JUDGMENT : (T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J.) : 1. Since both the appeals arise from the common judgment, they are being disposed of by way of this common judgment. 2. A.S.No.79 of 2009 is filed, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”) by the Appellant/2nd Defendant challenging the decree and judgment dated 13.03.2008 in O.S.No.07 of 2002 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvid (for short, ‘trial court’).The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.07 of 2002, for specific performance of contract directing the Defendants 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 to execute a registered Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the schedule property after receiving the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,30,000/- from the Plaintiff and to deliver vacant possession of the schedule property to the Plaintiff. 3. The Appellant/Plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 for partition of plaint schedule property into 16 equal shares and allot 10 such shares to the Plaintiff by meets and bunds as per good and bad qualities and allotment of such share to the Plaintiff and for separate possession of the same. 4. A petition has been filed under Section 24 of the CPC by the Appellant/Plaintiff in O.S. No. 46 of 1998. The petitioner seeks to transfer A.S.No.55 of 2013 from the jurisdiction of the learned XV Additional District Judge, Nuzvid, Krishna District, to this Court, so it can be heard along with A.S. No. 79 of 2009. Following the Order, in TR.CMP. No. 513 of 2013 dated 02.04.2014, the learned Judge of the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, allowed the petition. Consequently, A.S.No.55 of 2013 is transferred to High Court and renumbered as TRAS.No.358 of 2014. 5. The parties in both appeals will hereinafter be referred to as they were arrayed before the trial court. 6. The brief averments, of the plaint, in O.S.No.46 of 1998, are as under: (a) The Plaintiff is the sole son of the deceased 1st Defendant, and they are members of a Hindu joint family. During 1st Defendant's lifetime, he acquired the schedule property through a registered sale deed on 21.08.1980, using funds obtained from the sale of ancestral property located in Tenneru Village, Kankipadu Mandal. Since that time, both the Plaintiff and D.1 have shared joint possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. During 1st Defendant's lifetime, he acquired the schedule property through a registered sale deed on 21.08.1980, using funds obtained from the sale of ancestral property located in Tenneru Village, Kankipadu Mandal. Since that time, both the Plaintiff and D.1 have shared joint possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. (b) In 1985, 1st Defendant transferred the Oil Dall Mill and flour mill, which is Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, to the Plaintiff at his request. This arrangement was documented in an unregistered partition agreement on 16.02.1986. Following this, the Plaintiff operated the Oil Mill business, while D.1 ran a Kirana business on the premises associated with Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Currently, the Plaintiff manages the Kirana shop located on Item No.1, while 1st Defendant continues to oversee the Oil Mill, which is Item No.2. The unregistered partition agreement dated 16.02.1986, was intended to facilitate independent business operations by the parties but was never fully implemented. Consequently, the entire property remains under the joint and constructive possession of the Plaintiff and the deceased D.1. Additionally, Defendants 2 and 3, who operate an automobile business in Agiripalli, have been influencing 1st Defendant to sell the schedule property to them and are attempting to secure documentation in their favour concerning the property. 7. Pursuant to the docket order dated 04.03.1999, the written statement of 1st Defendant was forfeited due to his failure to file it. 2nd Defendant submitted his written statement, and 3rd Defendant adopted the written statement filed by 2nd Defendant. In his written statement, 2nd Defendant denied all allegations made in the plaint, asserting that 1st Defendant is the absolute owner of Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule property and that it is D.1's self-acquired property. 2nd Defendant contended that, in order to settle 1st Defendant's debts, he sold Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property for a consideration of Rs.8,00,000/-. Additionally, 1st Defendant entered into an agreement of sale with his wife, 3rd Defendant, on 15.07.1998, and 2nd Defendant paid Rs.4,25,000/- on the same day as part performance of the contract. (a) According to the agreement, the Plaintiff was required to pay the remaining balance of Rs.3,75,000/- to 1st Defendant by the end of September, 1998, at which point 1st Defendant was to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff at her own expense. (a) According to the agreement, the Plaintiff was required to pay the remaining balance of Rs.3,75,000/- to 1st Defendant by the end of September, 1998, at which point 1st Defendant was to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff at her own expense. Subsequently, 2nd Defendant paid Rs.1,45,000/- to 1st Defendant, as evidenced by a receipt dated 20.08.1998. Both 2nd Defendant and 3rd Defendant expressed their readiness and willingness to fulfil their contractual obligations by arranging the remaining balance of Rs.2,30,000/-, as well as covering the costs for stamp duty and registration expenses. (b) 1st Defendant, having received the majority of the sale consideration and settled his debts, is now attempting to evade the execution of the registered sale deed. Consequently, he has initiated the present suit through his son. 1st Defendant remains in possession of two shops on Item No.1 of the schedule property, where he is conducting an automobile business and also residing. Meanwhile, the Plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. The Plaintiff is not entitled to seek a partition of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, as it is 1st Defendant’s self-acquired property. Therefore, 3rd Defendant is considered a bona fide purchaser of Item No.1 of the schedule property for valid consideration. 8. 4th Defendant filed a written statement, and Defendants 5 to 7 adopted the written statement filed by 4th Defendant. They contend that the Plaintiff is the only son of 1st Defendant, while 4th Defendant and Jyothi, who was the wife of 5th Defendant and mother of Defendants 6 and 7, are daughters of 1st Defendant. Jyothi has since passed away, leaving behind Defendants 5, 6 and 7. According to the amended Hindu Succession Act, 4th Defendant and Jyothi are also co-parceners in the joint family of 1st Defendant. As such, Defendants 4 and 5 to 7 assert that they have a bonafide right and share in the joint family properties of the deceased 1st Defendant. The plaint schedule properties were acquired using assets from the ancestral properties of 1st Defendant. Consequently, they assert that the agreement of sale in favor of 3rd Defendant is not binding upon them. Therefore, they claim that the suit filed by 3rd Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2002 against the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant is not maintainable. 9. The plaint schedule properties were acquired using assets from the ancestral properties of 1st Defendant. Consequently, they assert that the agreement of sale in favor of 3rd Defendant is not binding upon them. Therefore, they claim that the suit filed by 3rd Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2002 against the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant is not maintainable. 9. Additional written statement filed by 2nd Defendant, which was adopted by 3rd Defendant, asserts that neither the Plaintiff nor Defendants 4 to 7 are entitled to any share in the plaint schedule property, as it constitutes selfacquired property of 1st Defendant. Defendants 4 to 7 were introduced into the case at the behest of the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant, with the intention of undermining 3rd Defendant’s right to seek specific performance of the contract made between her and 1st Defendant. 10. 8th Defendant filed a written statement, contending that Defendants 4 to 7, along with the Plaintiff, holds joint shares in the plaint schedule property. This property, according to 8th Defendant, was acquired by 1st Defendant with the aid and assistance of the ancestral nucleus of the joint family. 11. Basing on the averments in the plaint and written statement, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to seek partition of the plaint schedule property? 2) Whether the partition pleaded by the Plaintiff which was reduced in writing as partition list dated 16.02.1986 is not binding upon him? 3) Are there any properties left open for partition after 16.02.1986? Additional Issues: 1) Whether the 4th Defendant and deceased Seedarla Jyothi are entitled to equal shares as per Section 29(A) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956? 2) Whether D.4 to D.7 are entitled to claim any right over the plaint schedule property or not? 3) To what relief? 12. The brief averments, of the plaint, in O.S.No.07 of 2002, are as under: (a) The plaint schedule property is claimed to be the self-acquired property of 1st Defendant, in which 2nd Defendant has no share. Approximately four years ago, the Plaintiff's husband rented two shops and a portion of the residential house from 1st Defendant. He operates a business under the name and style of Hanuman Automobile and Pesticides Shop, and resides in the rented portion of the residential house on Item No.1 of the schedule property. Approximately four years ago, the Plaintiff's husband rented two shops and a portion of the residential house from 1st Defendant. He operates a business under the name and style of Hanuman Automobile and Pesticides Shop, and resides in the rented portion of the residential house on Item No.1 of the schedule property. On 15.07.1998, 1st Defendant executed an agreement of sale in favour of the Plaintiff in Nuzvid, having received Rs.4,25,000/- in respect of the schedule properties. According to the agreement, the Plaintiff was to pay the remaining balance of Rs.3,75,000/- to 1st Defendant by the end of September 1998, at which point 1st Defendant was to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff and her husband have been in possession of the two shops and the residential portion as tenants, as specified in the agreement of sale. The Plaintiff has consistently been ready and willing to fulfil her contractual obligations, including paying the balance of the sale consideration and covering the expenses for obtaining the registered sale deed, which she was prepared to do by 20.08.1999. (b) Subsequently, the Plaintiff's husband paid Rs.1,45,000/- to 1st Defendant on 20.08.1998, on behalf of the Plaintiff as part of the balance of the sale consideration. 1st Defendant issued a receipt in the name of the Plaintiff's husband. As a result, the Plaintiff still owes Rs.2,30,000/- towards the remaining balance. However, 1st Defendant, in collusion with his son 2nd Defendant, filed a suit in O.S. No. 46 of 1998 seeking partition of the schedule property, claiming that the properties are joint family assets, and thus attempting to evade the execution of the registered sale deed. In response, the Plaintiff issued a registered notice on 17.05.2001, demanding that 1st Defendant fulfil his part of the contract. 1st Defendant received this notice on 18.05.2001, and subsequently sent a reply notice on 08.06.2001, containing untenable allegations. As a result of these developments, the Plaintiff was compelled to file the present suit. 13. The 1st Defendant filed a written statement denying all the allegations made by the Plaintiff. He asserts that all assets are jointly and constructively possessed by the deceased 1st Defendant and his son, 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff's husband, Uma Maheswara Rao, is a tenant in three units—two shops and a residential premises with a godown in Agiripalli. 13. The 1st Defendant filed a written statement denying all the allegations made by the Plaintiff. He asserts that all assets are jointly and constructively possessed by the deceased 1st Defendant and his son, 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff's husband, Uma Maheswara Rao, is a tenant in three units—two shops and a residential premises with a godown in Agiripalli. They were under a definitive agreement to pay a consolidated rent of Rs.2,800/- per month. The rent was paid regularly until the end of March 1999, after which the payments ceased. 1st Defendant intended to sell the schedule property with the consent of 2nd Defendant. However, the Plaintiff and her husband allegedly acted with malafide intent by obtaining 1st Defendant's signature on blank papers, claiming that they would later obtain 2nd Defendant's signature on those same papers. Subsequently, 2nd Defendant secured an injunction order against 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff and her husband in O.S.No.46 of 1998, prohibiting the sale or purchase of the schedule property to the Plaintiff or any other party pending the suit's resolution. The matter was subsequently brought before elders, who advised the Plaintiff to accept the advance amount of Rs.4,25,000/- from 1st Defendant. It is claimed that the Plaintiff’s husband did not pay Rs.1,45,000/- to 1st Defendant on 20.08.1998, as part of the balance of the sale consideration, and this amount was unrelated to the sale transaction. As such, the Plaintiff is argued to have no legitimate claim for specific performance of the contract under Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act. 14. The 2nd Defendant filed a written statement, reiterating the assertions made by the 1st Defendant. He further contends that the schedule property is not 1st Defendant’s self-acquired property but rather an ancestral property of the Defendants' family. The 2nd Defendant claims a share in the schedule property and other properties in Agiripalli Village, which are jointly enjoyed by the Defendants. Additionally, the 2nd Defendant initiated a suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 against 1st Defendant, seeking a partition of the schedule properties into two equal shares. He asserts that 2nd Defendant did not sign the suit sale agreement. The Plaintiff, according to the 2nd Defendant, obtained signatures from 1st Defendant on blank papers with the intent of unlawfully claiming the schedule property. 15. Pursuant to the orders in I.A.No.473 of 2005 dated 29.11.2005, Defendants 3 to 6 were added as parties to the suit. He asserts that 2nd Defendant did not sign the suit sale agreement. The Plaintiff, according to the 2nd Defendant, obtained signatures from 1st Defendant on blank papers with the intent of unlawfully claiming the schedule property. 15. Pursuant to the orders in I.A.No.473 of 2005 dated 29.11.2005, Defendants 3 to 6 were added as parties to the suit. 3rd Defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by Defendants 4 to 6. 3rd Defendant contends that Defendants 2, 3, and the deceased daughter of 1st Defendant, Jyothi, are co-parceners in the joint family of 1st Defendant. She further asserts that 1st Defendant has no right to sell the entire property and is only entitled to sell his undivided share. Furthermore, 3rd Defendant asserts that the alleged agreement of sale is neither valid nor binding upon Defendants 2 to 6. 16. In accordance with the orders in I.A.No.330 of 2006 dated 26.06.2006, 7th Defendant was added as the legal representative of the deceased 1st Defendant. 7th Defendant filed a written statement contending that the plaint schedule property was acquired with the aid and assistance of the ancestral nucleus and belongs to the joint family of 1st Defendant. Defendants 7 and 1 had a male child, 2nd Defendant, and female children, 3rd Defendant and Seedarla Jyothi (who is the wife of 4th Defendant and the mother of Defendants 5 and 6). 3rd Defendant’s marriage took place on 04.03.1993, in Agiripalli with Valiveti Naga Venkata Satya Srinivasa Rao. As both daughters of 1st Defendant are co-parceners in the joint family, which includes Defendants 1 to D.3 and Jyothi, 1st Defendant did not have the right to execute the agreement of sale in favour of the Plaintiff concerning the plaint schedule property. Consequently, the plaint schedule property is not considered self-acquired by 1st Defendant. 17. Basing on the averments of the plaint and written statements, the trial Court has framed the following issues: 1) Whether the Defendant subscribed his signature on the blank stamped papers believing the words of Plaintiff and her husband without passing consideration as alleged in the written statement is true? 2) Whether the elders of Agiripalli advised the Plaintiff and her husband to receive the advance amount from the Defendants as alleged in the Written Statement is true? 3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the Specific Performance under an agreement of sale? 2) Whether the elders of Agiripalli advised the Plaintiff and her husband to receive the advance amount from the Defendants as alleged in the Written Statement is true? 3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the Specific Performance under an agreement of sale? 4) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to alternate relief? 5) To what relief? Additional Issues: 1) Whether the plaint schedule property is joint family property of Defendants? 2) Whether the 1st Defendant has no legal necessity to sell the schedule property? 18. During the course of trial, both the suits in O.S.No.46 of 1998 and O.S.No.07 of 2002 were clubbed together and the evidence was adduced in O.S.No.46 of 1998. 19. The Plaintiff in O.S.No.46 of 1998 who is D.2 in O.S.No.07 of 2002 was examined as P.W.1 and on his behalf, the junior paternal uncle of P.W.1 was examined as P.W.2 and Ex.A1 to A.17 were marked. On behalf of the Defendant, Defendants 4 to 8 in O.S.No.46 of 1998, who are Defendants 3 to 7 in O.S.No.07 of 2002 among them 4th Defendant is examined as D.W.1. Husband of 4th Defendant is examined as D.W.2, 8th Defendant examined as D.W.3. On behalf of the Defendants 2 and 3 in O.S.No.46 of 1998, 3rd Defendant, who is Plaintiff in O.S.No.07 of 2002, is examined as D.W.4. 2nd Defendant is examined as D.W.5. One of the attestor of Ex.B2 is examined as D.W.6. The scribe of Ex.B2 is examined as D.W.7. On behalf of the Defendants, Exs.B.1 to B.10 and Exs.X1 to X.5 were marked. 20. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 was dismissed and suit in O.S.No.07 of 2002 was decreed in respect of Item No.1 of schedule property, directing the Plaintiff in O.S.No.7 of 2002 to deposit the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,30,000/- within 30 days from the date of order and that the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.4 to 8 in O.S.No.46 of 1998 are entitled to receive the same and further directed the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.4 to 8 in O.S.No.46 of 1998 to execute a Regular Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.7 of 2002 within 30 days from the date of the order. Aggrieved by the Common Judgment and decree, the parties in both the suits have filed the present Appeals. 21. Aggrieved by the Common Judgment and decree, the parties in both the suits have filed the present Appeals. 21. I have heard learned counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff in TRAS No.358 of 2014 and learned counsel for the Respondents. 22. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the trial court should have recognized that combining trials for discretionary reliefs with those for substantial statutory reliefs is not advisable, as it may prejudice either type of relief. Learned counsel further contended that the trial court should have evaluated the evidence provided by P.Ws.1 and 2, and D.Ws.1 to 3, regarding the nature of the plaint schedule properties. This evidence, is sufficient to demonstrate that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties and that the Plaintiff has fulfilled his duty in proving this claim. Furthermore, the learned counsel contends that Defendants 2 and 3, who intended to purchase Item No. 1 from the 1st Defendant, failed to provide adequate documentary evidence to establish that Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule is the self-acquired property of the 1st Defendant. There was no sufficient documentary or oral proof presented by Defendants 2 and 3 to substantiate their claim that Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule properties is self-acquired by the 1st Defendant. 23. Learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that Defendants 2 and 3, being current tenants of the property, are well aware of the property rights of the Plaintiff and his father (D.1); the fact that Defendants 2 and 3 inquired whether the Plaintiff would sign the agreement of sale, and received no consent from him, indicates that they recognized the Plaintiff’s rights in the property. Learned Counsel further contended that the trial court should have accepted the depositions and documents provided by the Plaintiff and Defendants 4 to 8, which demonstrate that the properties listed in the plaint schedule are joint family properties; the deceased 1st Defendant did not have the right to alienate the entire property on his own, especially without any demonstrated necessity. Furthermore, learned counsel further submit that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory relief sought by the Plaintiff and Defendants 4 to 8 for the partition of the joint family properties listed in the plaint schedule. Furthermore, learned counsel further submit that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory relief sought by the Plaintiff and Defendants 4 to 8 for the partition of the joint family properties listed in the plaint schedule. This decision, the learned counsel asserts, was made despite the absence of any evidence from Defendants 2 and 3 contradicting the evidence presented by P.Ws.1 and 2, and D.Ws. 1 to 3. 24. I have heard learned counsel for the Appellant in A.S.No.79 of 2009 and learned counsel for the Respondents. 25. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the trial court should have dismissed the suit for specific performance rather than granting it; the trial court overlooked the fact that there was a joint family nucleus at the time of the purchase of the suit property by D.1 in Thenneru Village; this property was acquired in 1st Defendant’s name as the Kartha and Manager of the joint family, which included himself and the Appellant. 26. Learned counsel further asserts that the trial court erred by not adequately considering Exs.A.1, A.16, and A.17, which are crucial for determining the nature of the property; the agreement of sale relied upon by the 1st Respondent is neither authentic nor valid, and therefore is not binding on the Appellant or the other Respondents. Furthermore, the 1st Respondent failed to present evidence refuting the claim that the suit property is joint family property, as documented in Exs.A.1, A.16, and A.17. Additionally, the Appellant had filed a suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 for the partition of joint family properties, which included the suit property. The 1st Respondent, who purportedly obtained the agreement of sale from the Appellant’s father, did not pursue the matter until 2002. 27. Learned counsel for the Appellant further contends that the trial court should have rejected Ex.B.5, the receipt, as a suspicious document due to its lack of proper proof; the trial court failed to address why, in the presence of an agreement of sale in favour of the 1st Respondent, the payment was made without an endorsement on the agreement, and why a separate receipt, Ex.B.5, was obtained. This discrepancy was neither explained nor substantiated by the evidence. Additionally, learned counsel asserts that the trial court overlooked that Ex.B.2, the agreement of sale in favor of the 1st Respondent, specifies that time is of the essence in the contract. This discrepancy was neither explained nor substantiated by the evidence. Additionally, learned counsel asserts that the trial court overlooked that Ex.B.2, the agreement of sale in favor of the 1st Respondent, specifies that time is of the essence in the contract. The trial court should have determined that the plaint schedule property is joint family property of the Appellant and his deceased father, and that the Appellant had no right to alienate it. Learned counsel further contended that the sale contract allegedly executed by the Appellant's father was neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate. 28. The learned counsel for the Respondents supported the findings and observations made by the trial Court. 29. I have carefully perused the pleadings, evidence, Common Judgment of the Trial Court and the grounds of Appeals with utmost circumspection and considered the rival submissions. 30. Having regard to the pleadings in both the suits, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court. 31. Yenduri Venkatarathnam, the 1st Defendant in both cases, passed away during the proceedings. Subsequently, his wife, Yenduri Rajalakshmi, was impleaded as a party in both suits. Their daughter, V. Sujatha, was also arrayed as a party in the suits. Sujatha and late Jyothi are the daughters of the deceased 1st Defendant. Jyothi, who is married to Nehruji, has children named Sai Pavan and Praneeth, who are also shown as parties to the suits. To establish the relationship between Nehruji, Sai Pavan, and Praneeth with Jyothi and the deceased 1st Defendant, certain documents were submitted, marked as Exs.X.1 to X.5. One V.N.S.V.Srinivasa Kumar, is examined as DW.2 in the suit. The trial court noted that he is married to DW.1and confirmed that there is no dispute regarding the recitals in Exs.X.1 to X.5. Furthermore, the trial Court acknowledged that Defendants 6 and 7 are the children of the late Seedarla Jyothi. The relationships delineated above are undisputed. The Plaintiff in O.S.No.46 of 1998 is the son of the 1st Defendant, and he is shown as the 2nd Defendant in the suit in O.S.No.7 of 2002. 32. The trial Court consolidated both suits, and the evidence was recorded in O.S.No.46 of 1998. To avoid any confusion, all parties and witnesses will henceforth be referenced as they are shown in O.S.No.46 of 1998. 33. 32. The trial Court consolidated both suits, and the evidence was recorded in O.S.No.46 of 1998. To avoid any confusion, all parties and witnesses will henceforth be referenced as they are shown in O.S.No.46 of 1998. 33. In O.S. No. 46 of 1998, the Plaintiff asserts that the schedule property is joint family property belonging to himself and the 1st Defendant. The purchase of this property by the 1st Defendant, evidenced by Ex.A.1 (certified copy of the sale deed dated 21.08.1980). However, the Plaintiff contends that the property was acquired using funds obtained from the sale of ancestral property located in Tenneru village, Kankipadu Mandal. According to the pleadings and evidence presented by both parties, it is undisputed that the 1st Defendant, originally from Tenneru village, later relocated to Agripalli, Nuzividu Mandal, after selling the family properties. The certified copy of the sale deed, Ex.A.1, confirms that the property was purchased by the 1st Defendant from Yenduri Kasipathi Rao, Vishnuvardhan Rao, and Mallikarjuna Rao, which is also not in dispute. 34. In O.S. No. 7 of 2002, the Plaintiff contends that the properties shown in the plaint schedule are the self-acquired assets of the 1st Defendant, Venkatarathnam, and were purchased using income earned from business activities in Agripalli. Notably, the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 7 of 2002 is named as the 3rd Defendant in O.S. No. 46 of 1998, while her husband is arrayed as the 2nd Defendant in that suit. Given the arguments presented in both suits, the principal issues for determination are, whether the schedule property is indeed the self-acquired property of the 1st Defendant or if it was acquired with funds obtained from the sale of ancestral properties located in Thanneru village. Additionally, it must be determined whether the 1st Defendant had any legal necessity to sell the schedule property. In light of these considerations, now the points for determination are as follows: 1. Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 by determining that the schedule property is the self acquired property of the 1st Defendant and thereby, the Plaintiff is not entitled for partition of the schedule property? 2. Whether the trial court was correct in adjudging that the agreement of sale is valid, true, and binding on the Defendants in O.S. No. 7 of 2002? 3. To what relief? POINT NO.1: 35. 2. Whether the trial court was correct in adjudging that the agreement of sale is valid, true, and binding on the Defendants in O.S. No. 7 of 2002? 3. To what relief? POINT NO.1: 35. In O.S. No. 46 of 1998, the Plaintiff contends that both he and his father (1st Defendant), engaged in business activities in Agiripalli and utilized their earnings to acquire the schedule properties. He also contends that the 1st Defendant acquired the property detailed in Ex.A.1 with funds realized from the sale of the schedule properties. As the trial court correctly observed, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the 1st Defendant purchased the property shown as item No.1 using the sale proceeds from selling a one-fourth share of an ancestral house, along with business income, was introduced only after the trial concluded on 14.12.2007. This assertion was not included in the initial plaint. It is undisputed that the 1st Defendant and his brother purchased land in Agiripalli from Madhupalli Bala Nagaiah and others, encompassing 418 square yards. To support this, the Plaintiff provided Ex.A.17, a registered extract of the sale deed. 36. The Plaintiff examined PW.2 (Y. Subramanyam). It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff is his elder brother’s son. PW.2 testified that they sold their joint family properties in Tenneru village and used the sale proceeds to acquire properties in Agiripalli. He specifically mentioned purchasing the 1st Defendant’s share of the property in 1983 under Ex.A.16, a document executed by the 1st Defendant and Narasimha Rao in favour of PW.2. Ex.A.16 indicates that the 1st Defendant transferred his one-fourth share of the property to PW.2. As observed by the trial court, the Plaintiff did not claim to have been present during the sale of his father’s one-fourth share of the property to PW.2. Consequently, the trial court's finding that no ancestral properties remained with the deceased 1st Defendant after this transaction is upheld. In cross-examination, PW.2 acknowledged that they acquired a tiled house in Agripalli by selling all the properties in Tenneru village, except a house and a site. PW.2 further testified that there were no joint family properties remaining and that there is no documentation indicating that all the brothers engaged in joint business activities. Additionally, PW.2 confirmed the absence of a registered partition deed. 37. PW.2 further testified that there were no joint family properties remaining and that there is no documentation indicating that all the brothers engaged in joint business activities. Additionally, PW.2 confirmed the absence of a registered partition deed. 37. The Plaintiff’s assertion in O.S.No.46 of 1998 that his father and his four brothers owned 3.50 acres of wet land in R.S. Nos. 337 and 335, which was sold to one Yarlagadda Apparao under a registered sale deed dated 17.08.1967 (Ex.B.1), was contested. PW.1 confirmed during crossexamination that apart from the property detailed in Ex.B.1, there were no other properties in Tenneru village. Although the Plaintiff attempted to argue that the 1st Defendant used the proceeds from Ex.B.1 to purchase the schedule properties, this plea was not included in the initial plaint. 38. Regarding the income from the joint family business, PW.1 acknowledged the lack of documentary evidence to support the claim of business activities in sundry items, fancy goods, and fertilizers, and was uncertain about the investment amount by his father. Additionally, evidence suggests that by the time of the partition, the Plaintiff was not yet born; he completed his 10th standard in 1982, and the property in question was acquired by the 1st Defendant on 21.08.1980. The trial court’s observation that the Plaintiff would have been under sixteen years old at the time of this purchase is accurate. 39. The Plaintiff’s claim in O.S.No.46 of 1998 that he and his father conducted business in Agripalli and used the proceeds to acquire the schedule properties has been found to be incorrect. The Plaintiff also claimed an unregistered partition deed dated 16.02.1986, which purportedly documented a partition between him and his father and subsequent reunification for joint business. However, no such unregistered partition deed was produced in evidence. The trial court, after thoroughly examining DW.1’s testimony, correctly concluded that the Plaintiff’s assertions in this regard were unsubstantiated and lacked credibility. 40. In Makhan Singh (Died) by LRs. v. Kulwant Singh, AIR 2007 (SC) 1808 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “The legal, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. v. Kulwant Singh, AIR 2007 (SC) 1808 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “The legal, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available”. 41. In Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh V. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh, (1969) 1 SCC 386 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: Of course, there is no presumption that merely because the family is joint so the property is also joint. So the person alleging the property to be joint family property must prove it. In that case, this Court further held that the burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is, therefore, in the first instance, upon the person who claims it to be coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. The Court carved out an exception and observed that, “this is, however, subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. 42. In Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court heavily relied upon the ratio of the Privy Council judgment in Randhi Appalaswami v. Randhi Suryanarayanamurti, ILR 1948 Mad 440 (PC), wherein the legal position of Hindu Law has been beautifully articulated by Sir John Beaumont. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: (Randhi Appalaswami case [ILR 1948 Mad 440 (PC)], ILR pp. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: (Randhi Appalaswami case [ILR 1948 Mad 440 (PC)], ILR pp. 447-48) “… Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property is joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property;” 43. Upon review of the evidence adduced, this Court finds that there is no material on record demonstrating that the properties covered by Ex.B.1 were ancestral properties of the 1st Defendant and his brothers. The evidence does indicate that these individuals were engaged in business activities. Even assuming that the 1st Defendant and his brothers did possess ancestral properties, the evidence does not sufficiently establish that the property described in Ex.A.1 was purchased with the funds from Ex.B.1. Furthermore, the evidence does not support the assertion that the amount specified in Ex.B.1 was adequate to acquire the properties outlined in Ex.B.1. Additionally, PW.1’s testimony reveals that his father conducted business to meet the family's financial needs. Even if it were assumed that the 1st Defendant acquired the schedule properties using the funds from Ex.B.1, the evidence reviewed suggests that he acted merely as a manager of the family’s assets. 44. The Plaintiff does not contend that his father lacked a legal necessity to alienate the schedule properties. The evidence on record reveals that the 1st Defendant attended to the welfare of his son and two daughters, including arranging their marriages. There has been no allegation from the Plaintiff regarding any habitual vices on the part of his father. PW.1’s testimony indicates that in 1992, the marriages of Jyothi and the 4th Defendant were conducted with grandeur in Agripalli, and that the 1st Defendant (the Plaintiff’s father) performed the Plaintiff’s marriage in 1990. Additionally, item No.1 of the house was constructed by the father in 1996. PW.1’s testimony indicates that in 1992, the marriages of Jyothi and the 4th Defendant were conducted with grandeur in Agripalli, and that the 1st Defendant (the Plaintiff’s father) performed the Plaintiff’s marriage in 1990. Additionally, item No.1 of the house was constructed by the father in 1996. It was also noted that the 1st Defendant did not secure any bank loan for the installation of item No.2 of the schedule property. PW.1’s evidence further confirms that the father had two sisters, was a diligent individual who built his business through personal effort and savings, and did not engage in any detrimental habits. The evidence provided by PW.1 substantiates that the 1st Defendant made substantial efforts to benefit the family. Initially, there were disputes between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, leading the 1st Defendant to file a caveat petition asserting that the schedule properties were self-acquired. PW.1’s testimony also shows that a temporary injunction was obtained to prevent the 1st Defendant from alienating the schedule properties. 45. In P.R. Kannaiyan (died) v. Ramasamy Mandiri, 2005 (4) CTC 457 (DB), the Division Bench of Madras High Court, after discussing the two judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam, 2003 (10) SCC 310 and in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa, AIR 1961 SC 1268 , has held as follows: “From the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa, (cited supra) Sankaranarayanan v. The Official Receiver, Tirunelveli, AIR 1977 (Mad.), and also from the observations made by the Allahabad High Court in Bhagwant Kishore v. Bishambhar Nath, AIR 1950 (All.) 54, and in Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and usage, and all other decisions noticed above, it is apparent that no exception is carved out in the matter relating to acquisition in the name of Kartha, where it is proved that Kartha had no independent income and he is in possession of some nucleus and not necessarily sufficient nucleus of the joint family property. 46. In Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash, (1988) 2 SCC 77 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 6. …………... It is well settled that in a joint Hindu Mitakshara family, a son acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in ancestral property. 46. In Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash, (1988) 2 SCC 77 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 6. …………... It is well settled that in a joint Hindu Mitakshara family, a son acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in ancestral property. The father by reason of his paternal relation and his position as the head of the family is its Manager and he is entitled to alienate joint family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the property, provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate or for meeting an antecedent debt. The power of the Manager of a joint Hindu family to alienate a joint Hindu family property is analogous to that of a Manager for an infant heir as observed by the Judicial Committee in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree [(1856) 6 Moo IA 393 (PC)] : “The power of a Manager for an infant heir to charge ancestral estate by loan or mortgage, is, by the Hindu Law, a limited and qualified power, which can only be exercised rightly by the Manager in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate. But where the charge is one that a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate, a bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred, in the particular instance, or the criteria to be regarded. If that danger arises from any misconduct to which the lender has been a party, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong to support a charge in his favour against the heir, grounded on a necessity which his own wrong has helped to cause. A lender, however, in such circumstances, is bound to inquire into the necessities of the loan, and to satisfy himself as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, that the Manager is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate. A lender, however, in such circumstances, is bound to inquire into the necessities of the loan, and to satisfy himself as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, that the Manager is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate. If he does inquire, and acts honestly, the real existence of an alleged and reasonably-credited necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of his charge, which renders him bound to see to the application of the money.” 47. The evidence on record demonstrates that the 1st Defendant, acting as the karta or manager of the family, agreed to sell the schedule properties and entered into the agreement to address the debts incurred by him, fund the construction of the house shown as item No.1 of the schedule property, and support the development of his oil business. The record establishes that the schedule properties are the self-acquired assets of the 1st Defendant. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the schedule properties are joint family assets, it is evident that they were alienated solely to discharge debts and facilitate business development. Consequently, this Court agrees with the trial Court's conclusion that Ex.B.2, executed by the 1st Defendant, is binding on the other Defendants. Accordingly, this point is answered. POINT NO.2: 48. PW.1 testified that he was unaware whether the 1st Defendant represented to Defendants 2 and 3 in O.S.No.46 of 1998 that item No.1 of the plaint schedule property was self-acquired, and that he needed funds to address debts incurred for the construction of a building. PW.1 stated that the 1st Defendant had offered to sell the property for Rs. 8,00,000/- and had received Rs. 4,25,000/- from the 3rd Defendant on 15.07.1998, subsequently executing Ex.B.2, an agreement in favour of the 3rd Defendant. PW.1 confirmed recognizing his father's signature on Ex.B.1 but was uncertain whether the 2nd Defendant had paid Rs. 1,45,000/- to the 1st Defendant as part of the sale consideration under Ex.B.2. He also testified that he did not know whether the 1st Defendant had received Rs. 4,25,000/- from the 3rd Defendant on 15.07.1998 as per Ex.B.2, or whether the 3rd Defendant was obligated to pay the remaining Rs. 3,75,000/- by the end of September 1998 according to Ex.B.2. 1,45,000/- to the 1st Defendant as part of the sale consideration under Ex.B.2. He also testified that he did not know whether the 1st Defendant had received Rs. 4,25,000/- from the 3rd Defendant on 15.07.1998 as per Ex.B.2, or whether the 3rd Defendant was obligated to pay the remaining Rs. 3,75,000/- by the end of September 1998 according to Ex.B.2. PW.1 further stated that he was unaware if he had expressed readiness to pay the remaining sale consideration and requested his father to execute a sale deed in his favour in O.S.No.7 of 2002. In cross-examination, PW.1 admitted he did not know if the 1st Defendant had settled his debts with the payments made by the 3rd Defendant on 15.07.1998 and by the 2nd Defendant on behalf of the 3rd Defendant on 20.08.1998. The evidence presented by PW.1 does not dispute the execution of Ex.B.3 by his father or the payments made under the agreement. Moreover, PW.1's testimony during cross-examination reveals that the Plaintiff in O.S.No.46 of 1998 did not contest the claims made in O.S.No.7 of 2002 regarding the specific performance of the agreement. Although PW.1 asserted that his financial condition was stable at the time of filing the suit and during his testimony, he later admitted in cross-examination that he had filed I.P.No.72 of 2005 against twenty-six individuals seeking to be declared insolvent. 49. One V. Sujatha, the 4th Defendant in O.S.No.46 of 1998 and the 3rd Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2022, testified as DW.4. Her testimony indicated that the 1st Defendant, herself, and her sister Jyothi, being members of a Hindu undivided family, entitling her to a one-fourth share in her father's properties. The 1st Defendant’s wife, who is arrayed as the 8th Defendant in O.S.No.46 of 1998 and the 7th Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2022, was examined as DW.3 and supported her son’s version. V. Uma Maheswara Rao, the 2nd Defendant in O.S.No. 46 of 1998 and the husband of the 3rd Defendant in that suit, is also the spouse of Nagamani, who filed the suit in O.S.No.7 of 2002. He was examined as DW.5 in that case and supported the Plaintiff’s case in O.S.No.7 of 2002. 50. B. Seetharamaiah, one of the attestors of Ex.B.2, was examined as DW.6, and the scribe of Ex.B.2 was examined as DW.7. Both witnesses supported the Plaintiff's case in O.S.No. 7 of 2002. He was examined as DW.5 in that case and supported the Plaintiff’s case in O.S.No.7 of 2002. 50. B. Seetharamaiah, one of the attestors of Ex.B.2, was examined as DW.6, and the scribe of Ex.B.2 was examined as DW.7. Both witnesses supported the Plaintiff's case in O.S.No. 7 of 2002. The trial Court thoroughly examined their testimonies and noted that the evidence provided by DWs. 4 to 7 was consistent regarding the execution of Ex.B.2 and the payment of Rs.4,25,000/- to the deceased 1st Defendant. No contradictions were revealed during the cross-examination of DWs. 4 to 7. The trial Court further observed that Defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No.7 of 2002 did not claim that Ex.B.2 was a forged document. The execution of Ex.B.2 was acknowledged by the deceased 1st Defendant in favour of the 3rd Defendant. Additionally, the 1st Defendant did not challenge the contents of Ex.B.8, which is a copy of a caveat filed by him against his son, the 2nd Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2002. 51. The evidence on record demonstrates that the 2nd Defendant in O.S.No.7 of 2002 has not disputed the execution of Ex.B.2 by his father or the payment of consideration. DW.2’s testimony reveals that there was no challenge to the Plaintiff’s assertion regarding readiness and willingness to perform her obligations under the agreement. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the 1st Defendant sold the schedule property to discharge debts incurred for constructing the house shown as item No.1 and for developing his oil business, as detailed in Ex.B.2. The 2nd Defendant has not provided evidence to refute these recitals in Ex.B.2. Although the 1st Defendant initially supported the Plaintiff's case in O.S.No.7 of 2002, it appears that Defendants 1 and 2 subsequently resolved their disputes, with the 1st Defendant aligning with the 2nd Defendant's position in the suit. The Plaintiff in O.S.No.46 of 1998 has not contested the assertion in O.S.No.7 of 2002 that they began occupying item No.1 of the plaint schedule property as tenants approximately two years after the construction of the building in item No.2. The 2nd Defendant then commenced business in automobiles and pesticides in the second shop within item No.1 of the schedule property and also resided in the residential portion as a tenant. 52. The 2nd Defendant then commenced business in automobiles and pesticides in the second shop within item No.1 of the schedule property and also resided in the residential portion as a tenant. 52. As rightly noted by the trial Court, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff and her husband were in possession of two shops and residing in a portion of the residential house referred to in item No.1 of the schedule property as tenants by the date of Ex.B.2 agreement of sale; the 1st Defendant did not contest the suit in O.S.No.46 of 1998 filed by his son, the 2nd Defendant, seeking specific performance of the schedule property. The evidence, particularly from DWs.4 to 7, supports the execution of the Ex.B.2 agreement and the payment of Rs.4,25,000/- to the 1st Defendant as part of the consideration, with the balance of consideration i.e., Rs.3,75,000/- to be paid by the end of September 1998. The trial Court correctly noted that there is no evidence from Defendants 1 and 2 suggesting that the Ex.B.2 agreement of sale is forged. Moreover, the 1st Defendant admitted to executing the Ex.B.2 agreement. Upon reviewing the contents of the caveat petition (Ex.B.8), this Court views that the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiff and her husband maliciously obtained the 1st Defendant’s signatures on blank papers with the promise of obtaining their son’s signatures later, is not credible. 53. Additionally, DW.3, who testified as PW.1 in C.C.No.321 of 2001 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nuzividu on 06.10.2006, admitted that her husband had agreed to sell the shopping complex and residential house in Agiripalli to the 2nd Defendant (DW.4) and had executed an agreement of sale. It is also acknowledged that 1st Defendant passed away on 18.01.2006, during the pendency of the suit. Although the 1st Defendant contends that the payment of amount of Rs.4,25,000/- was not made under Ex.B.2, the trial Court correctly observed that he failed to explain the circumstances under which he received Rs.4,25,000/-. Further, Ex.B7, a reply notice given by 1st Defendant, indicates his readiness and willingness to return the advance of Rs.4,25,000/- upon the advice of elders. However, the elders who supposedly advised the 1st Defendant, were not called to testify. The material placed on record shows that the husband of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.7 of 2002, paid Rs.1,45,000/-, as evidenced by Ex.B.5 receipt. However, the elders who supposedly advised the 1st Defendant, were not called to testify. The material placed on record shows that the husband of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.7 of 2002, paid Rs.1,45,000/-, as evidenced by Ex.B.5 receipt. The trial Court correctly noted that the 1st Defendant did not explain the payment reflected in Ex.B.5 related to which transaction. 54. On the other hand, the counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff submits that the Plaintiff at all material time was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. As the Defendants did not come forward, the Plaintiff promptly issued legal notice to the Defendants and in the case of sale of immovable properties, time is not the essence of the contract. Time, it is stated, is not the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties, unless, there are grounds to hold to the contrary. 55. The Defendants’ counsel contends that the Plaintiff failed to establish that she is ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. He further contends that the Plaintiff has to prove that she has the money or has alternatively made necessary arrangements to get the money, and the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. 56. In U.N. Krishna Murthy (since deceased) Thr. Lrs Vs. A.M.Krishnamurthy, 2022 Live law SC 588 in Civil Appeal No.4703 of 2022, the Apex Court held that : Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Given Explanation (i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the Plaintiff to tender money to the Defendant or to deposit money in Court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (ii) says the Plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 57. In Nathulal Vs. Phoolchand, A.I.R. 1970 SC 546, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that: 6. However, Explanation (ii) says the Plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 57. In Nathulal Vs. Phoolchand, A.I.R. 1970 SC 546, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that: 6. ……..To prove himself ready and willing, a purchaser has not necessarily have to produce the money or to vouch for a concluded scheme for financing the transaction: Bank of India Ltd. & Ors. v. Jamsetji A. H. Chinoy and Messrs. Chinoy and Company, A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 90 at p.96. …………….. 58. In P. Daivasigamani Vs. S.Sambandan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1391, the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to case of in case of Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337 , a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that: 10. It cannot be gainsaid said that even though time is not considered as the essence of the contract in case of immoveable property and that the suit could be filed within three years as provided in Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the Respondent - Plaintiff had to perform his part of the contract within the reasonable time having regard to the term of the agreement prescribing the time limit. The time limit prescribed in the agreement cannot be ignored on the ground that time was not made the essence of the agreement or that the suit could be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance or from the date when the performance is refused by the vendor. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the suit having been filed by the Respondent well within the prescribed time limit under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the Respondent could not have been non-suited on the ground of the suit being barred by limitation as sought to be submitted by learned counsel for the Appellant. 12. The ratio in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 , it has been observed as under: “7. Mr. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems— English and Indian—qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems— English and Indian—qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay — the time lag depending upon circumstances — may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises.” The aforesaid ratio has also been followed recently by this Court in R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji, (2019) 8 SCC 62 . We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that mere delay alone in filing the suit for specific performance, without reference to the conduct of the Plaintiff, could not be a ground for refusing the said relief, when the suit was filed within the statutory time limit by the Respondent-Plaintiff. “It is significant that this explanation carves out a contract which involves payment of money as a separate class from Section 16(c). Explanation (i) uses the words “it is not essential for the Plaintiff to actually tender to the Defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court”. (emphasis supplied) This speaks in a negative term what is not essential for the Plaintiff to do. This is more in support of the Plaintiff that he need not tender to the Defendant or deposit in court any money but the Plaintiff must [as per Explanation (ii)] at least aver his performance or readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract”. 18. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200 this Court had laid down that Law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the Respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash with them. It is sufficient for the Respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. 18. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh, (1997) 2 SCC 200 this Court had laid down that Law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the Respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash with them. It is sufficient for the Respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. The said principle was followed in case of A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed, (2017) 4 SCC 654 in case of C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280 etc. In the light of the above settled legal position, this Court views that mere non deposit of the balance sale consideration amount, cannot be a ground to hold that the Plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It is not the Appellants/Defendants case that despite the direction of the trial Court or this Court, the Respondent/Plaintiff failed to deposit the amount. 59. The evidence on record establishes that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.B.5 agreement of sale with the Plaintiff, agreeing to the terms and conditions. The trial Court, on proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has come to the correct conclusion regarding the execution of the sale agreement by the 1st Defendant. 60. In Prakash Chandra V. Angadial, A.I.R. 1979 SC 1241, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. 61. Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act contains the cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific Performance. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. 61. Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act contains the cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific Performance. Three types of cases have been given under subsection (2) in the form of clauses (a), (b) & (c), in which the Court exercises its discretion not to decree specific Performance; it is useful to extract the said clauses hereunder: (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the Plaintiff an unfair advantage over the Defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on Defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on Plaintiff; or (c) where Defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, make it inequitable to enforce specific performance. 62. The instant case does not fall under any of these clauses. Usually, when the trial Court exercises its discretion in one way or another after appreciating the entire evidence and the materials on record, the appellate Court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate Court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for a specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless, once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established, the Court has to exercise its discretion to grant relief for a specific performance. 63. After going through the entire evidence on record, this Court upholds the trial court’s findings that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.B.5 registered agreement of sale agreeing to the terms and conditions therein and the Plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. 64. 63. After going through the entire evidence on record, this Court upholds the trial court’s findings that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.B.5 registered agreement of sale agreeing to the terms and conditions therein and the Plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. 64. Moreover, it is the Defendants who had always been trying to wriggle out of the contract by disputing the right of the 1st Defendant to execute agreement of sale and also execution of the agreement of sale and receipt of consideration amount. Now, the Defendants cannot take advantage of their wrong and then plead that grant of decree of specific performance would be inequitable. Specific Performance is equitable relief, and granting the relief is the discretion of the Court. The discretion has to be exercised by the Court judicially and within the settled principle of law. 65. After going through the entire evidence on record, this Court upholds the trial court’s findings that the 1st Defendant executed Ex.B.5 agreement agreeing to the terms and conditions therein and the Plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. There are no justifiable reasons to arrive at a different conclusion. The learned trial Judge used his discretion to grant relief of specific performance of the agreement, and the said discretion was based on the proper exercise of sound principles. The conduct of the Defendants resisting to execute the sale deed is quite incorrect. 66. On a consideration of the entire material, pleadings, evidence adduced and the impugned Judgment, I am convinced in the light of the analysis above that the trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in granting the relief of specific performance and rightly decreed the suit. Accordingly, this point is answered. POINT NO.3: 67. Having determined that the trial Court’s common judgment and decree resulted from a thorough and correct evaluation of the evidence, I find no illegality or arbitrariness in the impugned Judgment and decree. Consequently, the view taken by the trial Court stands, and these appeals are dismissed. The decree and judgment passed by the trial Court are upheld. 68. As a result, the A.S.No.79 of 2009 and TRAS.No.358 of 2014 are hereby dismissed without costs by confirming the Common Decree and Judgment in O.S.No.46 of 1998 and O.S.No.7 of 2002, dated 13.03.2008 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvid. The decree and judgment passed by the trial Court are upheld. 68. As a result, the A.S.No.79 of 2009 and TRAS.No.358 of 2014 are hereby dismissed without costs by confirming the Common Decree and Judgment in O.S.No.46 of 1998 and O.S.No.7 of 2002, dated 13.03.2008 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvid. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Appeals, shall stand closed.