. Counsel submits that the aforesaid action of the respondent-Company makes it liable for the offence under Section 206 Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”). Counsel submits that in case, any award is passed by the Labour Court in favour of the workman, then certainly the petitioner-Company would also be entitled to obey the same, hence, under these circumstances, the Labour Court has not committed any error in allowing the application filed by the workman for impleading the petitioner-Company as party to the lis pending between him and the respondent-Company M/s Autopal Industries Limited. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Karnataka High Court in the case of M.N. Cariappa vs. Smt. Rosamm a and Others reported in 2013 (138) FLR 247 . Counsel submits that in view of the submissions made herein above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be rejected. Analysis : 4. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record. 5. The crux of the argument of the counsel for the petitioner-Company is that the petitioner-Company is not a successor-in-interest of the respondent-Company, as the petitioner-Company has simply purchased a piece of land from the Respondent-COmpany and it had not purchased the estate as an on-going concern. It is also contended that neither the business of the respondent-Company has been taken over by the petitioner-Company nor the same has been merged into it, hence the petitioner-Company is neither necessary nor proper party to the litigation pending between the respondents No.1 and 2. 6. Both the counsel for the petitioner-Company as well as the respondent-workman have relied upon Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act of 1947”), and the same is reproduced as under: “ 18. Persons on whom settlements an d awards are binding - (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10-A] or [an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, [arbitrator,] [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” Perusal of the Section 18(3)(c) of the Act of 1947 indicates the key-words “heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates”. In the instant case the business of the respondent-Company was run by it and during pendency of the industrial dispute between the respondent-workman and the respondent- Company, before the Labour Court since the year 2000, the respondent-Company has sold certain parts of its land to the petitioner-Company by a registered sale deed on 10.10.2019. 7. Because of this subsequent event, the Labour Court has impleaded the petitioner-Company as party in the said proceedings. Now, the question that remains for consideration of this Court is “whether the petitioner- Company can be impleaded as party or not?” 8. Provisions contained under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) deals with power of the Court, to add any party, at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary or proper for effective adjudication of the issue involved in the matter. Judgments Referred and views of Hon’ble Apex Cour t and different High Courts on the issue involved in thi s petition : 9. Judgments Referred and views of Hon’ble Apex Cour t and different High Courts on the issue involved in thi s petition : 9. The Madras High Court in the case of Sri Kanch i Kamakoti Peetam Charitable Trust Hospital versu s Industrial Tribunal and Ors. reported in 2003 SCC OnLine Mad 643 has held that the power of labour Court to implead or add parties in an industrial dispute, is not totally prohibited. For the purpose of complete adjudication of dispute, the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court has incidental powers including the power to implead or add parties other than employer, employee or persons before the Conciliation Officer. It is for the parties to substantiate their respective claim and ultimately it is the duty of the Tribunal to consider the same with reference to oral and documentary evidence and arrive at a just decision. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under: “13. It is also relevant to note that rule 24 of the Central Rules, 1957, confers powers on the Labour Courts, which are vested in the civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of discovery and inspection, granting adjournment, reception of evidence taken on affidavit, summon and examine any person, whose evidence appears to be material. Conjoined reading of the provisions referred to above and the dispute raised, I am of the view that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is not excluded in directing persons other than the employer and employee, who would be required for complete adjudication of the issue. A reading of the provisions, such as Ss. 2(k), 10, 11 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as the Rules show that the test always must be, is the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself is effective and enforceable. In other words, in the absence of any specific provision, I am of the view that impleading of a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court is not totally prohibited. If the Labour Court considers that the presence of such party is necessary for the enforcement of the award, it has ample power to add or admit a party to the industrial dispute. The authority can consider, in addition to the dispute, specify in the order of reference any matter incidental to the dispute. 14. If the Labour Court considers that the presence of such party is necessary for the enforcement of the award, it has ample power to add or admit a party to the industrial dispute. The authority can consider, in addition to the dispute, specify in the order of reference any matter incidental to the dispute. 14. In this regard, it is relevant to refer the case of Palanisamy R. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [2001 (3) L.L.N. 638]. While considering similar issue, K. Raviraja Pandian, J., has concluded, in Para. 12, at page 641, that: “… The power of the Labour Court to add or implead a party is not totally prohibited. If the Labour Court is of the opinion that the presence of the party is necessary for effective and enforceable adjudication, it can add a party. Further, the Labour Court can adjudicate upon matters, which are incidental to the order of reference.” 15. It is also worthwhile to refer the case of Natarajan v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [2001 (1) L.L.N. 539], wherein F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., in similar circumstance has held that under S. 18-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court is vested with powers to implead persons not made parties before Conciliation Officer, as parties to dispute before it. Since both the decisions are in accordance with the statutory provisions and considered the interest of parties concerned, I am in agreement with the same. In the light of the statutory provisions referred to above and for the purpose of complete adjudication, I am of the view that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court has incidental powers including to implead or add parties other than employer, employee or persons before the conciliation officer. 16. It is also relevant to note that all the financial institutions have sold the property of Tamilnad Hospital to the writ-petitioner and the petitioner is having interest in industrial dispute, pending before the Tribunal, I am in agreement with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the writ-petitioner is necessary party to enable it to factually and completely adjudicate upon the question involved in the industrial dispute. It is made clear that merely because the petitioner has been impleaded as one of the parties in the industrial dispute, it may not be automatically presumed that the liability is to be fastened on it. It is made clear that merely because the petitioner has been impleaded as one of the parties in the industrial dispute, it may not be automatically presumed that the liability is to be fastened on it. It is for the parties to substantiate their respective claim and ultimately it is the duty or the Tribunal to consider the same with reference to oral and documentary evidence and arrive a just decision. When such remedy is available, I am unable to appreciate the stand taken by the petitioner. All the questions/objections including liability are left open and it is for the Tribunal to consider and pass orders while deciding the main industrial dispute. With the above observation, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P., and W.V.M.P., are also dismissed.” 10. The key test for consideration here is, whether the non-joinder of a party would render the proceedings ineffective or unenforceable. In the light of this test, the power of the Labour Court to implead a party should be regarded as limited. During final adjudication of an industrial dispute, the Labour Court must focus on whether the impleaded party has been summoned without any valid reason or proper cause. However, if at all impleading any additional partiy is necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute, the Labour Court cannot use its power so as to expand the scope of the matter. Ultimately, every decision depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grea t Indian Motor Works LTD., And Anr. V Employees an d Ors. reported in 1959 SCC OnLine SC 154, on the similar issue has held that only a party to the reference aggreived by the award could be a party to appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while affirming the order of the Tribunal, declared the reference to be incompetent insofar as the auction- purchaser was concerned, whereby three main grounds were discussed as to whether the auction-purchaser can be made party to the dispute, and the relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “9. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while affirming the order of the Tribunal, declared the reference to be incompetent insofar as the auction- purchaser was concerned, whereby three main grounds were discussed as to whether the auction-purchaser can be made party to the dispute, and the relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “9. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that in view of the provisions of Section 12, read with Section 3, of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (48 of 1950) (which was repealed by Act 36 of 1956), which governed the making of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal, the appeal to that Tribunal was competent, and should have been heard and determined on merits. The provisions of Sections 3 and 12, which we have to construe in this case, are in these terms: “3. The provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” *** “12. An appeal under this Act against any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal may be presented to the Appellate Tribunal by— (i) any party which is aggrieved by the award or decision; or (ii) the appropriate Government or the Central Government, where it is not the appropriate Government, whether or not such Government is a party to the dispute.” We have first to determine whether there is anything in the Indian Companies Act, with particular reference to Section 179 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, (re- enacted as Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956), that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (which hereinafter will be referred to as “the Act”). If there is anything in those provisions of the Companies Act, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the latter shall prevail. Hence, we have to construe the provisions of Section 12 which specifically deals with appeals. That section permits an appeal to be presented to the Appellate Tribunal by any party which is aggrieved by the award (omitting the words not necessary for our present purpose). It is the usual statutory provision for an appeal, which otherwise would not lie. Hence, we have to construe the provisions of Section 12 which specifically deals with appeals. That section permits an appeal to be presented to the Appellate Tribunal by any party which is aggrieved by the award (omitting the words not necessary for our present purpose). It is the usual statutory provision for an appeal, which otherwise would not lie. It does not say either in express terms or by necessary implication, that those specific provisions of the Companies Act, are abrogated or modified. It does not do away with the necessity of the requisite sanction of the Court so far as a Liquidator is concerned. Under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, the affairs of the company under liquidation, are placed in charge of the Official Liquidator, and under Section 457, it is only the Liquidator who is authorized with the sanction of the Court, to institute any suit or other legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company. Thus, there is no inconsistency between the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Companies Act, which only laid down a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal, if it has to be, by a Liquidator of a company in the process of winding up. It concerns a very special case and has no bearing on the general right of appeal. As, in the instant case, the Court refused the necessary sanction to the Liquidators to prefer the appeal, no appeal could have been filed on behalf of the Company. Hence, insofar as the appeal purported to be on behalf of the Company, through the Managing Director aforesaid, it was wholly incompetent. But the appeal was not only by the Company as such, but also by the said K.D. Nundy as the creditor or contributory or auction-purchaser of the Company. So far as this part of the appeal is concerned, it is clear that only a party to the Reference aggrieved by the Award could be a party to the appeal. K.D. Nundy was not a party in his capacity as creditor or as contributory. He was impleaded, as already indicated, as a party to the reference in his capacity as the auction- purchaser of the business of the Company. So far as that capacity is concerned, it is clear from the order of the Tribunal, that no award was made against him as such. He was impleaded, as already indicated, as a party to the reference in his capacity as the auction- purchaser of the business of the Company. So far as that capacity is concerned, it is clear from the order of the Tribunal, that no award was made against him as such. He could not, therefore, be said to be a party aggrieved by the award, having been exonerated from its terms. The Tribunal put this on three main grounds— (1) that the auction-purchaser had purchased the business of the Company free from all encumbrances, out-goings and liabilities, (2) that the employment of the workmen had been terminated by the Liquidators before possession of the business was delivered to the auction-purchaser, and (3) that there was no relationship of employer and employees between the auction- purchaser and the workmen whose services were so terminated. The Tribunal, in that view of the matter, declared the reference to be incompetent insofar as the auction-purchaser was concerned. This order, the Tribunal passed at the instance of the auction-purchaser himself. The auction-purchaser, therefore, succeeded in obtaining the order which the Tribunal passed, holding that the reference, so far as he was concerned, was incompetent. In view of these facts, it must be held that so far as the auction-purchaser is concerned, he was not aggrieved by the Award made by the Industrial Tribunal. That being so, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, are not attracted to the appeal purported to have been filed by the auction-purchaser. It is a little difficult to appreciate why the auction-purchaser, having succeeded in obtaining the order, set out above, in his favour, changed his mind and preferred an appeal which, in the events that had happened, was not maintainable.” 12. The similar issue came up before the Five Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ankapall e Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd . vs. Workmen and Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1489 and it has been held in para 9 and 10 as under: “9. The question as to whether a purchaser of an industrial concern can be held to be a successor-in-interest of the vendor will have to be decided on a consideration of several relevant facts. Did the purchaser purchase the whole of the business ? The question as to whether a purchaser of an industrial concern can be held to be a successor-in-interest of the vendor will have to be decided on a consideration of several relevant facts. Did the purchaser purchase the whole of the business ? Was the business purchased a going concern at the time of the sale transaction ? Is the business purchased carried on at the same place as before ? Is the business carried on without a substantial break in time ? Is the business purchased carried in at the same or similar to the business in the hands of the vendor ? If there has been a break in the continuity of the business, what is the nature of the break and what were the reasons responsible for it ? What is the length of the break ? Has goodwill been purchased ? Is the purchase only of some parts and the purchaser having purchased the said parts purchased some other new parts and started a business of his own which is not the same as the old business but is similar to it ? These and all other relevant factors have to be borne in mind in deciding the question as to whether the purchaser can be said to be a successor-in- interest of the vendor for the purpose of industrial adjudication. It is hardly necessary to emphasise in this connection that though all the facts to which we have referred by way of illustration are relevant, it would be unreasonable to exaggerate the in importance of any one of these facts or to adopt the inflexible rule that the presence or absence of any one of them is decisive of the matter one way or the other. If industrial adjudication were to insist that a purchaser must purchase the whole of the property of the vendor concern before he can be regarded as a successor-in- interest, it is quite likely that just an insignificant portion of the property may not be the subject-matter of the conveyance and it may be urged that the exclusion of the said fraction precludes industrial adjudication from treating the purchaser as a successor-in- interest. Such a plea, however, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that in deciding this question industrial adjudication will look at the substance of the matter and not be guided solely by the form of the transfer. Such a plea, however, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that in deciding this question industrial adjudication will look at the substance of the matter and not be guided solely by the form of the transfer. What we have said about the entirety of the property belonging to the vendor concern, will apply also to the goodwill which is an intangible asset of any industrial concern. If goodwill along with the rest of the tangible property has been sold, that would strongly support the plea that the purchaser is a successor-in-interest; but it does not follow that if good will has not been sold, that alone will necessarily show that the transferee is not a successor-in-interest. The decision of the question must ultimately depend upon the evaluation of all the relevant factors and it cannot be reached by treating any one of them as of over-riding or conclusive significance. 10. It is in the light of this legal position that the question about the character of the appellant vis-a-vis the vendor company has to be judged. It would be recalled that the vendor company sold the concern to the appellant because it was faced with the problem of recurring losses, and so, the appellant, in purchasing the concern, was not prepared to have both the advances and the outstandings included in the sale transaction. The appellant Society has been formed by the local cane growers with the object of manufacturing sugar which would suit each, one of them in turn and so, the purchaser was not particularly interested in including the goodwill of the Company in the sale transaction. The exclusion of 4,000 bags of processed sugar shows that the purchaser wanted to accommodate the Company in that matter. On the other hand, the appellant has carried on the business of the Company, without an appreciable break; the business thus carried on is the same as that of the Company, the place of business is the same, and the very object of entering into the sale transaction was to enable the local cane growers to carry on the business of the Company. Therefore, we are inclined to take the view that having regard to all the relevant facts in this case, the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is a successor in-interest of the Company.” 13. Therefore, we are inclined to take the view that having regard to all the relevant facts in this case, the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is a successor in-interest of the Company.” 13. The aforesaid judgment was followed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of M.N. Cariappa vs. Smt. Rosamma and Others reported in 2013 (138) FLR 247 and it has been held in para 19 to 21 as under: “19.The said dictum in our view runs counter to the observations of the Apex Court in Anakapalla Co-op Agricultural and Industrial Society case. It is not necessary that the business must be purchased as a going concern at the time of the sale transaction. Some parts of the existing business could be purchased for starting altogether a new business by purchase of some other parts or properties. Even then, the transferee would become the successor-in-interest within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act. Even if an altogether new business is started, out of the assets purchased from the vendor of the old establishment even then, the transferee would have to be considered to be a successor-in- interest for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act, insofar as it would not derogate from the fact that the industrial dispute related to the establishment which was transferred or assigned by the original owner or employer. Thus the transfer of the business as a going concern is not a sine qua non for considering the transferee as a successor-in-interest in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. Therefore, we over-rule the ratio of the decision of learned Single Judge in PSI Data Systems Limited. 20. Having regard to the fact that in the instant case, the appellant had purchased the estate during the pendency of the proceedings, what has been purchased is an establishment of coffee estate. Even if the coffee estate was not purchased as a going concern, coffee estate was purchased would per se imply that the appellant is the successors-in-interest in respect of the establishment to which the dispute related and his legal representatives are bound by the award. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that P.S.I Data Systems Limited has no application to the facts of the present case. 21. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that P.S.I Data Systems Limited has no application to the facts of the present case. 21. The learned Single Judge has held that the Labour Court was justified in fastening the liability on the estate owner and if the present owner of the estate satisfied the award of the Labour Court, then on the basis of the relevant clause in the sale deed, the present owner i.e., the appellant could seek indemnification but Respondent Nos.1 and 2 - workmen cannot be denied the fruits of the award. The said directions and observations of the learned Single Judge would not call for any interference. On the basis of the sale deed, the appellants are at liberty to seek recovery of the amounts deposited by them under the award from the Respondent Nos.3 to 8 in accordance with law. As we do not find any merit in this appeal, it is dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.” 14. Similarly in the case of M/s Arafa t Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has also dealt with the similar issue in para 21 of the judgment as under: “21.After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case as well as the precedent law cited by the counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that Section 18 of the Act of 1947 in itself carries the clear legislative intention of the power given to the Labour Court to implead any party as an employer, which shall include his heirs, successors and assigns in respect of the establishment to which dispute relates. In the present case, it is not disputed that the establishment in question is the one which relates to the dispute being adjudicated by the reference in question. The scope of reference is right of the work menarising out of the establishment in question, which was with the respondent company and now has been passed to the present petitioner in accordance with the tripartite agreement. The scope of reference is right of the work menarising out of the establishment in question, which was with the respondent company and now has been passed to the present petitioner in accordance with the tripartite agreement. The tripartite agreement is very wide and is covering almost all the rights of the workmen, but even if, there is any restriction, which is in the tripartite agreement, it cannot be read contrary to the spirit of Section 18(3)(c) of the Act of 1947 and thus, the petitioner being in command over the establishment in question shall have to participate in the adjudication so as to ensure that if it wants to defend against the liability in question, then it may take all necessary steps to defend itself against the liability in question. This Court has also seen the precedent law cited by counsel for the parties in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has only stated that the relevancy of the party in relation to the adjudication in question, being necessary party and/or proper party, has to be seen before the party is impleaded. The precedent law regarding the question whether the interim order passed by the Labour Court can be challenged in writ jurisdiction or not, is very clear that the challenge, if given by the employer, cannot be maintained as he can afford to wait for final adjuidcation, but challenge can definitely be given by the workman, if he is suffering some prejudice. All the case laws cited have been considered. The impugned order passed by the Labour Court impleading the petitioner as a party is a lawful order as the present petitioner is admittedly in control of the establishment in question and thus, the extent of the liability of the petitioner can be decided only after it is impleaded as a party.” The view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Arafat Petrochemicals Pvt. Ltd . (supra) was assailed before the Division Bench by way of filing DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.1409/2019, however the the said Special Appeal was rejected on 06.01.2020 with the following observations in para 12 and 13: “12.The learned Single Judge in its order observed that the Tripartite Agreement was very wide covering almost all the rights of the workmen. (supra) was assailed before the Division Bench by way of filing DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.1409/2019, however the the said Special Appeal was rejected on 06.01.2020 with the following observations in para 12 and 13: “12.The learned Single Judge in its order observed that the Tripartite Agreement was very wide covering almost all the rights of the workmen. But even if; there was any restriction which was in the Tripartite Agreement, it could not be read contrary to the spirit of section 18 (3) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . Thus, the appellant being in command over the establishment in question would have to participate in the adjudication so as to ensure that if it was to defend against the liability in question, then it might take all necessary steps to defend itself against the liability in question. The impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal is just and fair and is for the benefit of the appellant. Therefore, the learned Single Judge as well as the learned Tribunal had not committed any mistake to implead the appellant company as a party to the Reference. 13.We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge and also the learned Tribunal had not committed any illegality and infirmity in its order. So, in these circumstances, we do not find any merit in these appeals and they deserve to be dismissed.” 15. On various occasions, their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court were of the opinion that in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings between the parties, the third party should be impleaded as proper party in the lis, pending before the Court. In the case of Amit Kuma r Shaw vs. Farida Khatoon reported in 2005 (11) SCC 403, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a combined reading of the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 22 Rule 10 CPC and keeping in view the principles laid down under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired such interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation, and he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. Observations : 16. He is entitled to be impleaded in suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation, and he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case. Observations : 16. Now reverting back to the facts of the present matter, it is clear that after selling its estate, the respondent-Company has received a total consideration amount of Rs.15,50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Crore Fifty Lacs) by creating third party rights/interest and thereafter, approached NCLT for declaring it as insolvent. In case, the NCLT declares the respondent-Company as insolvent and in case, the Labour Court decides the industrial dispute in favour of the respondent-workman, the major issue of compliance of the Award would arise, as to who would be made liable and responsible for compliance of the Award etc. and answers to these questions are lying in the womb of future and the same would be decided by the Labour Court after affording opportunity of hearing to all the respective parties. Conclusion : 17. Hence, under such circumstances, it would be too early to answer as to whether the petitioner-Company is responsible and liable for the affairs of the respondent- Company on the basis of the purchase of its land or not. This issue is required to be decided by the Labour Court at appropriate time, after taking into consideration the evidence led by all the parties. Hence, the Labour Court has not committed any error in impleading the petitioner- Company as party to the proceedings. 18. In view of the discussions made herein above, the writ petition does not call for any interference and the same is liable to be and accordingly dismissed. 19. Stay application and all the miscellaneous applications (pending, if any) stands dismissed. 20. Before parting with the order, it is made clear that whatever has been observed in this order should not be treated as an expression or opinion of this Court on merits and demerits of the case and this order would not cause any prejudice to the case of the petitioner-Company on the merits and the liability shall be adjudicated by the Labour Court, on the basis of the evidence led by all the sides, in accordance with law. Additional Directions : 21. Additional Directions : 21. Looking to the fact that the industrial dispute is pending between the parties since last 24 years, it is expected from the Labour Court to expedite the pending proceedings and decide the dispute expeditiously as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.