JUDGMENT : Mr. Deepak Gupta, J. This order shall dispose of four revision petitions titled above, as all of them are between same parties and pertain to the same demised premises. In order to avoid confusion, parties shall be referred as “landlord” and “tenant”, i.e. as per their status before the trial Court. 2.1. Admittedly, the demised premises, i.e. Shed No.433-A, Industrial Area, Phase-ll, Chandigarh was originally allotted to Smt. Swaraj Katari by Chandigarh Small Industries Department Corporation Limited. M/s R.D. Sales Corporation through its proprietor Rakesh Gupta (petitioner herein) was inducted as tenant in the demised premises on the right side portion to the extent of 12 Ft. X 60 Ft., vide rent note dated 19.10.1994 on monthly rent of Rs. 6,000/- including water and electricity charges, for a period of 11 months. Said rent was later on enhanced to Rs. 8,500/-. 2.2. On 18.04.2006, Smt. Swaraj Katari entered into an agreement to sell (Ex.P-8) with Mr. Anoop Singh Gill — landlord (respondent herein) for consideration of Rs. 30,00,000/-. She also executed irrevocable general power of attorney dated 17.04.2006 (Ex.P-9), affidavit dated 18.04.2006 (Ex.P-7) and Will dated 04.05.2009 (Ex.P-6) in favour of said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. The power of attorney authorised him to manage the property, to collect rent from tenants and evict them as per law. 2.3. As per pleaded case of the landlord, Smt. Swaraj Katari vide letter dated 10.10.2006 informed the tenant (petitioner herein) to pay rent directly to landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill and also informing him that possession had been handed over to the said Mr. Gill. 3.1. The landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill instituted rent petition No. 24 of 2015 in January, 2015 before Rent Controller, Chandigarh, seeking ejectment of the tenants (petitioners herein) under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act of 1949’), by submitting that by virtue of Attornment and complete sale, he had become owner/landlord of the demises premises. 3.2. It was pleaded that as per Chandigarh Sale of Sites and Building Rules, 1960, no site can be used for the purpose other than the purpose, for which it was allotted. 3.2. It was pleaded that as per Chandigarh Sale of Sites and Building Rules, 1960, no site can be used for the purpose other than the purpose, for which it was allotted. It was alleged that respondents were tenants, who were using the premises for trading in electrical goods, which was against terms and conditions of allotment and on account of said violation, building can be resumed by Chandigarh Administration at any time. Petitioner had received a notice from CITCO regarding the violation, i.e. subletting to the respondents as well as the change of user. As such, it was alleged that change of the user of the tenanted premises, had also resulted into material impairment in its value and utility as the premises were meant for small scale industry. Request was made to the tenants to stop the misuse and remove the violation, but they refused to do so, compelling the landlord to file a suit for permanent injunction. 3.3. It was further the case of the landlord that condition of the entire industrial plot was dilapidated and as such, it was not fit for human habitation and so, it was required to be demolished and reconstructed. 3.4. Petitioner — landlord further pleaded that the entire industrial shed in question was required by him for his personal bonafide need and occupation, as he wanted to do the business in the same as per terms and conditions of the allotment alongwith his father. He wanted to demolish and reconstruct the building after due approval from the concerned authority for better utilization and smooth running of the business in the premises. 3.5. Thus, the ejectment of the tenants from demised premises was sought on the ground of change of user; material impairment of its value and utility of the premises; the premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation; and also that of the bonafide necessity of landlord. It was also pleaded that tenants had not paid the rent w.e.f. August, 2007 onwards till the filing of the rent petition apart from the electricity consumption charges. 4.1. The respondents i.e. tenants resisted the petition, by raising objection in respect of relationship of landlord and tenant. According to him, during the continuation of tenancy rights under Smt. Swaraj Katari, petitioner could not acquire the rights to institute the rent petition. 4.1. The respondents i.e. tenants resisted the petition, by raising objection in respect of relationship of landlord and tenant. According to him, during the continuation of tenancy rights under Smt. Swaraj Katari, petitioner could not acquire the rights to institute the rent petition. It was also pleaded that Smt. Swaraj Katari had given her consent to utilize the tenanted premises for commercial purpose and ever since the inception of tenancy, the respondents, i.e. tenants were utilizing the same for trading in electrical goods. It was claimed that the alleged agreement to sell, power of attorney, Will etc. were not valid documents for transferring the ownership rights and these documents could not be used by the petitioner for filing the ejectment petition, as the sale on the basis of such like documents was prohibited under the law. The respondents-tenant contended that the rent petition was not maintainable and that the same had been filed in connivance with the Smt. Swaraj Katari - landlady of the premises. 4.2. The respondents-tenants further pleaded that they were paying rent to Smt. Swaraj Katari and that all the rentals from April, 2006 till July 2015 had already been paid through account payee cheques drawn in the name of Smt. Swaraj Katari, which stood encashed by her. The respondents-tenants further denied to have received any intimation from Smt. Swaraj Katari to pay the rent to the petitioner. The allegations of change of use; material impairment of value and utility of the premises etc. were denied. It was also contended that petitioner had concealed some material facts from the Court to the effect that in the surrounding plots, only the shops were being operated and that the size of the demised premises being small, it could not be utilized for running of any industry. It was denied that the premises in question were in dilapidated condition, or unfit for human habitation. The personal necessity of the landlord was also denied and it was submitted that even the petitioner-landlord was running business of electrical good in the name and style of M/s Preet Electricals alongwith his father and this way, none of the grounds of eviction was available to the petitioner. 5. In the rejoinder, the petitioner-landlord reiterated his case and controverted the stand of the respondents-tenants. 6. Following issues were framed by learned Rent Controller:- “1. 5. In the rejoinder, the petitioner-landlord reiterated his case and controverted the stand of the respondents-tenants. 6. Following issues were framed by learned Rent Controller:- “1. Whether there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? OPP 2. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of non-payment of rent? OPP 3. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of change of user? OPP 4. Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of material impairment? OPP 5. Whether the petitioner requires the demised premises for his personal use and occupation? OPP 6. Whether the present petition is not maintainable? OPR 7. Whether the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands? OPR 8. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPR” 7. The evidence produced by both the parties was taken on record. Learned Rent Controller by way of order dated 10.03.2018 decided Issue No.1 in favour of the petitioner by holding that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Issue Nos.2 and 5 were also allowed in favour of the landlord by holding that tenants were liable to be ejected on the ground of non-payment of rent and the bonafide necessity of the landlord. However, issue Nos.3 and 4 were decided against the petitioner-landlord and in favour of the tenants by denying the ejectment on the ground of change of user or material impairment. Under Issue No.6, rent petition was held to be maintainable. Issue Nos.7 and 8 were decided against respondents- tenants. Consequent to all these findings, the rent petition was accepted on 10.03.2018 by ordering the ejectment of respondents-tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity. 8. The above order led to filing of two appeals — one each by both the parties. The tenants filed rent appeal bearing No.RA-69-2018 challenging the finding of Rent Controller on the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant, besides the ejectment allowed on the ground of non-payment of rent and bonafide necessity. On the other hand, landlord filed appeal bearing No.RA-113 of 2018 assailing the findings of learned Rent Controller, whereby ejectment was declined on the ground of change of user and material impairment. On the other hand, landlord filed appeal bearing No.RA-113 of 2018 assailing the findings of learned Rent Controller, whereby ejectment was declined on the ground of change of user and material impairment. Both these appeals were decided together vide common order dated 02.12.2019 by learned Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, whereby the finding with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was upheld. The finding of ordering ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent was reversed, as it was found that rent had been paid by way of cheques to Smt. Swaraj Katari and the same had been received by the petitioner- landlord — Anoop Singh Gill. The finding of learned Rent Controller allowing the ejectment on the ground of bonafide necessity was upheld. As such, the appeal filed by the tenants was partly accepted. The appeal as filed by the landlord was allowed by reversing the findings of learned Rent Controller on the ground of change of user as well as material impairment in the value and utility of the premises, as it was held that tenants were liable to be ejected on these grounds as well. 9. The abovesaid order dated 02.12.2019 of the Appellate Authority led to filing of Civil Revision Nos.1662 and 1663 of 2020 by the tenants. 10. Here itself, it may be noted that during pendency of Rent Appeal No.69 of 2018 filed by the tenants, an application of the landlord for grant of mesne profit was allowed on 30.07.2018 by the Appellate Authority, whereby the tenants were directed to pay mesne profit @ Rs. 50,000/- per month. This order has been challenged by the tenants by filing Civil Revision No.6078 of 2018. 11. Another Rent petition No.638 of 2016 was filed by petitioner-landlord — Mr. Anoop Singh Gill seeking ejectment of the tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016 onwards apart from non-payment of electricity consumption charges. The said rent petition was allowed on 31.05.2019. Against this order, Rent Appeal No.81 of 2019 filed by the tenants was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 02.12.2019 and this led to filing of Civil Revision No.1664 of 2020. 12. It is how that the aforesaid four revision petitions are before this court. 13. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides at length and have appraised the entire record carefully. Civil Revision Nos.1662 and 1663 of 2020 14. 12. It is how that the aforesaid four revision petitions are before this court. 13. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides at length and have appraised the entire record carefully. Civil Revision Nos.1662 and 1663 of 2020 14. The main dispute between the parties is about the relationship of landlord and tenant. The contention of learned counsel of the petitioners-tenants herein is that they were inducted as tenants by Smt. Swaraj Katari way back in 1994 and that at the time of filing of the rent petition in January, 2015, she was still the owner. It is contended that on the basis of agreement to sell, power of attorney, Will or affidavit, title of the demised premises cannot be conveyed to the petitioner-landlord — Anoop Singh Gill and as such, the petition for ejectment filed by him was not maintainable. It is also the contention that earlier the ejectment petition was filed by Smt. Swaraj Katari through general power of attorney holder Mr. Anoop Singh Gill and therein, Swaraj Katari was held to be the landlady. Learned counsel contends further that in case during pendency of the petition, conveyance deed has been executed in favour of landlord — Mr. Anoop Singh Gill pursuant to the decree of specific performance in his favour, that cannot change the status of the landlord, inasmuch as the maintainability of the petition is to be considered at the time of its filing and the fact remains that at that time, Mr. Anoop Singh Gill was not the title holder of the premises. Still further, it is urged that ejectment on ground of bonafide need can be sought only by the owner and not the landlord and as, Mr. Anoop Singh Gill did not acquire the status of owner of the premises, he could not maintain the ejectment petition. 15. Refuting the aforesaid contentions, it is argued by learned counsel of the landlord-respondent herein that by virtue of the agreement to sell (Ex.P-8), the entire sale consideration amount had been paid to Smt. Swaraj Katari, who had executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the landlord. The said power of attorney authorizes him not only to collect the rent, but also to seek ejectment of the tenants also. The said power of attorney authorizes him not only to collect the rent, but also to seek ejectment of the tenants also. It is contended that consent of the tenants is not required for the purpose of attornment and so, the contention of counsel for the petitioners-tenants to the contrary is against law. Learned counsel has also drawn attention towards he definition of ‘landlord’ as contained in the Act of 1949 so as to contend that the landlord cannot be equated with owner and that it is the bonafide necessity of the landlord and not that of the owner, which is a ground for ejectment. Learned counsel further contends that the fact of eviction of conveyance deed subsequent to the filing of the petition is immaterial, as the execution of the conveyance deed only conferred right upon the landlord to transfer the property to anybody else. As far as the remaining rights are concerned including the right to recover rent or seek ejectment etc., these were already granted to the petitioner-landlord in view of the general power of attorney and other related documents in his favour and as such, both the Courts below have rightly held that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Learned counsel has also cited numerous authorities, so as to contend that the High Court cannot interfere in the concurrent findings of facts in this regard by re-appreciating the evidence, during its revisional jurisdiction. 16. Having considered submission of both the sides, this Court agrees with the contentions raised by Ld. Counsel for the landlord (respondent herein), for following reasons. 17. Section 2(c) of the Act 1949 provides the definition of “landlord” as under:- “landlord” means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord;” 18. Interpreting the aforesaid provision in “K.D. Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar”, 2002 AIR (SC) 67, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “8. Interpreting the aforesaid provision in “K.D. Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar”, 2002 AIR (SC) 67, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord : (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of ‘landlord’, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category, the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2, a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.” 19. It is, thus, clear that following persons fall within the meaning of “landlord”:- (i) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (ii) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (iii) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; (iv) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. 20. 20. It is further clear that to be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2, a person need not necessarily be the owner. Though, in a vast majority of cases, an owner will be a landlord but in many cases, a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. For purposes of the Act, the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act. 21. Further, Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, providing bonafide need as a ground of ejectment, reads as under: “(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession - (i) in the case of a residential building if - (a) he requires it for his own occupation; (b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned; and (c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area; (d) it was let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment:” 22. The above provision make it clear that it is the landlord, who may apply for ejectment of tenant for his bonafide need. It is not necessary that said landlord should be the title holder of the demised property or that he should plead the bonafide need of the owner. Once a person falls within the scope of ‘landlord’ as defined in Section 2 (c) of the 1949 Act, he is entitled to apply for ejectment of tenant for his bonafide need. As explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.D. Dewan’s case (supra), the 1949 Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act. 23.1. As explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.D. Dewan’s case (supra), the 1949 Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act. 23.1. Learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants relies upon “Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash”, 2002(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 351, in order to contend that when the ejectment is sought on the ground of bonafide requirement, it is only the owner—landlord, who can maintain the suit for eviction on the said ground of bonafide requirement and that a person filing suit on the ground of bonafide requirement has to prove ownership apart from the landlord-ship. 23.2. Though on the first blush, the aforesaid contention appears to have some force, but it is noticed that in the aforesaid case before Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, which were being interpreted. The relevant portion of Section 12 of the aforesaid Act provided as under:- “Section 12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only namely:- (a) to (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx [not relevant] (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purpose is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. (g) & (h) xxx xxx xxx xxx [not relevant] 23.3. (g) & (h) xxx xxx xxx xxx [not relevant] 23.3. Besides, the landlord is defined in the aforesaid Madhya Pradesh Act of 1961 as under:- “landlord” means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodation were let to a tenant and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord. 23.4. Interpreting Section 12 (f) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in the light of the definition of the landlord, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement under clause (f) abovesaid, the landlord is required to allege and prove not only that he is a ‘landlord’ but also that he is the ‘owner’ of the premises. The definition of ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ as given in clauses (b) and (i) of Section 2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act the concept of landlord-ship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a ‘landlord’ though not an ‘owner’ of the premises. The factor determinative of landlord-ship is the factum of his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in the definition of landlord. Such landlord would be entitled to seek an eviction of the tenant on one or more of such grounds falling within the ambit of Section 12(1) of the Act which do not require the landlord to be an owner also so as to be entitled to successfully maintain a claim for eviction. Clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner- landlord and not a landlord merely. Clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner- landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course, we may hasten to add that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control Law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In Rent Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit........... 23.5. It is, thus, clear that in the Madhya Pradesh Act, it is necessary that ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement can be sought only when the landlord is the owner of the premises. However, there is no such words “if he is the owner thereof” in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949 and as such, the authority cited by learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 24. It is further the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants that when the owner authorizes his agent to receive rent, such an agent is though a landlord in such a case, but he cannot file the petition for ejectment of tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement and that such a petition can be filed by the owner-landlord himself. For this proposition, learned counsel refers to “Smt. Ram Piari v. M/s. Delhi Fruit Company and Ors.”, 1980(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 512; “M/s Industrial Trade Links and another v. Col. D.S. Ahuja and others” (CR No.6638 of 2013, decided by this Court on 21.02.2015). 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners further refers to “Apollo Zipper India Limited v. W. Newman and Co. Ltd.”, 2018(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 512, in which it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that though tenant is estopped from challenging title of his landlord, yet tenant is entitled to challenge derivative title of assignee of original landlord in action brought by the assignee. Ltd.”, 2018(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 512, in which it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that though tenant is estopped from challenging title of his landlord, yet tenant is entitled to challenge derivative title of assignee of original landlord in action brought by the assignee. However, this right of tenant is subject to caveat that tenant has not attorned to assignee. If the tenant pays rent to the assignee or otherwise accepts assignee’s title over demised property, then it results in creation of attornment depriving tenant to challenge derivative title of landlord. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants further refers to “Bismillah Be (Dead) by L.Rs v. Majeed Shah”, 2017(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 113, wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “25. Law relating to derivative title of the landlord (Lessor) and challenge, if made, to such title by the tenant (Lessee) during subsistence of tenancy in relation to demised property is fairly well settled. Though by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of his landlord during continuance of the tenancy, yet the tenant/lessee is entitled to challenge the derivative title of an Assignee/Vendee of the original landlord (Lessor) of the demised property in an action brought by the Assignee/Vendee against the tenant for his eviction from the demised property under the Rent laws. This right of a tenant is, however, subject to one caveat that the tenant/lessee has not attorned to the Assignee/Vendee. In other words, if the tenant/lessee pays rent to the Assignee/Vendee of the tenanted property then it results in creation of an attornment between the parties which, in turn, deprives the tenant/lessee to challenge the derivative title of an Assignee/Vendee in the proceedings. 26. However, once the Assignee/Vendee proves his title to the demised property, the original tenancy devolves on the Assignee/Vendee and tenant/lessee by operation of law on the same terms and conditions on which it was entered into with the original landlord/lessor and continues till either modified by the parties or is determined by the landlord in accordance with law. It enables the Assignee/Vendee to acquire the status of a “new landlord” in place of the original landlord of the demised premises qua tenant/lessee. (See Law of Evidence by Sarkar, 16th Edition, pages 2106-2108).” 27. It enables the Assignee/Vendee to acquire the status of a “new landlord” in place of the original landlord of the demised premises qua tenant/lessee. (See Law of Evidence by Sarkar, 16th Edition, pages 2106-2108).” 27. Further contending that the landlord herein was only the power of attorney holder on behalf of the owner; and that power of attorney cannot even appear as a witness on behalf of the owner, learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants has relied upon “Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd.”, 2005(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 240, wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that statement and cross-examination of power of attorney on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant is not permissible. He cannot be allowed to appear and depose as a witness on behalf of the principal in the matters of his personal knowledge. He can appear only as a witness in his own capacity to depose with regard to the acts done by him on behalf of the principal. In that case before Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that whether a person was a co-sharer in the property purchased and had the source of income to contribute to its purchase price are the matter of personal knowledge of such person and that his power of attorney cannot depose in that regard. 28. I am afraid that the none of the aforesaid contentions have any merit. In the present case, the agreement to sell dated 18.04.2006 Ex.P8 would reveal that Smt. Swaraj Katari agreed to sell the entire industrial shop No.433-A measuring 25 Ft. x 80 Ft., of which the demised property forms a part, for total consideration of Rs. 30,00,000/- and this entire consideration was paid by the purchaser Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. The symbolic possession of the occupied portion was delivered to the purchaser; whereas, the physical vacant possession of the rest of the building was given. Clause No.8 of the agreement provides that purchaser became absolute lawful owner of the industrial shed in question with full proprietory rights immediately upon the execution of this agreement. 29. Ex.P9 is the General power of attorney dated 17.05.2006 executed by Smt. Swaraj Katari in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill giving almost all the powers of a title holder to said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. Clause No.11 of the said power of attorney is particularly relevant and important for the purpose of the present matter. 29. Ex.P9 is the General power of attorney dated 17.05.2006 executed by Smt. Swaraj Katari in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill giving almost all the powers of a title holder to said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. Clause No.11 of the said power of attorney is particularly relevant and important for the purpose of the present matter. It reads as under:- “11. To apply for and obtain completion/occupation certificate of the Shed, to let out the same and all other machinery, plant and all other assets of the above said firm to any tenant/s, to enter into such rent agreements, lease deeds, to receive and recover the rents or to issue receipt thereof, to eject the tenant/s or unauthorized occupants personally or through court or law under his/her own signatures” 30. Ex. P6 is the Will by Smt. Swaraj Katari, whereas Ex.P7 is the affidavit of Smt. Swaraj Katari dated 18.04.2006, para No.2 of which reveals that after receiving full and final payment from the purchaser Mr. Anoop Singh Gill, the executant, i.e. Smt. Swaraj Katari had executed an irrevocable Will and irrevocable general power of attorney for management in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill, in respect of the Shed. 31. When all the aforesaid documents [Ex.P6 to Ex.P9] are read together, the intention of the seller/Smt. Swaraj Katari becomes quite evident that all the rights in the industrial shed in question were transferred by her in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. It is no doubt true that in view of the legal position, unless a proper conveyance deed/sale deed is executed and registered in favour the purchaser, i.e. Mr. Anoop Singh Gill, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act to be read with Section 17 of the Registration Act, the purchaser Mr. Gill did not acquire right to convey the title of the property to anybody else, but except for this right, he acquired all the rights in the property in dispute. He is thus not only the power of attorney holder on behalf of the owner, but the full and final agreement to sell was executed in his favour. Will and affidavit were also executed by the owner in his favour authorizing him not only to collect the rent, but also to file ejectment petition, as has already been noticed. He is thus not only the power of attorney holder on behalf of the owner, but the full and final agreement to sell was executed in his favour. Will and affidavit were also executed by the owner in his favour authorizing him not only to collect the rent, but also to file ejectment petition, as has already been noticed. It has already been noticed that the definition of “landlord” as given in the Act, 1949 is quite wide and it certainly includes a person such as the respondent in the present case and it is the landlord, whose legal necessity is to be seen and not that of the owner. 32. Apart from above, it is a matter between landlord — Mr. Anoop Singh Gill and owner — Smt. Swaraj Katari and the tenant has nothing to do with it, as to whether the complete ownership rights have been transferred or not. As far as the landlord and tenant is concerned, all the rights including the right of receiving rent and seeking ejectment were conveyed by owner Smt. Swaraj Katari to Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. Not only this, the letter dated 10.10.2006 clearly indicates that Smt. Swaraj Katari had informed the tenants, i.e. petitioners herein regarding the said sale and had asked him to pay further rent in favour of said Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. There is ample evidence on record to support this contention, which has been duly appreciated by both the Courts below. 33.1. In “Amar Nath v. T.C. Mittal” CR No.4030 of 2012 (O&M) [decided on 23.07.2012], similar were the facts as in the present case. In that case also, the landlord claimed to be owner of the demised house by virtue of an agreement to sell executed by the previous owner in his favour apart from general power of attorney and that he was entitled to maintain the ejectment petition. Ejectment was sought for the bonafide use and occupation. The tenant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, besides the necessity of the landlord. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority allowed the eviction petition. Tenant approached this Court by raising the contention that the landlord was not entitled to maintain the petition only on the basis of the power of attorney executed in his favour by the original owner. 33.2. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority allowed the eviction petition. Tenant approached this Court by raising the contention that the landlord was not entitled to maintain the petition only on the basis of the power of attorney executed in his favour by the original owner. 33.2. Refuting the above said contention, it was held by this Court that when a power of attorney as well as an agreement to sell is executed in favour of a person then that person has an interest in the property concerned as envisaged under Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act and that for all intents and purposes, such person becomes the owner of the property and the powers of an owner are transferred in the said person. Holding that since agreement to sell as well as power of attorney had not been disputed, therefore, there could be no hesitation in holding that the objection raised in this regard did not hold any forte. 33.3. It will not be out of place to mention that above order dated 23.07.2012 passed by this Court in CR No.4030 of 2012 was challenged by the tenant before Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Civil No.26553 of 2012), but the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 17.09.2012. 34. Similar were the facts before the Delhi High Court in “J.C. Mehra v. Smt. Kusum Gupta’, 2006(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 31. Sale of the property was made in 1993 through power of attorney and agreement to sell. Symbolic possession was delivered. Conveyance deed was executed in 1995. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, purchaser could evict tenant after expiry of 05 years from the date of purchase. The question was as to whether the year of sale will be of 1993 or 1995. It was held by Delhi High Court as under:- “18. It is clear from the aforesaid that the concept of power of attorney sale has been recognised as a mode of transaction. These transactions are different from mere agreement to sell since such transactions are accompanied by other documents including General Power of Attorney, wills, affidavits and payment of full consideration and transfer of possession. A perusal of documents shows that power attorney was for consideration within a meaning of Section 202 of the Contract Act. These transactions are different from mere agreement to sell since such transactions are accompanied by other documents including General Power of Attorney, wills, affidavits and payment of full consideration and transfer of possession. A perusal of documents shows that power attorney was for consideration within a meaning of Section 202 of the Contract Act. Interest was thus created in the property in favour of the respondent in the year 1993. Possession was also handed over so was the right to recover rent. Thus the respondent acquired the premises by transfer in part performance of agreement to sell and got notional possession of the premises, which continued to be in possession of the tenant, for all intents and purposes. Execution of conveyance deed is a subsequent event after the acquisition of the premises by the respondent by virtue of power of attorney sale. The respondent thus became a landlord on the date when agreement to sell was executed and he got symbolic possession of the suit premises. Section 14(6) of Delhi Rent Control Act will not stand in the way of the respondent in asking of recovery of possession on the basis of power of attorney sale. Because the period has to be reckoned not from the date of the conveyance but from the date the power of attorney sale was made.” 35. In yet another case before this Court titled as “Steet Kumari v. Girdhari Lal”, 2003(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 124, house was sold on the basis of power of attorney, agreement to sell and Will. Possession was delivered to the vendee. It was held by this Court that though the title will not pass to the vendee without registration of the sale deed, but the possession of the vendee is protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of the Property Act and in case, vendee after getting the possession gives the house on rent to the vendor, the vendor would be tenant of the vendee and liable to eviction. 36. It is next argued by Ld. Counsel for the petitioners-tenants that in the present case, petitioners never accepted assignee’s i.e., landlord Mr. Gill’s derivative title. However, this contention of learned counsel to the effect that consent of the tenant was required for attornment in favour of the landlord, is devoid of any merit. 36. It is next argued by Ld. Counsel for the petitioners-tenants that in the present case, petitioners never accepted assignee’s i.e., landlord Mr. Gill’s derivative title. However, this contention of learned counsel to the effect that consent of the tenant was required for attornment in favour of the landlord, is devoid of any merit. The similar issue was considered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in “Pardeep Kumar v. Rajesh Bhanot and another”, 2019(1) Law Herald (P&H) 208 and it was held as under:- “6. As regards submission of learned counsel that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it will be noted that as per section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, by operation of law, the tenant has become tenant under the transferee. section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that if the lesser transfers the property leased in absence of a contract to the contrary the transferee shall possess all the rights. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no attornment by the tenant in favour of the landlord. In this context, it is to be considered that whether consent of the tenant is required for attornment or not. Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require any positive action on the part of the tenant for attornment. There is no need for a consensual attornment. Attornment is brought about by operation of law. Attornment by a tenant is not a condition precedent to create a relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee landlord and the existing tenant in possession of the tenanted premises. Section 109 does not operate only if the tenant has attorned. Once the transfer of the ownership of the property which is already on lease has been transferred, the tenancy stands transferred in favour of the transferee. In view of the aforesaid, there is no substance in the second submission of learned counsel.” 37. To contend that documents like GPA/Will/agreement to sell etc. do not create any title, learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants relies upon “Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another”, 2011(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 669, in which it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that no immovable property can be legally transferred or conveyed through a General Power of Attorney, agreement to sell /sale agreement or Will. do not create any title, learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants relies upon “Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another”, 2011(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 669, in which it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that no immovable property can be legally transferred or conveyed through a General Power of Attorney, agreement to sell /sale agreement or Will. In that case, it was concluded by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank - 94 (2001) DLT 841, that the “concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction” when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law. 16. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA sales’ or ‘SA/GPA/WILL transfers’ do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.” 38. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.” 38. It is no doubt true that title of the immovable property cannot be legally conveyed through a general power of attorney or agreement to sell or Will, as has been held in Suraj Lamp’s (supra), but the said proposition will not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as have been noticed earlier that it is not required for the petitioner-landlord to prove that he was the title holder to the demised property to seek ejectment on the ground of the bonafide necessity. It is sufficient that he falls in the category of ‘landlord’ as defined under the Rent Act so as to seek the ejectment of the tenant. In present case, the landlord fulfills the said conditions. 39. Apart from this, as has been noticed earlier that by virtue of the four documents, i.e. affidavit, power of attorney, Will and agreement to sell, all the powers were transferred by the owner in favour of the landlord. The only embargo on the right of the landlord was that he cannot further convey the title to suit property in favour of anybody else, unless a proper conveyance deed is executed in his favour. Even that embargo has gone in the present case as it is undisputed that during pendency of the eviction proceedings, the landlord had filed a suit for specific performance based on agreement to sell Ex.P8 against the previous owner Smt. Swaraj Katari. That the suit was decreed in the Lok Adalat on 12.12.2015 and later on, conveyance deed was duly executed in favour of landlord Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. These subsequent events cannot be ignored by the Courts and so, have been rightly taken into consideration by the Courts below. 40. It is further important to notice that judgment in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was announced by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 11.10.2011. Anoop Singh Gill. These subsequent events cannot be ignored by the Courts and so, have been rightly taken into consideration by the Courts below. 40. It is further important to notice that judgment in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was announced by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 11.10.2011. One of the submissions made before Hon’ble Supreme Court was that this decision to the effect that SA/GPA/Will transfers are not legally valid modes of transfers, be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship, as large number of persons Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:146797 had already entered into such transactions. To deal with the said situation, it was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. 18. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not ‘transfers’ or ‘sales’ and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said *SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of TP Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to “SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision” 41. We make it clear that if the documents relating to “SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision” 41. Hon’ble Supreme Court, has thus made it clear that though such transactions based upon SA/GPA/WILL cannot be treated as complete transfers or conveyances but they can continue to be treated as existing agreement to sell and that nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered deeds of conveyances to complete their title and that these transactions could also be used to obtain specific performances or to defend possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, such transactions i.e. SA/GPA/Will sales entered into prior to the decision of the Supreme Court were not declared as invalid but were made subject to the parties getting registered deeds of conveyances to complete their title. 42. In this case, as noticed above that agreement to sell, GPA, Will and affidavit had been executed by Smt. Swaraj Khatri in favour of landlord Anoop Singh Gill in 2006 i.e., prior to the decision in Suraj Lamp case (supra). Suit for specific performance filed by Anoop Singh Gill in 2015 has already been decreed and conveyances deed dated 6.9.2016 Ex.PW4/1 has already been executed in his favour. As such, even the plea that the landlord was not the title holder, is no longer available to the petitioner-tenant. 43. Consequently, no fault can be found with the concurrent findings of the courts below holding that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 44. Proceeding further, once it is found that ejectment petition filed by landlord Mr. Gill was maintainable, it is required to be considered as to whether ejectment of petitioners — tenants has been rightly ordered by courts below on various grounds. 45. On ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord, as noticed earlier that tenant had denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. However, both the Courts found that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and this finding has been sustained by this Court as above. 45. On ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord, as noticed earlier that tenant had denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. However, both the Courts found that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and this finding has been sustained by this Court as above. In these circumstances, petitioners-tenants cannot now be allowed to raise the plea of denial of the personal necessity as pleaded by the landlord and as such, it does not lie in their mouth to plead that personal necessity of the landlord is not bonafide. Even if the said fact is ignored, there is sufficient overwhelming evidence on record, which remains unrebutted, proving the personal necessity of the landlord. 46. It is the specific case of the landlord i.e., respondent herein that he requires the entire industrial shed including the demised premises for his personal use and occupation. As per his testimony, the shed is required to be demolished and thereafter, new construction is required to be raised so as to facilitate carrying on the business/ industrial activity in the premises after obtaining due permission from the competent authority. Law is well settled that when the landlord pleads bonafide necessity in respect to the demised premises that necessity is to be presumed and Rent Controller is not to proceed with any adverse presumption to the effect that necessity so pleaded is not bonafide. Once, if it is so, the onus shifts upon the tenants to bring evidence on record to prove otherwise. 47. In the present case, the tenants having denied even the relationships of landlord and tenant between the parties, they did not even bring any reliable evidence to controvert the case of the petitioner regarding his plea of bonafide necessity. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement. Neither tenant nor the Court can dictate the terms to the landlord in this regard. As such, the finding of both the Courts below regarding the bonafide necessity is hereby affirmed. 48. Coming to the ground of change of user and material impairment in the value and utility of the demised premises, although the Rent Controller had decided the issues against the landlord, but the Appellate Authority has reversed this finding and ordered the ejectment on these grounds also. 48. Coming to the ground of change of user and material impairment in the value and utility of the demised premises, although the Rent Controller had decided the issues against the landlord, but the Appellate Authority has reversed this finding and ordered the ejectment on these grounds also. In this regard, it will be relevant to refer to the observations made by the Appellate Authority, which are as under:- “32. There is no dispute regarding the fact that industrial shed in question was allotted in favour of Smt. Swaraj Katari vide allotment letter Ex.P1. Condition No.(xix) thereof provides that the allottee will not carry on or permit to be carried on in the industrial shed any trade or business other than establishment of a small scale industry. This condition is also there in the lease deed Ex.P3. In this view of the matter, in case a tenant uses the premises for a purpose other than the one mentioned in the allotment letter/lease deed, he cannot resist his eviction on the ground of change of user by saying that he started using the demised premises for a purpose contrary to the conditions of allotment letter/lease deed with the consent and approval of the landlord. Tenant, for howsoever long, may use the premises for a particular purpose but if the said user is against the terms and conditions of the allotment letter/lease deed, he cannot take the plea of acquiescence by the landlord and, therefore, if landlord applies for eviction of the tenant on the ground of change of user and impairment of value and utility of the demised premises, he can successfully take the plea of change of user notwithstanding his silence to the user of premises for a purpose other than the one prescribed in the allotment letter/lease deed. This is based upon the principle of law that there can never be estoppel against statute or terms of the allotment letter/lease deed. 33. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that appellants have been using the premises in question, which is a part and parcel of the industrial shed No.433-A, which as per the conditions of the allotment letter and lease deed was required to be used for running a small scale industry, for carrying on business of trading in electrical goods which admittedly is not an industrial activity. Thus, there certainly was change of user and this is no defence that erstwhile owner of the industrial shed namely Smt. Swaraj Katari had permitted the appellant to use the premises for said purpose or that she never raised any objection. It is also no defence that in the surrounding area, similar premises are being used for the purposes which do not amount to industrial activity. It is also relevant to mention here that due to use of demised premises for purpose other than the one prescribed in the allotment letter and lease deed, a notice Ex.P10 has also been issued to the owner of the industrial shed wherein it is clearly mentioned that user thereof has been changed and, therefore, owner has been called upon to stop the illegal user failing which it was warned that premises shall be resumed. Thus, act of the appellants in using the demised premises for business of trading in electrical goods, has put the industrial shed at the peril of resumption. Even if, till date, no resumption has taken place but all the same, there certainly is violation of conditions of the allotment letter and lease deed and hence, possibility of resumption looms large on the head of landlord and, therefore, he has a right to seek eviction of the appellants on the ground of change of user. 34. In any case, vide application Ex.PXY-2 dated 19.06.1980, Smt. Swaraj Katari had applied for allotment of an industrial shed for manufacturing of steel furniture and as per letter dated 08.03.2000 Ex.PXY-5 issued by the competent authority, Smt. Swaraj Katari was granted permission to sub-let the demised premises to the appellants respondents for manufacturing of machines etc. as described therein. Hence, as per said letter, appellants-respondents could use the premises in question only for industrial purpose and not trading in electrical goods. Further, the petitioner filed a Civil Suit No.3135 of 04.07.2014 for permanent injunction against the appellants-respondents for restraining them from misusing the tenanted premises which was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 12.09.2017. This all proves that appellants-respondents indulged into misuse of the demised premises by changing the user thereof and, therefore, Id. Rent Controller fell into an error by not deciding issue No.3 in favour of the petitioner. 35. This all proves that appellants-respondents indulged into misuse of the demised premises by changing the user thereof and, therefore, Id. Rent Controller fell into an error by not deciding issue No.3 in favour of the petitioner. 35. It may also be mentioned here that since the change of user has exposed the demised premises to peril of resumption, it can also be said without any hesitation that such act on the part of appellants has the effect of impairing the value and utility of the demised premises. Thus, on both the grounds, rent petition deserves to succeed. Ld. Rent Controller wrongly decided issues No.3 & 4 against the petitioner under a misplaced premise that no evidence to prove these issues was led by him. Hence, findings on issues No.3 & 4 are reversed and both these issues are decided in favour of petitioner and it is consequently held that appellants are liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the grounds of change of user and impairment of value and utility as well.” 49. It is clear from the aforesaid observations that as the allotment in favour of the erstwhile owner was for running a small-scale industry, therefore, carrying on the business of trading electrical goods, which was not an industrial activity, was certainly the change of user. The contention of the petitioners herein, i.e. tenants that the erstwhile owner Smt. Swaraj Katari had permitted them to use the premises for the said purpose and that she never raised any objection in this regard, is without any merit, as no such written consent is placed or proved on record. Even otherwise, there cannot be any estopple qua consent against the statutory requirement. Simply because in the surrounding area, similar premises are being used for the similar purpose, not amounting to industrial activity, has absolutely no force. The premises are required to be used only for the purpose as per the allotment letter. Even in the notice (Ex.P-10) issued to the owner of the industrial shed, it is clearly mentioned that user thereof had been changed and therefore, the owner was called upon to stop the illegal user. The tenant cannot be allowed to plead that no resumption order has been passed till date. Even in the notice (Ex.P-10) issued to the owner of the industrial shed, it is clearly mentioned that user thereof had been changed and therefore, the owner was called upon to stop the illegal user. The tenant cannot be allowed to plead that no resumption order has been passed till date. It cannot be denied that there certainly is violation of the conditions of the allotment letter and lease deed and therefore, learned Appellate Authority has rightly observed that the possibility of resumption loomed large on the head of landlord and therefore, he has the right to seek eviction of the tenants on the ground of change of user. 50. As such, the finding the Appellate Authority ordering the ejectment of the tenants on the ground of change of user and material impairment in the value and utility of the demised premises, is also upheld. 51. Apart from the above, it is most important to notice that the findings of the Courts below regarding the relationship of landlord & tenant and bonafide necessity of the landlord are concurrent finding of fact. Whether this Court exercising in its revisional jurisdiction can interfere in the said finding or not, is to be seen. 52.1. The provisions relating to revisional powers of the High Court in other Rent Legislations came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh, 2014(4) RCR (Civil) 162: 2014(2) RCR (Rent) 210" (2014) 9 SCC 78 . The matter was referred to the larger Bench because of two lines of decisions, which were somewhat inconsistent, as is apparent from the referral order quoted in opening of the decision. “The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a three- Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others, (1993) 1 SCC 499 , wherein Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act was in question. It was held in the said decision that though Section 20 of the said Act provided that the Revisional Court can go into the ‘propriety’ of the order but it does not entitle the Revisional Court to re-appreciate the evidence. A similar view was taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba vs. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 . A similar view was taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba vs. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645 . On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1422 which was also a three Judge Bench decision. It has been held in that case that the expression “legality and propriety” enables the High Court in revisional jurisdiction to re- appraise the evidence while considering the findings of the first appellate Court. A similar view was taken by another three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Moti Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and others AIR 1960 SC 655 . From the above it is clear that there are conflicting views of coordinate three Judge Benches of this Court as to the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression ‘legality and propriety’ and whether in revisional jurisdiction the High Court can re-appreciate the evidence. Hence, we are of the view that the matter needs to be considered by a larger bench since this question arises in a large number of cases as similar provisions conferring power of revision exists in various rent control and other legislations, e.g. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that the papers be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench.” 52.2. After referring to numerous precedents on the issue, the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh” (supra) approved the legal position explained in Rukmini Amma Saradamma’s case (supra) and held as under: “45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re- appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” 53. In another case titled Vaneet Jain Vs. Jagjeet Singh, 2000(5) SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of the revisional power of the High Court. The matter had arisen out of the ejectment petition filed under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1973. Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to sub-Section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, which confers the revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court and held as under:- “4. Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re- evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta ( 1999 (6) SCC 222 ) held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 (8) SCC 119 , it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. 5. A perusal of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below……” 54. Yet another case titled Ajit Singh and another Vs. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below……” 54. Yet another case titled Ajit Singh and another Vs. Jeet Ram and another, 2008(4) RCR (Civil) 390, reached before Hon’ble Supreme Court out of the proceedings of eviction filed under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (like the present case), wherein also it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that a finding of fact as recorded by the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide requirement of the demised shop cannot be interfered with by the High Court. The High Court under its revisional jurisdiction could have interfered with such findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority only if the High Court had found that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of bonafide requirement was either perverse or arbitrary. 55. In Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 AIR (SC) 275, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot act as a third Appellate Court in the revision before it, so as to reverse the concurrent findings of facts. Same view has been taken in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal, 2001(2) SCC 762 ; and Boorugu Mahdev & Sons and Anr. v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao and Ors., 2016 AIR (Supreme Court) 433. 56. Thus, the legal position as explained above make it clear that: • The revisional power of the High Court under the Rent Legislation is not appellate power and so, the high court cannot re appreciate the evidence on record, whether oral or documentary only because it is inclined to take a different view of facts as it were a court of facts. • The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller/ Appellate Authority, only if it finds that the said finding on the question of bonafide requirement is either perverse or arbitrary, or there is illegality or perversity of such a nature that it demands interference. 57. • The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller/ Appellate Authority, only if it finds that the said finding on the question of bonafide requirement is either perverse or arbitrary, or there is illegality or perversity of such a nature that it demands interference. 57. In the light of above legal position qua scope of interference by this court under its revisional jurisdiction, when the findings of courts below are examined, it is found that the Courts below have rightly appreciated the entire evidence on record on the issues of the relationship of landlord & tenant between the parties; and bonafide necessity of the landlord and there is no scope for interference in the well-reasoned findings, as this Court does not find any illegality or perversity so as to interfere in the impugned orders. Even the findings of the appellate authority allowing the ejectment of tenants on the grounds of change of user and material impairment in the value and utility of the demised premises, do not call for any interference. Both the petitions are hereby accordingly dismissed. CR No.6078 of 2018 58. Coming to CR No.6078 of 2018, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners herein/tenants is that excessive mesne profit @ %50,000/- per month has been fixed by learned Appellate Authority, as the market rent at the relevant time of the similar premises was not more than Rs. 30,000/- per month. It is also the contention of learned counsel that the instances of the market rent in the locality, as produced by the petitioners-tenants were wrongly ignored by Appellate Authority. 59. After considering submissions of both the sides, this Court does not find any merit in the above contention. It may be noted that the reply to CR No.6078 of 2018 has been filed by the respondent- landlord alongwith photographs in respect of the premises, regarding which the copies of lease agreements were placed on record by both the parties. 60.1. As the impugned order would reveal, the landlord produced the following two instances to show the market rent. Sr. No. Date of Lease deed Indust. Plot No. Area(sq. feet) Rent(per sq. feet) Period 1. 04.02.2015(Rs. 96.8 per sq.ft) 447 to 31.01.2018 1000 Rs. 96,800/- 01.02.2017 2. 26.10.2012(Rs. 90.72 per sq. ft) to 31.07.2015 402 450 Rs. 40,824/- 01.08.2014 60.2. 60.1. As the impugned order would reveal, the landlord produced the following two instances to show the market rent. Sr. No. Date of Lease deed Indust. Plot No. Area(sq. feet) Rent(per sq. feet) Period 1. 04.02.2015(Rs. 96.8 per sq.ft) 447 to 31.01.2018 1000 Rs. 96,800/- 01.02.2017 2. 26.10.2012(Rs. 90.72 per sq. ft) to 31.07.2015 402 450 Rs. 40,824/- 01.08.2014 60.2. On the other hand, the tenants, i.e. petitioners herein relied upon the following instances:- Sr. No. Date of lease deed Indust. Plot No. Area(sq. feet) Rent(per sq. feet) Period 1. 24.03.2017 28/1 1000(Rs. 44/- per sq.ft) Rs. 44,000/- 01.03.2017 to 28.02.2018 2. 04.12.2002 431/A 400 Rs. 5,500/- (Rs. 13.75 per sq. ft) Irrelevant 3. 23.11.2015 136 2550 Rs. 90,000/- (Rs. 35.29/- per sq.ft) 61.1. The mesne profits are to be assessed by keeping in view the market rate of rent in the locality at the time, when the ejectment petition was allowed. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., 2005 (1) RCR (R) 1, once a decree for eviction has been passed, in the event of execution of decree for eviction being stayed, the appellants can be put on such reasonable terms, as would in the opinion of the appellate court reasonably compensate the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of the decree by the grant of stay in the event of the appeal being dismissed. It has also been held that with effect from the date of decree of eviction, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises on being vacated by the tenant. While determining the quantum of the amount so receivable by the landlord, the landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent which was prevalent prior to the date of decree. 61.2. The said principle was further confirmed by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (2) RCR (R) 246. 62. In the present case, the ejectment petition was allowed by learned Rent Controller in March, 2018 and so the Court is required to assess the mesne profits accordingly. 63. 61.2. The said principle was further confirmed by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd., 2009 (2) RCR (R) 246. 62. In the present case, the ejectment petition was allowed by learned Rent Controller in March, 2018 and so the Court is required to assess the mesne profits accordingly. 63. A perusal of the instances as placed on record by both the parties before the Appellate Authority would reveal that all of them pertain to Industrial Area, Phase -ll, Chandigarh, i.e. the area, in which the demised premises are situated. But at the same time, the premises bearing plot No.28/1 and plot No.136, which have been placed on record by the tenants are located far away from the demised premises and not in the nearby locality. On the other hand, the industrial plot Nos.447, 402 and 431 are in the nearby locality, as demised premises bear industrial plot No. 433A. 64. As per the lease deed dated 04.02.2015, the market rent for the period from 01.02.2017 to 31.01.2018 for an area of 1000 sq. feet of plot No.447 was Rs. 96,800/- per month, i.e. Rs. 96.8 per sq. feet. Similarly, for the area of 450 sq. feet falling in the plot No.402, the market rent for the period from 01.08.2014 to 31.07.2015 was Rs. 90.72 per sq. feet. 65. The tenant also relied upon lease agreement of 04.12.2002 in respect of plot No.431A with area of 400 sq. feet and at that time, its rent was Rs. 5,500/- per month. However, this instance is absolutely irrelevant as it is much earlier than the period, for which the market rent is to be seen. Incidentally, the respondent-landlord before this Court has placed on record the latest lease agreement in respect of the same premises, i.e. plot No.431-A with the area of 12Ft. X 80 Ft., i.e. 960 sq. feet and as per the said lease agreement Annexure R-7 dated 07.05.2018, the rent was fixed to be Rs. 75,000/- per month for the period w.e.f. 01.06.2018 to 31.05.2019, i.e. @ Rs. 78.125 per month. 66. The area of the demised plot is 720 sq. feet and so, @ Rs. 78.125, the market rent works out to be Rs. 56,250/- per month. 67. 75,000/- per month for the period w.e.f. 01.06.2018 to 31.05.2019, i.e. @ Rs. 78.125 per month. 66. The area of the demised plot is 720 sq. feet and so, @ Rs. 78.125, the market rent works out to be Rs. 56,250/- per month. 67. Keeping in view all the aforesaid circumstances, particularly the fact that plot No.431-A is situated just nearby the demised premises i.e., 433/A, this instance Annexure R-7 is considered to be most appropriate so as to assess the market rent and by keeping in view the said instance of the market rent, this Court finds that learned Appellate Authority did not commit any error whatsoever to assess the market rent of the demised premises @ Rs. 50,000/- per month, which is payable from 10.03.2018, i.e. the date of ejectment order as passed by the Rent Controller, till date. As such, finding no merit in CR No.6078 of 2018, the same is hereby dismissed. CR No.1664 of 2020 68. Coming to CR No.1664 of 2020, as noticed earlier that this revision has arisen out of the order dated 02.12.2019 of the Appellate Authority, dismissing the appeal against the ejectment order dated 31.05.2019 in Rent Petition No.638 of 2016, whereby ejectment was allowed on the ground of non-payment of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016 onwards, besides the electricity consumption charges. 69. The stand taken by the tenant in that case was not only the denial of relationship of landlord and tenant, but further that no arrears of rent were due as the same stood paid in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari, the erstwhile owner. 70. After appreciating the evidence placed on record by both the parties, the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority came to the same conclusion to the effect that with a mischievous motive, the tenants had deposited the rent in the account of erstwhile owner Smt. Swaraj Katari, despite knowing that all the rights in respect of the demised premises had already been sold by her in favour of Mr. Anoop Singh Gill. In this regard, it will be relevant to reproduce the observations made by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 02.12.2019, which reads as under:- “25. Rent petition was filed on 15.10.2016 and respondent Rakesh Gupta had entered appearance in person on the very next date i.e. 23.11.2016. Thereafter, respondents continued to obtain adjournments and did not file written statement. In this regard, it will be relevant to reproduce the observations made by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 02.12.2019, which reads as under:- “25. Rent petition was filed on 15.10.2016 and respondent Rakesh Gupta had entered appearance in person on the very next date i.e. 23.11.2016. Thereafter, respondents continued to obtain adjournments and did not file written statement. They filed written statement only on 09.05.2017 after being warned by the Rent Controller by the order dated 27.04.2017 that defence shall be closed, if written statement was not filed on the next date. Thus, written statement came to be filed after more than five months of their appearance before learned Rent Controller. Prior to that, on 06.05.2017, they transferred an amount of Rs. 1,02,000/- i.e. rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016 to 31.08.2017 through NEFT in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari and nothing was explained by them as to what was the reason behind depositing the said amount in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari after so much delay. In fact, as becomes clear from the evidence on the record, respondent very well knew that erstwhile owner of the demised premises Smt. Swaraj Katari had already sold her lease hold rights in the shed in question in favour of petitioner Anoop Singh Gill. In this behalf, reference may be made to award passed by the National Lok Adalat dated 12.12.2015 Ex.P5 on the basis of statements of Anoop Singh Gill and Smt. Swaraj Katari Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 respectively. In this connection, it is also pertinent to have a look at the order dated 24.08.2014 Ex.P6 passed by the Executing Court whereby objections filed by the appellants-respondents against enforcement of award Ex.P5 were dismissed with the following observations: “Rather, as per operation of law, once the landlady has transferred her entire interest in the property in favour of third person, such person steps into the shoes of landlady and becomes landlord of the person coming as tenant in the property in question. 7. Moreover, the objectors have even questioned the title/right of their landlady i.e. defendant/JD to transfer the suit property in favour of a third person which the objectors are clearly estopped from doing. At any rate, I am of the considered opinion that the present applicants/objectors have absolutely no locus standi to challenge the transfer of property/lease hold rights from the JD to DH in pursuance to the award/decree. At any rate, I am of the considered opinion that the present applicants/objectors have absolutely no locus standi to challenge the transfer of property/lease hold rights from the JD to DH in pursuance to the award/decree. Objections as they have been filed are entirely misconceived and the question of framing issues and receiving evidence thereon does not arise.” 26. Thus, objections filed by the appellants-respondents on 25.04.2016 (see zimni order dated 25.04.2016 Ex.PW4/A) came to dismissed on 24.08.2016 well before the filing of the present eviction petition and hence, as on the date of the appearance of appellants-respondents before Id. Rent Controller and filing of the written statement, they very well knew the factum of petitioner-respondent having purchased the leasehold rights qua the industrial shed in question by way of registered deed Ex.P7 dated 06.09.2016 which too is prior in time than the filing of the present rent petition. However, they still were not prepared to accept him as their landlord and hence, did not pay rent to him. They rather deposited the rent for the period from 01.09.2016 to 31.08.2017 in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari, the erstwhile owner through NEFT whereas being left with no rights in the shed in question after passing of the Award Ex.P5 and execution and registration of deed Ex.P7, she no more was a landlady qua the demised premises. In fact, on finding deposit of an amount of Rs. 1,02,000/- through NEFT in her account on 06.05.2017, she immediately made a complaint Ex.PW5/5 dated 20.05.2017 to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh against the appellants-respondents in which she stated as under: “…. They are well aware that Deed of Transfer of Lease Holds Rights in favour of Anoop Singh Gill has been executed and | have transferred all rights to Anoop Singh Gill by making statements in the Hon’ble Court also. I have made number of requests to them not to send the cheque of monthly rent to me and pay the rent to Shri Anoop Singh Gill. I am not responsible for any kind of loss, if they have deposited the amount in my account illegally and unlawfully without my consent and knowledge. Kindly take appropriate action against the above said person as per law.” 27. After the above complaint, statement of Smt. Swaraj Katari Ex.PW5/6 was also recorded by the police wherein as well, she reiterated her above stand. Kindly take appropriate action against the above said person as per law.” 27. After the above complaint, statement of Smt. Swaraj Katari Ex.PW5/6 was also recorded by the police wherein as well, she reiterated her above stand. On these complaints made by Anoop Singh Gill and Smt. Swaraj Katari, enquiry was conducted by the police. Appellants were also associated in said enquiry whose versions too were recorded. Thus, from the inception, they knew that Smt. Swaraj Katari was no more their landlady and it was respondent-petitioner Anoop Singh Gill who had acquired the status of landlord and in these circumstances, they were required to pay rent to him only. But having not done so and they being in arrears of rent w.e.f. 10.09.2016 and having not tendered the rent in court under the ill-conceived plea of absence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, they were rightly held to be liable for eviction from the demised premises. Rakesh Kumar Gupta RW1 in cross-examination, though knew all the facts, conveniently feigned ignorance about afore-discussed police complaints and other facts of the case while stating his counsel knew the facts and he was not aware. Appellant-Respondent No.2 Rakesh Kumar Gupta, proprietor of M/s R.D.Sales Corporation is a well- educated person and he having deposed in such a fashion in cross- examination, clearly goes to show that he wanted to hide true facts. His such conduct makes it very much clear that he out of malafides was not admitting respondent-petitioner as their landlord and as such, due to oblique motive, he deposited rent in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari which was not at all required. Rent was required to be paid to the respondent-petitioner and having not done so, transfer of amount of Rs. 1,02,000/- in Rs. the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari cannot be taken as a valid tender of rent. Learned Rent Controller, thus, upon appreciation of evidence correctly came to the conclusion that there was subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and as on the date of filing of the rent petition, appellants-respondents were in arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.09.2016. Learned Rent Controller, therefore, correctly ordered their eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. 28. It also needs to be mentioned here that in the grounds of appeal, finding of Id. Learned Rent Controller, therefore, correctly ordered their eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. 28. It also needs to be mentioned here that in the grounds of appeal, finding of Id. Rent Controller as to relationship of landlord and tenant has not been assailed. Appellants-respondents have rather challenged the impugned order of eviction on the ground that entire rent stood paid through challans Ex. DA, DB and DC. 29. These deposits were made on account of order passed by the Appellate Authority in another rent appeal between the parties on an application for fixation of mesne profits. All payments have been deposited in the name of respondent-petitioner and by doing so, plea being raised is that entire arrears of rent having been cleared, appellants-respondents could not have been evicted from the demised premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. 30. Plea so raised is absolutely mis-conceived inasmuch as the appellants-respondents having denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, cannot subsequently be allowed to avoid being evicted by depositing the arrears of rent in the name of respondent-appellant. Do they now admit him as their landlord? If yes, they should have done so at the beginning of the rent petition and tendered rent. In that case, on tender of rent, the rent petition itself would have become infructuous leaving the respondent-appellant with no option but to withdraw the same. However, appellants-respondents persisted with their illegal stand of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and hence, now they cannot be allowed to take a somersault in order to emerge successful in this appeal.” 71. This Court does not find any reason to interfere in the well- above said reasoned findings as recorded by the Appellate Authority, affirming the findings of the Rent Controller. It has been rightly observed that despite fully knowing that Smt. Swaraj Katari was no longer the owner of the demised premises, the petitioners herein deposited the rent in the account of Smt. Swaraj Katari and that too much after filing of the ejectment petition and not at the relevant time. As such, the ejectment order as passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority, are hereby affirmed. Holding the present revision to be devoid of any merit, the same is hereby dismissed. 72. As such, the ejectment order as passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority, are hereby affirmed. Holding the present revision to be devoid of any merit, the same is hereby dismissed. 72. On account of the entire discussion as above, this Court does not find merit in any of the four revision petitions. All of them are hereby dismissed. 73. Before parting, it may be noticed that ejectment order in the first petition was passed in March, 2018. The appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority in December, 2019. The petitioners are continuing their unauthorized possession till date, i.e. November, 2024. 74. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioners herein, i.e. tenants, are hereby directed to vacate the premises on or before 31.12.2024 positively. In case, they fail to vacate the premises up to 31.12.2024, they will be liable to pay the user & occupation charges / mesne profits @ Rs. 2,00,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.01.2025 onwards. It is also hereby clarified that from the date of ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller, i.e. 10.03.2018, till 31.12.2024, they have to pay the user charges/mesne charges @ Rs. 50,000/- per month as was allowed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 30.07.2018 in Rent Appeal No.69 of 2018, which has been upheld by this Court in CR No.1664 of 2020. 75. Ordered accordingly. Photocopy of this order be placed on the connected case files.