Dipakbhai @ Pappu Baldevji Dabhi v. Commissioner Of Police, Ahmedabad City
2024-01-02
A.Y.KOGJE, RAJENDRA M.SAREEN
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (A.Y. Kogje, J.) 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed essentially challenging an order of detention passed by the the detaining authority Commissioner of Police, Surat City on 25.08.2023 detaining the petitioner as a "Dangerous person" on the basis of three offences under the provisions of Indian Penal Code. 2. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the nature of offence alleged against the petitioner is that of a private complaint where no breach of public order can be said to have taken place. 3. Learned advocate submitted that offences were registeed in quick succession and that too at the behest of same person. It is also submitted that the petitioner was enlarged on regular bail by the Court of competent jurisdiction. However, there is no reference to the option available to the detainign authority as the ordinary law would be sufficient to prevent the petitioner from indulging into so called anti-social activity and even if the petitioner being arraigned as an accused is the ground with the detaining authority, the petitioner has been released on bail in last offence 06.04.2023 whereas order of detention was passed on 25.08.2023 and therefore, the order of detention is passed belatedly. Thereby, vitiating the order of detention itself. 4. Learned AGP has objected to the petition by submitting that the offences registered against the petitioner are falling in the category as specified in the definition of ‘Dangerous person’ in PASA. In fact the gist of the offences registered against the petitioner and produced in the grounds of detention clearly indicates conduct of the petitioner being anti-social and thereby disturbing the public order. Therefore, the detention order is justified. 4.1 Learned AGP also submitted that in the order itself the satisfaction is recorded that in view of the petitioner is having been granted bail could continue to indulge in the offence and therefore the authority was left with no option but to pass an order of detention. 4.2 Learned AGP lastly submitted that an order of detention was passed against the petitioner in the year 2020 also, despite this, the petitioner is involved in such activity which is antisocial. 5. In rejoinder learned advocate for the petitioner makes a statement at bar that the order of detention was passed against the petitioner, but the same was under the Prohibition Act.
5. In rejoinder learned advocate for the petitioner makes a statement at bar that the order of detention was passed against the petitioner, but the same was under the Prohibition Act. However, the same was not approved by the State government. 6. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and having perused the documents on record, petitioner has been detained as Dangerous person by an order dated 25.08.2023 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City. 6.1 The grounds of detention indicates that the detaining authority has relied upon the three IPC offences registered against the petitioner. The details of which in tabular form are as under; Sr. No. Police Station FIR No. Sections Date of Registration Arrested on Released on bail on 1 Nikol Police Station C.R. No.11191015230193 384, 452, 114 of the IPC 19.03.2023 22.03.2023 03.06.2023 2 Odhav Police Station C.R. No.11191037230210 384, 452, 506(2), 294B, 114 of the IPC 17.03.2023 04.04.2023 22.05.2023 3 Odhav Police Station C.R. No.11191037230212 394, 450, 323, 506, 114 of the IPC 19.03.2023 19.03.2023 06.04.2023 6.2 The chronology mentioned herein above would indicates that all the offences registered against the petitioner in quick succession. The first offence was registered with Nikol Police station on 19.03.2023, in which petitioner was arrested on 22.03.2023 and released on bail on 03.06.2023. On the very day another offence was registered in Odhav Police Station, in which petitioner was arrested on same day i.e. 19.03.2023 and released on bail on 06.04.2023 and in Odhav Police Station only another offence was registered on 17.03.2023, in which he was arrested on 04.04.2023 and released on bail on 22.05.2023. Therefore, the petitioner was enlarged on bail in connection with the last offence in chronology on 03.06.2023 and thereafter the petitioner was detained by the impugned order on 25.08.2023. Therefore, there is a gap of two months in passing the order of detention during which the petitioner was not in custody. In opinion of the Court this delay of two month is fatal and the detaining authority was not prompt in passing the order of detention then the detention itself would stand vitiated. The Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura reported in AIR 2022 S.C. 4715 has observed as under; “11.
In opinion of the Court this delay of two month is fatal and the detaining authority was not prompt in passing the order of detention then the detention itself would stand vitiated. The Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura reported in AIR 2022 S.C. 4715 has observed as under; “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the "live and proximate link" between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention & failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited.
13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffie to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: "Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the "live & proximate link" between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxxx 20.
However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the "live & proximate link" between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxxx 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner & though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” 6.3 The detaining authority is expected to act with urgency where the detaining authority is satisfied that the petitioner is associated to such an activity which can be termed to be antisocial. In the present case, there is no explanation to delay and therefore, detention is vitiated. 6.4 The Court finds that the detaining authority has also relied upon the previous order of PASA being No.1260/2020. However, it is stated before the Court at the bar that the said order has not been approved by the State Government. 7.
In the present case, there is no explanation to delay and therefore, detention is vitiated. 6.4 The Court finds that the detaining authority has also relied upon the previous order of PASA being No.1260/2020. However, it is stated before the Court at the bar that the said order has not been approved by the State Government. 7. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIRs by themselves cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 8. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 25.08.2023 passed by the respondent – detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.