JUDGMENT : M.A. ABDUL HAKHIM, J. 1. These appeals arise from O.S Nos. 1205/1996 and 1206/1996 on the files of the First Additional Munsiff’s Court, Ernakulam. Both the suits were filed on the same day and the parties are the same. The plaintiffs are the appellants and the defendant is the respondent in these appeals. Since the parties are the same and contentions are almost the same in both the appeals, I dispose of both the appeals together. 2. O.S. No. 1205/1996 is a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against trespass and sale. O.S. No. 1206/1996 is a suit for declaration of title and permanent prohibitory injunction. The plaint schedule properties are different in these suits. The Plaint schedule property as amended in O.S. No. 1205/1996 is a Serpent Grove having an extent of 11.4 cents in Sy No. 735/1 in Thiruvankulam village which forms the western part of ‘Kanam Vallayil Dharmadevaparambu”. The Plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 is the eastern part of ‘Pandaravaka verumpattam Vallayil Dharmadevaparambu” in Sy No. 735/1 Thiruvankulam village. The basis of derivation claimed with respect to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 as per Exts.A1 and A2 Partition Deeds of the year 1077 & 1091 (ME), respectively, is produced in O.S. No. 1206/1996. The basis of derivation claimed with respect to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1205/1996 is as per the said Ext.A1. 3. The Trial Court decreed O.S. No. 1206/1996, first as per the judgment and decree dated 26/11/1997 and thereafter dismissed O.S. No. 1205/1996 dated 29/02/2000. The First Appellate Court allowed A.S. No. 88/1998, filed by the defendant setting aside the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 1206/1996. The First Appellate Court dismissed A.S. No. 240/2000, confirming the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 1205/1996. The appellants are aggrieved by the dismissal of both the suits. 4. R.S.A. No. 1125/2003 arises from O.S. No. 1206/1996. R.S.A.No. 1126/2004 arises from O.S. No. 1205/1996. The parties are referred acceding to their status before the Trial Court. 5. The First Appellate Court dismissed A.S. No. 240/2000, confirming the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 1205/1996. The appellants are aggrieved by the dismissal of both the suits. 4. R.S.A. No. 1125/2003 arises from O.S. No. 1206/1996. R.S.A.No. 1126/2004 arises from O.S. No. 1205/1996. The parties are referred acceding to their status before the Trial Court. 5. As per the plaint allegations in both suits, the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Vallayil Tharavad, that it was allotted to the share of Nani Amma as per Ext.A1 produced in OS No. 1206/1996; that it was again partitioned as per Ext.A2 produced in OS No. 1206/1996, and the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 was allotted to Narayani Amma who has been holding the same until her death in the year 1956; that on the death of Narayani Amma, the property is devolved on her sole legal heir Kunhunni Nair; that he continued to hold the property till his death in 1975 and thereafter the plaintiffs who are the children of Kunhunni Nair derived rights over the property. With respect to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996, the plaintiffs claimed that they are the sole owners in possession of the same as per Ext.A2 produced in O.S. No. 1206/1996 and that they had permitted five persons named in the Plaint to put up bunks in the property as licensees on payment of license fees and they have received license fees; and that they are entitled to purchase jenmom rights now vested with the Government by virtue of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. With respect to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1205/1996, the plaintiffs claimed that it is in their possession and management in continuation of their predecessors and that they have been performing all poojas and conducting all ceremonies and festivals at their expense. 6. The cause of action in both the suits is a Publication that appeared in Malayala Manorama daily Newspaper dated06.07.1996 at the instance of the defendant/Palace Administration Board inviting tenders/quotations of the auction sale of 42 cents of lands, which includes the plaint schedule properties. 7. 6. The cause of action in both the suits is a Publication that appeared in Malayala Manorama daily Newspaper dated06.07.1996 at the instance of the defendant/Palace Administration Board inviting tenders/quotations of the auction sale of 42 cents of lands, which includes the plaint schedule properties. 7. The defendant resisted the suits filing Written Statements contending, inter alia, that the plaint schedule properties never belonged to the plaintiffs or their Tharavadu; that if the properties are included in the Partition Deeds of the Tharavadu, they are not binding on the members of the Cochin Royal Family to whom the properties belong; that the descriptions of the properties in the plaint schedules are not correct; the right claimed in the plaint in O.S. No. 1205/1996 is kanam right whereas the right showed in the schedule is verumpattam; that the property is in possession of the defendant; that the plaintiffs have admitted the title and possession of the defendant, as in the year 1971, Kunhunni Nair had sought permission from the Palace Controller of the Maharaja for reconstructing the damaged compound wall of the Serpent Grove from the remaining property and the 2nd plaintiff by his letter dated 25/01/1994 had made representation to the defendant requesting to exclude the portion of the property where Serpent Grove is situated from auction; that the devolution of the properties alleged in the plaint is not correct; that the bunks put up in the plaint schedule property belonged to Cochin Royal family; that the property having an extent of 26 cents in RS 735/1 and 16 cents in R.S No. 735/5 lie contiguously, it belonged to the Maharaja; that on the death of Maharaja by virtue of Hindu Succession Act the said properties devolved on the Cochin Royal family, it is being managed by the defendant Palace Administration Board; that the plaint schedule properties were Item Nos.23 and 24 in O.S. No. 26/1976 filed by one Kunjukuttan Thampuran in Sub Court, Ernakulam; that Palace Administration Board had taken over all the properties as Receiver; that after the disposal of the said suit the plaint schedule properties were taken over with the consent of all the members of the family; that the Thandaper of the properties is in the name of the defendant and the plaintiffs never paid basic tax for the property; that there was mistake in the Survey number showing the property in Survey No. 735/1 as puramboke; that the Department rectified the mistake by giving new Survey Number 316/19 with Thandaper No. 5199 in the name of the defendant; that as absolute owner in possession of the properties the defendant is entitled to the same. 8. O.S. No. 1206/1996 was decreed by the Trial Court as per judgment and decree dt. 26.11.1997 declaring that the plaintiffs have title on verumpattom right in the scheduled property and are in possession of the same and granting a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant and its agents from interfering in any manner the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the scheduled property and from trespassing into it and selling or attempting to sell or induct strangers in it. The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs have title and possession over the plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.A1 and A2 Partition Deeds. The First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, holding that the description in the plaint schedule is vague and that the plaintiffs have not disclosed the nature of rights over the plaint schedule property. Relying on Ext.B13 proceedings of the District Collector which was produced by the defendant in the Appeal, the First Appellate Court concluded that the defendant is having better title to the plaint schedule property. 9. O.S 1205/1996 was dismissed by the Trial Court as per judgment and decree dt.29.02.2000, holding that plaintiffs are not entitled to get the injunction on the ground that though there is sufficient evidence to prove that the property with respect to which the plaintiff sought relief is a serpent grove and poojas and ceremonies being done by the plaintiffs, but that was with the permission of the defendants. 10. I heard the learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri. Gopikrishnan Nambiar and the learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri.Manoj George. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that both the suits should have been decreed since the plaintiffs have proved their case on the basis of Ext.A1 and A2 Partition deeds, which are produced in O.S. No. 1206/1996. The finding that the plaint schedule properties are not identified is unsustainable; the plaint schedule descriptions are clear and free from any ambiguity. The defendant clearly understood the plaint schedule properties and claimed rights over the same. The defendant did not produce any evidence to prove their title and possession. The First Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 acted illegally in receiving Ext.B13 proceedings of the District Collector dated 6.02.1982 as additional evidence and in holding that the defendant is having better title to the plaint schedule property. The defendant did not produce any evidence to prove their title and possession. The First Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 acted illegally in receiving Ext.B13 proceedings of the District Collector dated 6.02.1982 as additional evidence and in holding that the defendant is having better title to the plaint schedule property. The First Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 accepted the said order as additional evidence and marked the same as Ext.B13 invoking its power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC on a petition filed by the defendant without disclosing any ingredient to attract Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 and the decision of this Court in Sankara Narayanan v. Ramaguptan, 1979 KLT 744 to substantiate this contention. The Trial Court in O.S. No. 1205/1996 also illegally relied on the said proceedings of the District Collector dated6.02.1982, which is marked as Ext.B1, to nonsuit the plaintiffs. The said document is not properly proved. The plaintiffs are not parties to the said document, and hence, the same is not binding on the plaintiffs. The documents referred therein should not have been relied on by the Courts. The District Collector is not an authority under the Transfer of Registry Rules to pass an order like the said order. The District Collector has no authority to decide title of immovable properties in a summary proceeding. The learned Counsel cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Taj Trading Company, (1982) 2 SCC 141 and State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Padmavathi Devi (Dead by LRs. and others, JT 1995 (5) SC 481 to substantiate the point that title of immovable properties cannot be decided by authorities in summary proceedings and the same is to be adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law. 12. On the other hand, the Counsel for the respondent submitted that Ext.A1 and A2 Partition deeds produced in O.S. No. 1206/1996 could not be relied on to prove the title of the plaintiffs. It is well settled that Partition Deeds are not title deeds. It is not stated how the Tharavadu derived the properties mentioned therein. The devolution of the property up to the plaintiffs has not been proven. It is well settled that Partition Deeds are not title deeds. It is not stated how the Tharavadu derived the properties mentioned therein. The devolution of the property up to the plaintiffs has not been proven. The plaint schedule properties are not identifiable as per the description of the plaint schedules. The descriptions of pliant schedule properties are vague and could not be identified. The plaintiff did not take out any commission to identify the plaint schedule property. Relying on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.Chandrasekharan and others v. Kanakarajan and others, (2007) 5 SCC 669 , Abdul Majid v. Abdul Gaffar, 1996 SCC Online All. 1023 and Bandhu Das v. Uttam Charan Pattnaik, AIR 2007 Orissa 24, the learned Counsel contended that on failure to furnish the right description as required under Order 7 Rule 3 CPC, there could be no decree which can be passed by the court with respect to an immovable property. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Dutt and another v. Shakuntala Devi and others, (2010) 15 SCC 601, the learned Counsel contended that if an immovable property is not specifically identifiable, no decree could be passed against such property. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madamanchi Ramapa v Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , the learned counsel contended that a certified copy of a public document does not necessitate a witness to be proved and hence there is no illegality in accepting the Order of the District Collector in evidence. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi, AIR 1959 SC 1204 , the learned Counsel contended that sufficiency of the adequacy of the evidence to support a finding of a fact is a matter for the decision of the Trial Court and Appellate Courts and it cannot be agitated in a second appeal. The learned Counsel also pointed out that though the plaintiffs themselves realized the description of the property in the schedule in O.S No. 1206/1996 and filed I. A No. 6204/1997 seeking to amend the schedule, the same was not contested and later the same dismissed as not pressed. 13. RSA 1125/2003 was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: 1. 13. RSA 1125/2003 was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether on the face of Ext.A2 title, under which the plaintiffs claim right over the plaintiff schedule property, the Lower Appellate Court was justified in receiving additional evidence in receiving Ext.B13 proceedings of the District Court? 14. R.S.A No. 1126/2003 was admitted by this Court on the substantial questions of law Nos. 1, 2, & 4 framed in the Memorandum of Appeal. The substantial question of law No. 1 is whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the plaintiffs had not proved the nature of the right on which the plaintiffs claim title when Ext.A1 judgment clearly mentioned the plaint schedule property as a part of the Partition Deeds of 1077 ME and 1091 ME. Since Ext.A1 judgment in O.S. No1206/1996 is set aside by the First Appellate Court, the substantial question of law No. 1 does not arise for consideration. Hence, the following substantial questions of law 2 & 4 framed in the Memorandum of Appeal alone arise for consideration: 1. Whether the Court below were right in accepting Ext.B1 to which the plaintiffs were not a party? 2. Whether the Lower Courts were right in accepting the District Collectors proceedings of the year 1982, which relied on a suit O.S. No. 29/1976, which was a partition suit before the Hon’ble Sub Court Ernakulam, when that suit had already been dismissed as early as on 1980? 15. The aforesaid substantial questions of law relate to the admissibility and reliability of the proceedings of the District Collector dated 06/02/1982, which is marked in O.S. No. 1205/1996 as Ext.B1 and as Ext.B13 in A.S. No. 88/1998 arising from O.S. No. 1206/1996. 16. I have considered the rival contentions. In these cases, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants did produce material pieces of evidence with respect to the plaint schedule properties before the Court. In A.S No. 88/1998, the First Appellate Court entered a finding that the defendant has established better title of the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 than the plaintiff relying on Ext.B13 produced before it. Ext.B13 is only an Order of the District Collector changing the nature of the land from puramboke to private land, assigning a new survey number. It is not an order deciding the title of the property mentioned therein. Ext.B13 is only an Order of the District Collector changing the nature of the land from puramboke to private land, assigning a new survey number. It is not an order deciding the title of the property mentioned therein. The District Collector has no right or authority to decide the title of the plaint schedule property in summary proceedings and it is within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to decide the same. The decisions cited by the Counsel for the appellants in this regard are squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. In Union of India and others v. Taj Trading Company, (1982) 2 SCC 141 and State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Padmavathi Devi (Dead by Lrs and others), JT 1995 (5) SC 481, it is well settled that the title of immovable properties cannot be decided by authorities in summary proceedings and the same is to be adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law. The plaintiffs are not parties to Ext.B13. Their claim is not considered by the District Collector. Hence, the plaintiffs are not bound by Ext.B13. The learned Counsel for the respondent invited my attention to various documents referred to in Ext.B13, contended that those documents would prove the ownership and possession of the plaint schedule properties in favour of the defendants. Nothing prevented the defendants from producing those documents before the Trial Court to prove their title and possession. The defendant produced Ext.B13 only at the appellate stage in the case of O.S. No. 1206/1996 by filing I. A No. 5108/2000 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The said I. A was opposed by the plaintiffs by filing a Counter Affidavit. The said I. A is allowed on 25/09/2001, holding that since the document is necessary for disposing of the appeal, it is hereby marked as Ext.B13. The said I.A was allowed mechanically and without any application of mind. It was allowed without verifying whether the defendant has made out sufficient ground for acceptance of additional evidence at the appellate stage as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The First Appellate Court ought to have conducted necessary enquiry in the matter to determine whether the appellant has made out sufficient reason to accept additional evidence as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. No such enquiry was conducted. The First Appellate Court ought to have conducted necessary enquiry in the matter to determine whether the appellant has made out sufficient reason to accept additional evidence as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. No such enquiry was conducted. On perusal of I. A No. 5108/2000, I find that the defendant has not even made sufficient pleading to accept additional evidence at the appellate stage as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The defendant has not stated any reason for the non-production of the same before the Trial Court. It is well settled that an Application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC shall be allowed only after recording reasons for doing so. The order shall be made under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, clearly finding the grounds available under the said Provision after considering the objection raised by the other side. It is not done in this case. Mere finding that the document is necessary for disposing of the appeal is insufficient. Ext.B13 is a document referred to in the Written Statement of the defendant. It is a public document issued by the District Collector. It is useful to extract Paragraphs Nos.37 & 38 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 : “37. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The Court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the Court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the Court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the Court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the Appellate Court. In case the Court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the Court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. In case the Court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the Court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration: 38. An application under O.41 R.27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the Court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. [Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh and Others, 1951 KHC 236 : AIR 1951 SC 193 : 1951 SCR 258 : 1951 (1) MLJ 556 : 87 Cal LJ 243 : 1951 ALJ (SC) 78 and Natha Singh and Others v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Others, 1976 KHC 791 : AIR 1976 SC 1053 : 1976 (3) SCC 28 ].” 17. In the decision of this Court in Sankara Narayanan v. Ramaguptan, 1979 KLT 744 it is specifically held that the Court can, for reasons to be recorded in writing, on being satisfied that the party was disabled from production of these documents for valid reasons, admit the documents, and the court shall look into such additional documents before deciding the appeal; that the duty cast upon the court to consider the reasons given in the application for acceptance of additional evidence; that while admitting documents as additional evidence the court has to assign reasons and that even though the Court is not bound to give reasons for dismissal, it is highly desirable and useful that the court while dismissing the application also, gives reasons for it, so that the appellate court can appreciate why the documents were rejected; for the rejection of documents at the appellate stage will always be the subject matter of attack in the appeal. 18. In these cases, the plaintiffs and the defendants did not produce material pieces of evidence with respect to the plaint schedule properties before the Trial Court to enable the Court to weigh the evidence to consider the preponderance of probabilities. The illegal reception of evidence by marking Ext.B13 has tilted the balance of evidence as the First Appellate Court entered a finding that the defendant has established a better title to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 than the plaintiff relying on Ext.B13 produced before it. I find that the Appellate Court ought not to have accepted additional evidence by marking Ext.B13 as the defendant could not make out, and the First Appellate Court could not find out the reasons for the invocation of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Hence, I set aside the marking of Ext.B13 as additional evidence in A.S. No. 88/1998. The defendant’s documents prove payment of tax only after Ext.B13 /B1. There is no evidence to prove even the status of the defendant vis-a-vis the plaint schedule properties. Since Ext.B13 is not there in evidence, the finding of the Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 that the defendant has established better title of the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 is liable to be interfered with. Hence, the said finding is set aside. 19. Since Ext.B13 is not there in evidence, the finding of the Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 that the defendant has established better title of the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996 is liable to be interfered with. Hence, the said finding is set aside. 19. The Trial Court in O.S No. 1205/1996 should not have relied on Ext.B1 on the very same reasons as aforesaid other than the reasons with respect to the reception of evidence. Hence, all the substantial questions of law are found to be in favour of the appellants. But that would not be sufficient to set aside the impugned judgments and decrees. It could not be said that the Second Appeals are liable to be allowed in all cases where all the substantial Questions of law formulated in the appeal on admission are decided in favour of the appellant. The impugned judgment and decree are liable to be confirmed when other findings are entered therein to support the said judgment and decree. In the cases on hand, even if the aforesaid Ext.B13/B1 is not there in evidence, the plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to prove their case, and the weakness of the defence is not sufficient to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. There are sound reasons in the impugned judgments to dismiss the suits filed by the plaintiffs. 20. There is no specific pleading in the Plaints with respect to the nature of rights claimed by them over the plaint schedule properties. Though they claim that they are entitled to purchase the jenmam rights over the plaint schedule property over the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996, the details of the Jenmi and the lease hold rights are not stated in the plaint. In Ext.A1 and A2 documents, the derivation of title in favour of the Tharavad is also not stated. The mere statement in Ext.A1 is that possession of Dharamadaiva parambu is given to Nani. Ext.A2 does not refer to Ext.A1. In Ext.A2, the eastern part of Dharamadaiva parambu is included as Item No. 3. The total extent of Dharamadaiva parambu is not stated in Ext.A1. What happened to the western part of Dharamadaiva parambu is not stated in Ext.A2. The plaintiffs have no idea about the total extent of Dharamadaiva parambu and the extent of its eastern part. In Ext.A2, the eastern part of Dharamadaiva parambu is included as Item No. 3. The total extent of Dharamadaiva parambu is not stated in Ext.A1. What happened to the western part of Dharamadaiva parambu is not stated in Ext.A2. The plaintiffs have no idea about the total extent of Dharamadaiva parambu and the extent of its eastern part. Ext.B1 is Representation dated 25/01/1994 submitted by the 2nd plaintiff to the defendant. He was not examined in the suit to deny Ext.B1. In Ext.B1, there is no claim that he is the co-owner of the property. Though I.A. No. 3248/1999 was filed in O.S. No. 1205/1996 to appoint an advocate commission, the said Application was dismissed as not pressed. The descriptions of the properties in the Plaint Schedules are not clear and the plaintiffs failed to identify the plaint schedule properties. 21. It is clear from the schedules in both the suits that the plaintiffs are claiming rights over the western part and eastern parts of the same property by the name “Vallayil Dharmadeva parambu” in Sy No. 735/1. Originally, the extent was not stated in both the schedules. As per I.A No. 3461/1999, the schedule in O.S. No. 1205/1996 is amended to include 11.4 cents with side measurements. The schedule was again amended as per I.A. No. 6742/1999 to substitute the word ‘kanam’ instead of the word ‘Pandaravakapattom’. The schedule in O.S. No. 1206/1996 remained as ‘Pandaravakapattom.’ Though I.A No. 6204/1997 was filed in O.S. No. 1206/1996 to include 16 cents, the same was not pressed by the plaintiffs. As per the contention of the defendant, the property, having an extent of 26 cents in R.S.No. 735/1 and 16 cents in R.S No. 735/5, lie contiguously. In Ext.A2, the eastern part of “Vallayil Dharmadeva parambu” in Sy No. 735/1 is included as item No. 3. Plaintiffs are claiming title over this eastern part of “Vallayil Dharmadeva parambu” in Sy No. 735/1 and claiming only possession over the western part. The plaintiffs do not have an idea about the extent of the area coming within the boundaries of the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996. The plaintiffs do not have an idea about the total extent of Dharmadeva parambu. The plaintiff did not take out a commission to identify the plaint schedule properties to measure its extent. The plaintiffs do not have an idea about the extent of the area coming within the boundaries of the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996. The plaintiffs do not have an idea about the total extent of Dharmadeva parambu. The plaintiff did not take out a commission to identify the plaint schedule properties to measure its extent. No evidence is adduced to prove possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. Though the plaintiffs filed several Affidavits of the persons claimed to be in possession of the bunks in the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996, only PW2 alone was examined to prove Ext.A3 Affidavit. The First Appellate Court found his evidence unreliable as, in cross-examination, he expressed ignorance of even the contents of the Affidavit. Ext.B6 proved that he sought an assignment of 2 cents from the defendant and the same was rejected as per Ext.B6. B2 to B5 prove other rejections of such requests from bunk owners. I do not find any ground to interfere with the judgments and decrees of the First Appellate Court in the case of O.S. No. 1206/1996 and of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in the case of O.S. No. 1205/1996 with respect to the title and possession of the plaintiffs. 22. In light of the aforesaid discussion, these appeals are disposed of allowing R.S.A No. 1125/2003 in part, setting aside the finding of the First Appellate Court in A.S. No. 88/1998 that the defendant has established better title to the plaint schedule property in O.S. No. 1206/1996, but confirming the dismissal of the said suit and dismissing R.S.A No. 1126/2004 and confirming the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 1205/1996 of the Trial Court, both without costs.